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Foreword
For old and new studies in decision making and risk analysis, this book
should stand at the watershed. Studies of conflict resolution and public
policy will surely now have to take account of the model investigation
provided by the IIASA team, and many things will not be the same again.
This is a report of inquiries into the siting of liquefied energy gas (LEG)
facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. The risks of transporting this highly
combustible stuff, and the economic benefits of being able to bring a
natural energy source from one side of the globe to the other, holding it,
and piping it out as needed, make LEG a model case for studying the
public response to dangerous technology. The dangers of LEG are differ-
ent from those of nuclear power, for instance, where the response too
often becomes entangled with the fear of nuclear war. The dangers of
LEG include uncontrollable explosions, rather than insidious contami-
nation. But the degree of dangerousness is very much of the same order as
that of nuclear power, and is at least as difficult to assess.
In four different countries the constitutional procedures involved in
obtaining approval of nuclear or LEG facilities are on record. The four
case histories here are a model for comparative study of conflict resolu-
tion. The period over which the negotiations developed is much the" same.
The political structures, economic pressures, and local representative
institutions differ, however, and in each case the events unfolded in
slightly different ways. To bring together in one strong framework case
histories, whose similarities and dissimilarities could easily fall into a
confused medley, a single structure of comparison has been adopted.
The cases are clearly contrasted. In only one (the UK) the site and
designs were approved between 1976-79 and construction is now under
way. Two others (the Netherlands and the FRG) actually got the plans
approved, despite the inclusion by the Algerian suppliers of time-limit
clauses that forced the pace of the negotiations. In neither the Netherlands
nor the FRG, however, has construction work begun because, as a result
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of a change in their gas export policy in 1980, the Algerians cancelled the
contracts. The Californian applications never got approval and were with-
drawn by the utilities after about 15 years of investigating and negotiating
with the government of Indonesia, concluding with a contract signed in
1975. There is reason for thinking that the Californian authorities would
never have agreed to license a site, but the stated reason for letting the
project drop was a change in the estimate of need for natural gas.
The UK planned to bring the gas from a domestic source; the Dutch
and Germans were hoping to bring it from Algeria; and the Americans had
supplies from Alaska and Indonesia in mind. None of these differences in
sources seem to have played much part in the outcomes.
Decision-making analysis for these case histories has to be threaded
through the differences between the more centralized, compact institu-
tional structures in the UK and the Netherlands, and the loose federal
constitutions in the FRG and the US. In the first two, the emphasis is
more on discussion and consensus, while in the second two the procedures
are frankly more adversarial. In the four cases, the points at which public
participation was able to influence the decisions varied, as also did the
points at which final risk analyses were called for and the issues on which
they were focused. The local expectations of prosperity following the
building of the plants and, of course, the extent to which those expec-
tations were represented in the decision-making process, made a big
difference. In Scotland everyone was convinced that this port and its
hinterland, once a coalmining center but now very economically depressed,
would get more work and income from the development. This was also
the case, although to a lesser extent, in the Netherlands and the FRG, but
much less so in prosperous California, where the manifold varieties of
possible economic developments were much greater.
From the complexities, some conclusions emerge that are not un-
expected but which are very interesting for all that. One strong impression
is that the more the structure of the dialogue about risk is set in an
adversarial institutional structure, the less likely is it ever to come to
anything but a negative conclusion. Another fairly predictable impression
is that the risk debate will come to a conclusion that accords with the
negotiating strength or representation allowed to the party with the
strongest views about the issue. These apparently homely insights are
enormously important in the light of the two chapters on expert risk
assessment. These provide a mind-boggling survey of different methods of
measuring risks and the huge differences in the outcomes following small
differences in the measures used. The experts disagree. But all the more
does the apparently objective tool of risk analysis lend itself to capture
by parties in the discussion. In the case studies the focus in the discussion
shifts between whether there is any basic need to import LEG at all (a
question in California and the Netherlands), whether the risks are
acceptable (and what they are), and from this the identification of
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maximal possible bad outcomes, regardless of assigned probabilities of
accident occurrences. There are huge degrees of freedom in analytical
judgment that can push the measurement in any desired direction.
Apart from the history, the analysis of decision making cross-nationally,
and information about discrepancies in the measures of risk, the book
contains also some profound reflections on, for example, the implications
of these methods (of democratic problem solving and compensation of
losers) for distributive justice. Finally, within the same covers, an anthro-
pologist makes reproaches to the policy analysts who have reduced
cultural diversity to a single theoretical framework and who, in doing so,
by imposing their own cultural viewpoint, have lost a lot of the explana-
tions of what was actually happening in each country. The decision
processes in the FRG, the Netherlands, and the US are unravelled again in
a new contrast with the UK. A new pattern of forces emerges interacting
with the legal and constitutional structures. This opens new vistas for
analyzing cultural biases in the formulation of policies. Given the scope
of its conception, the centrality of the issues involved, and the highly
technical and theoretical level of analysis, this book must have profound
implications for the basic dilemmas of Western social thought and for the
workings of Western democracy.
Mary Douglas
June 1983

Preface
This book investigates the decision processes for siting liquefied energy gas
(LEG) facilities in four countries: the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Different coun-
tries have specific institutional settings that influence how siting choices
are made. A key thrust of the book is to explore the role of risk analysis,
given a particular cultural and political structure, in siting decisions.
It also suggests possibilities for distributing the total pie - i.e., costs and
benefits - among individuals and groups affected by siting problems.
The introductory chapter sets the scene by providing synopses of the
four case studies and highlights distinguishing features of the problem of
siting LEG facilities. We then develop several reader's aids, including a
multi-attribute, multi-party (MAMP) framework, to describe the sequential
decision-making process associated with the siting of new technological
facilities. These aids are applied to each of the four case studies in Chap-
ters 3-6, thus enabling the reader to examine how agendas are established
and how key parties interact with each other over time.
Chapter 7 compares different risk assessments prepared by analysts in
each of the four countries, and reveals some rather wide discrepancies
between estimates of the probability of accidents, even for the same
facility. Since large-scale LEG facilities involve a relatively new technology,
there are problems in measuring these risks. It is therefore difficult to
determine the accuracy of risk analyses. In Chapter 8 these analyses are
examined within the social and political context surrounding the siting
debates. Particular emphasis is placed on the advantages and disadvantages
of introducing quantitative risk analyses in political policy debates.
Chapter 9 focuses on ways to improve the decision process and the
resulting outcomes. Particular attention is devoted to how policy analysis
can aid the siting process. The chapter concludes by recommending four
normative criteria for a desirable siting process, which are phrased in rela-
tive rather than absolute terms since each society will naturally determine
its own appropriate targets.
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During the course of the writing of this book, a cultural perspective on
societal decisions involving risks to the public was developed at IIASA.
In the Postscript this cultural approach is described and used to explain
many of the anomalies found in the four case studies. This perspective
both builds upon and, to some extent, challenges the framework developed
in this book to describe political decision processes.
Howard Kunreuther
Joanne Linnerooth
April 1983
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Chapter 1
The Problem*
The Gasworks company has filed an application to locate a liquefied energy gas
(LEG) terminal in the vicinity of Pietersdorf. Gasworks feels that this proposed
project is economically justifiable from an investment point of view. It has also
been encouraged to undertake such a project by the National Energy Board, because
LEG promises to meet some of the country's future energy needs. The community
of Pietersdorf stands to benefit from the plant insofar as it will provide additional
tax revenues and future employment opportunities. However, some residents from
the town are concerned about the impact of the facility on their future safety given
the risk, even though relatively small, of a serious accident that might damage
property as well as threaten lives. In addition, this group is concerned with the
potential negative effect of large·scale technological facilities on the future quality
of the environment and the lifestyle of their children and grandchildren. Environ·
mentalist groups have voiced similar concerns and are opposed to the project.
The above scenario is typical of a wide class of problems where there
are potential conflicts between different groups. Public concern over the
siting of new technological facilities has been aroused in recent years
through heated debates regarding the desirability of nuclear power as a
source of energy. Proposals for new LEG terminals have created much less
of a stir, but the principal issues are similar. In this book we explore the
processes associated with LEG siting from a cross-national perspective;
more specifically, interest is centered on the following questions:
• Why is the siting of LEG facilities a problem?
• Who is involved?
• What are the viewpoints of the different groups?
• How are the conflicts handled?
• Where do analysts and experts enter the process?
• How can analysts and experts playa more constructive role?
• What criteria should be utilized in making siting decisions?
These are discussed in the context of proposed LEG facilities in the
Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and
*This chapter was written by Howard Kunreuther.
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the United States. Prior to completing these four case studies, IIASA held
a week-long workshop to discuss the similarities and differences between
countries in siting LEG facilities (Kunreuther, Linnerooth, and Starnes
1982; henceforth abbreviated to KLS 1982). In various parts of this
book we illustrate aspects of the decision process through selected com-
ments from participants. At the end of the workshop, one of the partici-
pants, C.D.J. Cieraad of the TNO Center for Energy Studies in the Nether-
lands, had this to say:
I think this has been a very informative meeting where the pitfalls of analysis, and
the usefulness of it as well, have been explored. I think what we must include is
that the use of analysis in politics must be very carefully looked at. (KLS 1982,
p450)
This is the spirit in which this book is written.
SETTING THE STAGE
The oil crisis of 1973 and its subsequent sharp rise in prices shocked most
of the world into recognizing that there is a tight interdependence
between nations and that alternative sources of energy must be investi-
gated. At the same time there was increasing concern with potentially
harmful, long-term effects of new technological facilities on the environ-
ment, as well as the potential for catastrophic accidents. Hence, it is not a
simple matter to recommend new sources of energy such as nuclear power
or LEG in place of oil, even if these sources are cost effective. All aspects
of human activity and concerns have to be considered in developing new
energy strategies (Hafele 1981). It is against this background that our
study of the siting of LEG facilities has been undertaken.
What is LEG?
Liquefied energy gas (LEG) comprises two substances: liquefied natural
gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). The technology associated
with producing and storing these sources of energy has been developed
only relatively recently, but the num ber of new facilities has grown at a
rapid rate. The principle upon which this technology is based involves
chilling the gas until it becomes liquefied at a vastly reduced volume. For
example, natural gas is chilled to -161.5 °c, at which point it becomes a
liquid at about one-six hundredth of its volume at atmospheric pressure.
Therefore, a tank of LNG contains 600 times as much energy as an equal-
sized tank of natural gas.
The technology serves two principal purposes. First, it offers gas com-
panies an opportunity to store its surplus gas during the warmer summer
months by liquefying it. During the winter months when demand is rela-
tively high, the LEG can then be regasified to satisfy peak demand. These
PRODUCING COUNTRY
The Problem 3
so-called peakshaving plants can be linked to "satellite" stations in rural
communities, which store LEG transported to them by road tankers.
Secondly, this technology offers a means by which natural gas produced
in countries such as Algeria and Indonesia can be liquefied, shipped in
specially constructed tankers, and received and stored at terminals hun-
dreds or thousands of miles away. The LEG is then regasified and distrib-
uted to consumers mostly by pipeline, with the remainder carried by
trucks or railcars. Figure 1.1 depicts the different elements associated with
the transportation and storage process. The entire system (i.e., liquefaction
facility, the LEG tankers, the receiving terminal, and the regasification
terminal) costs more than $1 billion to construct.
OCEAN
TRANSPORTATION IMPORTING COUNTRY
Natural gasfield Liquefaction and
related fac iIit ies
Tanker fleet Receiving
terminal facilities
Gas to
distributors
~
Figure 1.1. Major elements of a liquefied energy gas (LEG) project (adapted from
Jensen Associates Ltd).
Of the four case studies reported in this book, three (the FRG, the
Netherlands, and the US) involve the proposed construction of LNG
import facilities while the project in the UK involves a facility for export-
ing LPG. As recently as 1977 the gas industry estimated that if all the
announced international LNG import deals were to be put into operation
by 1985, LNG could account for as much as 22% of American gas supplies,
23% of Western Europe's and 86% of Japan's (Daniels and Anderson
1977). Six countries import LNG and five more are considering construct-
ing new facilities. I Figure 1.2 shows the location of existing liquefaction
plants and storage facilities around the world. Davis (1979) points out,
however, that in the late 1970s the potential of LNG as an important
source of world energy diminished rapidly, for two principal economic
reasons: a rapid rise in the price of LNG since 1973, and increasing con-
cern over the reliability of supplies from countries such as Algeria and
Indonesia.
How hazardous is LEG?
One of the most difficult problems associated with locating new technolog-
ical facilities lies in assessing the safety risks to the surrounding population.
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The development of LEG was scarred when the first storage tank, built in
1941 in Cleveland, Ohio, ruptured after three years of service, spilling the
contents into adjacent streets and sewers. The liquid evaporated, the gas
ignited and exploded, resulting in 120 deaths, 300 injuries, and approxi-
mately $7 million in property damage. The plant was never rebuilt and set
back the development of the technology for two decades. In the mid-
1960s engineers and technicians were confident that the problems that
had caused the tanks to fail had been corrected, so they pronounced LNG
safe for future commercial development. 2
To appreciate more fully the risks associated with an LEG facility,
accident scenarios have been developed by analysts. Figure 1.3 illustrates
the major components of such a scenario. The process begins with some
initiating event, such as a vessel accident or a storage tank rupture, which
results in an LEG spill. The LEG will immediately start to vaporize after a
spill, producing a vapor cloud that can be carried downwind to a popu-
lated area. The mixture of vaporized LEG and air may ignite if it comes in
contact with some ignition source, such as an electric spark. If the cloud
does burst into flame, then there is a chance that fatalities may result from
fire and explosions in confined spaces, and that materials will catch fire by
radiant heat. Should the vapor cloud not be ignited within a given period
of time then it will mix with a sufficient amount of air so that it becomes
innocuous, and the cloud will disperse.
LEG spill initiating events
(vessel accident. storage
tank rupture. etc.)
1
Vapor cloud formation
1
Location and size of vapor
cloud at ignition
1
Fatalities from ignited vapor cloud
Fig. 1.3. Elements of an accident scenario (from Keeney 1980).
Scientific experts cannot agree on the risks associated with such acci-
dents. What is the probability of an LEG spill? What are the chances that
the resulting vapor cloud will ignite? How many lives will be lost and what
will be the extent of injuries if such a sequence of events occurs? In
Chapter 7 we document the wide discrepancies in these estimates due to
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different assumptions made by analysts on the causes and nature of these
LEG-related risks. The widely different views on the potential hazards of
LEG are important in understanding the political dynamics of the siting
debates.
THE CASE STUDIES
The empirical basis of this book (Chapters 3----6) consists of case studies
describing the decision processes and institutional arrangements associated
with siting LEG facilities in four countries. The features of the processes
were interpreted through retrospective interviews with key persons repre-
senting the relevant interested parties, as well as by using technical reports
and documents supplied by these individuals. Interviews were conducted
without any preconceived framework for analyzing the decision process;
each case study writer simply obtained information as to how the parties
perceived the different aspects of the siting process and in what ways their
views changed over time. The roles of these groups were studied solely in
the context of the specific LEG projects, rather than from larger agendas
or perspectives on which parties may have based their actions. Below we
present a brief synopsis of each of the four cases.
The FRG. In September 1972, two major gas companies founded a sub-
sidiary for the purpose of building an LNG importjregasification facility
in Wilhelmshaven, a port city on the North Sea coast, to handle LNG
shipped from a liquefaction facility in Algeria. The terminal was expected
to provide a significant proportion of the projected national energy supply
for the FRG, as well as to aid regional industrial development in the
Wilhelmshaven area. On the other side of the coin, certain parties con-
tended that the proposed terminal would adversely impact the environ-
ment, and thus reduce tourism. There would also be increased risks to the
population from shipping accidents that could occur at the berthing
facilities in Jade Bay serving not only the LNG terminal, but also a
proposed petrochemical plant and an existing oil refinery. Several risk
studies were undertaken by interested parties and regulatory agencies,
each of which looked at particular aspects of public safety. Conditional
approval of the terminal was given in July 1979 by the Federal Minister of
Transportation, who decided that the shipping risks were acceptable in
view of the perceived economic benefits of the project. Because of
problems with the Algerian gas delivery contract, however, no construction
of the facility has taken place as of this date.
The Netherlands. In the early 1970s the semi-state-owned gas company
Gasunie declared an interest in inporting LNG into the Netherlands, and
started discussions with the Algerian company Sonatrach. The proposed
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site for the import terminal was at the port of Maasvlakte in the Rotterdam
harbor area, since there was a confluence of interests among those con-
cerned with energy policy and economic development in having a facility
there. However, approval of a Maasvlakte site was endangered by opposi-
tion from environmentalist groups, so that Eemshaven was eventually
selected over Rotterdam because the Dutch government felt a facility
there would have a positive effect on the regional economy and employ-
ment. A significant factor that triggered the selection of Eemshaven was
the feeling by some of the local parties involved in the approval procedures
that the potential risks associated with the handling and reception of LNG
at Maasvlakte were unacceptable. A government-sponsored risk assessment
on LNG was used by all the major parties in the debate. Both the
Eemshaven and the Maasvlakte locations were deemed acceptable by the
government, but the former was approved in late 1978. Shortly afterwards,
however, the LNG contract was canceled by Sonatrach so that, in the
absence of alternative suppliers, further planning for an LNG import
terminal in the Netherlands has been postponed.
The UK. In July 1976 Shell and Esso expressed a joint interest in
locating a gas processing facility at Mossmorran and an export terminal at
Braefoot Bay, Scotland, as part of a larger development program to
process natural gas from the nearby Brent oil and gas field for export.
Hence this project did not directly affect national energy supply, as was
the case in the other three countries. The key points of controversy at a
public inquiry were whether the potential economic benefits to the region
would be sufficiently large to offset the perceived negative impact of the
facility on the environment and, more importantly, the possible risk of a
catastrophic accident. Amongst the individuals who potentially would
benefit from the project were the residents of Cowdenbeath because of
the jobs that would be created by the Mossmorran facility. The potential
losers were the predominantly middle-class residents of Aberdour and
Dalgety Bay, near the export terminal site at Braefoot Bay, who would be
exposed to the risks of LEG storage and handling, and they therefore
formed an action group to oppose the project. Independent risk studies
were undertaken by the local authorities, the national government, and
the Action Group. The site was eventually approved in August 1979 by
the Secretary of State for Scotland, who stipulated that a detailed techni-
cal audit on the plant be undertaken prior to its commissioning. Today
construction of the plant is well under way. It is expected to be in oper-
ation in the 1990s.
The USA. In September 1974, Western LNG Terminal Company, repre-
senting the interests of three gas distribution utilities, applied for approval
of three sites on the California Coast: Point Conception, Oxnard, and Los
Angeles, to receive LNG from Indonesia and Alaska. Over the next three
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years a number of interested parties at the federal, state, and local levels
debated the desirability of each of these locations. By the summer of
1977, it became clear that none of these sites would be approved under
existing procedures, so the utility companies and other business interests
pressed for new state legislation to speed up the siting process. The result
was the LNG Terminal Siting Act of 1977, which simplified the licensing
process and stipulated certain population density requirements that would
be acceptable. To help resolve the safety question, several risk studies
were commissioned independently by interested parties, and these fueled
the conflict between these groups. It appeared that Point Conception
would be finally approved in October 1981 by the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission and the California Public Utilities Commission, since a
recently discovered seismic fault was shown not to present an unaccept-
able risk. However, the question of whether California still needed an
LNG terminal remained unresolved. The utilities have now announced
their intention to withdraw their application for the present, but to keep
open the option of pursuing the project further - possibly in the 1990s.
Similarities and contrasts
The political decision processes in each of the four countries reflect the
different institutional structures within which groups debate controversial
issues. Nonetheless there are certain common features that stimulated
much of the controversy surrounding the development of LEG facilities.
In the mid-1970s Western governments were searching for a more secure
source of energy for the future, given the uncertainty of Middle East oil
supplies. The energy companies felt that natural gas could fulfill this
need and national governments were supportive of this development if
the inherent dangers of such technologies could be shown to be acceptable.
If the choice of sites coincided with regional economic development
needs, then the governments had an added incentive to favor a proposed
plant. At the same time, the environmentalist movements were marshaling
support for their concerns about the impact of large-scale technological
development on the future quality of life and the risks to individuals
residing near LEG facilities. Local action groups sprung up and voiced
their concerns about the siting of these potentially hazardous facilities in
their backyards.
In view of this conflict between national energy needs and safety/
environmental issues, it was inevitable that conflicts would arise between
concerned individuals and groups. The following brief extracts from the
four case studies highlight the difficulties that each country faced in
dealing with these disputes.
In the FRG case, Hermann Atz considers the main failing to be an
excessive amount of secrecy on the part of the government when consider-
ing plans for an LEG facility:
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In an atmosphere of growing societal concern about risk and the negative conse-
quences of technological development it is advisable to reconsider the concept of
strict isolation of decision making ... without public debate. (Chapter 3, p60)
With respect to the Netherlands, Michiel Schwarz highlights the pre-
dominant influence of politics in determining the outcome of the debate:
Although the government committed itself to an LNG terminal site, responding to
an "energy policy" imperative, political considerations rather than safety concerns
most strongly influenced the final outcome of the decision process. (Chapter 4, p92)
In the UK case study, Sally Macgill draws attention to the limitations of
the British planning system in dealing with issues of risk:
The risk studies used in the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay decision process were part
of a public debate that was unbalanced and inconclusive .... The debate was
unbalanced in the sense that the emphasis given to various safety issues did not
match the relative importance of those issues .... The debate was inconclusive
given that the interested parties could not reach agreement on criteria on which to
judge safety. (Chapter 5, p12Q-l)
In the US case study, John Lathrop and Joanne Linnerooth present the
positive and negative features of the 1977 California LNG Terminal Siting
Act, which gave a single state agency the mandate to grant a siting permit
rather than requiring the utility to obtain approval from a number of local
authorities:
An LNG facility brings prospects of regional economic development and may
increase the tax revenues of the municipality, but it also imposes risks on local
residents. For this reason, a procedure requiring local approval may prove difficult.
Yet, if citizen participation in decision procedures is important, any process that is
less sensitive to local preferences may be undesirable. (Chapter 6, p144-5)
A look at the current status of the projects in all four countries reveals
a radically different picture from the scene in the mid-1970s. Only the
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay export facility is under construction; the FRG
and Netherlands have indefinitely postponed construction of their LEG
terminals due to the uncertainty of gas supplies. In the US the utilities
have concluded that LEG will not be a profitable future source of energy;
hence it is unlikely that a terminal will be built at Point Conception in the
immediate future even though the site has been declared seismically safe.
DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF SITING PROBLEMS
There are several features of siting problems that make them a particularly
interesting area for study.
Relevant interested parties
There are many different parties who have an interest in the final outcome,
and each group has its own goals and objectives, which may change over
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Government agencies
Local residents
Figure 1.4. Relevant interested parties in a facility siting debate.
time. A closer look at the participants in LEG facility siting debates depic-
ted in Figure 1.4 provides some insight into why conflicts are likely to
result.
The applicant: Firms or developers who support the construction and
operation of a facility have concluded that despite future uncertainties,
the anticipated profits associated with the project will exceed the expec-
ted costs. Their analysis is likely to be based on the economics of operat-
ing a plant, the future purchase and selling price of the product, as well as
the risk of a catastrophic accident.
Local residents: Residents in the vicinity of a proposed terminal are
likely to have differing views of the situation. Those who own property
on the land on which the plant is to be constructed may be concerned
that a court will not award them a fair price for their property. Others
may focus on the reduced property taxes, increased employment, or
increased economic activity that a facility is likely to bring. A third group
may be concerned with the potentially hazardous features of the facility.
Hence some local residents may favor the project while others will oppose
it.
Government agencies: Government agencies normally have well speci-
fied formal responsibilities in the siting process. Their roles, which are
often defined by legislation, provide greater advantages to some interests
than to others. The four case studies provide interesting contrasts with
respect to the role of government agencies at the national, state or region-
al, and municipal levels, and show how the different stakeholders were
affected by their actions.
Public interest groups: Recently there has been increased involvement
by citizens' and environmentalist groups in siting debates. These organiza-
tions generally represent the interests and preferences of certain sections
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of the public. For example, the membership of the Sierra Club is concerned
with the effects that the siting of any new technological facility will have
on the environment. Local citizens' groups are generally concerned with
how a proposed project may affect property values in the area and the
safety of its residents. Those attracted to such organizations have strong,
particular interests that dictate the agenda of the organization and
influence the type of information that is collected and processed.
The following general objectives are at least implicitly considered by
these different interested parties in judging the attractiveness of proposed
alternatives .
• Welfare objective: the goal of improving the well-being of society; this
is often referred to as the efficiency goal .
• Distributional objective: the goal of improving the well-being of specific
individuals and groups; this is often referred to as the equity goal.
Certain interested parties such as the applicant, public interest groups,
and residents are primarily concerned with their well-being and will favor
a facility if they feel it promises to yield them net benefits over maintain-
ing the status quo. Some government agencies may have a mandate to
consider national interests, such as the impact of a project on the price
and reliability of energy in the future. Those responsible for the environ-
mental and safety aspects of a new facility will focus on the impact of the
project on certain segments of the population. As we shall see in the four
case studies, the institutional arrangements associated with LEG siting
decisions influence the relative importance of welfare and distributional
concerns in determining the final outcomes.
The contrast with, for example, a proposal to locate a shopping center
in a community brings out some of the special features of the LEG siting
problem. Those affected by the shopping center normally reside nearby so
the project is likely to raise only local interest and concern, although this
may still erupt into a heated debate. A proposed LEG facility will have a
much wider positive impact since the potential beneficiaries cover a much
wider region. Those who bear the costs will normally be locally concen-
trated, although national public interest groups may champion their cause.
Hence the conflicts are likely to be between a large number of groups.
Louis Clarenburg of the Rijnmond Public Authority in the Netherlands
highlighted the national conflicts between efficiency considerations and
local equity concerns with respect to siting an LEG facility:
I am sure that the majority of the population would be in favor of a guarantee of
electricity. Only people living in the immediate surroundings of the site would
probably be opposed. How to weigh the interests of the local population is the
relevant question, and I don't feel that a referendum on the project resolves this
question. It takes the responsibility away from the political level where it belongs.
(KLS 1982, p232)
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Sequential nature of the process
The political decision process associated with siting problems is dynamic
and sequential in nature. Due to human limitations in processing and
collecting information, as well as legislative and legal constraints, there are
a number of subproblems that comprise the larger question of whether a
project should be approved or not. The stakes of the different parties, as
well as their relative importance, will vary over time depending on the
particular subproblem being discussed. This feature highlights the impor-
tance of structuring the order in which questions are resolved. A different
agenda for the same problem may lead to another final outcome because
of the new clusters of interested parties who will interact with each other.
Exogenous events such as disasters help to structure the political agenda
by calling attention to the dangers associated with a particular technology.
A small database for judging the frequency of low-probability events
increases the impact of these salient events on the decision-making process.
Controlled laboratory experiments by psychologists have illustrated this
type of estimation bias. For example, Lichtenstein and her colleagues
(1978) have shown that individuals tend to overestimate the frequency of
deaths from events that are easily recalled, such as natural or technological
disasters. Their studies reveal that accidents are judged to cause as many
deaths as diseases, whereas diseases actually take about 15 times as many
lives. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) describe this bias as an availability
heuristic whereby one judges the frequency of events by the ease with
which they can be retrieved from memory.
Norbert Dall from the Alliance for Coastal Management in California
feels that individuals have a difficult time dealing with probabilities and
hence are greatly influenced by recent past experience. He illustrates this
point with an example related to siting LNG facilities in communities in
the US:
... in places like Staten Island, Oxnard, and Santa Barbara, the local perception of
risk has been formed by proximate, tangible and easily understood events that
became etched into a deterministic appreciation of risk. Past events in the all-too-
human hazardous industries suggest "it can happen here" and the puritanical strain
in us recommends prudence. (KLS 1982, p146)
Since individuals have difficulty dealing with statistical measures of risk it
is likely that they will fault the experts should a disaster occur. The result
may be a distrust of technology, as evidenced by the reaction of the
public to nuclear power after the Three Mile Island scare.
Pervading our analysis of the decision process is the presence of conflicts
between the interested parties because each group has a different set of
concerns that will influence the type of information it collects, and the
uses it makes of specific events such as disasters or accidents. The resolu-
tion of these conflicts is likely to depend on the institutional structure of
a particular country with respect to its allocation of responsibility to
specific parties at different stages of the decision process.
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Chapter 2 develops a framework for exploring the dynamics of siting
processes in different countries. We have introduced several reader's aids
to compare the four case studies: a graphical representation of key events
in the siting process based on the program evaluation review technique
(PERT); a party/concern matrix for depicting the main parties and their
expressed concerns; and a multi-attribute, multi-party (MAMP) framework
to help clarify the arguments the parties bring into the policy arena. The
case studies provide descriptions of how conflicts were dealt with and
resolved in the context of the different institutional structures that shaped
the sequential political decision processes.
Disagreement on risks
Interested parties often disagree on the nature of the risks associated with
new technologies such as LEG. Differences are created at even the most
elemental level since the word "risk" has many interpretations. In this
book we utilize the definition of risk provided by Fischhoff and his
colleagues (1981 b), that is, a threat to life or health as a potential conse-
quence of a given activity. An activity is risky if it creates the possibility
of these types of losses.
Weinberg (1972) was one of the first scientists to call attention to the
estimation problems associated with low-probability events. He proposed
the term "trans-science" to indicate that there is no practical basis for
estimating the statistical chances and consequences of the occurrence of
certain types of accidents although, epistemologically speaking, they are
questions of fact. A similar point has been explicitly made in a report by
the Council for Science and Society (1977), which indicated that the
calculation of these numbers is highly uncertain. If interested parties
provide alternative estimates of the uncertainties and consequences of
these types of risks, it is particularly difficult to settle these differences in
a scientific manner.
The problems associated with estimating risks has been highlighted
because of a concern in siting debates as to whether a technology is
acceptably safe. 3 At the IIASA LEG Task Force Meeting, Richard Mehta,
chairman of a citizen's action group in Mossmorran, Scotland, suggested
that some acceptable risk standard be made explicit:
... there ought to at least be some generally acknowledged standard so that the
public can judge what standard of acceptability was being implied. (KLS 1982,
p196)
Harry Otway from ISPRA in Italy took issue with this point of view:
I would warn Mr. Mehta against agreeing to a numerical acceptable risk criterion,
because there is more to life than just not being dead - there are other things that
matter besides physical risk. To what extent is this silly numbers game of "accept-
able risk" really a surrogate for a debate about the legitimacy of insitutions? If the
institutions were perceived as being legitimate, then risk should never emerge as an
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issue. Do discussions of acceptable risk beg the question of institutional legitimacy?
(KLS 1982, p196)
Two surveys of acceptable risk problems have recently been made by
Fischhoff et al. (1981b) and Vaupel (1982). Fischhoff et al. argue that no
one solution to the problem is likely to be found because the alternative
approaches have different strengths and limitations. The authors indicate
that there are a number of uncertainties that make it extremely difficult
to arrive at a magic number with which to guide risk decisions. In particu-
lar, they point out that there is uncertainty associated with defining
particular decision problems, assessing the facts and values, and assessing
the quality of the decisions that are made. In addition, both the general
public and experts are fallible in their perceptions of risk and may exhibit
systematic biases.
Vaupel points out that all of the acceptable risk approaches envisage a
health, safety, or an environmental standard as being made by a single
decision maker. Thus it is natural from these perspectives to imagine the
decision being made by one "decision maker" who is given some facts and
then decides what to do. Sometimes this "decision maker" is thought of
as a person who has some discretion and can exercise judgment; some-
times the "decision maker" is, in effect, a formula or rule; sometimes the
"decision maker" is a reification of the consensus of a group of individ-
uals. In any case, the implicit image is that of a single decision rather than
of a decision process. Hence, Vaupel argues, acceptable risk approaches
may be misleading, inappropriate, and even unhelpful in some situations,
like the siting of an LEG terminal, where the evolving trajectory of a
policy is "the resultant of a complex process of interplay among many
actors. "
On a more general note, Wynne (1982) has suggested that we study risk
perceptions not as a separate entity but rather as a part of the political
and social organizational context in which decisions are made. This view-
point is similar to that of Mary Douglas (1982), who claims that:
Accepting risks is part of accepting organizations. The risk analysts and risk per-
ception psychologists try to strip the idea of acceptable risk free of political
adhesions, but the problems of risk perception are essentially political. Congresses
and parliaments give away their rightful territory when they hand over such
problems to risk experts. The public debates about risk are debates about politics.
(p30)
In this book we take the viewpoint that risk is a political problem.
Controversy frequently arises in siting debates because different stake-
holders provide different estimates of the risk to reflect their views as to
whether a particular technology should be part of society's portfolio. The
four case studies presented in Chapters 3---6 delineate the roles of the
major parties, the siting processes, and their attitudes toward the proposed
LEG projects.
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THE USE OF ANALYSIS
Chapters 7, 8, and 9 of the book explore and discuss the use of analysis
as it affects the decision process for siting hazardous facilities. By analysis
we mean a systematic set of approaches for dealing with a particular
problem. Sometimes analysis is done in universities and research institu-
tions; at other times it is done by consultants and advisors to interested
parties.
Chapter 7 is devoted to a comparison of different analyses associated
with the risk to life from LEG-related catastrophic accidents for the
planned terminals in the FRG, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US. Since
LEG is a relatively new technology there are problems in measuring these
risks. The absence of a detailed statistical database has thus forced scien-
tists either to use historical data or to develop physical models of the
process. For example, the probability of an accident involving a vessel
carrying LEG could be estimated by looking at the safety records of oil
tankers and modifying these figures on the basis of anticipated differences
in LEG tankers. Alternatively, ship collisions could be analyzed using an
abstract model of shipping movements, taking into account traffic patterns
for the harbor in question.
Risk analyses cannot be viewed in a vacuum but must be examined
within the social and political context surrounding the siting decisions. In
fact, the usefulness of analyses will be affected by the view that each
society has towards its experts. In recent years the scientific community
has lost its impartial image because technological uncertainty has allowed
each scientist a wide range of interpretation regarding the risks associated
with hazardous technologies. For example, with respect to nuclear power,
scientists make judgments regarding the seriousness of health and en-
vironmental risk that correspond to their attitudes toward nuclear power
(Nelkin 1981).
Chapter 8 compares how risk studies were incorporated in the decision
procedures of the four case studies. Population safety was an important
concern in all the siting debates, so that some type of risk analysis was
required before each terminal could be approved. The national decision-
making styles of each country determined how these analyses were
actually used. Chapter 8 also investigates whether risk analyses were a
useful input to the decision processes and why more comprehensive
analyses were not pursued. Some suggestions are given as to how risk
analysts might play a more productive role in setting policies involving
the introduction of hazardous technologies.
Chapter 9 is concerned with how analysis can improve the siting process
given the prevailing tensions between the welfare and distributional
objectives. Our general view of how to proceed corresponds to the position
taken by Randolph Deutsch, an attorney with the California Public
Utilities Commission:
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The analysts should find out first what the real world is like, and then make an
honest decision on where he thinks his analysis can be useful in the decision making
process. I don't think it can be of use all the way across the board to decide all the
societal issues in the siting process. (KLS 1982, p262)
Analysts can propose tools and approaches for facilitating the decision
process itself, as well as the outcomes of party interactions. In focusing on
the process side, attention is given to questions of procedural rationality -
the way decisions are made. In addressing the outcome side, analysts are
concerned with substantive rationality - the effect of different programs
on the distribution of scarce resources among opposing groupS.4 We
delineate three perspectives that analysts can take in improving the
process and outcome side. Chapter 9 concludes by proposing a set of
normative criteria for a desirable siting process.
A parallel approach, throughout the lifetime of this project, has focused
exclusively on the cultural dimensions of the case studies, and its results
are presented in the Postscript.
SUMMARY
This book is primarily a descriptive analysis of the decision processes and
the use of risk analyses in siting new technological facilities. We are inter-
ested in the similarities and differences between four countries (the FRG,
the Netherlands, the UK, and the US) in locating LEG terminals. By
pointing out commonalities we indicate certain fundamental features of
these siting problems that cut across cultures. By indicating differences we
highlight the roles that different institutional arrangements and national
styles play in structuring the decision processes and final outcomes. Based
on these descriptive findings we suggest ways that analysts can play a
more constructive role in the policy process.
NOTES
1. The countries currently importing LEG are France, Italy, Japan,
Spain, the UK, and the US. Those who have considered investing in
terminals are Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, the FRG and Sweden
(Davis 1979, pH).
An investigation of the Cleveland accident revealed that the tank had
failed because it was constructed out of 3.5% nickel steel, which
becomes brittle when it comes into contact with the extreme cold of
LEG. All plants are now built with 9% nickel steel, aluminum, or
concrete, and the storage tanks are surrounded by dikes capable of
containing the contents of the tanks if a rupture occurs.
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3. One of the earliest treatments on the subject of acceptable risk was by
Starr (1969) who suggested that new technologies are acceptable only
if they do not exceed the level of risk of existing technologies which
provide similar benefits to society. This "revealed preference" philos-
ophy has led interested parties to focus on acceptable risk levels that
can be used to justify their positions.
4. See Simon (1978) for a more detailed discussion of these two types of
rationality.
Chapter 2
The Framework*
Comparing four case studies presents an analytic challenge since each
country has its own style, decision process, and institutional arrangements.
This chapter presents a set of ,mifying concepts that are sufficiently broad
to enable us to structure the siting procedure in each country using a
common framework. Building on these concepts we develop a set of
reader's aids that clarify the sequence of key events, the main concerns of
the interested parties, and the arguments each stakeholder brings into the
policy arena. Most importantly, these aids indicate how each siting
problem was initially formulated and how it evolved over time.
UNIFYING CONCEPTS
Who has power?
Power is a major explanatory concept in political science studies of social
choice. By power we mean the ability of an individual or group to influ-
ence the actions of others. 1 The concept can take several different guises.
A party can have power by virtue of its entitlement or legal right in a
specific situation (Calabresi and Melamed 1972). Individuals who own
their own property have entitlement to the land and can determine
whether they want to sell it to a potential buyer. Local governments also
have entitlement to the land to the extent that they impose zoning
restrictions, which constrain certain individual transactions. If a higher
level of government sees a need for a certain piece of property, it may
then employ special powers (such as eminent domain in the US) to obtain
entitlement to this land.
Parties can obtain power through standing, by which we mean the right
to participate in the decision process as specified by existing institutional
*This chapter was written by Howard Kunreuther and Joanne Linnerooth.
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arrangements. For example, special interest groups have standing if their
views can be officially voiced at public hearings as part of the siting
process. If individuals have entitlement then they automatically have
standing, but they can have standing without any entitlement.
Those parties who have responsibility for certain actions also have
power. By responsibility we mean the formal duties specified by legisla-
tion as well as the concerns or mandates associated with a particular
interest group. Government regulatory agencies are good examples of
interested parties with formal responsibility; citizens' action groups and
environmentalist organizations are examples of parties that feel they have
a responsibility to their members to defend certain positions.
These three concepts of power can be illustrated in the context of the
siting of LEG facilities. For example, in the FRG case study the munici-
pality of Wilhelmshaven had entitlement to the land, which was zoned for
industrial purposes. In the UK a local action group from Aberdour and
Dalgety Bay was given standing by being allowed to present arguments
against the proposed Mossmorran terminal at a public inquiry. In the
Netherlands, the national cabinet had formal responsibility for selecting
the terminal and for determining whether the safety risk was acceptable.
In the US the California Coastal Commission had formal responsibility for
protecting the California coastline and hence approving LNG projects
until the passage of the LNG Terminal Siting Act, which transferred
primary responsibility to the California Public Utilities Commission.
Representatives of the Sierra Club reflected their concern and responsi-
bility with environmental issues by opposing remote onshore siting in
California in public hearings on LNG terminals in the state.
Bounded rationality
There is a growing recognition in the political science literature that
decision makers are limited in their ability and desire to collect informa-
tion on which to base their actions. They thus attempt to satisfice rather
than optimize. One of the earliest descriptions of this bounded rational
behavior in the context of societal decision making was by Lindblom
(1959), who contended that the political process is one of incremental
muddling rather than comprehensive choice. Instead of examining the
full range of alternatives available, government agencies or politicians
focus only on a limited set of options. They proceed incrementally by
comparing the results of each new policy with old ones, thus drastically
simplifying the decision-making process from the one implied by the
classical rational model of choice (Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963).
Implicit in the concept of incremental decision making is the assump-
tion that individuals and interested parties have a very limited amount of
time available to deal with any particular problem. An excellent illustration
of this feature is Aaron Wildavsky's (1964) analysis of the US budgetary
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process. Due to the complex structure and myriad sets of figures in the
budget it is necessary for officials to employ simplified tools in making
their choices. One of the principal ways budget officials justify their
actions is to use the previous year's budget as a guide. In fact, as Wildavsky
points out,
Budgeting is incremental, not comprehensive .... Thus the men who make the
budget are concerned with relatively small increments to an existing base. Their
attention is focused on a small number of items over which the budgetary battle is
fought. (p15)
The decision to build an LEG terminal at a particular location is also
not made in a comprehensive manner in the sense that the alternatives to
natural gas are scrutinized with full knowledge of the best available sites
and the technical difficulties. A series of decisions are typically made,
often beginning with approval "in principle" for the import or export
project without full knowledge of the available sites or the technical
details. This decision may partially lock the process into a certain course
of action, and future policies are set on increasingly narrow aspects of the
problem. For example, in California the question of whether California
needed an LNG terminal was decided by the California legislature, which
subsequently instructed the responsible authorities to identify an appro-
priate site.
Parties and issues
The literature on both organization theory and political science provide
an important perspective on the societal decision-making process by
stressing the role of multiple parties, each of which has its own goals and
objectives. For example, March and Simon (1958) and Cyert and March
(1963) view the organization as a coalition of parties, each imposing
different demands on the system. The goals of the firm arise through a
process of bargaining between potential coalition members. In a similar
vein, Neustadt (1970), in his reflections on presidential power, points out
that each of the interested parties in the government has its own interests
and separate responsibilities. Policy emerges as a result of political bargain-
ing between the actors.
One of the finest studies illustrating the importance of multiple parties
in the decision-making process is Allison's (1971) analysis of the Cuban
missile crisis. Of the three models he develops to explain the way policy is
made, his government politics model (model III) comes closest to our view
of the societal decision-making process. Allison points out that in decision-
making situations there are many actors who are in the game as players,
each focusing on multiple problems rather than single issues, and each
having its own set of national, organization, and personal goals. The
parties share power and have conflicting preferences. In order to deter-
mine how a policy emerges it is necessary to identify the various issues
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that are deemed important, to indicate what bargains and compromises
emerge and "to convey some feel for the confusion" (Allison 1971,
p146).
The sites that were selected for LEG terminals in the four countries
studied were each a result of political bargaining, and in no case is a single
interpretation of the recorded events adequate. One purpose of recording
these events is to reveal the confusion with the hope that some insights
will be gleaned, which will enable analysts to bring some clarity into a
"muddled" world.
Conflicts and agendas
If there are a number of different actors in the societal decision-making
game, then conflicts are likely to emerge. These conflicts can arise even if
it appears that the interested parties agree on the overall objectives of a
particular program. Simon (1979) provides an interesting example of the
type of conflicts between groups in an early field study on administration
of public recreational facilities. He found that there was general agreement
between the school board and the city public works department on the
objectives of the recreational program, but there was tension between the
two parties on how the funds should be allocated between physical main-
tenance and play supervision. The reason for this was that the public
works administrator viewed the playground as a physical facility, while
the recreation administrator treated it as a social facility. In a similar
manner interested parties may have differing views on an LEG facility, in
which case there are likely to be conflicts and tensions between them on
whether or not to approve the project.
One of the important questions that has been studied in recent years is
how these potential conflicts are handled. Cyert and March (1963)
hypothesize that sequential and decentralized decision making enables
actions to be taken in many situations even if the parties concerned have
incompatible goals. The importance of these features of the organizational
decision-making process in a political context is highlighted by Herbert
Simon (1967):
Influence over the direction of attention of the political organs is a principal means
for effecting action. The notion of power as a tug-of-war between alternatives yields
to a notion of power as an influence on a sequential process in which actions must
be generated as well as chosen, and in which attention is a scarce resource. (pI08)
This characterization of the decision process is similar to the one formu-
lated by Allison, who suggests that each party in the game faces an agenda
with many deadlines, not all of which can be met. There is thus a need to
set priorities. In other words, one needs to consider the nature of the
agenda-setting process. As one would expect, those items placed on the
legislative agenda become an important determinant of the final decisions
that will be taken by society.
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Cobb and Elder (1972) indicate that an important way in which an
issue gets placed on the agenda is through some type of exogenous event
that creates conflict. They illustrate this phenomenon using the example
of the passage of the Federal Coal Mine and Safety Act of 1969, which
was designed to reduce deaths from mine accidents and protect miners
from "black-lung" disease. The legislation was triggered initially by a cave-
in of a West Virginia coal mine that trapped and eventually killed 78
miners. This disaster caused the miners to strike, thus putting pressure on
the state and federal government to react to the miners' concerns.
In another context, Holling (1981a) has pointed out how specific crises
in the short term can lead to changes in policies with respect to environ-
mental and ecological problems (e.g., the suppression of the spruce bud-
worm after it had destroyed forests in Canada). Kunreuther and Lathrop
(1981) describe with specific examples how exogeneous events triggered
new coalitions and new legislation regarding LNG siting decisions in the
US.
One reason for the importance of exogenous events, such as crises and
disasters, in creating societal interest in a specific problem is that they
indicate potential trouble in a salient way. Walker (1977) hypothesizes
that accidents and disasters play an important role in setting the discre-
tionary agenda of political bodies such as the US Congress. To support
this conjecture, Walker presents empirical evidence on the passage of
safety legislation in the US. Numerous examples of this process are also
provided by Edward Lawless (1977) through a series of case histories of
problems involving the impact of technology on society. He points out
that frequently:
... new information of an "alarming" nature is announced and is given rapid and
widespread visibility by means of modern mass communications media. Almost
overnight the case can become a subject of discussion and concern to much of the
populace, and generate strong pressures to evaluate and remedy the problem as
rapidly as possible. (p16)
In the case of decisions such as the siting of hazardous facilities, exoge-
nous events such as an LEG explosion or an oil spill, may be sufficiently
graphic and affect enough people to cause a reversal of earlier decisions,
inject other alternatives into the process, or to change the relative strength
of parties interested in the decision outcome. The mass media often focus
on these specific events and in many cases exaggerate their importance.
Sequential processing of issues
Braybrooke (1974, 1978) has developed a concept of the political system
which he views "as a machine or collection of machines for processing
issues". In contrast to the static theory of collective choice based on the
pioneering work of Arrow (1963) on social choice, Braybrooke views the
decision-making process as sequential and constantly changing. At any
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point in time there is an issue or set of issues involving many different
interested parties. Over time these issues may be resolved, disappear, or
be transformed as new information or new alternatives emerge. In particu-
lar, new proposals may be constructed to reflect either the changes in
preferences of the interested parties and/or a revised set of societal values.
The importance of Braybrooke's work is that it enables one to decompose
a problem into smaller subproblems by focusing on relevant issues. It thus
captures the sequential decision-making process that characterizes individ-
ual and organizational problem solving (March 1978), as well as the public
policy-making process (Gershuny 1981).
The setting of an agenda is likely to play an important role in determin-
ing the final outcome emerging from such a sequential decision process.
Empirical evidence from the field, as well as from laboratory experiments
(Plott and Levine 1978), indicates that the order in which specific sub-
problems are considered frequently leads to different outcomes for the
same broader question.
We expect the same ordering effect for societal decision-making problems
for two principal reasons. Once a decision has been made on a particular
issue, this will then serve as a constraint for the next set of issues. If the
order of the issues is reversed then there is likely to be a different set of
choices to consider. Secondly, each issue involves a different set of inter-
ested parties, and each party uses its own set of data to support its cause.
The timing of the release of this information may have an effect on later
actions. For example, citizens' groups normally enter the scene with
respect to siting problems only when a site close to their own community
is being considered as a possible candidate. The order in which different
locations are considered is thus likely to influence the final outcome of
the debate.
During each stage of the sequential decision process there is a particular
arena that serves as a focal point for the exchange of information. An
arena is either a physical place like a courtroom, or a type of procedure
like a public inquiry where interested parties either debate an issue or
where an opinion is rendered. The types of arenas will differ between
countries depending on the procedural system, as well as on the existing
legislation that designates responsibility to each of the concerned groups.
READER'S AIDS
Here we present three "reader's aids" or analytical frameworks that pro-
vide a structure to the following case studies and that capture the concepts
of the decision-making process described above. We introduce these aids
with some hesitation, however, since analytical heuristics of any kind
inevitably present a degree of artificiality to the process being described. Re-
cognizing that paradigms might actually hinder understanding (Hirschman
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1970), we nonetheless feel that a certain amount of structure is necessary
for the reader to understand and compare the essentials of the four com-
plex siting procedures. The three aids that we have developed for this
purpose include a program evaluation review technique (PERT) diagram
to illustrate the main events and decisions of each process; a party/concern
matrix to illustrate the primary concerns of the main parties; and a multi-
attribute, multi-party (MAMP) framework to illustrate the changing
structure of the problems addressed and the interactions of the parties
involved.
The PERT diagram
An important recent development in the analysis of decision-making
problems over time is networking approaches. These techniques have been
developed for analyzing "one of a kind" activities such as the expansion
of a factory, the introduction of a new product, or a new computer
system. We have turned to this literature in developing a standardized
graphical format to structure the siting decisions in the four countries.
More specifically, we have chosen to construct a diagram modeled on
PERT. 2
We incorporate only the schematic aspects of PERT in our treatment of
the case studies. Figure 2.1 presents a hypothetical diagram in the form
that will be displayed for each case study. The time line indicates the
length of the process from when the project was proposed until a final
decision was made (or to the present if the final outcome is still uncertain).
In this example, the process was initiated in January 1970 and final
approval of the project was given in December 1980. Here there are three
6
8 ,
r- ---Round A- - ----- tRound Bt----- -Round C--1
January December December December
1970 1975 1978 1980
o Key events and/or decisions (= completion of all activities leading to that node)
--. Direction of activity (= task required to be undertaken)
Figure 2.1. Hypothetical PERT diagram.
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rounds, each characterized by a set of events. An event usually represents
a distinct action taken by an actor or an interested party, although it
could also represent an exogenous event such as a disaster. The arrowed
lines connecting events indicate specific activities or tasks in the decision
process. For example, event <D occurs after the activities triggered by
events ® and ® are completed; event ® triggers activities leading to
events ® and <D. This type of PERT diagram, as used in the case studies,
provides a snapshot of the decision process and enables the reader to gain
an overview of the activities, events, and groups participating in the
debate.
The party/concern matrix
An important element of the case-study work has been to describe in
detail the perspectives of each key party or actor entering the debate.
These participants - or, more precisely, groups of participants - have
certain concerns about the outcome of the decision. Their perspectives are
often dominated by a particular dimension of the issue. In each case study,
a table showing the major parties in the siting procedures and their princi-
pal concerns is presented. The table is intended to provide a general over-
view of the conflicting interests involved.
A list of the concerns expressed by the major parties in the four coun-
tries under study is shown in Table 2.1. This table is comprehensive only
in the sense that it shows those concerns that selected persons representing
the major parties revealed when interviewed; there is, of course, no
guarantee that other "hidden" concerns (such as a psychological feeling
against large technologies) exist. In some cases, then, these concerns may
represent more the strategies of the parties than their "real" feelings about
the project.
The MAMP framework
Although the PERT diagram and party/concern matrix present a snapshot
of the key events and party concerns, they do not portray the dynamics
of the process. For this purpose, we have developed the multi-attribute.
multi-party (MAMP) framework, based upon Braybrooke's (1974) formu-
lation of an "issue machine", which he developed to structure a case study
concerning traffic congestion in London.
The anatomy of rounds. A central concept of this "issue machine" is the
notion of rounds of political interaction to describe the evolution of
public policies. A round is simply a convenient device to illustrate a
change in the focus of discussions; that is, a change in the problems being
addressed and a possible accompanying change in the parties involved.
This new focus or formulation may be triggered by:
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Table 2.1. Comprehensive list of actor/party concerns.
National Local
Need N I Economic costs L 3
Import policy N 2 facili ty costs L 31
Export policy N 3 harbor costs L 32
Economic benefits N4 channel costs L3)
(taxes, royalties, balance of negative effects on fishing L 34
payments) and tourism
Economic costs N s Risks to population L 4
facility costs N SI shipping L41
harbor costs N S2 gas storage L 42
channel costs N S3 earthquakes L 43
Image N 6 radio sparks L44
Socioeconomic benefits N 7 jetty operations L4S
Energy policy Ng Risks to workers L s
Regional Physical suitability of site L 6
Air quality R I
Ease and safety of shipping L 7
Industrial development R 2 Consumer
Economic costs R 3 Proximity of users to facility CI
Support of smaller gas supply R 4 Price of gas C2
companies Supply interruption risk C3
Local due to need for gas C31
Amenity and environment L I
due to source country C32
land use L ll
due to weather C33
fishing, marine L 12
due to accidents C34
tourism, recreation L 13
due to earthquakes C3S
local history L I4 Applicant
Economic benefits L 2 Profit Al
taxes L 21 revenues Alljobs, short-term L 22 costs, facility A I2jobs, long-term L 23 costs, harbor A 13jobs, indirect L 24 costs, channel A I4
spin-off industry L 2S Control over sources A 2
harbor activity and prestige L 26 Image A 3
Physical suitability of site A 4
(a) a key decision made on some subset of the overall siting problem (e.g.,
a decision by the national government that a terminal is "needed" in
view of national energy needs);
(b) a statement reached due to conflicts between parties; or
(c) a change in the context of discussions due to an unanticipated event,
the entry of a new party, or new evidence brought into the debate.
Although the structuring of the process in this way has proved to be a
useful heuristic, it must be recognized that these rounds are not unique.
Indeed, there are many ways in which the divisions could be made. We
have attempted to find those points where there appears to have been a
changed agenda, or a central problem, that served as the focus of attention
for the interested parties. For example, an important problem in California
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was whether there existed a need for imported natural gas. Three years
into the approval process, legislation was passed by the California legis-
lature declaring that this need existed and that a site for an LNG terminal
should be identified by a certain date. This changed the political agenda
and marked the beginning of a new round of political interactions.
While in some cases these breaks appear natural, we recognize that
inevitably in some cases the natural flow of events have been forced into
this analytical framework. Yet, in general, we have found that the cases
fit easily and usefully into this structure.
Each round, in turn, is characterized by a general problem formulation,
an initiating event or events, the interaction of the parties involved, and a
decision (or "nondecision") concluding the round. These characteristics
are briefly explained below.
Problem formulation: A critically important aspect of the political
decision-making process is the way in which the problem is formulated.
For instance, is the question before the relevant authorities "whether to
choose site X or site Y", or is the question whether to approve the import
of LNG in the context of national energy needs. Generally, we find that as
the rounds progress, the number of open questions is reduced as each is
sequentially resolved, sometimes bounding the discussions of the next
round. An early round may be opened by industry submitting an appli-
cation for a facility at its chosen site. In this case, the open questions may
include whether the facility is needed and whether the chosen site is the
best alternative; or, if these questions have been resolved (e.g., within
national energy policy and a siting plan) the open question may instead be
framed as whether the facility can be operated safely at that site.
Problems are formulated by a process where earlier decisions and the
power of those with decision authority essentially frame the issues on the
table. There is no pretense here that all the parties involved agree with this
representation. Indeed, each party has its own definition of the problem,
and ideas as to how it would frame the issue. For example, an opposition
group may not agree that the facility is needed. Yet, if this question has
been resolved in an earlier round, such as was the case in California, it may
prove difficult, though not impossible, for the group to reopen the "need"
discussion. It is a common characteristic of interactive problem solving
that many (perhaps most) of the participants carry in their minds a
distinct version of how they define "the problem". There is thus continu-
ing competition between the parties to frame the problem on the political
agenda; for example, will the hearings on site X allow debate on the
question of whether the facility is needed? The "problem formulation" as
recorded in the rounds of the case studies does not represent a consensus
between the parties, but rather indicates the power of certain parties to
define the issues to be addressed.
Initiating a round: A round of discussions may be initiated by a
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formal application or an informal request. Informal discussions may be
initiated simply by a request for information on the part of one of the
parties, or a request for preliminary discussions. The particular form of
these initiating requests may further define or limit the bounds of the
discussion.
The rounds recorded in the case studies generally commence when the
question of siting an LEG terminal gains status as an issue on the political
agenda. Internal discussions by the industry concerning a site would not
constitute an issue on the political agenda; nor would discussions by the
national government on energy policy if there is not a specific concern
about an LEG terminal.
While the case study rounds begin with a formal request or application
by one of the parties, much information, analysis, as well as politics, enter
into the problem well before the explicit decision-making process is begun.
Long-standing beliefs and attitudes constrain the problem formulation as
it finally emerges for explicit consideration; they also constrain the
alternatives that can be considered. To some extent, therefore, solutions
are decided upon before they become the focus of discussion, analysis,
and debate (Lindblom 1982, personal communication). These "pre-
rounds" of the process are unfortunately difficult to elicit since there is
little formal documentation, and parties often have conflicting inter-
pretations of the activities. To the extent possible, however, these early
interchanges are discussed in the case studies.
Interaction phase: To understand a particular pattern of institutional
choice it is necessary to describe the actors, their respective responsibil-
ities, interactions with one another at different stages of the process, and
the information available to them. In a formal sense, a party's evaluation
of a specific siting alternative is based on its estimation of the levels and
values of each effect or attribute resulting from that alternative, and the
relative importance given to each attribute. Another party might have
different estimates of the effects of an alternative based on conflicting
information, its own analysis of costs and benefits resulting from those
effects, or a different ranking of the importance of the attributes.
Another important feature of the decision process is that the value of
an attribute can change over time because of the introduction of new
information. For example, if a report provides new insight into the seismic
risk associated with a particular site, this may cause a change in the
perception of this attribute by one or more of the parties involved. That
change may take the form of a different estimate of the level of the
attribute for that site, or perhaps a different weight may be given to the
relative importance of the attribute.
The outcome of the political debate, to a large extent, results from
some combination of the following: the formal responsibilities of the
parties involved; the attention given to the issues in light of limited
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financial resources and time; the way in which the problems on the political
agenda are framed; and the exogenous events that may change the problem
and/or the parties. The interaction phase can be thought of as the formal
and informal communication between the parties influencing the decision
outcome. Wynne (1982) feels that it is futile to assume that parties inter-
act as "rational" actors in the sense of actively and openly pursuing clearly
defined objectives. Defensive behavior, that is, the avoidance of problems
and dangers, may be as rational in these situations as goal-directed behavior.
In addition, Majone (1979) points out that organizational behavior is
usually not directed at problem solving in any rational sense, but rather at
serving the longer-term interests of the organization or institution. In the
public domain, as opposed to the market, decisions must be justified using
seemingly objective arguments. Therefore the points made by the parties
are important insofar as they reveal the complex strategies and counter-
strategies of those in the policy game.
The interactions between the parties, as recorded in the rounds of the
case studies, are represented by the main arguments each party brings to
the debate in support of or in rejection of each of the alternatives at hand.
These arguments may relate to only one or two attributes. In some cases
the attribute may be selected to maximize the effectiveness of the argu-
ment rather than reflecting an actual concern of the party. For example,
a party opposed to a site because of its concern for environmental quality
may present an argument using seismic risk as the main reason for rejecting
the site. The argument thus reflects a strategy on the part of the actor in
support of or in opposition to the proposal. This strategy may be based on
hidden agendas that are never revealed by overt actions or statements. By
studying the strategy of the actors, one could uncover underlying motives
and desires. This is important in understanding the interpretation and use
of scientific evidence, including risk analyses.
The interactions between the various and often multifold participants is
only partly face-to-face, as in a committee, task force, or hearing. Most of
the dialogue that bears on the final resolution of the policy question are
distant interactions. Moreover, they sometimes occur without individuals
being directly aware of the actions of others. The interaction phase
provides useful insights into the process. Parties often come into the
debate with firm preferences. The interaction phase brings out their argu-
ments, and perceptions, and reveals many changes in their positions on an
issue. The stability of the system can, at least partially, be judged by the
degree to which the actors and arguments remain the same after each
successive round.
Concluding a round: A round is concluded by a decision, a stalemate,
a change in information (changing the focus of the debate and hence
initiating a new round), or an exogenous event (e.g., a disaster) aborting
the discussions and requiring a new round of inquiry. Each decision, in
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turn, can be described by the trade-offs implicit in the choices made.
These trade-offs may not be explicitly recognized by the decision makers,
nor explicitly analyzed in the process of making the decision.
The conclusion of a round can take one of two forms. If there is a
feasible solution that is agreed upon by those with decision responsibility,
the process ends. However, if one or more parties is dissatisfied with the
situation at the end of the round, and has recourse to other channels, or if
the round ends in a request for further action, a new problem is formulated
for the next round. This sequence is repeated for another set of alterna-
tives, interested parties, etc.
SUMMARY
In summary, the societal decision-making process is one where there are a
number of interested parties each of which has its own goals and objec-
tives. Each group also has its own set of information that is used to defend
specific recommendations. The decision-making process is frequently
sequential and decentralized, and many items compete for the limited
time and attention of the people involved. The process of agenda setting is
an important element in understanding why certain problems are consid-
ered important while others are ignored. Recent empirical studies have
stressed the importance of exogenous events in having items placed on the
formal agenda. Political decision making is likely to follow a sequential
process whereby new issues emerge through the resolution of previous
issues, changes in party preferences, and/or social norms.
Three aids have been developed to structure the political siting processes
of the four countries: a PERT diagram to describe the main events; a
party /concern matrix to list the concerns of the major parties; and a
MAMP framework to describe the evolving problem formulations and
arguments of the participating parties. The case studies themselves were
developed after extensive interviews with key individuals involved in the
siting processes of the countries concerned. Each interviewee was asked to
describe the process and problems of siting an LEG facility from his or her
own perspective.
Only after the individual perspectives of each of the major participants
or observers were elicited and recorded in full-scale case studies did we
develop the reader's aids. These aids are not intended as analytical tools.
Rather, their purpose is to help trace and structure the events and party
participation of four complex siting procedures in a way that lends itself
to making descriptive comparisons. Analysis and interpretation of this
material, such as questioning the usefulness of scientific expertise in
political siting issues, is only possible with a firm understanding of the
people and institutions involved, as well as of the procedural constraints.
In the following case studies the people, institutions, and political styles
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of the four countries in selecting and approving LEG terminal sites will be
described using these reader's aids. Chapters 8 and 9 address some of the
analytical questions raised, based on this descriptive material, coupled
with the use of risk analyses in the four countries.
NOTES
1. This definition of power is used by Cobb and Elder (1972), who
elaborate on its importance in the context of agenda building.
2. The PERT approach originated in 1958 as part of a research project
designed to evaluate the progress of the US Navy's Polaris missile
program (Emory and Niland 1968).
Chapter 3
The FRG: Ripples at
Wilhelmshaven*
This chapter deals with the siting and approval process for a liquefied
natural gas (LNG) import facility at Wilhelmshaven in the Federal Republic
of Germany. The major aspects of the political decision-making process
are summarized, focusing on the role of technical analyses of public safety
risk in this decision. The most remarkable feature of this process was that
despite the novelty of the LNG technology in the FRG, it deviated very
little from established industrial siting and approval procedures. Public
interest in the project and concerns about its acceptability did not rise
above a relatively low level. At some point, however, unexpected diffi-
culties related to the question of safety risk seemed to threaten the
approval of the terminal, but these were eventually overcome by the
federal government in a rather elegant way, leaving little more than ripples
on the surface.
SETTING THE STAGE
The Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of 1949 established the FRG as a federation
of what are currently ten autonomous states or regions, called Lander
(excluding West Berlin, which has special status). As a rule, the federal
government establishes laws and regulations that are implemented by the
Lander (for a more detailed description see Southern 1979). There are five
administrative levels: federal (Bund), state (Land), district (Regierungs-
bezirk), county (Kreis), and municipality (Gemeinde). The counties and
municipalities act in some matters as agents of the states, but at the same
time they are also responsible for executing the local autonomous
legislation (kommunale Selbstverwaltung). At the two lowest levels an
*This chapter was written by Hermann Atz, based on a more comprehensive case
study (Atz 1982). The author worked closely with Joanne Linnerooth in integrating
the case stUdy material within the MAMP framework.
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elected council oversees and also usually appoints the head of administra-
tion. At the district level, no elected body exists, but the district govern-
ment is responsible for a variety of administrative duties. It is the principal
executive institution within the state, and may act as an agency of the
state government in matters delegated to it.
Political decision making in the FRG cannot be fully understood unless
one takes into account the specific separation of powers between the
legislature and the executive as laid down in the constitution and perceived
by the citizens. In contrast to the US system, for example, public adminis-
tration is regarded as a branch of law, rather than as part of the political
system proper. Because administrative bodies are not directly controlled
by the elected bodies, the administrative law and its courts playa particu-
larly important role in protecting citizens against decisions that they
perceive to affect their granted rights. Consequently, citizens are quite
capable of dealing with administrative procedures, whereas most of them
exhibit passive attitudes towards the policy formulation process (Reichel
1981).
Because of this complicated distribution of responsibilities, the strict
separation of powers, the important role of civil servants in policy making,
together with the relatively weak position of individual political parties, a
tendency towards consensus has prevailed in German politics (see Scharpf
et al. 1976). Yet, over the last 15 years, a growing number of environmen-
talist and citizens' action groups of all kinds have entered the political
arena, and in many cases siting decisions on large-scale technological
installations (such as nuclear power plants) have been the focus of strong
protest (see Murphy et al. 1979, Guggenberger 1980, Kitschelt 1980).
Despite the extension of formal public participation, however, the
opportunity for interest groups to influence particular decisions through
political demands has remained rather small, although in some cases
litigation has proved an effective means of stopping, or at least of delaying,
certain industrial projects and technological policies.
Wilhelmshaven, established as a Prussian naval port in the nineteenth
century, is a city of about 100 000 inhabitants on the German North Sea
coast to the west of Bremerhaven (see Figure 3.1). In spite of its location
on Jade Bay, which provides naturally good shipping conditions,
Wilhelmshaven's industrial base has remained relatively weak, partly
because of the city's dependence on military installations did not encour-
age such development, and partly because of other factors such as the
great distance from the consumer markets in the Hannover area, Lower
Saxony's economic and administrative center. The coastal zone near the
city of Wilhelmshaven is one of the least developed parts of Lower Saxony,
with a high rate of unemployment.
To help alleviate these economic difficulties Wilhelmshaven has been
designated an industrial center in regional development plans. To attract
industry, the shipping channel was deepened and a large area of land
34 Risk Analysis and Decision Processes
North Sea
Dusseldorf
NETHERLANDS
I
,
Schleswig-
Holstein
Hannover
•
-
50
I
Scale
I I
a
I
Dortmund
•
Nordrhein-
Westfalen
•Essen
.......
I
.-.- .
c
.-!
Eemshaven
I
,
I'
'"
Figure 3.1. Northern part of the Federal Republic of Germany.
reclaimed from the sea. The state of Lower Saxony has been deeply
involved with these activities, and the LNG terminal was discussed in this
context in order to make use of the infrastructure created to promote
industrial developmnet.
The site selected for the LNG terminal lies in the north of this reclaimed
land near Wilhelmshaven, on the border of the adjacent municipality of
Wangerland (see Figure 3.2), which has a population of approximately
10000. The village of Hooksiel, which belongs to this municipality, is less
than 2 km from the terminal plot, and a recreational area is only a few
hundred meters away. This recreational zone was intended to compensate
for the loss of Hooksiel's boating harbor and for the inconvenience
resulting from the closeness of industry. In fact, the proximity of Hooksiel
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and the unfortunate location of the recreational zone became important
points of conflict during the procedures relating to the LNG terminal (see
Figure 3.3).
The project under consideration involved the construction of an LNG
import terminal at Wilhelmshaven to store natural gas shipped from a
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liquefaction facility in Algeria in special tankers, each carrying 125000 m 3
of LNG. From Wilhelmshaven the gas would be distributed to consumers
either by pipeline (after regasification) or by smaller LNG tankers. The
planned terminal consisted of a berth to load or unload one small and two
larger LNG tankers at the same time, a closed transfer system to the
facilities on land, storage tanks (originally four, later six) for approxi-
mately 500000 m 3 of LNG, and a regasification plant. l The facility was
designed to transfer 12 billion m 3 of natural gas per year (equivalent at
normal temperature and pressure), corresponding to one-fifth of the
current (1980) level of natural gas consumption in the FRG. As described
below, the LNG project became closely bound up with plans to build a
petrochemical plant handling hazardous chemicals (ethylene, vinylchloride,
and soda-lye) on an adjacent site. Both facilities were designed to use a
common transport bridge (elevated pipelines for LNG and liquid chemi-
cals, and a road) connecting the two separate jetties.
Because of the sandbanks on Jade Bay, the planned jetties would have
to be at least 1500 m long, extending to within 500 m of the deep-water
channel. At this point there is a fairly sharp bend in the channel, and so
a seriously debated concern was the risk of a vessel deviating from its
course along the channel and colliding with an LNG tanker moored at the
jetty or with the transfer facilities.
Different technical features of the LNG project determined which
approval procedures would be necessary (see Steiger and Kimminich
1976). The most important were the following:
(1) The land-based facilities would be licensed, as is the case with other
major industrial projects, by a state administrative agency.
(2) Since Jade Bay is within the three-mile coastal zone, it is considered to
be part of the inland waterway system, under the jurisdiction of the
Federal Waterways and Shipping Administration. A special licensing
procedure is necessary for any construction in a federal waterway.
(3) Plans for a land-based facility can only be licensed if they comply with
town and country planning regulations. The adjustment of the relevant
zoning plans to suit the particular development (a responsibility of the
municipalities) was therefore a precondition for the approval of the
proposed terminal.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
After briefly introducing the principal parties, we will structure the main
events with the aid of a PERT diagram, as described in Chapter 2. This
discussion presents an outline of the main decisions and events in the
siting process, but does not take account of internal decision making
within each interested party.
The main parties that played a dominant role in the decision-making
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Table 3.1. Key parties in the LNG decision process in the FRG.
Applicant
Ruhrgas, Gelsenberg
(DFTG)
National government
Federal Minister of
Transportation (FMT)
Water and Shipping
Board North-West
(WSB)
State government
Lower Saxony Ministry
of Economic Affairs
and Transportation
(ME&T)
District Government
of Weser-Ems (DGWE)
Local authorities
Wilhelmshaven
Wangerland
County of Friesland
Two important private energy supply companies and
their subsidiary company, DFTG, applied for approval
of the LNG terminal. Ruhrgas is specialized in the gas
market, and provides two-thirds of the supply.
Highest authority of the Federal Waterways and Ship-
ping administration, responsible for maintaining and
developing waterways and regulating shipping in them.
It was in this last capacity that the FMT was involved
in the LNG decision process.
One of the six federal waterway authorities at the
intermediate level, in charge of licensing the proposed
harbor facilities of the joint DFTG/ICI project in
accordance with the Federal Waterway Law by a plan
specification procedure.
Executes regional development programs for the state
(Land) government; in particular, it grants subsidies
and advises interested enterprises in their siting
decisions.
Involved in two different functions in the LNG siting
process: responsible for granting a license for the land-
based facilities according to the Federal Immission
Control Law; and acted as an agent of Lower Saxony
in planning a part of the harbor facilities, namely the
transport bridge to be used jointly by DFTG and ICI.
In this latter capacity, DGWE also filed an application
with WSB for a plan specification procedure.
Host municipality and county of the LNG terminal,
comprising an elected council and administrative body
headed by an appointed director. While the city council
has to approve all main decisions, most of the actual
work is done within the administration. Because of
local autonomy with respect to zoning and develop-
ment planning, compliance of the municipality is
crucial for any industrial project.
The municipality bordering on the terminal site in the
north of Wilhelmshaven. Since some Wangerland
citizens would be more directly affected than the
majority of residents of Wilhelmshaven, this munici-
pality was naturally an interested party looking very
critically at the project.
Encompasses eight municipalities around Wilhelms-
haven, excluding the city. The county had only
limited formal duties in the decision process, but it
strongly supported the interests of Wangerland, a
municipality within its jurisdiction.
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Table 3.1. continued
Other interested parties
Hooksiel Citizens'
Group (HCG)
The most effective action group intervening in the
LNG siting debate, formed by members of 17 associ-
ations and clubs based in the village of Hooksiel. The
group attempted to represent the interests of the
residents in a quasi-official way, but its influence
depended mainly on a few very active persons.
process are listed in Table 3.1. Other interested parties were either of
negligible influence, or their positions were represented by other groups
listed in the table. 2
The PERT diagram showing the main events leading to the approval in
principle of an LNG terminal at Wilhelmshaven in 1979 is shown in Figure
3.4. The circled numbers in the diagram and in the text indicate the
decision events that can be construed as dividing the process into four
partially overlapping rounds. Rounds A and B em braced the siting
decision proper, outline planning of the facilities, and the general agree-
ment between three of the parties - Ruhrgas and Gelsenberg, Lower
Saxony, and Wilhelmshaven - on the desirability of the project. The initia-
tion of the formal approval and licensing procedures is taken as the
starting point of round C, in which most of the public debate on the LNG
terminal took place. Round D dealt with the question of shipping hazards,
which emerged as the most critical from the licensing procedures.
Rounds A and B. In the late 1960s several gas companies in Europe
began considering the possibility of importing LNG from Algeria, at that
time a major exporting country. After completing an internal screening
process, Ruhrgas and Gelsenberg decided that they would prefer a possibly
more expensive domestic site to other potentially less costly sites in
Belgium, France, or the Netherlands, and this was justified by the perceived
lower risk of supply interruption. In 1972 the two companies founded a
subsidiary firm based in Wilhelmshaven to build and operate an LNG
terminal, the Deutsche Fhissigerdgas Terminal Gesellschaft mbH
(DFTG). <D
Subsequent consultations with the Lower Saxony Ministry of Economic
Affairs and Transportation (ME&T)3 and with local authorities confirmed
DFTG's view that Wilmhelmshaven was particularly appropriate for an
LNG terminal site. ® In these talks the ME&T acted not only as the state
authority concerned with regional economic development in general, but
also represented the state of Lower Saxony as the owner of the reclaimed
land on Jade Bay. The choice of Wilhelmshaven was agreed in principle in
a preliminary contract between Ruhrgas and Gelsenberg, DFTG, and
Lower Saxony in November 1973. ® These parties, and the Wilhelmshaven
authorities, then engaged in long and tough negotiations concerning
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Figure 3.4. PERT diagram for the LNG decision process in the FRG.
Key events and/or decisions
<D Ruhrgas and Gelsenberg decide in tavor of a domestic site for the LNG terminal
and set up the subsidiary DFTG (1972).
@Gas companies, DFTG, and Lower Saxony sign preliminary contract (Nov. 1973).
® DFTG, after consultations with public authorities, selects from possible sites at
Wilhelmshaven (June 1974).
@ A settlement contract is agreed between DFTG, Ruhrgas, Gelsenberg, Lower
Saxony, and Wilhelmshaven (July 1976).® DFTG, ICI, and Lower Saxony agree on joint harbor facilities for the petrochemi-
cal plant and the LNG terminal (spring 1977).
@Wilhelmshaven initiates the construction plan approval procedures for the terminal
site (May 1977).
Q) A delivery contract between a Dutch-German consortium and Sonatrach of
Algeria is signed (June 1977).
® DFTG, followed by ICI and Lower Saxony, files application for the harbor facili-
ties with the WSB (September 1977 to February 1978).
® DFTG files application for land-based facilities with the district government of
Weser-Ems (September 1977).
@)Wilhelmshaven City Council approves the construction plan after overcoming
objections raised by interest groups (July 1978).
@ The Federal Minister of Transportation (FMT) becomes directly involved in the
approval procedure concerning harbor facilities (July 1978).
@The FMT evaluates the risks related to the LNG terminal and tanker traffic on
Jade Bay, and finds them acceptable subject to certain conditions (March 1979).
@WSB approves the joint harbor facilities (March to July 1979).
~ The DGWE grants its preliminary license for land-based LNG facilities (July 1979).
@Termination of approval procedure for construction of the LNG terminal (July
1979).
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necessary preconditions for approval of the project, the outcome of which
was the signing of a "settlement contract" in July 1976.4 @
Simultaneously, at the request of the ME&T, the local authorities
affected by the LNG project, the regulatory agencies, and DFTG consid-
ered its feasibility from different perspectives, such as impact on the
regional economy, environmental effects, and occupational and pu blic
safety. They also considered suitable locations within the industrial zone
at Wilhelmshaven and agreed on criteria relevant in selecting the actual site
(see Table 3.3, round B). In 1974, DFTG decided in favor of one of the
two plots offered by Lower Saxony, namely the northernmost zone.
Legally, the sale of this piece of land was finalized in the settlement
contract and was later approved by the parliament of Lower Saxony.
Following the negotiations, although some time before the signing of
the contract, all interested parties intensified their efforts to initiate the
planning approval procedures. Various discussions took place between
DFTG, Wilhelmshaven, and the licensing authorities (DGWE and WSB),
but in late 1976 these were disturbed by an event that surprised all
parties in the decision process, with the possible exception of the ME&T:
the British company Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd (ICI) declared its
interest in Wilhelmshaven as a site for a new petrochemical plant. Lower
Saxony supported the ICI proposal and, since the only suitable site was
one adjacent to that reserved for the LNG terminal, DFTG was informed
that changes would have to be made to the jetty designs. The revised plans
eventually agreed upon by DFTG, ICI, and Lower Saxony provided for
two separate jetties, one for each facility, connected by a joint transport
bridge, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. ®
Rounds C and D. Because ICI wanted to start construction of the petro-
chemical plant as soon as possible, this had a considerable impact on the
dynamics of the decision process, and thus initiated round C in spring
1977. The new jetty design had hardly been settled when the Wilhelms-
haven authorities initiated construction plan (Bebauungsplan) procedures
for both projects, as required by federal construction law (Bundesbauge-
setz). ® Objections to the LNG terminal were then raised by a rather
small group of environmentalists in Wilhelmshaven, the Hooksiel Citizens'
Group, as well as by the municipality of Wangerland and some other local
authorities on the grounds of safety risk, and the potentially negative
effects on the environment, fishing, and tourism. Having heard and
responded to these objections the Wilhelmshaven City Council approved
the construction plan as proposed in July 1978. 0
A crucial first step in the realization of the LNG project was in June
1977, when the Dutch-German consortium (Ruhrgas AG, Salzgitter
Ferngas GmbH, and NV Nederlandse Gasunie) signed a contract with the
Algerian company Sonatrach for the sale of 8 billion m 3 of LNG per year
for a period of 20 years starting in 1984, half of which was reserved for
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the German companies. 0 According to this contract, Sonatrach had to be
notified of the exact location of the LNG terminal site by October 1978,
a deadline which was later to cause problems.
In September 1977 DFTG filed applications for two licenses: the dis-
trict government of Weser-Ems (DGWE) was responsible for approval of
the land-based facilities through a preliminary license (Genehmigungsuor-
bescheid) according to the Federal Immission Control Law,s ® but the
harbor facilities were subject to another licensing procedure, the so-called
plan specification (Planfeststellung), in accordance with the Federal
Waterway Law. The Water and Shipping Board North-West (WSB) was
responsible for granting this license, and considered the two jetties and the
transport bridge (to be built by Lower Saxony, represented by the
DGWE) jointly in three similar procedures. 6 ®
Both DGWE and WSB then scrutinized the plans, and the application
was laid open to the public. However, toward the middle of 1978, the
WSB revealed a growing reluctance to approve the project because of their
concern over unresolved problems related to shipping hazards in Jade Bay.
The WSB therefore informed the Federal Minister of Transportation
(FMT) that it did not wish to take sole responsibility for decisions regard-
ing appropriate safety measures and the acceptability of the public safety
risks, and so asked the minister to consider the critical questions him-
self. @ The FMT was advised by a working group at the WSB (which
included representatives of all relevant local authorities and regulatory
agencies) and a committee of experts from the ministry. After consulta-
tions with other federal ministries, the FMT decided that the public safety
risk would be acceptable only if a number of special measures were taken,
the most important being an expensive change to the configuration of the
deep-water shipping channel to the terminal. @ This paved the way for
the WSB to approve the plans for all the harbor facilities (DFTG and ICI
jetties, transport bridge) between March and July 1979. @
When, shortly afterwards, the district government of Weser-Ems granted
a preliminary license for the land-based facilities, ~ all potential obstacles
had been surmounted. This was equivalent to an approval in principle of
the whole project, allowing construction to start. @ As for the current
state of the project (end of 1982), construction of the terminal has not
begun because of an unanticipated change in Algeria's export policy
concerning LNG in early 1980. It is expected that construction will be
delayed until the gas companies are able to negotiate a new LNG import
contract.
PARTY CONCERNS
Table 3.2 gives an overview of the features and potential impacts of the
proposed LNG terminal that were of concern to the main interested parties.
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One has to be cautious in interpreting this table since the reasons for the
parties' concerns about specific aspects of the project differed quite
markedly. For example, the vital interests of some parties were directly
affected, some parties had a legal mandate to look at particular conse-
quences, while others used their concerns as strategic arguments to support
their positions. While it is easy to identify explicit responsibilities, it is
much more difficult to distinguish between "real" and "strategic" con-
cerns. In addition, this list does not aim to assess in detail the roles of all
the main parties, but rather to give a general picture of the variety of
dimensions considered.
National and regional aspects were not considered in any great detail;
most of the parties focused on local impacts. Consequently, the public
debate dealt mainly with expected economic benefits or costs, potential
risks, or negative environmental effects. In general, the parties most
directly affected at local level had the broadest concerns, whereas the
perspectives of the licensing authorities were generally confined to a few
dimensions. 7 Of course, the picture is incomplete unless one takes the
time dimension into account, and this will be done below.
THE MAMP FRAMEWORK
To illuminate some of the "substance" and the dynamics of the decision
process, we introduce here the multi-attribute, multi-party (MAMP)
framework (see Chapter 2). For the purpose of adding some structure, we
have divided the process into a series of four rounds, which were discussed
above. Each round is initiated by certain decisions or events that lead to
an interaction phase. A round is concluded by a set of other events or
decisions. Party interactions are characterized by the main concerns and
the associated arguments of each actor. In so far as different questions are
treated simultaneously, rounds also overlap. Full details of the rounds
are given in Table 3.3.
Policy questions
The LNG siting decision in the FRG can be divided into three policy
questions:
• Is a domestic LNG terminal desirable?
• If so, where should it be located?
• Under what conditions can the terminal be approved at that site?
It is apparent that the first two questions played a negligible role in the
political decision process: the question of desirability was addressed only
in the narrow sense of whether the LNG terminal was suitablE for Wil-
helmshaven. The siting question was not dealt with by public authorities
except for the choice between different plots at Wilhelmshaven. A more
general evaluation of the question of desirability and appropriate siting
was only done within Ruhrgas and Gelsenberg (DFTG). Government
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Table 3.3. The MAMP framework applied to the decision process on LNG in the
Federal Republic of Germany.
(a) ROUND A: 1972-July 1976.
PROBLEM FORMATION
Assumptions: (1) Natural gas is an important source of energy and its benefits are generally
accepted.
(2) The possibility exists to import Algerian LNG.
(3) The site at Wilhelmshaven is an area created to encourage industrial devel-
opment.
Question: Given its feasibilty, is the proposed LNG project suitable and desirable for
Wilhelmshaven?
II INITIATION
Ruhrgas and Gelsenberg (later DFTG) announce to Lower Saxony their intention to build
an LNG terminal (1972). Wilhelmshaven is considered to be the most appropriate harbor by
DFTG and ME&T. <D a
III INTERACTION
Party
DFTG, gas
companies
Wilhelmshaven
ME&T
Position
For site at
Wilhelmshaven
For site at
Wilhelmshaven, subject
to conditions on
environmental impact
For site at
Wilhelmshaven, subject
to conditions on
business structure
Arguments
Need for natural gas (N I) fits regional
development plans (R 2 ); technology is
safe (L 4 ).b
Contributes to industrial development
(L 2 ); safety and a high degree of envi-
ronmental protection have to be ensured
(L 1 , L 4 ).
Beneficial to regional economy (R 2 , L 2 );
support of gas supply companies in
Lower Saxony (R 4 ).
IV CONCLUSIONS
1976: Lower Saxony and Wilhelmshaven commit themselves to support the project at the
selected site; ® ® the gas companies and DFTG agree on certain conditions (settlement
contract). @
a Circled numbers refer to the main events as illustrated in the PERT diagram (Figure 3.4).
b Symbols in parentheses are the same as those used in Table 3.1 to denote different con-
cerns; arguments referring to population safety are indicated in italics.
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Table 3.3. (continued) The MAMP framework applied to the decision process on LNG
in the Federal Republic of Germany.
(b) ROUND B: 1972---j;pring 1977.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Assumption: For economic, technical and political reasons, Wilhelmshaven is a desirable
site for constructing an LNG terminal. @
Questions: (1) Is the proposed LNG terminal acceptable with regard to safety and envi-
ronmental protection requirements, town and country planning regula-
tions, etc.?
(2) Which site at Wilhelmshaven is most appropriate?
II INITIATION
Lower Saxony and industry ask the regulatory agencies to give their views (1972/73).
III INTERACTION
Because of the type of interaction that went on at this stage of the decision process (informal
consultations between companies and licensing authorities), and the restricted sources of in-
formation available, it was not possible to identify the individual positions and arguments of
particular parties in this round. Therefore, we only list the parties involved and dimensions
considered.
Parties
DFTG, gas companies, Wilhelmshaven, Friesland County, ME&T, DGWE, WSB.
Concerns
Safety and ease of shipping in the channel, nautical safety at the jetty.
Hydrological conditions and effects on the morphology of Jade Bay.
Population safety
Negative environmental effects: noise, air, and water pollution.
Technical and operational aspects.
Costs: facility, harbor, and maintenance of shipping channel.
IV CONCLUSIONS
(1) June 1974: Based on a siting analysis performed by a consultancy firm, DFTG selects
one of the two plots offered by Lower Saxony. ®
(2) Spring 1977: DFTG, ICI, and Lower Saxony agree on plans to construct joint harbour
facilities for the ICI petrochemical plant and the LNG terminal. ®
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Table 3.3. (continued) The MAMP framework applied to the decision process on LNG
in the Federal Republic of Germany.
(e) ROUND C: Spring 1977-July 1979.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Assumptions: Contract with Sonatrach ensures LNG delivery (deadline for the terminal site
selection October 1978). <D DFTG, gas companies, Lower Saxony, Wilhelms-
haven are precommitted to a site at Wilhelmshaven. ICI want to build a
petrochemical plant adjacent to the proposed LNG terminaJ:,.so Lower
Saxony, ICI, and DFTG agree to combined jetty facilities. ®
Questions: (1) Is the project suited to local and regional development plans?
(2) Do the facilities meet all relevant safety and environmental regulations?
(3) Are there any private rights preventing approval of the project?
Process Various established statutory procedures for siting and licensing industrial
constraints: facilities
II INITIATION
May 1977: Wilhelmshaven initiates construction plan approval procedures. ® September
1977: DFTG requests approval of the DGWE to construct the facilities. ® September 1977
to February 1978: DFTG, followed by ICI and Lower Saxony, request WSB approval to
build jetty facilities. ®
III INTERACTION
Party Position Arguments
Against the
project
Against the
project
For the project,
with additional
safety measures
DFTG
Hooksiel
Citizens'
Group
Wilhelmshaven
Wangerland
and Friesland
County
DGWE
WSB
For the project Need for natural gas (N I ); supplies guaranteed (N 2); bene-
ficial to region (R 2); improves infrastructure (L 25 ), jobs
(L 22 , L 23 ); no population risks with safety measures (L 41 ,
L 42 ; 1-6)a; environmental regulations are met (L II , L\2).
Benefits not obvious; few jobs created (R 2 , R 3 ); tourism
and fishing affected (L 34 );population risks unacceptable
due to probable vessel accidents and proximity of ICI and
Mobil (L II , L 42 ; 8): psychological threat, pollution
unacceptable (L 11 , L 12 ).
Beneficial to industrial development (L 2 , L 25 , L 26 ); tax
benefits (L 21 ); few jobs created, but important (L 22 , L 23 ,
L 24 ); technology is safe (L4 ); minor environmental effects
with safety measures (L l1 , L 12); benefits outweight eco-
nomic and environmental costs (L 1 , L 2 , L 34 ).
Negative effects on environment (L [I ), tourism, and
fishing (L 34 ); high risks due to vessel accidents and
proximity of ICI and Mobil (L II , L 42 ).
For the project Beneficial to region (R 2 , L 2 ); jobs (with ICI) (L 22 , L 23 ,
L 24 ); tax benefits (L 21 ); no danger to public si;.~" worst
conceivable accident not serious (L 42 ; 11,13); environ-
mental regulations are met (L I ); negative effects accept-
able (L 1 , L 2 , L 3 ).
For add:tional No effects on Jade Bay (L 12); 'IOn-neglible population risk
safety measures, (L 41 ; 1, 3, 6,9); shipping safety not guaranteed (L 6 ).
but still undecided
IV CONCLUSIONS
(1) July 1978: City of Wilhelmshaven approves construction plan. @
(2) July 1979: DGWE grants license, subject to a number of technical requirements. 3
(3) WSB remains undecided with respect to shipping safety. @
a Numbers in parentheses refer to the respective numbers of expert studies (see Table 3.4)
used to support the arguments.
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Table 3.3. (continued) The MAMP framework applied to the decision process on LNG
in the Federal Republic of Germany.
(d) ROUND D: August 1975-July 1979.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Assumptions: (1) WSB is concerned about the safety aspects of LNG shipping in Jade Bay.
(2) Industry and Lower Saxony are concerned about delays in the decision
procedure.
(3) Extensive risk-reducing measures (change in configuration of the deep-
water channel) are proposed.
Questions: (1) Are the risks of LNG shipping in Jade Bay acceptably low in view of the
proposed safety measures?
(2) Are the risk-reducing measures justified?
II INITIATION
August 1978: Federal Minister of Transportation (FMT) intervenes in the WSB approval
procedure. @
III INTERACTION
Party
Advisory Committee
at FMT
Position
Approve project, subject
to safety conditions
Arguments
Limited population risk is acceptable
(L 41 ; 17).
IV CONCLUSIONS
(1) March 1979: The FMT decides that the residual risk of the LNG terminal is accept-
able.a @
(2) July 1979: The WSB approves the license for the LNG terminal. @
a Residual risk is defined as the risk remaining after all safety measures have been enforced.
agencies influenced the answers to these questions only in a very indirect
way through energy (Federal Minister of Economic Affairs) and regional
development policies (ME&T). One could therefore say that the most
important part of the decision had been taken before the first round
considered here began. This study does not account for these crucial
predecisions because either they were not made in the context of LNG,
or were taken internally to an organization, and thus outside the political
arena.
The first two rounds can be interpreted as preparatory stages to the
central part of the public decision-making process concerning the LNG
terminal, i.e., the formal licensing and approval procedures that took place
in round C. In round A, the questions addressed were whether and to
what extent Lower Saxony and the local authorities were willing to
support the project in general, and were willing to carry out planning and
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construction approval procedures. Because of this restricted agenda, the
party interactions had the character of negotiations and consultations
based on common interests, such as industrial and economic development.
The local residents knew of course about these activities, since DFTG's
proposal to construct an LNG terminal at Wilhelmshaven had been
reported in the media; but details of the project were treated as confiden-
tial during the first two rounds. By the end of round A, the D FTG and the
public authorities involved were committed to a particular site and to
certain preconditions for the realization of the project.
In round B the regulatory agencies, particularly the licensing authorities
WSB and DGWE, had to give their preliminary views of the feasibility of
the project, and they supported the parties of round A in their choice of
possible sites at Wilhelmshaven. Although this interaction was informal
and not binding, mutual information and internal deliberations had an
important influence on both DFTG's preparation of the plans and the way
in which the license applications were later evaluated. The DFTG was
informed of the main problems from the perspective of the regulatory
agencies, and was thus able to improve in advance the weak points in the
plans. The licensing authorities were also able to collect and process
technical information and to set the conditions that the DFTG would
have to fulfill in order to comply with the relevant regulations.
Site approval formed the agenda of round C, since the site had already
been selected. Various aspects, such as regional development, safety, and
environmental impacts were considered in round C. While the issues at
stake were quite similar to those of round B, the main difference was that
the formal procedures of round C were legally binding, thus enabling new
parties to become involved in the decision process. For example, only
after detailed design plans were published could the public air its views on
the proposed LNG terminal. In other words, only after important predeci-
sions such as the choice of an appropriate site and the elaboration of a
desirable terminal design had been taken (during rounds A and B) did
those directly affected by the project have an opportunity to participate
in the debate.
Interaction between the interested parties therefore became consider-
ably more adversarial during round C, although not in the form of open
public debate because of legal constraints. Concerns about the project
could only be raised within a certain period of time and within the
problem bounds defined by law for each of the procedures. Town and
country planning, for instance, does not enable safety or environmental
issues to be addressed in any detail, even if the procedure is adjusted to a
particular project, as it was in this case.
Local opposition to the LNG terminal was aroused during the spring and
summer of 1976 when the public and neighboring municipalities were
officially informed about the project as part of the legally required con-
struction plan approval procedures. It had been known for some time that
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the area to the north of Wilhelmshaven had been earmarked for industrial
development; but the reaction to the actual DFTGjICI plans could best be
described as "planning shock". The residents of Hooksiel were under the
impression that the area had been zoned for small-scale, environmentally
harmless industries since it had been designated as a "restricted industrial
zone", but this injunction in fact referred only to noise levels. The hazards
and potential environmental effects became more obvious after the
publication of the plans, and offered a clear focus for the opposition.
The opposition to the DFTGjICI project was made up of a coalition of
environmentalists in Wilhelmshaven, inhabitants of Hooksiel who felt
directly affected, and local authorities (Wangerland and Friesland) who
considered the plans a serious threat to the economic development of
Hooksiel. This opposition did not include groups with general anti-
industrial, anti-capitalist ideologies, nor "grassroots" movements that tend
to refuse to cooperate in principle with established political institutions.
The local residents' concerns about risk, negative environmental effects,
and damage to local businesses and tourism were closely related - indeed,
sometimes interwoven.
Despite its efforts to support these concerns with as many arguments as
possible, the opposition was not very successful in fighting its case. During
the construction plan approval procedure the Wilhelmshaven City Council
overruled most of the objections on procedural grounds, referring to the
following licensing procedures. The licensing authorities considered them-
selves the wrong audience for issues they felt were not technical but
political in nature (such as insufficient public participation, no long-term
economic benefits, etc.). Only when Wangerland and the Hooksiel Citizens'
Group (HCG) each appealed to the courts against the ICI plan were the
Wilhelmshaven authorities and Lower Saxony willing to consider a com-
promise. HCG's case was dismissed, and Wangerland voluntarily withdrew
after Lower Saxony committed itself to higher subsidies towards tourist
facilities in Hooksiel as a sort of compensation. 8
Numerous discussions took place between the DFTG and the licensing
authorities, and the public authorities examined numerous technical
details. While advice from independent experts had already been used in
the preparatory stages of the procedures, most of the detailed technical
reports were only commissioned during round C. By the end of this round
'preconditions and requirements for the approval of the project had largely
been settled.
The one remaining question - namely shipping risks in Jade Bay - set
the bounds for round D, and thus limited the number of participating
actors. For the most part the debate took place within federal government
ministries, so that the final decision can be ascribed to a single decision
maker, the Federal Minister of Transportation (FMT) during round D.
However, he could not overrule decisions that had already been made in
previous rounds, so his power was somewhat limited.
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UNUSUAL FEATURES
A number of features and events in the site decision on the first LNG
terminal in the FRG can be considered remarkable or unusual.
(1) The preparatory phase of the approval procedures stretched over
more than five years from the first involvement of the public authorities
to the lodging of the formal applications. This was longer than in other
industrial siting decisions of comparable importance, such as the ICI
project.
Because of the informal character of talks between industry, local
authorities, and the state industrial development agency (ME&T), there
was no prescribed limit to their duration; the same applied to the prepara-
tory phase of the approval procedures. Several factors contributed to the
length of this phase, such as Lower Saxony's requirement that smaller
regional gas companies could join the corporation operating the LNG
facility, which was a serious point of contention in the negotiations with
Ruhrgas and Gelsenberg. The problem was resolved by a compromise
reached in 1976 restricting the overall share of these companies (to be
nominated by the ME&T) to 26%, and this was executed in 1979. Further-
more, the pricing negotiations between the gas companies and Sonatrach
were very tough; in fact a pre-contract signed in 1974 was not effected
because of differences on this point. Another important reason for the
delay was the public authorities' lack of experience with LNG tech-
nology; the DFTG thus had to reply to the numerous doubts about its
acceptability, particularly in relation to public safety and environmental
impact.
(2) The planning process, public discussions, and formal procedures
were considerably affected by the planned close proximity of the LNG
terminal and the ICI petrochemical plant.
Some of the consequences of this proximity have been discussed above;
one of these - apart from the necessary revision of the jetty design - was
that Lower Saxony took a more active role since it became an applicant
itself. Some citizens of Wilhelmshaven and neighboring municipalities
were alarmed by the new plans, although they had already known about
the LNG terminal. The licensing authorities, particularly the WSB, then
had to cope with a much more complex technical situation, since hazards
could result not only from incidents in each of the facilities or on the
respective tankers, but also from "domino-effect" interactions between
the two activities. 9
(3) An important part of the approval process, particularly town and
country planning procedures, had to take place within considerable time
constraints.
Perhaps the greatest impact of the ICI project on the LNG terminal
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decision was the increased momentum that resulted from the time con-
straints imposed. ICI (fully supported by Lower Saxony) was pushing for
an early decision on the petrochemical plant, so that a number of deci-
sions, such as the construction plan approval for ICI, were taken precipi-
tately, creating legal difficulties,10 and provoking conflicts at local level.
In mid-1978 DFTG also raised concerns about the delays since Sonatrach
had stipulated that the terminal location must be announced by October
of that year. In retrospect, this seems to have been mainly a tactical argu-
ment since it would probably have been possible to postpone this deadline
without negative consequences.
(4) The WSB's doubts about making a decision on the acceptability of
the risks imposed by LNG tanker traffic led to the unusual, though legally
correct, involvement of a federal ministry in the approval process.
The pressure of time acknowledged by representatives of the WSB and
the Wilhelmshaven authorities leads us to a key event in the decision
process: the inability or unwillingness of the WSB to approve the project
or, to be more precise, to decide independently on the acceptability of the
risks of LNG shipping. A most interesting aspect of this event from our
perspective is the extent to which the WSB's attitude can be explained by
the type of technical information that the board had to consider, and the
manner in which the data were perceived and interpreted.
We will therefore put the risk issue into perpective by accounting for
other possible influencing factors.
• The WSB did not employ professional experts in the field of hazardous
materials, and so had to rely to a large extent on outside experts.
• Difficulties resulting from the above point must have been aggJ;,avated
by the time constraints.
• There are indications that the "human factor" (Le., personal ambitions
or biased problem perceptions of key individuals) played a part. When
interviewed, representatives of some interested parties mentioned several
times (in reference to the WSB) the influence one person could have on
the behavior of an agency. If such an influence existed, it was in the
direction of risk avoidance.
• The WSB felt the need to involve the FMT in a decision concerning the
possibility of a catastrophic accident, in order to spread the responsi-
bility for that decision. In addition, the WSB might need federal support
for several unusually far-reaching and expensive measures it was going
to require from the applicants.
(5) Local opposition to the LNG project was shaped to a large extent
by the location of the terminal in that those who would have to bear the
main environmental costs were not the inhabitants of Wilhelmshaven, but
those of the neighboring municipality of Wangerland.
Because of the terminal's location, it was very difficult for the decision
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makers to take into account the various concerns debated at the local
level. The approved plans for the terminal did incorporate a number of
important revisions made in response to objections raised during the
licensing process. For instance, the revised storage tank design (agreed
after thorough deliberations between DFTG, DGWE, and Wilhelmshaven)
removed an important point of criticism. It was clear, however, that
Hooksiel and Wangerland would have been satisfied only if the plans to
build the terminal had been dropped altogether; a compromise was even-
tually reached because these parties felt that local political and financial
resources were not sufficient to defeat the project. Also, Wangerland was
afraid of losing Lower Saxony's financial support for its tourist develop-
ment plans if it did not accept this solution.
THE RISK ISSUE
Safety questions were considered at all stages in the decision process, but
under changing assumptions and constraints. The institutional risk evalu-
ation procedure followed essentially established paths, although the final
stage of decision making was quite unusual. With respect to the technical
risk assessments, the licensing authorities considered that their approach
to evaluating the public safety risk from LNG technology exceeded
standard approval procedures and established a precedent for comparable
industrial siting decisions.
Ruhrgas and Gelsenburg (DFTG) familiarized themselves with the main
safety problems of LNG technology before entering the site selection
process (pre-round A). During their negotiations with the state and local
authorities (round A), public safety risk was not the predominant issue,
but it nevertheless played an important role because the acceptability of
the risks was a necessary condition for the approval of the project. In
particular, the Wilhelmshaven authorities needed confirmation on this
point since its constituents would be directly affected by the hazards of
the terminal.
Consequently, the question of risk was discussed at length by the
DFTG and the public authorities concerned with the project. The regu-
latory agencies were asked to give their views on the acceptability of the
risks related to LNG (round B); they deemed the project feasible in
principle, but only if more detailed research revealed no unexpected
difficulties. Their evaluation was based on information obtained from
comparable authorities in other countries (including the Dutch TNO
report; see Chapter 4), official technical boards, and company experts,
but not on a comprehensive risk analysis done specifically for Wilhelms-
haven.
Studies concerning public safety risk (Gutachten) carried out by certi-
fied experts ll were only introduced in rounds C and D. These were com-
missioned by (i) the DFTG, to support its applications for the two licenses;
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(ii) interveners (Mobil Oil, HCG), to support their objections to the
project; and (iii) the licensing authorities (DGWE and WSB), to advise
them and to justify their decisions against potential claims from those
directly affected.
Most of these Gutachten did not address the problem of population risk
directly, but considered more piecemeal issues such as technical safety,
safety of shipping, or prevention of and mitigating measures against fire
and explosions. The focus on safety instead of risk has to be seen against
the background of the relevant legislation in the FRG, according to which
public authorities are responsible for protecting citizens against "harm-
ful environmental effects and other dangers, considerable detriments, and
considerable disturbances" (Federal Immission Control Law, paragraph 5).
Table 3.4 gives an overview of the expert studies dealing with population
risk.
Because of their importance in the final necision on the LNG terminal,
we now briefly describe the studies made by Bratz and Krappinger. In its
deliberations with the applicant, the WSB came to the conclusion that
ship collisions and groundings of LNG tankers could have disastrous
consequences, so that estimates of the expected frequency of such events
were deemed necessary. This work was performed by Professor Krappinger,
head of a shipbuilding research institute (Hamburgische Schiffsbauversuchs-
anstalt GmbH), who combined historical records of vessel accidents in
Jade Bay and a computer model for shipping operations with estimated
rates for LNG tank rupture in the event of an accident. Using these data,
Krappinger calculated probabilities on the order of 10-3 for a major spill
per year (Krappinger 1978a, b). These probability estimates provoked
much criticism from licensing authorities and industry experts, who
thought that the assumed spill rates were far too high. In the final version
of his report, at the request of the WSB, Krappinger modified his assump-
tions so that the probability of a tank rupture was lower.
Professor Bratz, an expert frequently consulted by licensing authorities,
was asked by DGWE and WSB to scrutinize the technical safety (Sicherheits-
technik) aspects of the applications for both licenses. In particular, the
WSB requested investigation of several types of potential major accidents
(Bratz 1978). Bratz was also asked to assess the likelihood and conse-
quences of a maximum credible accident at the land-based facilities, and
to give his opinion on the safety of the revised design for storage tanks,
which now incorporated an outer tank of reinforced concrete instead of
steel (Bratz 1979). An important part of his two reports dealt with
numerous technical devices, design requirements, and operational prescrip-
tions to prevent failures and confine accidents. After this traditional
engineering approach, Bratz also considered (at the request of the WSB)
the potential physical consequences of accidents to the public and the
neighborhood. While potential hazards to the population, particularly at
the recreational zone near Hooksiel, could not be completely excluded
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from these calculations, Bratz considered them to be minor enough in
view of their very low probabilities to comply with legal requirements.
In a standard approval process for a large industrial facility, expert
studies such as these, together with those dealing with purely environ-
mental issues, would have been sufficient to prepare and support the final
decisions of the licensing authorities. In fact, the preliminary license appli-
cation, according to the Federal Immission Control Law, was terminated
at this stage (DGWE 1979). However, the situation became more compli-
cated and difficult with the plan specification procedure, so that another
set of risk assessments had to be performed before final approval could be
given (round D).
By summer 1978 someone at the WSB apparently became concerned
about the LNG shipping risk. From Krappinger's study it was clear that
accidents involving tankers transporting LNG or hazardous chemicals were
the greatest potential risk, and had a significant probability of occurrence
along the shipping channel or at the jetty. Since the consequences of such
accidents "with respect to their scope and likelihood" had not been
assessed in a way that satisfied the WSB, the board was therefore not
prepared to approve the terminal without support from federal level.
One of the subsequent measures of the FMT was therefore to establish
a working group at the WSB to "intensify" the procedure and to elaborate
a decision aid for the board. 12 Based on discussions within this group, the
WSB drew up a report for the minister which, owing to time pressure,
reflected mainly its own views (WSB 1978). The report explained why
the information on the question of population risk was not considered to
be comprehensive and reassuring enough to warrant approval of the
terminal. The board also felt that the expert studies disagreed substantially
even on fundamental questions. Furthermore, there were differences
between the experts of the WSB working group regarding methods of
evaluating risks. Nevertheless, after proposing and deliberating various
risk-reducing measures the WSB tried to evaluate the residual risk of LNG
tanker traffic by reviewing and comparing the different expert studies.
Despite the fact that the probability of a major accident was deemed to be
very low, the WSB came to the conclusion that the population risk was
significant because of the serious consequences of such an accident.
The FMT handed this report, together with all expert studies, over to
the Advisory Committee for the Transportation of Hazardous Goods, a
permanent board of experts at the ministry. The committee formed a
working group to prepare a final risk assessment. Four of the five members
of this group belonged to institutions that had already been involved in
the decision process. 13 Whether it was intended to or not, the composition
of this group, according to one ministerial civil servant, played an essential
role in establishing some consensus between experts who thus far had not
agreed on such important points as an appropriate method of assessing
risk. After discussing methodology and qualitative factors associated with
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several major hazards, the working group concluded that there was a
residual risk related to shipping LNG and hazardous chemicals; this was
smaller in terms of probability but larger in terms of potential conse-
quences than comparable existing risks. This residual risk would be accept-
able "if public authorities took the responsibility for it, taking into
account political and economic benefits of the proposed project"
(Risikoabschatzung 1979, p12). This view was adopted by the FMT and
paved the way for the plan specification approval, including its injunctions
and requirements for the applicant (WSB 1979).
Technical analyses and expert studies dealing with risk to life and limb
were thus widely used in the decision process. All of these were intro-
duced in the context of formal approval procedures, but the site selection
decision was made without a comprehensive risk analysis that was avail-
able to more than one of the interested parties. These studies were related
to their use in the licensing procedures; the problems discussed were well
defined but their scope was often narrow, and authors of the studies were
selected on the basis of their professional qualifications, reputation, and
official or semi-official status. In most cases the presentation of the results
was oriented towards the general mandate of the regulatory agencies to
prevent dangers to the public and neighborhood, or, more specifically, to
ensure compliance with particular safety regulations. The question of risk
acceptability was phrased and answered within this framework only.
In general, the risk studies were used to justify specific actions of their
commissioners, rather than to advise, as is illustrated by the timing of the
studies. For example, the Bratz report was completed before the two
main licenses were granted, but after the objections raised during the
proceedings had been dealt with in public hearings. It would therefore
have been surprising if the findings of the expert studies had influenced the
decision-making process significantly.14 However, for particular aspects,
such as the probability of shipping accidents with serious consequences,
the reports might have had a significant influence on the main parties'
views and positions. At least the results of the Krappinger Gutachten,
unlike other reports, were published before the public hearings had taken
place, and were used by the WSB to support their main arguments. Also
most proposals regarding improvements, additional safety measures, and
construction and design features discussed in the expert studies, were
taken into account in the final plans. The most prominent example of
this was the modified design of the storage tanks.
In trying to evaluate the way in which expert opinion was introduced
into the decision process, the task of assessing the population risk was
accomplished without high costs in terms of money or time. Problems
arising from contradictory expert views that had caused some trouble
during the licensing process at the WSB were effectively resolved by the
FMT, in particular by forcing dissenting experts to work together to
determine the acceptability of the population risk. However, this final
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risk assessment did not include a thorough review of the studies made by
other experts in the field.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
From a broader perspective, one of the shortcomings of the decision
process investigated in this chapter was the secrecy and inaccessibility of
information in the early stages of decision making, before the formal
procedures began. In an atmosphere of growing societal concern about
risk and the negative effects of technological development it is advisable to
reconsider the concept of the strict isolation of preliminary, "in
principle" decision making in a political setting without public debate
on safety questions, and the existing licensing procedures where safety
issues can only be debated in the context of a preselected site. Other-
wise planning shock and subsequent strong reactions by the public, as
in this case, are only to be expected.
Much of the concern at the local level was related to procedural aspects,
although the opposition was not very strong in Wilhelmshaven. Some
problems could probably have been avoided by a broader debate on safety
questions at a stage when the decision was still open (i.e., during the zoning
procedure). However, decision makers in the FRG, as well as in other
countries, often disagree with this view. For instance, Anthony Barrell
of the Health and Safety Executive in the UK has commented:
Usually when you give more information you in fact arouse more controversy, not
less. But nevertheless, I think it is something we should aim to do. (KLS 1982,
p488)
The type of conflict about the LNG terminal and the composition of the
local opposition explains to some extent why the issue provoked so little
public protest. For instance, there was no participation by national or
regional environmentalist groups; among other factors, this can be attrib-
uted to the concentration of the existing opposition on purely local issues,
risk being only one of several areas of concern.
In societal debates comparable to that on nuclear power (which in
the future could also embrace issues like LNG terminal siting), more
comprehensive risk assessments and public participation earlier in the
decision-making process might be recommended, not only to increase the
acceptance of technological developments, but also to reduce the financial
risk of a possible rejection or major design change of a project at an
advanced stage of planning. On the other hand, the public authorities'
current practice of requesting only narrowly defined information from a
number of experts, and then integrating these fragmented views into a
more balanced and complete assessment, can be seen to have important
advantages too. Compared with having comprehensive risk assessments
performed by outside experts, this practice helps to ensure a higher degree
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of responsibility on the part of the public authorities and thus makes the
decision process, at least in principle, open to a certain degree of political
control. The limitations of this way of handling public saftey risk have to
he seen in the ever-growing complexity of technological issues that might
at some point go beyond the expertise of public employees, such as those
in charge of the licensing procedures related to LNG facilities.
NOTES
1. For a discussion of the safety risks related to this technology, in
particular distant vapor cloud ignition following an LNG spill, see
Chapter 7.
2. Other parties that participated at some stage in the decision process
were:
• Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd, who had applied for planning
permission to build a petrochemical plant in the vicinity of the
LNG terminal.
• The Federal Minister of Economic Affairs, who evaluated the
economic benefits of the project after it had become an issue at
federal level.
• The Military District Administration II in Hannover, concerned
about possible effects of LNG tanker traffic on the NATO naval
forces based at Wilhelmshaven.
• Wangerooge and Schortens, two other neighboring municipalities.
• Several citizens' action groups and individuals in Wilhelmshaven
concerned about environmental issues.
• The Mobil Oil Company, which operates a refinery to the south of
the planned terminal, raised concerns about shipping hazards and
potential cost of keeping the jetty area clear of sand deposits.
• Local regulatory agencies, such as the Wilhelmshaven Harbor Au-
thority and the Factory Inspection Agency in Oldenburg.
• The Brotherhood of Harbor Pilots Weser II/Jade, a kind of trade
union.
• Several official technical boards.
• Various consultants.
• A number of interest groups such as aquatic sports clubs and a local
fishermen's trade union.
3. Niedersachsischer Minister fur Wirtschaft und Verkehr, at the time
called Minister fur Wirtschaft und bffentliche Arbeiten.
4. Commitments from both sides on issues such as the provision of
physical infrastructure, subsidies to be granted, support in approval
procedures (public authorities), the types of investment to be made,
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environmental protection measures, and the possibility of smaller gas
companies taking over a share in DFTG (industry) were eventually laid
down in the "settlement contract". Such a contract (Ansiedlungs-
uertrag) is legally binding under private law, and is frequently used in
connection with industrial projects subsidized by public funds.
5. Bundes-Irnrnissionschutzgesetz. The word "immission", in contrast
with "emission", focuses on the potential detriment to the environ-
ment rather than indicating the source of pollution.
6. In addition, a procedure concerning water management and protection
was carried out by the DGWE. Although it became clear that this
license would be granted, the procedure was never terminated because
of the delay of the whole project.
7. The DGWE seems to contradict this statement, but this is due to the
fact that it was not only a licensing authority, but also assumed plan-
ning functions as a direct agent of the ME&T (see Table 3.1).
8. The cost of this recreational center, consisting of an enclosed seawater
swimming pool with artificial waves and various communications
facilities, was estimated at DM 12.5 million (approximately US$6
million), 80% of which would be covered by different state subsidies.
This was significantly more than the usual rate of 50% state subsidies
for economic development projects. Moreover, it was not clear that
without this agreement this particular project would have been
supported at all by the Lower Saxony authorities.
9. Such a domino effect would of course also be conceivable between the
Mobil Oil refinery (to the south of the ICI site) and the LNG terminal.
This point was raised and considered in one of the risk studies without,
however, playing a significant role in the public debate (probably
because the ICI petrochemical plant, technically and politically, was
such a prominent issue).
10. This procedure had to be repeated twice owing to concerns raised
about its legal correctness.
11. The technical term in the FRG is "gerichtlich beeideter Gutachter",
meaning that the expert has been approved by the courts, and that he
has agreed to judge impartially.
12. Apart from the WSB and the FMT, this working group consisted of
the DGWE, Wilhelmshaven, Friesland, the Military District Adminis-
tration II, and four technical boards, namely: the Federal Institute for
Material Control (BAM: Bundesanstalt fur Materialprufung) and for
Physics and Technology (PTB: Physikalische-Technische Bundes-
anstalt), the Federal Bureau for the Environment (Umweltbunde-
samt), and the Society for Nuclear Power Utilization in Vessel Con-
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struction and Shipping (GKSS: Gesellschaft fur Kernenergieverwertung
in Schiffbau und Schiffahrt).
13. Gennanischer-Lloyd, BAM, PTB, and the FMT.
14. A risk analysis performed for the ICI petrochemical plant had even
more far-reaching consequences since it resulted in the expensive
resettlement of almost 100 inhabitants of Inserhausersiel, a village
adjacent to the ICI site and therefore particularly exposed to potential
escapes of hazardous chemicals such as vinylchloride (Vahrenholt
1980).
Chapter 4
The Netherlands: The
Rotterdam - Eemshaven Debate*
Plans to import liquefied natural gas into the Netherlands were first drawn
up in the early 1970s and resulted in the initiation of studies and discus-
sions on various aspects of LNG technology. The siting question, however,
was not an urgent one until 1977, when a contract was signed with the
Algerian company Sonatrach to import 4 billion m 3 of LNG per year, for
a 20-year period starting in 1983. Following extensive political discussions
at various levels, an LNG terminal site at Eemshaven, in the northern
province of Groningen, was finally selected and approved by the Dutch
cabinet and parliament in 1978 (Tweede Kamer 1978). This decision out-
come was significant because Eemshaven only became a serious candidate
in late 1977; detailed studies and policy advice to and within the govern-
ment (including the cabinet) had previously focused on Maasvlakte in the
Rotterdam harbor area, as the preferred terminal site (see Figure 4.1).
This review of the Dutch decision-making process involved in LNG
terminal siting assesses the political factors that led to the final choice of
Eemshaven. Although the Eemshaven site was approved in 1978, the
Algerians have since canceled the LNG contract. As a result of the absence
of alternative suppliers, further plans to construct an LNG import facility
have been postponed.
SETTING THE STAGE
Decision making in the Netherlands is relatively centralized, with the
national government coordinating major policy decisions concerning
*This chapter was written by Michiel SChwarz, based on a complete case study report
(Schwarz 1982). The author worked closely with Joanne Linnerooth in integrating the
case study material within the MAMP framework.
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Figure 4.1. The Netherlands.
regional development, energy planning, and land use. Specific siting
approval for industrial development, however, is usually a matter for local
authorities, so that many planning decisions involve a combination of
local and national procedures.
At the local and national levels, public participation in decision making
takes place via elected councils of representatives. Dutch political tradi-
tion has emphasized the importance of pluralism in government and
society, and this is reflected in the large number of political parties.
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Parliamentary councils are elected by proportional representation, so that
ample opportunity is provided for a wide range of political views to be
aired. Against the background of the multi-party, consultative style of
political decision making, the tradition of pluralism explains why such a
large number of interested parties were involved in the LNG facility siting
debate. The nature and complexity of the decision events reviewed here
reflect this point.
As policy issues have become more complex and interrelated, there has
been an increasing emphasis on interdepartmental coordination within the
Dutch government. Where the responsibilities of different departments
overlap, coordinating committees are often set up with the aim of pro-
ducing agreement between top civil servants from different ministries,
in order to prepare governmental (and usually cabinet) policies (Binnen-
landse Zaken 1980). In the case of the LNG decision most of the coordi-
nation took place within the Interdepartmental Committee for North Sea
Affairs (ICONA), under the responsibility of the Ministry of Transport
and Public Works (lCONA 1978c).
The decision to import and store LNG at a domestic terminal was
made, to a large extent, within the context of national energy policy by
the semi-state-owned company NV Nederlandse Gasunie. Dutch official
energy policy, first formulated in 1974, established the need to import
natural gas - including LNG - in order to conserve Dutch gas fields and
to maintain strategic domestic natural gas reserves (Tweede Kamer 1974).
In the mid-1970s natural gas contributed over half of the total energy
supply of the Netherlands (CBS 1978). This policy provided the mandate
for major decisions to be made by Gasunie, as well as the policy frame-
work for subsequent government activities in connection with LNG.
The national dimension of decisions concerning LNG is emphasized by
the fact that Gasunie is not an independent entity; the state has a 50%
stake in the company.l Gasunie was set up in 1963 and is responsible for
all matters concerning the supply, management, sale, and distribution of
natural gas (domestic and foreign) to Dutch consumers. Close contacts
thus exist between Gasunie and the government, and these are formalized
through the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 2
The number of sites considered for the planned LNG facility was
narrowed down at an early stage in the decision process. Until late 1977,
intragovernmental evaluation of the technical feasibility and costs/benefits
of various sites had led to strong support for Maasvlakte in the Rotterdam
harbor area. Technical studies (such as those by the Netherlands Maritime
Institute, NMI) had concluded that alternative sites were less feasible; in
particular, Eemshaven harbor was declared unsuitable on nautical and
technical grounds. The focus on Rotterdam was further reinforced by
Gasunie, which had favored a Maasvlakte LNG site from the start for a
number of economic and corporate-strategic reasons. The consensus
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between Gasunie and the Ministry of Economic Affairs on the preference
for a Rotterdam site was an important element in defining the structure of
the early rounds of the debate.
Located in the south of the country, Rotterdam is the closest major
port to Algeria, the anticipated source of LNG, and is in close proximity
to the major gas consumers (see Figure 4.2). Rotterdam also provides the
benefits of a well established, international deep-water port where the
annual turnover of goods exceeds 270 million tonnes, two-thirds of which
involves oil and oil products (Rotterdam 1978a). In the early 1970s,
however, Rotterdam officials started to respond to a major shift in Western
Europe from oil to other fuels such as natural gas, LPG, and coal. They
saw the need to avert a decline in the harbor's economic activities by
developing facilities to handle alternative energy products. Such a transi-
tion would take advantage of the existing infrastructure and labor surplus,
and would help to maintain Rotterdam's position as Europe's major
energy distribution center.
However, due to the lack of consensus among the three major local
authorities with jurisdiction over the Rotterdam sites, and because of the
threat of delay and imposed conditions, in December 1977 Gasunie
reintroduced Eemshaven as a possible site for the LNG terminal (see
Figure 4.3). New technical studies on the nautical conditions at Eemshaven
concluded that recent shipping movements had made the approach to the
harbor suitable for LNG-type tankers, and so Eemshaven was officially
proposed. At the time, the government had already singled out the north-
eastern region as a focus for development and had initiated plans to
attract industry. Dutch regional development policies specifically favor
plans that provide a more equitable distribution of land use, economic
activities, and employment, so that siting the LNG terminal in Eemshaven
was viewed by the local authorities as a means by which the government
could demonstrate its commitment to promoting industrial activities in
this region. Based on the perceived socioeconomic advantages, the
Groningen local authorities successfully organized a large number of
public and private interests to lobby in support of the facility in Eems-
haven.
In addition to the land-based sites at Rotterdam and Eemshaven, several
other alternatives were also considered. These included an artificial island
27 km offshore, connected by pipeline to Maasvlakte or other parts of the
mainland, and an offshore tunnel terminal system (OTTS) comprising a
receiving platform 4 km offshore (11 km to the nearest town of Hoek van
Holland), connected by an underwater pipeline to a storage site at
Maasvlakte. Another "intermediate" solution was also rejected - the
Voornedam breakwater, a 7-10 km long dam extending from the south-
western point of Maasvlakte. These three alternative solutions had the
advantage that the shipping routes to the unloading terminals would not
interefere with other Rotterdam harbor traffic, but they were rejected by
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Figure 4.3. The location of Eemshaven, in the northeastern province of Groningen.
the government due mainly to their high construction costs (details of
these proposals are given in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1).
Natural gas imported by pipeline was also ruled out as a viable option at
an early stage because the government believed that natural gas suppliers
would be too remote to make this a feasible proposition.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
The decision-making process on the siting of a large-scale LNG import ter-
minal was preceded by developments involving the government and Gasunie
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Table 4.1. Details of the alternative LNG terminal sites in the Netherlands.
Maasvlakte (site A)
Maasvlakte (site B)
Maasvlakte (site C)
Voornedam Breakwater
(short or long)
North Sea island location
Offshore tunnel terminal
system (OTTS)
Eemshaven
In southwestern corner of Maasvlakte, adjacent to existing
Gasunie peakshaving plant. Relatively small site; distance
to nearest towns Hoek van Holland (5 km); Oostvoorne
(4 km).
In northwestern corner of Maasvlakte, larger than site A;
distance to nearest towns Hoek van Holland (6 km);
Oostvoorne (8 km). Shipping route to sites A and B 2 km
from the center of Hoek van Holland.
Extension west of existing Maasvlakte area to be con-
structed. Size of area can be designed as required. Distance
to nearest towns Oostvoorne (7 km); Hoek van Holland
(9 km).
Extended dam to be constructed 7 or 10 km long from
southwestern point of Maasvlakte. Shipping route does
not interfere with other Rotterdam harbor traffic. Dis-
tance to nearest town Oostvoorne (10-13 km) (short or
long dam).
Artificial island to be built 20-50 km off the Dutch coast,
connected by pipeline to Maasvlakte or elsewhere.
Platform 4 km offshore from Maasvlakte for reception of
LNG, with underwater pipeline for transport of gas to
storage site at Maasvlakte. Distance to nearest town Hoek
van Holland (11 km).
New harbor complex at the northernmost tip of the
province of Groningen. Situated in open agricultural land,
with very low population density (140 people per km2 ).
Distance to nearest towns Oudeschip (3 km); Uithuizer-
meeden (6 km). Eemshaven complex is managed by the
DeIfzijl Harbor Authority.
in the early 1970s. Gasunie first became involved with LNG in 1972,
when discussions were held with the Rotterdam Harbor Authority and
local authorities concerning its plans for an LNG peakshaving plant at
Maasvlakte. 3 Formal approval for the siting of such a plant, and for an
LNG terminal, was the responsibility of the municipal and provincial
authorities via various environmental and planning legislation (concerning
pollution, nuisance, etc.).4 In a formal sense, the approval of an LNG
terminal site could similarly have been handled at local government level,
provided that the Ministry of Economic Affairs had first approved the
plans in accordance with economic policy.
In the case of the LNG terminal, however, government involvement
went beyond that stipulated by formal (minimal) procedures; the role
the government would later play in the decision process can be partly
traced back to its earlier involvement in the LNG peakshaving plant
decision. In addition to the involvement of the Ministry of Economic
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Affairs in relation to energy policy, the government and Gasunie also
discussed the safety aspects of the peakshaving plant. This led to the
direct involvement of the Ministry of Social Affairs, which was con-
cerned with occupational hazards, etc. One consequence of this latter
was that a special committee was set up to investigate the safety aspects
of LNG.s
The major interested parties involved in the LNG siting decision process
included the national government (including the cabinet), Gasunie, and
the local authorities of Rotterdam (for the Maasvlakte sites) and Groningen
(for the Eemshaven site). In addition, many other government and some
private interests influenced to varying degrees the actions and decision of
these primary actors. Table 4.2 lists the most important of these groups.
The major events and decisions in the debate on LNG are summarized
by a PERT diagram (Figure 4.4), representing the sequence of decisions
and events. This sequence can be characterized by three main rounds (A,
B, and C), each of which involved different policy questions, contextual
factors, and actors. This division of the major decisions and events into
rounds illustrates the main shifts that occurred during the decision pro-
cess.
Round A. For our purposes the decision process concerning LNG can be
said to have begun when Gasunie declared its interest in importing LNG in
the early 1970s. <D Preliminary discussions with the Algerian state com-
pany Sonatrach took place in 1973 for the supply of 6 billion m 3 of LNG
per year for a period of 20 years. Although a final contract was only
drawn up in 1977 after a second round of discussions, the early negotia-
tions stressed Gasunie's objective of importing approximately 10-15
billion m 3 of LNG per year by the 1990s, in line with national energy
policy.6 Through the close working relationship of Gasunie and the
Ministry of Economic Affairs, the government was directly involved with
the plans. ® There was also concern over the availability of a suitable and
safe LNG terminal site, so that in March 1974 the Ministry of Social
Affairs commissioned the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast-
Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek (TNOf to carry out a study of the
safety aspects of LNG importation, while the Netherlands Maritime
Institute (NMI) examined the nautical feasibility. The government became
further involved in 1975, when Gasunie officially requested the govern-
ment's view of the possibility of an offshore terminal. During this time,
Gasunie started discussions with harbor authorities (particularly Rotter-
dam) within the Netherlands, as well as abroad, and with the local auth-
orities that would eventually be responsible for granting site approval.
In response to Gasunie's request, and existing industrial interest in the
possibility of an artificial island in the North Sea, in 1975 the Ministry of
Transport and Public Works set up the Stuurgroep Studie Noordzee-
eilanden en Terminals (STUNET: North Sea Island and Terminal Steering
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Table 4.2. Key parties in the LNG decision process in the Netherlands.
Applicant
NV Nederlandse Gasunie:
National government
Cabinet
ICONA
Gasunie: the sole national gas company set up in 1963
for the management, sale, and distribution of natural gas
in the Netherlands. The government holds 50% of the
shares in Gasunie, participates in its governing body, and
must approve or veto many of its activities.
The national executive body comprised of 16 ministers,
responsible for making national policies and decisions
(all but two head government departments).
The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on
North Sea Affairs (lnterdepartmentale Coordinatie
Commissie voor Noordzeeaangelegenheden). A policy
advisory group to the cabinet comprising (civil servant)
representatives of all but two of the 16 cabinet
ministers.
Local authorities
Groningen local authorities Include (a) governors and council of the province of
Groningen; (b) the city council of Uithuizermeeden; and
(c) DeIfzijl Harbor Authority.a
City of Rotterdam The local authority with primary responsibility for
planning permission and building permits in Rotterdam;
represented by the mayor and aldermen; responsible for
regulating harbor activities via the Rotterdam Harbor
Authority.
Rijnmond Public Authority A collective of 16 municipalities in the Rotterdam area,
including the city of Rotterdam, that performs certain
legislative roles regarding activities such as environmental
planning, housing policy, transportation, health and
safety, and pollution management.
Province of Zuid-HoIIand Encompasses the Rotterdam area and has legislative
responsibility for certain pollution, planning, and
housing regulations.
Other interested parties
Dutch Shipowners' Association
Electricity Corporation of Groningen and Drenthe
Provincial Chamber of Commerce of Groningen
P1.lblic interest and environmentalist groups in Rotterdam and Eemshaven
Trade Union organizations in Groningen
a The three Groningen local authorities are considered as one body in this chapter since
they held nearly the same viewpoint on the LNG siting issue and coordinated their
policy actions throughout the decision process.
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Figure 4.4. PERT diagram for the LNG decision process in the Netherlands.
Key events and/or decisions
(DGasunie declares interest in LNG imports and building a terminal (early 1970s).
Q)Gasunie discussions with Ministry of Economic Affairs begin (1977).
G)Government activities: TNO risk study commissioned; interest in offshore island
terminal declared; STUNET and ICONA initiated.
@)Rotterdam harbor and local authorities begin study and discussion of LNG
terminal siting.
(DGasunie signs contract with Sonatrach for LNG supply (June 1977).
@Sonatrach contract approved by Ministry of Economic Affairs (October 1977).
G> Cabinet and parliament start discussions on LNG.
® Public, environmentalist, and other interest groups start expressing concern over
LNG.
(2) Government requests further official advice from ICONA and other relevant
organizations; draws up procedure for local authority consultations.
@ Discussions between Gasunie and Groningen authorities start regarding Eemshaven
(December 1977).
@Eemshaven accepted as an alternative LNG terminal site by government (in
addition to the Maasvlakte sites) (March 1978).
@Local authorities start official local decision procedures (April 1978).
@ Local authorities formulate positions on LNG terminals at Eemshaven and
Maasvlakte, respectively (June 1978).
<0> Cabinet decision: LNG terminal at Eemshaven (August 1978).
@Parliament debates cabinet decision and approves LNG terminal at Eemshaven
(October 1978).
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Committee), and a working group to investigate the feasibility and desir-
ability of an offshore LNG terminal as an alternative to a land-based
site.® The technical reports of STUNET (1977) were then submitted to a
coordinating committee for North Sea affairs (lCONA).8 STUNET advised
positively vis a vis LNG imports and judged the "pipeline option" not
advisable because of economic and practical constraints, especially the
lack of "nearby" natural gas supplies (STUNET 1977). @)
A major impetus was introduced into the decision process in June
1977 when Gasunie signed the contract with Sonatrach for the pur-
chase of 4 billion m 3 of LNG per year over the period 1985-2005. ® An
important deadline was thus introduced; a side-letter to the contract
stipulated (a) approval of the contract by the Ministry of Economic
Affairs by 31 October 1977; and (b) notification of the exact location
of an LNG import terminal by 31 October 1978. If an LNG terminal
site could not be announced by this date, the contract would become
void.
In line with ICONA's first policy report to the cabinet, the Ministry of
Economic Affairs gave official approval to the Gasunie-Sonatrach con-
tract on 18 October 1977, although without consultation with the full
cabinet (Tweede Kamer 1978). ® The issue of LNG imports and the
selection of a terminal site then entered more fully the political arena -
involving the cabinet, parliament, local authorities, and environmentalist
groups. The approval of the LNG contract signaled a new round in the
decision process, to determine whether an acceptable LNG terminal site
could be found within the specified time period.
Round B. With the involvement of the cabinet, and the awareness within
several government departments that the siting of an LNG terminal
involved a number of issues beyond energy policy (such as the environ-
ment, safety, land use, regional planning, etc.), it became clear that the
final decision would have to be taken at the national level. <D ICONA, the
main coordinating committee on LNG, and various other advisory oodies
such as the Interdepartmentale Commissie voor Milieuhygiene (ICMH:
Committee for Environmental Hygiene), and the Rijks Planologische
Commissie (RPC: State Land-Use Planning Committee), were therefore
called in by the government to provide further advice.
The responsibility for granting final siting approval and planning
permission for an LNG terminal, however, remained with the relevant
local authorities. They followed established procedures in setting up
public hearings and local and regional debates. The government therefore
thought it necessary to request the relevant local authorities for "in
advance" judgments as to the acceptability of an LNG terminal in their
areas. A special decision procedure and a timetable were drawn up by the
government in late 1977 for consultation with the local authorities, in
order to avoid undesirable delays, and to ensure that a site selected at
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national level would not prove unacceptable at a later stage when the local
authority would be asked to grant planning permission.
By 1977 Rotterdam harbor had become the preferred site for the termi-
nal, following initial screening for technical feasibility and nautical safety
by the NMI and other bodies. Both the government (including ICONA)
and Gasunie focused virtually all their attention upon a Rotterdam loca-
tion, once it had been decided that a land-based terminal was favored for
strategic and economic reasons. ®
Initial discussions (from 1977 onwards) with the local authorities in the
Rotterdam region (province of Zuid-Holland, Rijnmond Public Authority,
and City of Rotterdam), indicated that they were likely to require strin-
gent conditions before approving an LNG terminal. In particular, Rijnmond
Public Authority (which had traditionally given particular attention to
safety and environmental matters) indicated that it would question in
detail the safety and desirability of such an operation. Safety and other
local concerns thus began to endanger the tightly timed decision-making
schedule. ® A serious threat of delay was presented by demands from
local authorities for greater public participation and for certain conditions,
such as the absence of a nuclear power station in the region, before
approval would be given. This potential opposition from the local authori-
ties, in addition to new objections being raised by environmentalist groups,
triggered an important new development: in December 1977 Gasunie
approached Delfzijl Harbor Authority in the province of Groningen to
reopen discussions as to the feasibility of using the newly built Eemshaven
harbor as a site for the terminal, @ thus introducing a major new group
of actors - the local authorities in Groningen - and signaling a new round
in the decision-making process.
Round C. Following additional feasibility and safety studies,9 and a
positive response from the Groningen local authorities, Eemshaven was
seen to be a viable alternative to Maasvlakte for the LNG terminal site.
In March 1978 the cabinet responded to the strong and enthusiastic
requests of the Groningen authorities for official consideration of Eem-
shaven, and so they were included in the special decision procedure that
would lead to the final site selection (Tweede Kamer 1978). @
The decision-making processes at the local authority level in Groningen
and Rotterdam formally began in April 1978. @ They were each given
three months in which to formulate their respective positions vis a vis the
acceptability in principle of an LNG terminal in their areas, by means of
council debates at various levels, and hearings where environmentalist
groups and the public could air their views. These local views were
presented to the cabinet in late June 1978. @
The positions of the local authorities, in addition to the advice from
ICONA and other advisory bodies, provided the background for the
cabinet's final siting decision: in August 1978 it declared its preference for
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Eemshaven, primarily on socioeconomic and regional industrial grounds
(Tweede Kamer 1978). @ The decision was debated at considerable
length in parliament; it was criticized and questioned by many political
parties, but was nevertheless approved in October 197810 (Tweede Kamer
1978/1979). @
These key events, especially those initiating new rounds in the decision
process, emphasize the importance of the government and Gasunie (rather
than the local authorities, which have responsibility for site approval only)
as the two major interested parties involved in determining the direction
and dynamics of the decision-making process. The local authorities in
Rotterdam (particularly Rijnmond Public Authority) also played a signifi-
cant role since their concerns over the safety and desirability of LNG had
prompted Gasunie's investigation of Eemshaven as an alternative site. The
"problem definitions" adopted by the key parties were very important in
structuring the decision process, particularly in rounds B and C, in which
the debate centered on the siting of the LNG import terminal, without
any further questioning of the viability of other alternatives.
PARTY CONCERNS
The Dutch terminal siting decision was characterized by the involvement
(either directly or indirectly) of a large number of interested parties.
Although formal planning permission was to be granted at local authority
level, the government, and ultimately the cabinet, took prime responsi-
bility for the basic siting decision, moving itself to the center of the
debate. Figure 4.5 shows the main actors in the approval process and the
major directions of the interactions.
Table 4.3 summarizes the principal concerns of the major parties. At
the national level, the government (Le., the cabinet and interdepartmental
committees) was concerned with a very wide spectrum of relevant issues;
government advisors and other internal consultative bodies at civil service
level (ICMH, RPC, and CPR) were requested to investigate particular
aspects (e.g., safety, environmental impact, etc.), while the local author-
ities and Gasunie had more limited sets of concerns. Because of their
different interests, the parties naturally attached varying degrees of
importance to certain aspects of the decisions at hand. The analysis of
party perspectives therefore reveals a set of party-specific problem formu-
lations based on these different concerns, and the roles the parties were
"assigned" in the decision process. In this section these different party
perspectives are assessed, particularly those dominant dimensions ll that
seem to have governed the different party positions. 12
leONA. The role of ICONA was comprehensive. Utilizing studies from
other official advisors and interdepartmental bodies - including those of
• TNO • NMI • NSP
• Gasunie
• RepresentatIves from nine
ministerial depts.
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Figure 4.5. Decision-making organization and input into the Dutch cabinet regarding
the LNG siting decision (based on TNO 1978).
ICONA Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for North Sea Affairs
STUNET North Sea Island and Terminal Steering Committee
TNO Organization for Applied Scientific Research
NMI Netherlands Maritime Insitute
MICONA Ministerial Committee for North Sea Affairs
RPC State Land-Use Planning Committee
ICMH Interdepartmental Committee for Environmental Hygiene
CPR Committee for the Prevention of Disasters due to Dangerous Substances
RRO Council for Land-Use Planning
NSP National Shipping Laboratory
TNO, ICMH, RPC, and CPR - ICONA prepared three policy reports
addressing:
• the desirability of LNG imports,
• whether the Netherlands should have its own LNG terminal;
• whether the terminal should be land-based or offshore; and
• which site was preferred and under what conditions.
ICONA was the only coordinating body that comprised representatives of
all the relevant ministries and, in order to prepare a cabinet position, it
took into account all aspects of national policy, as shown in Table 4.4. It
is important to note that ICONA first made a detailed assessment of the
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Table 4.4. leONA policy perspective.
Policy question
LNG imports desirable?
LNG terminal in the Netherlands?
LNG terminal land-based or
offshore?
Preferred location?
Dominant dimension (s)
(1) Energy policy
(2) (National)
(1) Energy policy
(1) Economics/cost
(2) Energy policy
(1) Economics/cost
(2) Energy policy
(3) Environmental impact
Outcome
Yes
Yes
Land-based
Maasvlakte
Eemshaven option only in its third policy report. ICONA's crucial conclu-
sion was that the risks involved in an offshore or land-based terminal were
equally acceptable; in some ways this was a prerequisite for addressing the
problem of where to locate the terminal. However, the precise basis for
deciding on the acceptability of LNG operations was never clearly spelled
out. The dimensions listed in Table 4.4 are those that were dominant in
the outcomes of the policy questions addressed. 12 Once the acceptability
of the risks involved had been established by ICONA, the safety factor
played only a secondary role in influencing the final outcome of the siting
debate.
However, in addition to ICONA's majority position on LNG, the repre-
sentative from the Ministry of Health and Environmental Hygiene also
issued a minority view. This stated that, from the viewpoint of safety, an
LNG terminal at Maasvlakte was undesirable, and that the need for
imported LNG was questionable (lCONA 1977, 1978a, b).
Maasvlakte - Province of Zuid-Holland. The cabinet's official request in
March 1978 for the relevant local authorities' views on LNG concerned
only the acceptability of the two Maasvlakte sites A and B, but the
province of Zuid-Holland also discussed the desirability and acceptability
of a terminal at a third Maasvlakte site C, and at the Voornedam break-
water (see Table 4.5). Underlying its concern about safety was the "stand-
still" principle, Le., a decline in environmental health and/or safety levels
as a result of an LNG terminal in the area was unacceptable. Zuid-Holland
did not provide a definite answer as to whether the Maasvlakte sites A and
B were acceptable. Instead, it urged further investigation of the Voornedam
alternative (Zuid-Holland 1978a, b), even though this option had been
ruled out at an earlier stage.
Maasvlakte - Rijnmond Public Authority. Although the official cabinet
request to Rijnmond was to establish its position vis avis an LNG terminal
at the Maasvlakte sites A and B, the authority evaluated the question in a
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Table 4.5. Province of Zuid-Holland policy perspective.
Policy question
LNG in province desirable?
LNG terminal in Zuid-Holland
acceptable?
Preferred LNG site?
Dominant dimension (s)
(1) Socioeconomics
(1) Health and safety
(2) Socioeconomics
(1) Health and safety
(2) Socioeconomics
Outcome
Yes
Yes/noa
Voornedamb
a Safety and environmen tal heal th standards should not be reduced.
b Voornedam site was preferred from the safety viewpoint, but no definite commit-
ment could be made until other alternatives had been explored further.
Table 4.6. Rijnmond Public Authority policy perspective.
Policy question
LNG desirable for Rijnmond
area?
LNG acceptable in Rijnmond
area
Where to site LNG terminal?b
Dominant dimension (s)
(1) Socioeconomics
(2) Economics/cost
(1) Health and safety
(1) Socioeconomics
(2) Health and safety
Outcome
Yes
Yes/noa
In/near
Rijnmond area;
not at Maasvlakte
a As far as Maasvlakte sites A and B were concerned, storage - acceptable, handling/
reception - not acceptable.
b This question refers to an LNG terminal where storage and handling/reception are
combined at one location.
wider context, involving the desirability and acceptability of an LNG
terminal somewhere in the area (see Table 4.6). Rijnmond accepted that
there was a need to import LNG, but it was most concerned with safety
aspects, namely that the storage and transport/handling of LNG should be
physically separated. The handling operations posed a more serious ~afety
problem and so should be carried out offshore. Contrary to the govern-
ment's request, Rijnmond thus discussed the option of an offshore tunnel
terminal system (Rijnmond 1978a, b).
Maasvlakte - the City of Rotterdam. As shown in Table 4.7, the city of
Rotterdam authorities evaluated the feasibility and desirability of an LNG
terminal in terms of the costs and benefits of the alternative Maasvlakte
sites to the various harbor authorities and municipalities. The perceived
social and economic advantages of an LNG terminal (Le., strengthening
the position of the port of Rotterdam) formed the context for consider-
ing such an operation somewhere in the harbor. 13 The Rotterdam author-
ities concluded that an LNG terminal would not be more dangerous than
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Table 4.7. City of Rotterdam policy perspective.
Policy question Dominant dimension (s) Outcome
Yes(1) Socioeconomics
(2) Economics/cost
(1) Health and safety
LNG terminal feasible and
desirable at Maasvlakte?
LNG terminal acceptable
at Maasvlakte?
Preferred Maasvlakte site? (1) Economics/cost Maasvlakte site
(2) Socioeconomics Ba
a Maasvlakte would only be acceptable if no nuclear power station would be built in
the area in the future.
Table 4.8. Groningen local authorities' policy perspective.
Policy question Dominant dimension (s) Outcome
LNG at Eemshaven acceptable?
Preferred site for LNG:
Eemshaven or Maasvlakte?
(1) Socioeconomics
(2) Health and safety
(1) Socioeconomics
(2) Health and safety
Yes
Eemshaven
existing industrial activities in the harbor, and that it would not greatly
increase the "cumulative" level of risk. However, one of the authorities'
conditions for the acceptance of the terminal at Maasvlakte was that the
(future) siting of a nuclear power plant there would be ruled out (Rotter-
dam 1978a, b).
Eemshaven - The Groningen local authorities. In the province of Gronin-
gen various bodies and local authorities joined forces at the start of the
discussions on LNG. 14 Following Gasunie's interest in Eemshaven, the
authorities were very anxious to attract the industry as a means of stimu-
lating the economy of this relatively poorly developed northern province.
In view of the perceived economic advantages that an LNG terminal would
bring, particularly in terms of employment, the local authorities, as shown
in Table 4.8, addressed only the policy questions concerning the con-
ditions under which an Eemshaven terminal would be acceptable. Since
Eemshaven was being introduced as an alternative to Maasvlakte, the
authorities, in order to strengthen their case, undertook a direct compara-
tive assessment of all the major sites, despite the cabinet's request that
they evaluate only their own position (Groningen 1978a, b).
Gasunie. Gasunie's policy perspective was based on its obligation to
supply natural gas at economical prices; its position with respect to an
LNG terminal, as shown in Table 4.9, was thus related to energy policy,
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Table 4.9. Gasunie policy perspective.
Policy question
Optimal site for LNG
terminal?
Dominant dimension (s)
(1) Energy policy
(2) Economics/cost
Outcome
Maasvlakte
and economics/cost. From both of these perspectives Maasvlakte site A
had been the company's first choice. l 5 In addition, Gasunie saw corporate/
strategic benefits in having an LNG terminal in the Netherlands. Although
Eemshaven was also an acceptable alternative, it was only a second choice
(Gasunie 1978b).
Other parties. Additional interested parties were involved in the Dutch
decision-making process, but they often were less directly concerned with
LNG (e.g., only local environmental or employment concerns). These
parties were assigned a less institutionalized role in the debate and usually
had fewer formal contacts with the central parties responsible for making
the major decisions (Le., the cabinet and local authorities).16 The main
channels of communication between these minor actors were via political
parties and responsible cabinet ministers. In the Netherlands no special
"anti-LNG" citizens' groups were formed, but the Eemshaven and Rijn-
mond cases were taken up by existing environmentalist groups through
which local residents could participate. Local and national political parties
also played a role in that they provided opportunities for (public) dis-
cussion via elected members of councils of representatives (municipal
councils, Rijnmond council, provincial councils, and parliament).
THE MAMP FRAMEWORK
In this section the multi-attribute, multi-party (MAMP) framework,17
which was described in Chapter 2, is applied to the case study material in
order to understand better the LNG facility siting decision process in the
Netherlands. Table 4.10 describes each round in terms of its problem
formulation, its initiation, party interactions, and its conclusions(s). The
conclusion of each round is then incorporated into the problem formu-
lation of the subsequent round, until the final decision is made. Exogenous
events, however, can enter any round at any point, and may act to reverse
earlier conclusions and extend the decision-making process.
The decision process, as illustrated in Figure 4.4, was characterized by
three rounds, within which the parties interacted in relation to particular
problem formulations. The representation of the process in Table 4.10
through the use of rounds uncovers a set of issues that are elaborated below.
These issues highlight (1) the introduction and rejection of alternative
Questions:
Process
constraints:
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Table 4.10. The MAMP framework applied to the decision process on LNG in the
Netherlands.
(a) ROUND A: December 1976-late 1977.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Assumptions: (1) A government policy paper (1974) has established the need to
import LNG in order to conserve Dutch natural gas supplies.
(2) Gasunie is interested in locating an LNG terminal adjacent to its
peakshaving plant at Maasvlakte (Rotterdam harbor).
(3) Government and industry are jointly interested in developing an
artificial island in the North Sea.
(1) Is it feasible and timely to have an LNG terminal?
(2) If so, should the plant be Dutch or foreign?, offshore or land·
based?, located at Maasvlakte?
(1) Any LNG import contract must be approved by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs (MEA).
(2) Siting approval would proceed through local authorities.
II INITIATION
Gasunie declares its interest in importing LNG,Q) and requests the formal approval of
the Ministry of Economic Affairs. ® Gasunie also requests the government's official
view of the acceptability of a terminal at Maasvlakte.@®
III INTERACTION
Party
Gasunie
STUNET
(1977)
ICONA
Rotterdam harbor
Position
For importation of LNG
to Rotterdam (Maasvlakte)
LNG feasible and practical;
land-based site more cost-
effective; island terminal
preferable on safety
grounds
LNG import desirable;
Dutch terminal (Maasvlakte,
if land-based)
Site at Maasvlakte
Arguments
Economical and practical; existing
infrastructure; technically feasible;a
proximity of major gas users.
Pipeline not viable and land-based
site conditions less costly; Eems-
haven not acceptable on nautical
grounds; risk comparable to other
industrial risks; environmental
effects acceptable.
Diversification of energy supply,
environmental benefits of gas, inde-
pendence of supply, cost consider-
ations land-based; risk acceptable;b
nautical/technical grounds favor
Maasvlakte (of land-based options).
Socioeconomic benefits
IV CONCLUSIONS
(1) June 1977: Gasunie signs contract with Sonatrach (Algeria) for LNG supply.®
This contract specifies that an LNG site be chosen by October 1978.
(2) October 1977: MEA approves Gasunie-Sonatrach contract. ®
(3) Late 1977: Government formulates a formal decision procedure for site approval,
involving early consultation with local authorities.
Italics indicate arguments involving population risk. Circled numbers refer to nodes in
the PERT diagram in Figure 4.4.
a Rotterdam (1977).
bTNO I1CJ7f)\
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Table 4.10 (continued). The MAMP framework applied to the decision process on
LNG in the Netherlands.
(b) ROUND B: February 1977-March 1978.
Government advisory bodies are strongly in favor of a Dutch site.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Assumptions: (1) Official government view is that the Netherlands needs to import
LNG; preferred site is Rotterdam harbor.
(2) The Algerian LNG contract requires a decision on a site by October
1978.
(1) Should a site in Rotterdam harbor be approved?
(2) If so, which of five possible sites: Maasvlakte (A, B, C), Voomedam,
or an offshore island?
The government has established a decision procedure for site approval
involving consultation with local authorities.
Questions:
Process
constraints:
Outcome
constraint:
II INITIATION
Gasunie applies to Rotterdam for approval of an LNG terminal at Maasvlakte. The
Ministry of Economic Affairs requires local authorities (at Maasvlakte) to start
decision proceedings (October 1977). G)@@
III INTERACTION
Party Positiona Arguments
City of
Rotterdam
Rijnmond
Public
Authority
Zuid-Holland
ICONA
Ministry of H&E
For Maasvlakte site; prefer
A or B to Cb
For Rotterdam site for
storage; against A, B except
for storage; receiving termi-
nal should be offshore
For Rotterdam site; A, B
unacceptable; for
Voornedam
For Maasvlakte sites A, B,
C; prefer to offshore site
Opposed to Maasvlakte site
National need; increased harbor
activity; jobs; shipbuilding; costs.
National need; increased harbor
activity; close to users; more jobs;
high transport and handling risks. C
National need; economic factors;
risk unacceptable.
National need; cost considerations;
risk acceptable.
National need questionable; high
risks.
IV CONCLUSIONS
(1) No decision was taken on Rotterdam harbor since a new round of discussions had
begun comparing the Rotterdam sites with Eemshaven. @
(2) Government decides LNG site options are now limited to two areas: Maasvlakte (A
or B) and Eemshaven.
a Full party positions of Maasvlakte local authorities were not officially formulated
until round C had commenced.
b The acceptance of LNG at Maasvlakte was subsequently made conditional on the
absence of a (future) nuclear power plant in the area.
cTNO (1976).
86 Risk Analysis and Decision Processes
Table 4.10 (continued). The MAMP framework applied to the decision process on
LNG in the Netherlands.
(c) ROUND C: March 1978-November 1978.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Assumptions: (1) Official government view is that the Netherlands needs to import
LNG.
(2) The LNG contract requires a decision on a site by October 1978.
(3) There are growing concerns about public acceptance and local
authority approval of a Maasvlakte site.
(4) Eemshaven harbor, contrary to earlier reports, appears to be
nautically acceptable for LNG, and becomes second contender, in
addition to Maasvlakte sites.
Question: Should Maasvlakte (site A or B) or Eemshaven be approved for the
LNG terminal?
II INITIATION
(1) Because of growing concerns about local approval of Maasvlakte, Gasunie
approaches Eemshaven. @)
(2) Cabinet responds positively to the province of Gronin1.en requests to take
Eemshaven into consideration (March 1978). @ @ Q2)
III INTERACTION
Party
Groningen
Trade unions
Environmentalist
groups
ICONA
Shipowners'
Association
Electricity
Corporation
Cabinet
Parliament
(majority)
Position
For Eemshaven
For Eemshaven
Against Eemshaven
Prefers Maasvlakte to
Eemshaven
For Maasvlakte
Against Eemshaven
For Eemshaven
For Eemshaven
Arguments
Socioeconomics; employment; risks
acceptable. a
Socioeconomics.
Risks unacceptable;a alternative
options, such as pipeline, neglected.
Proximity to major gas users; coal
gasification opportunities; costs,
indirect employment; risks approxi-
mately equivalent.
Nautical disadvantages and risks at
Eemshaven.
Safety of existing coal-fired power
station threatened.
Socioeconomics; regional policy;
risks acceptable.
In line with cabinet.
IV CONCLUSIONS b
(1) Cabinet selects Eemshaven; @ decision approved by parliamentary majority. @
(2) Groningen authorities (local and provincial) indicate that they will conditionally
approve the Eemshaven site.
aTNO (1978).
b Some parliamentary parties (minority) opposed to LNG siting decision made by
cabinet. Arguments: risks uncertain, or unacceptable; alternative options unexplored.
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LNG terminal sites (with perceived viability); (2) shifts in the decision
process and their determinants; and (3) the variable influence of decision
events on the final outcome.
(1) During round A, Maasvlakte emerged as the only viable land-based
site in terms of nautical feasibility and safety. This conclusion was drawn
at national level by ICONA, based on technical advice from STU NET and
the NMI. During round A and most of round B this view was not chal-
lenged by any of the interested parties. This acquiescence emphasizes the
role of the government, and perhaps to a lesser degree Gasunie, in estab-
lishing the terminal location options to be considered. 18 At an early stage
of round A the government had rejected the alternative of importing
natural gas by pipeline. This initial policy decision formed a particular
problem formulation that guided the later decision procedure.
The introduction of Eemshaven as an alternative - following new
technical studies commissioned by Gasunie and the Groningen local
authorities - was made independently of the government, signaling a
reduction in its influence. Under pressure from the Groningen authorities,
and with the threat of local opposition to a Maasvlakte site, the govern-
ment was forced to acknowledge the re-emergence of Eemshaven into the
debate, and to include evaluation of this site in its formal decision pro-
cedure.
(2) The declining influence of the government, as distinct from its
formal responsibility, can also be traced in the main shifts in the decision
process. Following the initial decision to build a terminal, the government
played an important role in initiating risk studies and setting up inter-
departmental study groups and advisory bodies such as ICONA and
STUNET. But two significant events outside the government's control
caused its role to become more responsive, and thus brought about shifts
in the dynamics and problem bounds of the debate.
The first shift occurred as a result of the LNG import contract with
Sonatrach, thereby introducing round B. This required a terminal site to
be selected within 16 months (by October 1978), thereby imposing a
strict time limit on the proceedings. Regarding the contract, the govern-
ment had relatively little influence on the activities of Gasunie, since the
latter was operating as a member of a consortium involving the FRG firms
Ruhrgas AG and Salzgitter Ferngas GmbH who were leading the nego-
tiations with Sonatrach. At a broader level, Gasunie had been given a
mandate to import LNG, in line with national energy policy, so that
approval of the contract by the Ministry of Economic Affairs could be
seen as merely a formality. The government was faced with a strong
imperative to select a terminal site within the time stipulated, and so felt
the need to set up a special decision procedure for "formal" consultations
with the local authorities (at Rotterdam!) rather than following the
normal, potentially lengthy, procedure for site approval at the local level,
which might jeopardize the contract. The structure and dynamics of the
88 Risk Analysis and Decision Processes
decision process were largely determined by the "frame of refererence"
provided by national energy policy considerations.
The second major shift in the concluding stages of the decision process
was Gasunie's introduction of Eemshaven as an alternative to Maasvlakte.
Gasunie appoached the Groningen local authorities to investigate the feasi-
bility of building a terminal at Eemshaven because of the lack of consensus
on the acceptability of the Maasvlakte sites based on one overriding
factor - safety. Although few formal discussions had taken place at the
local authority level at the time Gasunie began pursuing alternatives
(December 1977), it was clear that opposition to LNG was present within
the Rijnmond Public Authority, Rotterdam City Council, and the Zuid-
Holland Provincial Council. Reports in the media indicated that the main
issue concerned the potentially adverse environmental impact, particularly
the increased safety risks an LNG terminal would pose to the local popu-
lation. In the absence of agreed criteria for defining "factual risk" (prob-
ability x consequence, as used in the TNO study), concerns were also
aired about the "perceived" risk level to local residents. Most of the dis-
cussions on safety of the Rotterdam sites centered on the consequences of
a major accident. 19 The government therefore had to include Eemshaven
as an alternative in response to a request from the Groningen authorities.
(3) Whatever the real ability of actors at the national level to influence
the decision process, the final approval of Eemshaven was the responsi-
bility of the cabinet, which placed emphasis on the dimensions of regional
development policy and socioeconomic factors such as employment (see
Table 4.11; Tweede Kamer 1978).20 The overriding importance attached
to these factors is emphasized by the fact that the cabinet rejected the
recommendations of its closest advisors and diverged from earlier govern-
ment statements on the issue (in line with national energy policy and, to
a lesser extent, economics/cost, ICONA preferred Maasvlakte).
With regard to safety, the cabinet concluded that "no clear preference"
could be given to either site, but it did not resolve the conflicts that were
apparent between interested parties on the basic issues of desirability or
acceptability of LNG. The government did not involve itself in detailed dis-
cussions with opponents of the terminal (such as environmentalist groups);
nor did it specifically endorse the view of the Groningen authorities and
others that the risks involved at Eemshaven or Maasvlakte were equally
acceptable. 21 The cabinet did not actually use safety as a final selection
criterion, and so did not make any fundamental objections to LNG on
grounds of safety, but focused instead on dimensions such as socioeco-
nomics. 22
The above course of events suggests that the outcome of the LNG
decision process cannot be analyzed solely in terms of the party inter-
actions represented in the MAMP framework. In particular, the clearly
divergent views of the cabinet and its many official advisory bodies
(especially ICONA), on factors such as the "psychological" importance of
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Table 4.11. Government policy perspective.
Policy question Dominant dimension (s) Outcome
LNG imports desirable? (1) Energy policy Yes
Dutch terminal desirable? (1) Energy policy Yes
Land-based or offshore (1) Economics/cost Land-based
terminal? (2) Energy policy
Preferred LNG site? (1) Socioeconomics Eemshaven
siting the terminal at Eemshaven to provide a stimulus to industrial
development, limits the exteQt to which the cabinet's final decision can be
understood in terms of the official advice submitted to it.
Indeed, there are indications that a significant factor was political
pressure: the Groningen authorities had enlisted support at the provincial
and municipal levels, as well as from chambers of commerce and trade
unions, and were thus able to present a united front. In Rotterdam, on the
other hand, the authorities were divided: the City of Rotterdam governors
were strongly in favor of a Maasvlakte site for the terminal, but the Rijn-
mond Public Authority was reluctant, if not unable to give its whole-
hearted support. Another political factor regarding the acceptability of
Maasvlakte was the condition made by the Rotterdam City Council that
a nuclear power plant would not be sited in the area in the future.
The Groningen local authorities argued that a decision in favor of an
LNG terminal at Eemshaven would provide a unique opportunity for the
government to endorse, through concrete actions, its stated policy of
encouraging industrial development in the northern provinces. The Eem-
shaven harbor complex, which had been developed with government
support, had by and large remained unused since its official opening in
1973. This argument was endorsed by the governor of Groningen, a
skillful politician with experience at cabinet level. He was in a position to
penetrate cabinet circles through personal contacts and to exploit his ties
with one of the political parties (VVD) in the coalition government, of
which he was a longstanding member. 23 Without attaching perhaps too
great an importance to the influence of individuals, the role played by the
governor of Groningen does indicate the importance of factors clearly
outside the formal decision process that may have increased the weight of
some arguments put forward by interested parties. The final decision
therefore appears to have been guided more by political opportunity than
by consistent government policies, strategies, or decision procedures. The
final outcome conflicted with the official advice of ICONA, and raises the
issue of the appropriateness and effectiveness of "expert advice" in this
decision process. ICONA (purposely) left out of consideration two impor-
tant political aspects: the local risk perception in relation to public and
official acceptance of LNG, and the political importance attached by
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some interested parties to the siting of the terminal. In retrospect, these
factors can be seen to have been the most dominant in influencing the
structure and outcome of the siting decision process. It should be empha-
sized that the nature of the "decision problem" was framed by the govern-
ment in terms of energy policy in general, and the perceived need for
liquefied gas imports in particular.
THE RISK ISSUE
Risk and safety were important considerations in the Dutch decision-
making process on LNG. The government's early concern was demonstra-
ted in 1974, when it commissioned an LNG risk assessment by the TNO.
The TNO report (1976) considered the risks involved in an LNG terminal
at Maasvlakte, and at the request of Groningen local authorities, the
analysis was later revised for a terminal at Eemshaven (TNO 1978). No
other risk studies were undertaken, and all major parties made use of the
TNO assessments. These were technical documents that excluded specific
discussion of acceptable levels of risk. They did not consider the "per-
ceived risk", but used the common concept of risk: "probability x conse-
quence". In this context it is relevant to review the positions of the
various interested parties in the LNG debate in relation to the qualitative
assessment of risk, as shown in Table 4.12.
Confronted by the various positions on the risk of LNG, the cabinet
decided that both Maasvlakte and Eemshaven were acceptable sites, but
failed to state specifically what analysis formed the basis of this con-
clusion. 24 It stated only that the risks were acceptable in relation to the
perceived advantages of importing LNG. As regards the option of an off-
shore terminal (as was preferred by some groups, such as the Rijnmond
Public Authority), the cabinet decided that the disadvantages, in terms of
costs and timing, outweighed the marginal safety advantages. In the
recognition of such agreed acceptable levels of risk, safety aspects were
only discussed in relative terms: (a) by comparing the risk of LNG with
existing risk levels of other activities, and (b) by shifting the discussion
towards an assessment of the comparative advantages of different sites.
It is relevant to distinguish between the impact of safety concerns upon
the structure of decision process, and the outcome of the final round of
the debate. The risk dimension was very important in the structure of the
decision process and the nature and direction of the various rounds. In
this context the following aspects may be noted:
(1) Concern about safety aspects of LNG by the government was ex-
pressed at a very early stage 25 and led to the commissioning of the
TNO risk assessments.
(2) Nautical safety was an important consideration in the initial screening
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Table 4.12. Positions of interested parties regarding risk in the Dutch LNG debate,
based on TNO (1980) and Schwarz (1982).
Acceptable
Cabinet
ICONA
Parliament
(majority)
Rotterdam
Harbor
Authority
Rotterdam
municipal
authorities
Groningen
local
authorities
RPC
Too uncertain
Zuid-Holland
Provincial
Council
Eemsmond
Environmentalist
Group
North Sea (Noordzee)
Environmentalist Group
Additional
population risk
unacceptable
Zuid-Holland
Provincial
Governors
Rijnmond Public
Authority
Minister of Health
and Environmental
Hygiene
(minority view)
Unacceptable
North Sea (Noordzee)
Environmentalist
Group
Electricity Corpora-
tion of Groningen
Notes
Acceptable: risks are negligibly small or acceptable in relation to the advantages of
LNG.
Too uncertain: the risk analyses are too uncertain; too many underlying assumptions
and contradictions; it is unacceptable to draw conclusions (at this stage); further
investigation of risk and alternative options should be pursued.
Additional population risk unacceptable: psychological factor/perceptions of risk; at
least handling/reception of LNG should not take place at Maasvlakte (parties in this
group did not express views on the acceptability of the risk at other locations, nor on
absolute levels of acceptable risk).
Unacceptable: possible consequences of an accident are too great; reception/handling
and storage of LNG onshore are unacceptable.
of alternative LNG sites, and led to the preference for a Maasvlakte
site (setting the context for round A).
(3) Following the signing of the contract between Gasunie and Sonatrach
(introducing round B), discussions about safety intensified at many
levels, involving the Rotterdam authorities, environmental and public
interest groups, parliament, and political parties.
(4) Approval of the LNG contract by the Ministry of Economic Affairs
took place after the leONA assessment had concluded that the risks
involved in a land-based or offshore LNG terminal would be equally
acceptable.
(5) Gasunie's introduction of Eemshaven as an alternative site reflected
concern about the timing of the approval by the Rotterdam author-
ities, which in turn was the result of discussions on the local opposition
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to the safety risks involved, especially the potential consequences of a
major accident (prerequisites to round C).
(6) The subsequent (re-)introduction of Eemshaven into the debate
(signaling round C) took place only after re-examination and approval
of the nautical and safety aspects involved at Eemshaven harbor by
the Groningen local authorities. 26
However, in relation to the final outcome in favor of Eemshaven, the
risk dimension was relatively insignificant. The final choice of a site had
been narrowed to Maasvlakte and Eemshaven, and the cabinet made its
decision on the assumption that it was practically impossible to obtain
agreement on general safety criteria with which to assess the acceptability
of an LNG terminal site. Also, ICONA and others had recommended that
the risks from a land-based terminal would be acceptable.
The final choice of Eemshaven was justified by the cabinet primarily in
terms of socioeconomics, particularly the positive effects of an LNG
terminal on regional development and employment. The fact that the
government's own risk assessment showed that the Eemshaven site was in
some respects safer for the local population than Maasvlakte, seems not
to have been a decisive criterion in the final selection (Table 4.13). In fact,
the cabinet specifically stated that "on the grounds of risk considerations,
no clear preference can be given in favor of one or the other harbor site"
(Tweede Kamer 1978). Although the government committed itself to an
LNG terminal site, responding to an "energy policy" imperative, political
considerations rather than safety concerns most strongly influenced the
final outcome of the decision process. 27
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The following concluding observations are noted in relation to the Dutch
decision process.
• The decision process in the Netherlands was characterized by conflict-
ing interests and perceptions of various interested parties, concerning in
particular: (i) the need to import natural gas in liquefied form; (ii) the
acceptability of the "factual" risks (probability x consequence), as well
as "perceived" risks involved in LNG (e.g., by focusing on the maximum
possible consequences).
• The conflicts arising from the different party concerns and problem
definitions were never resolved by the government; the final outcome
of the decision process cannot be understood solely in terms of the
party-specific interactions.
• The final selection of the LNG terminal site was a political decision,
influenced by the government's commitment to a national energy
policy favoring imports of LNG to a land-based terminal. The site had
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Table 4.13. Risk comparisons of Maasvlakte and Eemshaven (from Tweede Kamer
1978).
Maasvlakte Eemshaven
Probability of major accident 3 x 10-7 10-7
(after additional safety measures) (3xlO-8 ) (5 x 10-8 )
Maximum consequences
0.5-2 x 104Number of deaths 0.5-2 x 103
Number of casualties 1-4 x 104 1-4 x 103
Material third-party damage (Dutch 18 x 109 ?
guilders)
Increase in risk of individual death 3 x 10-6 < 3 X 10-7
Weighted risk after safety measures 0.028 0.023 (approx.)
to be selected within a specific time period to enable the Algerian LNG
supply contract to be honored. The cabinet decision was furthennore
founded on the contention that the benefits would justify the risks
involved, and that factors relating to the "political feasibility" (or
acceptance) of a particular LNG terminal site was an important element
in determining the final decision outcome.
From a broader perspective, it is significant that the dynamics and the
"problem definition" governing the decision process on LNG siting were
largely determined during round A. In the early stages, the proceedings
mainly involved the applicant (Gasunie) and a limited number of govern-
ment departments concerned with the planning of national energy policy.
The initial accessibility of various other interested parties to the decision-
making process was significantly constrained. This had implications both
in terms of setting the political agenda and in the types of "legitimate"
policy options that were incorporated into the decision process. Policy
"demands" by local authorities and other groups upon the government
were limited mainly to the later stages of the formal decision process.
By the time the process entered round B, the imperative to honor the
basic government commitment to importing LNG to a land-based terminal
had already been established. Both the mode of public discussion on the
safety aspects of LNG, and the role assigned to formal risk analyses in the
LNG decision-making process in the Netherlands, must be viewed in this
particular context.
NOTES
1. The shares of Gasunie are divided as follows: the state, 10%; DSM
Aardgas BV (DSM, Dutch State Mines, is a state-owned company),
40%, Shell Nederland BV, 25%; and Esso Holding Company Holland,
25% (Gasunie 1978a).
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2. State involvement in the governing body of Gasunie takes place
through representatives of the Ministry of Economic Affairs (one of
16 cabinet ministers). The minister also has to approve Gasunie
decisions concerning the annual sales plan, gas prices, and the con-
struction of facilities and equipment for the transport and storage of
gas (Tweede Kamer 1974).
3. See Chapter 1 (p2) for a discussion of LNG peakshaving plants.
4. In the case of Rotterdam an additional intermediate body was also
involved: the Rijnmond Public Authority, effectively operating
between the provincial and municipal authority levels with respect to
certain areas of policy (see Table 4.2 for details).
5. In the context of the LNG decision-making process, it is of relevance
here to mention that Maasvlakte was selected by Gasunie for its peak-
shaving plant on economic grounds and because of the proximity of
major gas users, but potential expansion of the site for an LNG termi-
nal at a later date had also been considered. In the early 1970s, as
Gasunie was planning the peakshaving plant, the company was already
involved in discussions with Algeria regarding imports of LNG, for
which a terminal would eventually have to be built. The peakshaving
plant was approved in the mid-1970s by the local authorities of
Rotterdam (after considerable discussion on safety and other risks)
and became operational in May 1977. For a brief review of the general
use of risk analyses in the Netherlands to date, see Blokker (1981).
6. Discussions with Sonatrach took place within a consortium in-
volving the FRG firms Ruhrgas AG and Salzgitter Ferngas GmbH.
The annual gas consumption in the Netherlands is about 44 billion m 3 ,
less than half of the domestic gas production (CBS 1979). The other
half is exported, mainly to Italy and France, under long-term con-
tracts made in the mid-late 1960s for 20-25 year periods. The
energy situation today is different, however. Since a large part of the
energy infrastructure is designed to use natural gas, Dutch gas fields
are being conserved, and so the government and Gasunie agreed to
embark on a policy of importing LNG to offset the exports.
7. TNO is a government-supported institute for applied scientific re-
search. The TNO risk analysis Evaluatie van de gevaren verbonden aan
aanvoer, overslag en opslag van vloeibaar aardgas (TNO Bureau
Explosieveiligheid) was first published in 1976.
8. ICONA (Interdepartmentale Coordinatie Commissie voor Noord-
zee-aangelegenheden) included representatives of 14 government
ministries, and was designed to give policy advice on North Sea affairs,
including LNG, directly to the cabinet. Officially, ICONA advised
MICONA, a cabinet subcommittee consisting of ministers of the
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departments represented in ICONA (at senior civil servant level).
Because of the way the LNG siting issue had entered at the level of
national government, as a multidimensional problem, ICONA became
the central forum for interdepartmental discussion on siting policy
(see ICONA 1978c).
9. New nautical studies concluded that since 1976, when the NMI had
first investigated the possibility of an LNG terminal at Eemshaven,
changes had occurred in the approach to the port, making it (under
certain conditions) feasible as an LNG harbor. TNO was therefore
commissioned to carry out a risk analysis of the site (Tweede Kamer
1978).
10. A major criticism of some left-of-centre political parties (and indeed
some environmentalist groups) concerned the lack of serious attention
and analyses devoted by government to the option of importing
natural gas via pipeline (and/or rearranging deals with major importers
of Dutch natural gas).
11. The dimensions are the main aspects of the policy problem that were
recognized and addressed by the different interested parties. The
following main dimensions are used: energy policy (N 2 , N 3 , N I) , A 2 );
economics/cost (L 3 , N s , A) ); health/safety (L 4 , L s ); socioeconomics
(N7 , L 2 , L 3 ); and environmental impact (R), L d. A discussion of
these dimensions and further details of the various party perspectives
are given in Schwarz (1982).
12. Mention of one or more dimensions as being dominant in policy
questions does not mean that other concerns were left out of consider-
ation.
13. The City of Rotterdam favored Maasvlakte B (over C) because of cost
considerations, and (over A) because of the scope for additional
related industrial activities.
14. This alliance included the provincial authority, Delfzijl Harbor Author-
ity, and the municipality of Uithuizermeeden within which the pro-
posed terminal site was located.
15. Maasvlakte A was situated adjacent to Gasunie's LNG peakshaving
plant, and therefore offered economic and operational advantages.
16. The following "minor" parties were also involved in the decision
process:
• Trade unions: in favor of an LNG terminal in Eemshaven. Dominant
dimension, socioeconomics.
• Environmentalist groups: opposed the location of an LNG termi-
nal at Eemshaven and to a lesser degree at Maasvlakte. Dominant
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dimensions, environmental impact and health; they also questioned
the need to import liquefied natural gas.
• Dutch Shipowners' Association: opposed the location of an LNG
terminal at Eemshaven on grounds of nautical safety .
• Electricity Corporation (Groningen and Drenthe provinces): opposed
the location of an LNG terminal at Eemshaven since it would
endanger a nearby electricity power station if there was a serious
accident. For a detailed discussion of these and other party perspec-
tives, see Schwarz (1982).
17. For further details of this framework, see Kunreuther et al. (1982).
18. In the event, the conclusions of government-sponsored studies of the
most suitable sites were in line with Gasunie's preference for siting the
terminal at Maasvlakte.
19. The number of deaths in the Maasvlakte area, in the event of a worst
possible LNG accident (involving detonation), had been estimated at
5500 average, and 17600 maximum (TNO 1976).
20. Table 4.11 reflects those dimensions that were instrumental in resolv-
ing the various policy questions. Contrary to what the table may
suggest, the government did make an extensive assessment of the
safety aspects of LNG.
21. The selection of an LNG terminal site was the first major environmen-
tal issue faced by the newly established Rijnmond Public Authority;
given its special interest in environmental protection and the absence
of legislation covering "environmental impact statements", its institu-
tional interest was obvious.
22. Also, while the pipeline option was in all probability less risky than
importing LNG, it was claimed by some that this alternative was never
adequately evaluated by the government.
23. The governor of Groningen (Commissaris der Koningin) at the time
was Mr E.H. Toxopeus. If the dimensions of socioeconomics, energy
policy, and health and safety were crucial in the discussion on LNG
siting, it is perhaps significant that the responsible cabinet ministers
in those areas were members of the VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid
en Democratie, People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, a conser-
vative-liberal party), with whom the governor probably had close
political ties. It should also be noted that prior to December 1977 the
cabinet did not include members of the VVD, but was a coalition
including the Labor Party (PvdA). Local authorities concerned with
approval of a Maasvlakte site had, by and large, Labor party majorities,
and this is likely to have provided more scope for political contact
with the cabinet prior to December 1977. The Labor Party was on the
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whole more critical of the government's plans to site an LNG terminal
in the Netherlands, particularly on safety grounds and the lack of
attention paid to alternative gas import methods.
24. It should be noted that the various local authorities had also discussed
LNG siting without explicit reference to an absolute qualitative level
of acceptable risk.
25. In 1974, the need for a Dutch LNG terminal was a theoretical one,
since no contracts had been drawn up.
26. The Groningen local authorities commissioned safety studies by the
TNO and the provincial public works' authorities of Groningen.
27. It must be noted, however, that the cabinet was probably reluctant
(for political reasons) to emphasize the safety advantages of Eemshaven
as a major justification for its policy choice, given that in the early
decision rounds the government had consistently played down the
safety issues as a critical factor in the selection of an LNG site.
Chapter 5
The UK: Sparks at
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay*
This chapter provides a review of some aspects of the decision and ap-
proval process involved in the siting of liquefied energy gas (LEG) facilities
at Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay in Fife, Scotland. The terms of reference
for this decision process were for the international oil companies Shell
and Esso to obtain outline planning permission (i.e., official approval in
principle) for the following:
(a) An application by Shell for natural gas liquids separation facilities at
Mossmorran, and associated jetty facilities at Braefoot Bay.
(b) An application by Esso for an ethylene cracker plant at Mossmorran
and associated jetty facilities at Braefoot Bay.
(c) An application by Esso for industrial development at Mossmorran.
This study will be treated essentially as a one-site decision process. The
overriding question was whether Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay, in principle,
would be a suitable site for the facilities proposed. A related question, by
way of qualifying any positive response, concerned the nature of the
planning conditions that would need to be stipulated if this site were to
be used for the LEG facilities proposed. In the case of a negative response
to the first question, an alternative site would be sought and a corre-
sponding, but essentially separate, decision process would be set in train.
Alternative sites would thus be considered sequentially rather than simul-
taneously. The decision process spanned three years, from July 1976
when initial interest in the sites was expressed, until August 1979, when
an official decision of approval was announced.
*This chapter was written by Sally Macgill, based on a more comprehensive case study
(Macgill 1982). The author worked closely with Joanne Linnerooth in integrating the
case study material within the MAMP framework.
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SETTING THE STAGE
The facilities at Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay were planned in connec-
tion with the exploitation of the large Brent oil and gas field in the UK
sector of the North Sea (see Figure 5.1). Although the main resource of
the Brent field is crude oil, there are also commercially exploitable quanti-
ties of gas (methane and natural gas liquids). The installations as outlined
in application (a) were required in order to produce the commercial fuels
North Sea
Scale
o 100 km
I I I I
Figure 5.1. Scotland and the Brent oil and gas field.
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and feedstocks (propane, butane, and ethane) from the natural gas liquids.
The efficient exploitation of the North Sea reserves and their downstream
processing in the UK are important aspects of UK energy and industrial
policy. The commercial fuels produced at Mossmorran were intended
for export through the Braefoot Bay shipping terminal (see Figures 5.2
and 5.3).
Application (a) was the only one of the three that could strictly be
called an LEG facility, but it was considered alongside the larger package
of petrochemical developments involving applications (b) and (c). The
intended location of these facilities and their capacities and interrelation-
ships are indicated in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. The proximity of the shipping
terminal site at Braefoot Bay to existing communities, notably Aberdour
and Dalgety Bay, was the cause of determined and prolonged opposition
to the applications on grounds of safety.
During the decision process, application (a) was the only one for which
there was a stated commitment to construct the facility in the event of per-
mission being granted. Firm commitment by Esso to construct the ethyl-
ene cracker (application b) was not given until October 1980, and to date
there has been no firm commitment to take up application (c). Evaluation
of the overall benefits from the three applications was severely frustrated
by this lack of commitment, as application (c), providing potentially
North
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Figure 5.2. The Fife area.
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in excess of 1000 permanent jobs, would be considerably more labor-
intensive than either (a) or (b), which would provide only 100 and 250
jobs, respectively.
PERTINENT EVENTS
The UK has a very comprehensive planning system. Under the Town and
Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972, any development of land (whether
for a householder intending to build a garage adjacent to his house, or a
:1IiL. Mo"momm
~ ",m;oa' 'ito
\
o
Figure 5.3. Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay.
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Figure 5.4. Interrelationships between the storage terminal and the shipping terminal
for LEG (from Fife, Kirkcaldy, and Dunfermline District Councils 1977).
Sparks at Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay 103
multinational corporation wanting to develop a 300-hectare site) requires
planning permission. Official planning procedures in Scotland are set in
train when a formal application for a particular development on a specific
site is lodged. The onus of site selection rests firmly with the applicant.
Approval for planning applications may be given at the district, re-
gional, or national government level, depending on the relationship of the
project to the relevant government policies. The majority of applications
are determined at the district level, and raise issues that are usually con-
fined to the site in question. Those that raise issues of more than just
district significance, specifically if they are contrary to or additional to
the structure plan for the area (such as large industrial developments), may
then be determined at the regional level. Finally, the Secretary of State
may determine applications that raise issues of national significance, such
as airports, power stations, or North Sea oil-related developments.
For large-scale projects such as Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay, the granting
of planning permission involves a two-stage procedure, the first of which
culminates in the granting or refusal of outline permission (i.e., approval
in principle). It is this stage that, for the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay devel-
opment, corresponds to the decision process described in this case study.
Outline planning permission is followed in a second stage (not reviewed
here) by detailed consent. Once outline approval has been granted, it can
be removed on very limited grounds of specified reserved matters; other-
wise the government can face very substantial compensation claims. Thus
outline permission, for most purposes, is regarded as full permission.
The level of detail required in the application for outline planning
permission in this two-stage procedure has to be sufficient to establish the
nature of the proposed activity so that the determining authority can
establish in principle whether the site is suitable for accommodating the
proposal. Design detail of the plant and specific support services that will
be required (so-called reserved matters) are not usually investigated until
the second stage, when outline planning permission for the overall devel-
opment has been granted. In may cases this order appears to meet the
interests of the developer and of the planning authority, since both parties
may be reluctant to undertake detailed investigations before approval in
principle to the overall development has been given. Thus outline planning
permission relates only to the use of the land in principle, and not to any
detail, even if this has been entered in support of the application.
Another feature to note about a development of the scale of the
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay facilities is that there are likely to be a number
of informal consultations initiated by the developer with the district,
regional, and national authorities in advance of the lodging of the official
planning application. Such an exercise is directed initially at obtaining the
basic information to enable the developer to decide whether the intended
site is suitable. At the same time it enables the planning authority to assess
the nature of additional information that it will itself require in order to
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be able to judge the acceptability of the application, e.g., whether any
specific reports will need to be written or commissioned on particular
aspects. Thus consultations undertaken during the pre-application period
enable a more efficient processing of the formal application.
The major events and activities in the Mossmorran--Braefoot Bay de-
cision process are illustrated in the PERT diagram in Figure 5.5, which
divides the process into three rounds. The process as a whole took three
years, from July 1976 to August 1979. There was no overall time limit on
the duration of the decision, although certain procedures within it were
bounded by statutory time constraints.
8
m
Round C
14- - Round A- - -+*------ -Round B - - - - - ~-+j
Summer
1976
End
1976
Early
1977
Spring
1977
I I
Summer End
1977 1977
I I
Early Summer
1978 1979
(a) Informal consultations between oil
companies and local authorities.
(b) Consternation amongst local resi-
dents about the project.
(c) Public meetings arranged by local
authorities and oil companies.
(d) Local residents attend meetings.
(e) Oil companies prepare formal plan-
ning applications.
(f) Statutory notification set in train.
(g) Statutory publicity set in train.
o Key events and/or decisions (= completion of all activities leading to that node)
---. Direction of activity (= task required to be undertaken)
Figure 5.5. PERT diagram for the LEG decision process in the UK. Numbers along
flow lines indicate the expected time in months for the relevant activities; those in
parentheses indicate the actual times taken in this case.
Key events and/or decisions
<D Oil companies show interest in Moss-
morran-Braefoot Bay sites.
<D Local authorities, Forth Ports Au-
thority, and oil companies decide
informally on suitability of site.
® Local opposition articulated.
o Public meetings held.
o Formal planning applications lodged.
® Regional/nationallevels notified.
<D Planning applications publicized.
CD Risk, environmental, and economic
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impact analyses commissioned/pre-
pared.
(2) Applications called in by Secretary
of State.
@ It is decided to hold a public inquiry.
@ Public inquiry is held.
@ Public inquiry report received by
Secretary of State.
@ Radio sparks issue raised.
® Secretary of State announces pro-
visional approval but asks for further
submissions on radio sparks.
@) Dialogue terminated; decision of
approval announced.
(h) Consultations undertaken.
(i) Secretary of State reviews planning
applications.
(j) Secretary of State awaits response to
publicity.
(k) Signficant opposition articulated fol-
lowing publicity.
(I) Local residents further articulate
opposition.
(m) Local authorities unanimously ap-
prove application and prepare for
public inquiry based on formal
analyses and consultations.
(n) Interested parties prepare cases for
public inquiry.
(0) Statutory pre-inquiry activity co-
ordinated by inquiry reporter.
(p) Inquiry report circulated for com-
ment.
(q) Inquiry report considered by Sec-
retary of State alongside "national
interest" and other issues.
(r) Radio sparks issue brought to atten-
tion of Secretary of State.
(s) Interrupted dialogue between HSE
and Action Group over radio sparks
issue.
Round A. Round A began in July 1976, when the local authorities
were approached by Shell and Esso. <D Informal contacts were established
with other statutory authorities and interests concerning suitable sites for
the facilities, ® as a result of which significant local opposition was
articulated. ® @ Formal planning applications for the development of
Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay were lodged with the district councils
(Dunfermline and Kirkcaldy in this case, since Mossmorran straddles the
district boundary), in January 1977. ®
Round B. This round began after the planning applications had been
lodged, and initiated three interrelated lines of activity, as illustrated
schematically in Figure 5.6.
(1) District councils must notify regional (Fife in this case) and national
(Scottish Development Department in this case) authorities of applications
whose impact may extend to the regional or national level, respectively.
These higher authorities may, at their own discretion, "call in" the appli-
cation, and thereby assume responsibility for determining the decision
outcome. Applications that are not called in following such notification
are passed back to the district level for determination. The Mossmorran-
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Braefoot Bay applications were called in at the national level in view of
their importance to national energy policy, the national economy, and the
environment of the Firth of Forth. ® The ultimate decision taker was
thus the Secretary of State for Scotland. Significant government interest
at the regional level was also warranted and the three local authorities
(regional and two district) coordinated their consideration of the appli-
cations, although each authority council ratified them individually.
(2) District councils publicize planning applications via notices, local
press advertisements, and personal communications, so that any individ-
uals or organizations (private or public), or other branches of government
and public services who may be affected by them or have responsibilities
that relate to particular aspects of the proposals, may make appropriate
written representations before an official decision is made. In the case of
the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay applications there were many objections
following such publicity, mainly on hazard and environmental impact
grounds. <D There was also some notable expression of support for the
potential national interest and beneficial socioeconomic implications.
Following informal consultations (July-December 1976), significant
local opposition had already been articulated in advance of the formal
publicity.
In the light of the response to the statutory publicity the Secretary of
State may deem it suitable to hold a public inquiry into planning appli-
cations, affording all interested parties an opportunity to present argu-
ments for or against the applications, and to cross-examine those of
others. The proceedings may be similar to those of a formal court of law.
Since the discretion to hold a public inquiry lies with the Secretary of
State, it would have been legally possible, though politically difficult, to
rule on the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay applications without an inquiry.
The Secretary does not witness the inquiry proceedings personally, and is
not bound by any conclusions or recommendations that may stem from
an inquiry. @)
(3) Local authorities (district and regional) may seek professional
advice from their own or from outside experts on the potential impacts
of applications that may be significant from a planning point of view. In
this case, Cremer and Warner, a private firm of chemical and engineering
consultants, was commissioned to advise on hazard and environmental
impact (Cremer and Warner 1977). ® This step was taken to supplement
the more general advice on potential hazard to be issued by the Health
and Safety Executive, the statutory advisors and guardians of safety.
The directors of planning of the three local authorities jointly prepared a
report on socioeconomic impacts (Fife, Dunfermline, and Kirkcaldy
District Councils 1977).
In addition to the requirement of planning permission for the facilities
on land at Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay, a further statutory requirement
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was the granting of a jetty license by the Forth Ports Authority for the
Braefoot Bay shipping terminal.
The public inquiry @ was the centerpiece of round B of the decision
process, which began with the lodging of formal planning applications. ®
In round A, considerations of the proposed developments had been essen-
tially informal; ® 0 thereafter consideration became more formal, in
line with statutory procedures, ® <V and the main formal analyses were
prepared. ® The public inquiry itself focused on local planning issues (as
is quite usual); thus national government departments with a significant
interest in the proposals (Energy, Industry, and Scottish Development)
did not present their cases here, but issued brief written background state-
ments and communicated their views to the Secretary of State through
the normal course of official and unofficial (unobservable) interdepart-
mental contacts. In addition to their respective internal decisions and
contacts, the other statutory authorities involved (Health and Safety
Executive, local authorities, and the Forth Ports Authority) also presented
their positions at the public inquiry. This became the main opportunity
for acknowledged public debate of the issues at stake.
Round B ended when the Secretary of State received the public inquiry
report and other relevant information. @
Round C. Round C began after the public inquiry, when the issue of
the potential hazard of the ignition of a vapor cloud from radio trans-
mission break sparks came to light. @ This was, most unusually, con-
sidered by the Secretary of State to merit further publicly acknowledged
deliberation. Rather than reopening the inquiry as one possible course of
action, public participation was invited in the form of written correspon-
dence. @ Thus, although the inquiry report had been received for con-
sideration by the Secretary of State in November 1977, and an official
decision had been expected shortly thereafter, consideration of the radio
sparks issue postponed the final decision until August 1979. @
PARTY CONCERNS
The large number of interested parties that were involved in the Moss-
morran-Braefoot Bay decision process are listed in Table 5.1, and the
potential impacts or concerns of these parties are given in Table 5.2. The
notation and headings in this table are taken from the more comprehen-
sive list of concerns presented in Table 2.1. The concerns were appraised
differently by different parties, as indicated in the party/concern matrix
in Table 5.3. Some concerns may be interpreted as relating directly to the
utility or welfare of particular parties (denoted by .), while others were of
concern to parties representing areas in which they had explicit responsi-
bility (denoted by -). These concerns relate mainly, but not exclusively,
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Table 5.1. Key parties in the LEG decision process in the UK.
Applicant
Shell and Esso
National government
Secretary of State
for Scotland
Scottish Development
Department
Departments of
Energy and Industry
Public inquiry reporter
The Health and Safety
Executive
Local government
Forth Ports Authority
Local authorities
Others
Aberdour and Dalgety
Bay Joint Action
Group
Conservation Society
The residents of
Cowdenbeath
Private international oil companies.
The decision taker, a national government cabinet minister,
aided by legal and other advisors.
Part of the Scottish Office acting on behalf of the Secretary
of State, responsible for development control (an adminis-
trative function) and development planning (a policy
function) in Scotland.
Government departments with significant policy interests
in the developments.
A civil servant appointed by the Scottish Development
Department to chair the public inquiry proceedings.
Statutory UK guardian of safety, responsible for ensuring
the safety of the public and employees potentially at risk
from hazardous activities. The Executive's role is advisory
in the planning stage, and enforcement in the operational
phase.
Statutorally responsible for leasing jetties and controlling
traffic in the Firth of Forth, including responsibility for
marine safety.
Fife region, Dunfermline and Kirkcalrly districts: host
local authorities to the planned developments, democrat-
ically elected councillors advised by professional planners,
and on hazard and environmental impact, by Cremer and
Warner.
A local pressure group opposed to the developments,
formed from the residents' associations of Aberdour and
Dalgety Bay, two villages each with an estimated popu-
lation of 4000, whose boundaries extend within one mile of
the Braefoot Bay jetty. Articulate, predominantly middle
class, suffering little unemployment, and considering that
their views would not be represented other than through
their own group, they were able to draw on indigenous legal
and technical expertise, as well as advice from a professor
of fire and safety engineering at Edinburgh University.
A national environmentalist lobby, the Scottish branch of
which made representations against the LEG plant.
Cowdenbeath, the nearest town to the Mossmorran site,
has a high rate of unemployment. Predominantly in favor
of the plant on employment grounds, although they made
little open articulation of this view within the formal
decision process.
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Table 5.1 (continued). Key parties in the LEG decision process in the UK.
Other parties Other individuals and organizations were less prominent
than those listed above, but not necessarily less concerned
(see Macgill 1982). The main political parties supported
the developments in principle (although a local MP raised
questions in parliament on procedural aspects), and a few
individuals from minority parties took an opposing view.
The media leaned towards the objectors' arguments,
although again there were exceptions.
Table 5.2. List of concerns relevant to the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay decision
Concern
National
Economic benefits N4
National costs N 5
National image N6
Energy policy N 8
Regional
Industrial development R 2
Local
Amenity and
environment:
land use LLt
)marine pollution L I2tourism, recreation L 13local history L 14
Economic benefits:
jobs, short-term L 22
jobs, long-term L 23
Population risk:
shipping L 41
gas processing
and storage L 42
radio sparks L 44jetty operations L 45
Physical suitability
of site L 6
Applicant
Profit A j
Interpretation of concern in the Mossmorran-
Braefoot Bay context
Taxes, royalties, and balance of payment earnings
20% of capital construction costs of NGL plant and
ethylene cracker
The encouragement of oil-related developments
The efficient exploitation of the Brent oil and gas
field
The encouragement of industry and diversification
of employment opportunities in Fife
Potentially adverse impacts on these areas
A maximum of 3500 construction jobs over three
years
100,250, and 1000+ jobs for each of the NGL
plant, ethylene cracker, and downstream industries
respectively
At Mossmorran
At Braefoot Bay
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to the statutory (government) authorities. Some impacts, although not
affecting the welfare or utility of individual parties, could be used as a
basis for arguments by those parties for "strategic" reasons (denoted by"').
For example, the Joint Action Group could use gas storage at Mossmorran,
L 42 , in this way; they were not likely to be directly affected by this
impact, but it provided scope for argument against the plant and hence
could augment their campaign.
From the static description given in Table 5.3, a dynamic represen-
tation of the decision process emerges by considering the interplay of
party arguments over these concerns at various stages in the process.
It turns out that the circles (e) identify some of the main causes for argu-
ment for or against the applications by parties primarily affected by them.
It is to be noted, however, that not all such party concerns were openly
debated by parties during the decision process - for example Shell and
Esso over profit considerations, AI' the population of Cowdenbeath
over short-term jobs, L 22 , and the Departments of Energy and Industry
over energy policy, N 6 • The squares (-) identify grounds for support or
objections to the applications. In the case of potentially adverse im-
pacts (amenity and environment, L 1 , for instance), the squares represent
arguments over whether the impact was or could be made acceptable,
or be sufficiently balanced by other benefits. Not all such concerns
were explicitly used as arguments during the decision process; for ex-
ample, the Health and Safety Executive's concern over shipping, L 41 •
The triangles (... ) identify strategic arguments used to reinforce party
positions.
THE MAMP FRAMEWORK
Following the MAMP framework, the UK decision process is divided into
several rounds, each of which has a problem formulation; a starting point
or initiating event; and interaction phase where party arguments are
represented; and an outcome or conclusion. As noted in Chapter 2, rounds
are loosely defined units, and there is no unique way to segment any given
decision process. The Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay process is divided into
three rounds for the purposes of this case study, as illustrated in Table 5.4
and the PERT diagram in Figure 5.5. Although this representation is
designed to self-explanatory, some additional comment is appropriate.
Round A began when initial interest in the sites was expressed, and
ended when formal planning applications were submitted. The end of
round A was marked by a transfer of observable arguments from predomi-
nantly local to both local and national considerations, and by the entry of
the ultimate decision taker, the Secretary of State for Scotland.
Only four parties appeared in round A. The residents of Cowdenbeath
did not organize themselves as a participating party as such, either in this
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or in subsequent rounds. The provisional approval at this stage by the
local authorities and by the Forth Ports Authority was important to the
applicants.
Round B embraced the public inquiry - this was announced by the
Secretary of State shortly after the "call in" - and ended with the Sec-
retary of State's provisional decision of approval.
Round C was initiated by the raising of the radio sparks issue - a new
concern that merited further open consideration. The reason why the
sparks issue received so much prominence was procedural rather than sub-
stantive; it was not that the issue was a relatively serious one, but rather
because it was only raised after the inquiry. The Action Group persisted
with further arguments on other concerns during this round, but these
were considered by the Secretary of State to be of a kind already dealt
with at the inquiry, and therefore refused them acknowledged debate.
Round C ended with the final decision of approval.
There had been strong support from both local and national government
(Scottish Development Department, Departments of Energy and Industry,
local authorities) to approve the applications, subject to satisfactory
reassurance on safeguards against potentially adverse impacts, and this
appears to have been little shaken by the relatively long delay over the
radio sparks issue. A relatively extensive set of 48 planning conditions
accompanied the approval of Shell's application, with an almost identical
set for Esso's application. The most onerous of these from a safety view-
point was that a full hazard and operability audit should be conducted
before the facilities could be commissioned. This condition was strongly
supported by many of the statutory authorities, who saw it as an integral
step in ensuring the safety of the plant. The local authorities had sug-
gested a similar condition at and before the public inquiry, following a
recommendation by Cremer and Warner, that the audit should be to the
council's satisfaction. The inquiry reporter, on the other hand, recom-
mended that the audit should be to the satisfaction of the Health and
Safety Executive. The Secretary of State decided that it must also be to
his own satisfaction.
Not all arguments of the main parties are summarized in Table 5.4.
There were undoubtedly a number of "unseen" interactions, both official
and unofficial, and also vehement arguments from the Action Group on
procedural aspects. The tabulations also mask the weight of concern by
various parties about different impacts (see Macgill1982). Moreover, only
those arguments of the statutory authorities that relate to their approval
in principle of the developments are reflected in Table 5.4, and not their
more specific concerns over individual matters of detail. Individual parties
did not substantially change their views on major concerns either during
or between rounds.
The decision for the resolution of a large UK planning application
would normally require two rounds, rather than the three indicated in
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Table 5.4. The MAMP framework applied to the decision process on LEG in the UK.
(a) ROUND A: August 1976--early 1977.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Assumptions: It is both feasible and desirable to process gases from the Brent oil and gas field.
Question: Is Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay, in principle, a suitable site for a processing plant?
II INITIATION
Shell and Esso show interest in Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay site. 0 a
III INTERACTION
Party
ShelljEsso
Forth Ports
Authority
Local
authorities
Aberdour and
Dalgety Bay Joint
Action Group
IV CONCLUSIONS
Position
In favor of site
Site suitable
In favor of applications;
further advice sought on
potential impacts; keen
to encourage application (c)
as well as (a) and (b)
Against applications
Arguments
Site designated for large-scale industry (R 2 );
environmental impacts can be made accept-
able (L 11, L 12); availability of construction
workforce advantageous (L 22 ); benefit of
long-term jobs (L 23 ); safety will be ensured
(L 41 , L 42 , L 45 ); site well suited physically to
developments (L 6 ).
Strict con trois can ensure acceptable marine
environmental impact and safety (L 12, L 13,
L 41 , L 45 ); site well suited physically to
developments (L 6 ).
Site designated for large-scale industry (R 2 );
potentially adverse, but on balance accept-
able, environmental impacts (L 11 , L n , L I4 );
policy to encourage employment (Ln , L 23 );
risks considered acceptable (L 41 , L 45 );
site physically well suited to developments
(L 6 )·
Significant environmental, historical, and
amenity losses (L 11 , L 13, L I4 ); risks appear
unacceptable (L41 , L 42 , L 45 ); Braefoot Bay
site physically unsuitable (L 6 ).
Planning applications formally submitted.
Italics indicate arguments involving population risk.
a Circled numbers correspond wi th nodes on the PE RT diagram in Figure 5.5.
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Table 5.4 (continued). The MAMP framework applied to the decision process on LEG
in the UK.
(b) ROUND B: January 1977-March 1978.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Assumptions: It is both feasible and desirable to process gases from the Brent field. Mossmorran-
Braefoot Bay is potentially a suitable site. A public inquiry is to be held where
concerns can be debated. Secretary of State for Scotland is the decision taker.
Question: Should the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay site be officially approved?
II INITIATION
Planning~plications are submitted, 0 processed, ® <D ® and subjected to debate at the public
inquiry.~ Inquiry report subsequently submitted to Secretary of State. @
III INTERACTION
Party
Shell/Esso
Departments of
Energy and Industry
HSE
Forth Ports
Authority
Local
authorities
Aberdour and
Dalgety Bay
Joint Action
Group
Conservation
Society
Inquiry
reporter
Position
In favor of
site
In favor of
approval
Site suitable
Site suitable
In favor of
approval
Against site
approval
Against site
approval
Recommends
approval
Arguments
Developments concur with national policy (N8 ); site
designated for industry (R 2 ); environmental impacts can
be made acceptable (L ll , L I2 ); availability of workforce
(L 22 ); benefit of long-term jobs (L 23 ); safety will be ensured(L41 , L42 , L 45 ); site well suited physically (L 6 ).
Developments accord with energy policy (N8 ); potential
economic (N4 ) and less tangible national benefits (N6 ).
Site suitable in principle for safe installations (L 42 , L 45 ).
Strict controls can ensure acceptable marine environmental
impact (L I2 , L l3 , L4 1> L45 ); site well suited physically -
no better site on estuary (L6 ).
Site designate!! for industry (R 2 ); potentially adverse, but
acceptable, environmental impacts (L ll , L 13 , L 14); jobs
(L 22 , L 23 ), plus multiplier effects of benefit; accept advice
that risks are acceptable a (L 41 , L 42 , L45 ).
Significant national costs (N5 ); significant environmental
and amenity losses (L ll , L 13 , L I4 ); employees may be
poached from existing industries (L 23 ); risks unacceptable;
little confidence in reassurances (L 41> L42 , L45 ); Braefoot
Bay site physically unsuitable (L6 ).
North Sea resources should be conserved (Ns ); significant
environmental and amenity losses (L ll , L l3 , L I4 ); risks
appear unacceptable (L 41 ,L42 , L45 ); site physically unsuit-
able (L 6 ).
National benefits must be accepted (N3 , N 4 , N6 ); beneficial
local impact (R 2 , L 22 , L 23 ); acceptable environmental but
small amenity losses (L II , L 12, L l3, L 14); weigh t of evidence
suggests risk acceptable (L41 , L42 , L 45 ); no better site on
estuary (L6 ).
IV CONCLUSION
The Secretary of State gives provisional approval to applications, subject to a wide range of planning
conditions. Overriding national need outweighs potential environmental losses. No question of
unacceptable risk emerging given Health and Safety at Work Act, and additional provisions, includ-
ing those embodied in planning conditions. Sparks issue has been raised since the public inquiry;
clarification of this issue required before final approval is granted.
a Denotes the submission of a formal risk study.
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Table 5.4 (continued). The MAMP framework applied to the decision process on LEG
in the UK.
(c) ROUND C: March 1978-August 1979.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Assumptions: The Secretary of State for Scotland has provisionally approved the Mossmorran-
Braefoot Bay site.
Question: Do radio sparks pose an unacceptable risk?
II INITIATION
The Secretary of State considers that further investigation of the sparks issue is warranted.
III INTERACTION
Party
Health and
Safety Executive
Local
authorities
Aberdour and
Dalgety Bay
Joint Action Group
IV CONCLUSION
Position
Site suitable subject to
additional safeguards
In favor of approval
Against applications
Arguments
No reason 10 delay planning permission a
(£44)'
No reason 10 delay planning permission a
(£44)'
Sparks issue not resolved (£44); significant
additional evidence on olher safely concerns a
(£41' £42, £4,)'
August 1979: Secretary of State ratifies provisional approval indicated in Round B.
a Denotes the su bmission of a formal risk study.
Table 5.4, with no observable interaction following receipt of the inquiry
report by the Secretary of State. One of the remarkable features of the
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay decision was that "new" evidence (the radio
sparks issue) came to light after the public inquiry, and led to protracted
consideration of the evidence in round C.
In rounds A and C, the public was able to participate through informal
public meetings, extensive lobbying, and canvassing, as well as written
representations, both to statutory authorities and to other interested
individuals and organizations. Objections centered mainly on safety, the
environment, and amenity concerns. In round B it was dominated by the
formal public inquiry and the preparation of a convincing case of oppo-
sition by the Action Group's expert witnesses and other individuals and
organizations who wished to express their views, and to question those of
others. Safety emerged as their predominant concern. Notwithstanding
their participation, the Action Group expressed a severe loss of confidence
in the UK public inquiry system. That afterwards only those written
representations dealing with the radio sparks issue were acknowledged as
being relevant additional evidence, and that there were no substantial
responses on other issues gave rise to their further disquiet and frustration.
Many members of the public who might have expected to be directly
affected by the planned installations - notably the residents of Cowden-
beath - did not actively participate in the decision process for a number
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of reasons (many considered themselves adequately represented by the
local authority councils, for instance). Those that did participate, how-
ever, articulated their views mainly through the Action Group, arguing on
behalf of sections of the Aberdour and Dalgety Bay communities that
were potentially most at risk.
The Aberdour and Dalgety Bay Joint Action Group was an extremely
determined, articulate, and well organized pressure group that was self-
funded and notable for the extent of its indigenous expertise - both legal
and technical. The involvement of the Conservation Society was modest
by comparison. The Action Group claimed that its technical expertise was
superior to that of the statutory authorities, and called for more stringent
safety requirements than those apparently considered adequate by those
authorities. The Action Group was openly critical of the Cremer and
Warner report, the competence of the Health and Safety Executive, and
of the safety assurances given by the Forth Ports Authority. Much of
the Group's concern over safety appears to have been intimately bound
up with its concern over procedures, and it is these aspects that are of
relevance in the present context. Fuller details of these aspects can be
found in the main case study report (Macgill 1982), but in summary, the
main concerns of the Action Group were:
• The decision procedures themselves, especially the site specificity of the
process, the lack of opportunities for public participation, the lack of
detailed information available, and the time and other resource con-
straints imposed on their own representations.
• The system of public participation in general, and the public inquiry
system, particularly its unsuitability for handling decisions of technical
complexity.
• The extent to which the safety of a proposed installation can (and
should) be seen to be established during the decision process - e.g., in
addition to (unseen) statutory safety scrutiny once official approval in
principle has been granted.
• The problems of accountability that arise when the population consider-
ing itself most at risk is too small for normal democratic representation,
and the single-issue nature of their concern is arguably unsuited to
representation at general or local elections.
• The nature of the contribution of a public interest group, at its own
expense, to societal risk management.
THE RISK ISSUE
The Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay decision process described in this chapter
was geared to the granting of outline planning permission for gas pro-
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cessing, storage, and transhipment facilities. As such, the question at issue
with regard to safety, framed by statutory procedures, was whether
an acceptably safe installation of the type outlined could in principle be
built on the chosen site. Risk studies were prepared by various parties in
relation to this question, although at various stages the risk aspect appears
to have become enmeshed with the more specific issue of whether the
actual installations and associated activities would be acceptably safe.
The most important risk studies compiled were: a report by Cremer
and Warner (1977); reports on radio transmission break sparks (see, for
example, HSE 1978a); and the Action Group's shipping hazards report
(1979). Other more modest hazard impact statements were prepared by
individual parties as bases for their public inquiry evidence and, in the case
of Shell and Esso, in support of their original applications, and in the case
of Cremer and Warner, on radio sparks. Formal risk studies were not
issued by the Health and Safety Executive (with the exception of those
specifically on the radio sparks issue), since their public statements were
required only to relate to whether an acceptably safe plant could be built
in principle. The Executive's safety scrutiny would be made on the basis
of the detailed plans of the facilities, but these would only become avail-
able after outline planning permission had been granted; only the outline
plans were available during the decision process.
The three major risk studies were as follows.
(1) The Cremer and Warner report (1977) was commissioned by the
local authorities towards the end of round A. It was written in response
to a general brief asking for: (i) advice as to the acceptability of appli-
cations (a) and (b) in terms of hazard, including possible interaction
effects and the layout of the proposed development; (ii) advice on the
adequacy of information provided by the applicants; and (iii) possible
recommendations for planning conditions. There was no statutory require-
ment that such a report should be prepared, but since hazard was a crucial
element in the general cost-benefit balance of the applications at the
local level, and because the advice from the Health and Safety Executive
would be more general, the local authorities sought outside expert advice
on this aspect. A small contribution to the cost of the report was contrib-
uted by the Scottish Development Department, who had an interest in
this study.
The Cremer and Warner report was the most comprehensive risk study
written during the decision process. It was necessarily restricted by the
amount of design detail available at the outline planning stage: generic
rather than specific design features had to be inferred at various stages.
Consequence analysis calculations were used to estimate the probability
of various types of failure (allowing for equipment malfunction and
human error), estimates of which were expressed as low, very low, or
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extremely low. The overall conclusion reached by Cremer and Warner
was that:
There is no reason to doubt that the installations proposed for Mossmorran-
Braefoot Bay cannot be designed, built and operated in such a manner as to be
acceptable in terms of environmental impact and community safety - provided
that reasonable and adequate safeguards are agreed and ensured.
Some specific recommendations regarding prudent layout and contain-
ment measures within the site were made in relation to applications (a)
and (b), and for the evacuation of residents of a small housing estate at
the edge of the development area. The report also suggested that a detailed
technical safety audit should be completed on the plants prior to com-
missioning. Close scrutiny of the content of application (c) was also
recommended.
The Cremer and Warner report was used by the local authorities to
underpin their own judgment that the risk would be acceptable in light
of the later enforcement role of the Health and Safety Executive and the
good reputations of Shell and Esso. The report was assessed internally by
the local authorities and by the Scottish Development Department and
was made available for public inspection prior to the inquiry. The report
was challenged by the Action Group with respect to its lack of detail, the
qualitative criteria used, and notably the relatively scant attention paid
to jetty operations at Braefoot Bay. The Action Group also questioned
the impartiality of the consultants appointed by local authorities who
appeared keen to support the application.
The public inquiry brought out a number of differences in the views of
Cremer and Warner, the risk experts of Shell and Esso, the Health and
Safety Executive, and the Action Group. With the exception of the Action
Group, these were considered by the other parties to be differences re-
lated to matters of fine tuning rather than fundamental factors arguing
against an acceptably safe plant. The Action Group, however, considered
the differences to be more substantial, giving cause for the public to be
fearful for its safety, particularly the hazard potential of open flammable
cloud explosions (Rasbash and Drysdale 1977).
(2) The radio sparks issue (round C), although considered by all parties
to be relatively less important than some other safety concerns, was given
by far the most thorough treatment in terms of risk studies prepared
during the decision process. The reports issued by the Health and Safety
Executive were based on field experiments designed to assess the potential
of radio transmission break sparks to ignite vapor clouds. These were
undertaken in response to requests from the Action Group on this issue.
The delay caused by the time taken to complete the experiments, and to
circulate the results, was an important procedural feature of the Moss-
morran-Braefoot Bay decision process.
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(3) The Action Group's shipping hazards report, which was published
during round C, was aimed to provide a quantitative assessment of risks
to Forth communities from the proposed jetty operations at Braefoot
Bay. The shipping risk element had received relatively little attention in
the Cremer and Warner report, and none from the Health and Safety
Executive at the public inquiry. The Action Group had long pressed for a
quantitative assessment of risk, having suggested that a hazard probability
of one in a million in any given year was a useful yardstick of risk accept-
ability, and noted that other parties implicitly accepted this yardstick,
though without reference to an explicit quantitative assessment.
The shipping hazards report adopted methods used in an official assess-
ment of the hazards at the Canvey Island gas and petrochemical complex
(HSE 1978b), which had then just been published. It calculated that the
annual probability of an incident at Braefoot Bay that could cause death
or severe injury to members of the communities of Aberdour and Dalgety
Bay was of the order of 10-3 • Lower probabilities were calculated for
other Firth of Forth communities.
The report was considered by the Action Group to provide disquieting
justification for their fears on the safety of the proposed installations.
Although written by amateurs, its methods were verified by expert private
consultants as being appropriate applications of those used in the Canvey
Island report. Other parties inferred, however, that the use of Canvey
"data" was inappropriate, but no written critique was made. The Adion
Group was concerned that there were no significant responses from
statutory authorities on the substance of their shipping hazards report,
or - in view of inferred criticisms - that a more sophisticated study of its
kind was not undertaken before approval was granted. As an element of
"post-inquiry" evidence, statutory procedures rendered this inappropriate.
Thus the report did not stimulate open dialogue or debate with other
parties in the decision process, although it did provide a focus for some
third-party interest in the Action Group's campaign. Notwithstanding
possible weaknesses in its technical content, this illustrates the point that
the Group's concerns on safety were bound up with those over pro-
cedures.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The risk studies used in the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay decision process
were part of a public debate on risk that was unbalanced and inconclusive.
Given the philosophical interest in the problems being dealt with, this can
hardly be unexpected. There are, however, a number of specific obser-
vations, aside from deeper philosophical considerations, that should be
made. The debate was unbalanced in the sense that the emphasis given to
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various safety issues did not match the relative importance of those issues.
For example, shipping hazards were given disproportionately little atten-
tion, whereas radio sparks were subject to extensive open scrutiny. The
debate was inconclusive given that the interested parties could not reach
agreement on criteria on which to judge safety. Also, many of the
doubts about safety that were raised at the public inquiry, and in the
quantity of post-inquiry evidence, remained unanswered.
Given that the debate was also severely limited by the amount of plant
detail available, it is notable that some potentially important modifications
in the handling of planning applications for major hazardous installations
have occurred in the UK since the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay decision.
The outstanding arguments on safety were only partially resolved by
requiring that a detailed hazard audit should be prepared to the satis-
faction of the Health and Safety Execuive and the Secretary of State prior
to the commissioning of the installations, a planning condition that was
unique at the time. This requirement was in addition to the nomal pro-
visions of the Health and Safety at Work Act, which requires the Health
and Safety Executive to scrutinize the general operation of the plant.
This was a satisfactory resolution for the statutory authorities, but not
for the Action Group, who called for greater stringency, a more explicit
basis for the judgment of safety, and greater opportunity for open safety
scrutiny during the decision process before they would be convinced of
the safety of '"he proposed installations.
In retrospect, the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay decision may be identi-
fied as something of a landmark in the handling of planning applications
for major hazardous installations in the UK. The Health and Safety Execu-
tive are now more positively involved in the early planning stages - in
defining the brief of advisory reports on safety and, if necessary, request-
ing more detail from the applicants about the proposed developments.
Over and above any procedural changes that may have occurred, however,
it remains true that the safety scrutiny of installations in the public eye
during the decision process can only be a modest beginning of the detailed
scrutiny (away from the public eye) they will receive from the Health and
Safety Executive, in conjunction with industry self-regulation when the
plants are under construction and in operation. A crucial consideration for
some members of the public in reaching a judgment on risk acceptability
may be their level of confidence in industry as self-regulators and the
Health and Safety Executive as scrutineers. The procedural modifications
that have occurred since the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay decision are
important not only in giving a more substantial role for the content of risk
assessments - in terms of scope and depth of the safety issues covered -
but also in providing a more positive demonstration of the effectiveness
of the Health and Safety Executive as the guardians of public safety.
Notwithstanding these procedural changes, it is doubtful whether the
Action Group would have been satisfied with the same final decision.
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Although their fears on safety were bound up with criticisms of pro-
cedure, a number of outstanding concerns about safety (not shared by
other parties involved) still remain. Indeed, a scenario could be con-
structed in which the recent procedural changes, allowing a more explicit
basis for a debate on safety, could give rise to a more rather than less
vigorous campaign. But that is another case study.
Chapter 6
The USA: Conflicts in California*
In the late 1960s, based on projections of decreasing existing natural gas
supplies and increasing demand, several US gas companies began to seek
additional supplies. In 1974, Western LNG Terminal Company, represent-
ing the terminal siting interests of three major utility companies, applied
for approval of three LNG import sites on the California coast: Point
Conception, on a remote and attractive part of the coast; Oxnard, a port
city; and Los Angeles, a large harbor metropolis (see Figure 6.1). Western
sought approval for all three sites in order to minimize the volume of
tanker traffic at anyone site, to separate ownership and control, and to
reduce the risk of LNG supply interruption due to possible problems at
anyone location. The LNG would be shipped from Alaska's North Slope,
Cook Inlet in southern Alaska, and Indonesia to the three sites. After
nearly a decade of controversy, the utilities have announced that they will
defer pursuing further their application for Point Conception, the one site
remaining under active consideration, because California no longer needs
to import natural gas.
SETTING THE STAGE
Energy planning in the US is decentralized in that initiatives for new
energy facilities come in the form of applications to government agencies
from energy supply and distribution companies. These companies are
largely independent monopolies, but they are subject to regulation by
federal, state, and regional agencies. Facility siting applications are also
subject to approval from local and municipal planning and regulatory
agencies. While federal agencies generally have authority for energy policy
issues, those at the state and local levels usually have authority for land-use
*This chapter was written by John Lathrop and Joanne Linnerooth, based on a more
comprehensive case study (Lathrop 1981, Linnerooth 1980).
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questions. Thus the division of authority for siting energy facilities is not
clear. While no state has the right to impede national interest projects, it is
rare for the federal government to impose its will over state protest.
At both the state and federal levels, quasi-judicial processes are usually
used to arrive at important regulatory decisions. An administrative law
judge presides over a set of hearings where representatives from interested
parties (applicants, opposers, affected groups such as labor unions, etc.)
present their cases. The staff of the government agency or commission
(e.g., the California Public Utilities Commission or the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission) also presents its case. The judge then delivers his
or her opinion to the person or group of commissioners heading the
agency or commission, who make the final decision. They can agree with
the judge, or disagree if they can establish defensible grounds for their
case. The staff tends to have a technical and legal orientation, while the
heads of the agency or commission are apt to be sensitive to political
considerations. 1
PERTINENT EVENTS
With a short introduction to the main actors, this section provides a brief
overview of the sequence of events and decisions that comprised the
decision process in California.
Table 6.1 lists the major parties, with a brief description of their roles
in the decision process. All parties were essentially players in the game,
differing chiefly in what levers each had available to manipulate, and in
what interests and responsibilities each of them held. The formal inter-
actions between the parties are shown in Figure 6.2. Perhaps the most
notable informal interactions (including lobbying efforts and personal
communications) included those between Western, public interest groups
(such as the Sierra Club), and the California legislature. No local govern-
ment bodies are included in this figure because the 1977 California LNG
Terminal Siting Act precluded a central role for them.
The PERT diagram in Figure 6.3, as described in detail in Chapter 2,
presents a flow chart of the key events and/or decisions that occurred
during the California LNG siting debate. The process can be broken down
into four separate, but by no means unique, rounds. These rounds are
described below where the major decisions and events denoted by circled
numbers correspond with the nodes in Figure 6.3.
Round A. In the late 1960s, the Pacific Lighting Corporation began to
investigate gas supplies from Indonesia and Cook Inlet, Alaska. In 1972, a
letter of intent was signed by PacIndonesia and Pertamina (the Indonesian
state-owned oil and gas company) for the purchase of about 15 million m 3
of gas per day. After three years of price negotiations, the LNG contract
was approved by the Indonesian government.
126 Risk Analysis and Decision Processes
Table 6.1. Key parties involved in the California decision process.
Applicant
Western LNG Terminal
Company
National government
Federal Power
Commission (FPC)
Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission
(FERC)
Economic Regulatory
Administration (ERA)
Office of Pipeline
Safety Regulation
(OPSR)
Coast Guard (CG)
State government
California legislature
California Public
Utilities Commission
(CPUC)
A company owned by and representing the LNG terminal
siting interests of two gas distribution companies: Pacific
Lighting Corporation (southern California) and Pacific Gas
and Electric (northern California). Until 1977 it also
handled the California terminal portions of an LNG
project for EI Paso Natural Gas Company.
Essentially a financial regulatory agency with a mandate to
regulate pricing policy and approve gas import projects. The
FPC was superseded in 1977 by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Agency (FERC) and the Economic Regulatory
Administration (ERA) as part of the newly created Depart-
ment of Energy.
Part of the Department of Energy (DOE), this commission
was originally a typical economic regulatory agency, but
under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)
its activities have expanded to generating Environmental
Impact Statements (EIS) for each major application and
certifying compliance with NEPA (best available alterna-
tives, etc.). For LNG it must also certify compliance with
the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA). In issuing Certificates of
Public Convenience and Necessity, the FERC examines all
aspects of a project, including costs, articles of incorpor-
ation, environmental impacts, and safety.
While the FERC is largely technical in orientation, the
ERA is the political regulator. As such, it concerns itself
with the supply and pricing dependability of the source
country, import price, balance of payments, and contrac-
tual structure of the marketing.
Sets technical safety regulations for the land portion of
LNG terminals. It does not, however, consider each appli-
cation as part of the permitting process.
Sets technical safety standards for ships, ship operations,
and the marine portion of LNG terminals. It rules on the
acceptability of each application, and issues licenses for the
LNG tankers.
An elected body of representatives responsible for develop-
ing and approving laws pertinent to certain activities within
the state.
A typical US public utilities commission (PUC) with
financial regulatory powers. As part of its duties it must
determine whether costs incurred by a utility can be passed
on to rate payers, and ensure adequate energy supplies to
avoid related unemployment. Compared with other state
agencies, such as the California Coastal and Energy
Commissions (CCC and CEC), the CPUC tends to take
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Table 6.1. (continued) Key parties involved in the California decision process.
California Coastal
Commission (CCC)
California Energy
Commission (CEC)
Local authorities
Los Angeles City
Council
Oxnard City Council
Santa Barbara County
Other interested parties
Sierra Club
Hollister and Bixby
Ranch Associations
stands on capacity expansion closer to the utilities'
point of view.
Charged with balancing the development and conservation
interests in the management of the California coastline, the
CCC has gained a reputation for deciding more often in
favor of conservation than development, and tends to
concentrate more than the CPUC on trade-offs between
environmental quality and economics.
The California E\:ergy Resources Conservation and Devel-
opment Commission was created in 1974 by both environ-
mentalists and the utility interests for the promotion of
conservation and alternative technologies. It was given the
authority to issue power plant siting certificates as a way of
streamlining siting procedures. The CEC serves as technical
consultant to the CPUC on LNG matters. It also reports to
the legislature on future state energy needs and supplies.
An elected body with responsibility for a variety of local
activities such as industrial development, employment,
housing, health and safety, and environmental protection.
LA is a large city with many diverse interests competing for
support.
An elected body with responsibility for a variety of local
activities such as industrial development, housing, health
and safety, and environmental protection. Compared with
LA, Oxnard is quite small, with a population of 100 000.
Oxnard does not have any major sources of income for its
tax base.
Point Conception is located in the county of Santa Barbara.
It has rigorous environmental quality standards and a long,
challenging procedure for industrial facility approval.
A national environmentalist organization with numerous
state and local chapters. It represents a large membership
of citizens concerned with the protection and preservation
of the environment. The Club often forms coalitions with
other environmentalist groups to advocate more effectively
its concerns.
Two relatively wealthy groups of landowners adjacent to
the Point Conception site.
Meanwhile, Western LNG Terminal Company had been formed as a
subsidiary of Pacific Lighting Corporation and Pacific Gas and Electric for
the purpose of planning and building two import terminals. After
somewhat limited site screening, the Port of Los Angeles was chosen to
receive gas from Cook Inlet, and Oxnard was chosen to receive gas from
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Figure 6.2. Interactions between the main interested parties in the California LNG
decision process.
2
July Sept.lOct. July October April 1982
1977 1977 1978 1979 1981
Round B Round Di4---RoundA--.--~- -- --RoundC-- -- --~---~
I I I I I I
September
1974
o Key events and/or decisions (= completion of all activities leading to that node)
---. Direction of activity (= task required to be undertaken)
Fig 6.3. PERT diag~am for the LNG decision process in the US.
Key events and/or decisions
<D Western files applications with the Federal Power Commission (FPC) for approval
of three sites: Point Conception, Oxnard, and Los Angeles.
o Oxnard City Council's response to an LNG terminal at Oxnard is uncertain,
influenced by the SES risk assessment, which expresses concern over the potential
risks.
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CD LA City Council is in favor of an LNG terminal at LA, stressing the economic
benefits and maintaining the acceptability of the risks.
o The California Coastal Commission (CCC) suggests that Western actively pursue at
least one remote site and one nonremote site (1977).
® The FPC staff opposes LA due to an earthquake fault in the vicinity. The FPC risk
assessment favors both Oxnard and Point Conception, but the US President's
National Energy Plan calls for remote siting (summer 1977).
<D Western perceives a stalemate - the key parties at all three levels of government
favor different sites - and fears that none of the sites will be approved.
(2) Western, the utilities, other businesses, and labor unions press for legislation to
expedite the decision process (July 1977).
® State legislature passes the LNG Terminal Siting Act of 1977, which requires
remote siting, and provides for "one-stop" licensing, whereby the CCC ranks sites
and California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) makes the final selection
(September 1977).
® Western submits application for an LNG terminal at Point Conception under the
Siting Act (October 1977).
@ The CCC ranks Point Conception third out of four alternatives that meet the
remote siting criterion.
@ The CPUC approves Point Conception on condition that additional seismic data are
favorable (July 1978).
@ The federal government passes the Natural Gas Policy Act (NPGA) in 1978 to
rectify the disparities created by previous regulations between unregulated intra-
state and regulated interstate markets. The FERC is given primary responsibility for
administering and enforcing the NGPA, which outlines some of the criteria by
which both FERC and the ERA must make their decisions.
@ The ERA approves LNG imports, recognizing the need for natural gas and deter-
mining the source country supply interruption risk to be acceptably low (condi-
tional approval December 1977; final approval September 1979).
@ The FERC approves the Alaska part of the project. The FERC staff prefers Oxnard,
but the Commissioners approve Point Conception to avoid confrontation with the
state legislature, which had already eliminated Oxnard (October 1979).
@ The Washington DC Court of Appeals decides in favor- of a petition requesting that
the FERC approval of Point Conception be reconsidered in the light of additional
seismic risk data (April 1981).
@ The FERC and the CPUC hold concurrent hearings on seismic risk (1980 to Sep-
tember 1982).
@ Pacific Gas and Electric and Pacific Lighting Corporation announce that they will
defer construction of the terminal until an unspecified date, since California no
longer needs imported natural gas.
Indonesia. In 1972, Western extended its role to include building and
operating an LNG terminal for the El Paso Natural Gas Company, which
was planning a project to receive gas from Alaska's North Slope. Because
El Paso had a corporate policy of not siting an LNG facility within ten
miles of a populated area, the remote Point Conception (Little Cojo Bay)
site was designated to receive gas from the North Slope.
In 1974, applications for these three sites were filed with the Federal
Power Commission (FPC),2 <D marking the beginning of round A, since
the process had formally entered the political arena. In support of the
densely populated Los Angeles and Oxnard sites, Western commissioned
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two risk assessment studies (SAl 1975a, b), both of which found the
safety risks to be extremely low. These reports generated estimates of the
probabilities that members of the public would be killed during anyone
year from terminal operations, based upon probabilities of marine and
onshore LNG accidents and bad weather conditions. In the usual manner,
these risks were compared with other possible causes of death (e.g., ill
health and occupational hazards), and the reports concluded that the risks
were extremely low. As required by federal law, environmental impact
statements for the sites were prepared by the FPC. Oxnard City Council
also commissioned a separate study of the environmental effects of LNG
(SES 1976). In addition to probabilistic measures, this study expressed
the risks of the project in terms of worst-case scenarios showing up to
70000 casualties in the event of an accident, and this "electrified"
opposition to the terminal (Ahern 1980).
Because of the absence of federal regulations relevant to LNG termi-
nals, the difficult task of ensuring the safe operation of such a facility
fell on the shoulders of the inexpert local authorities. Consequently, much
ofthe blame for the uncertainties and problems surrounding LNG terminal
siting has been seen to lie with the federal agencies (Ahern 1978).
Although during round A federal and local approval of a site was
viewed as necessary, 3 the final approval was vested in a state agency - the
California Coastal Commission (CCC). Created in 1976, the CCC is com-
posed of 12 lay people from a variety of backgrounds serving part time,
with responsibility for the protection of the California coastline. After
much deliberation, the CCC decided that the risks of an LNG terminal
were so uncertain that it could only approve a remote site at that time.
However, when and if those risks were found to be acceptable, it could
then approve a nonremote site. Consequently, in March 1977, the CCC
advised Western to pursue at least one remote site and one nonremote site.
At the federal level, the FPC (which later became the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, FERC) was in favor of the Oxnard site, but the
US President's National Energy Plan called for the remote siting of LNG
terminals. The FPC (FERC) was also deemed likely to deny the Port of
Los Angeles site because of the existence of an earthquake fault, even
though this site was favored by the local authorities. Again, at the local
level, the Oxnard authorities seemed increasingly unlikely to approve a
terminal. ® Western then faced a complex and lengthy approval process
with Santa Barbara County, which held approval authority over the Point
Conception site.
At the state level, it seemed unlikely that the CCC, placing priority on
pu blic safety, could be convinced that an LNG terminal was safe enough
for either Oxnard or Los Angeles. But the CCC also faced problems in
approving the remote Point Conception site, where the marine life, kelp
beds, surfing breaks, and spectacular views represented the types of
resources the Commission had been created to protect. 0 In addition,
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this site was being actively opposed by the Bixby and Hollister Ranch
Associations who owned the adjacent land. To complicate an already com-
plex situation, the Sierra Club opposed LNG on several fronts. They
argued that California did not need the gas, but if it were imported it
should go to Oxnard, because Los Angeles seemed unsafe, and the facility
should be kept off the beautiful Point Conception site. However, the Club
changed its stand in 1977 to oppose the Oxnard site on grounds of popu-
lation risk, and so opposed all sites.
In summary, Western faced the possibility of failing to obtain the
needed approvals for any of the three sites because the key parties at all
levels of government favored different sites. ®
Round B. In view of this impending stalemate the utility companies
turned to the state legislature for help. Their goal was to remove approval
authority from the many local interests and the CCC, and to place it in
the hands of the more congenial California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC). This agency is the principal state body involved in power plant
issues, primarily in setting electricity rates.
The legislation being considered at that time (California Assembly Bill
AB220), introduced by Assemblyman Goggins, was not acceptable to the
utility companies. Although it would have given the CPUC exclusive
authority to approve a proposed LNG facility, the CPUC was forced to
consider the feasibility of both remote land-based and offshore sites. In
addition, the bill required that the CCC and the California Energy Com-
mission (CEC) offer second opinions on the feasibility decision. The CEC
was known to oppose the CPUC on the question of LNG for California,
and in its 1977 policy report to the legislature, the CEC raised questions
about LNG safety, need, and costs. In the opinion of Western, this bill
would have effectively prevented the siting of LNG facilities in California
(Western 1978), so Western, together with other business and labor
interests, went to battle for a rival bill (SB1081), which vested the CPUC
with sole authority for approval, i.e., with one-stop licensing authority,
precluding any real interference from the CEC. G)
The resulting legislation, known as the LNG Terminal Siting Act
of 1977, was a compromise between the environmentalists, who sup-
ported consideration of offshore sites, and those who saw an urgent
need for an LNG facility to ensure energy and jobs. The CPUC was
chosen over the more conservation-minded CEC as the agency with
state licensing authority, pre-empting local governments. As a bow to the
conservationists, the CCC was given the mandate to choose and to rank
possible sites, and to pass these rankings on to the CPUC. ® It was agreed
that the site would not be offshore, as some environmentalists wished; nor
could it be in a populated area, as the gas utilities wished. Indeed, the
required population density was strictly defined: there should be no
more than an average of 10 people per square mile within one mile of the
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terminal, and no more than 60 people per square mile within four miles of
the terminal.
Round C. In accordance with the LNG Terminal Siting Act of 1977,
Western submitted an application to build a terminal at the remote Point
Conception. ® The CCC then evaluated 82 sites, 18 of which were nomi-
nated by the public. The CCC was required by law to rank the sites
proposed by the applicant. Of these 82 sites, only four, including the
third-ranked Point Conception, met the population density standards,4
and were not found to be infeasible on the basis of adverse wind and wave
conditions, earthquake faults, soil conditions, or other factors. The CCC
ranked these sites and passed its evaluation on to the CPUC, which elimi-
nated all but Point Conception, concluding that transients (campers, etc.)
near the sites, on roads, and at pUblic parks, made the other sites unsafe,
and that the approval for these sites would involve unacceptable delay.
This, however, was not the end of the story. During the course of the
screening process, the opposition (namely the Hollister and Bixby
Ranches) presented evidence of earthquake faults at Point Conception.
The CPUC only conditionally approved the site, stating in its July 1978
decision (the deadline date set by the 1977 Act) that this approval was
conditional on Western's demonstration that the faults presented an
acceptable risk to the terminal. ® The CPUC also called for further wind
and wave studies, but these studies did not generate any controversial
data.
Concurrent with the state proceedings, Western had filed with the
federal government for a license to import gas to Point Conception. The
federal government was now operating under the conditions of the
Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) of 1978, which was intended to set
prices for both unregulated instrastate and regulated interstate markets, to
remove outmoded regulatory burdens on the sales of interstate markets,
and to provide incentives for risky exploratory drilling, while also restrain-
ing price increases on previously discovered gas. @ The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) was given primary responsibility for
administering and enforcing this legislation, but approval of imports
remained with the Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA). Both
departments were in the newly created Department of Energy, so the
PacIndonesian file was transferred from the ERA, which approved the
importation of LNG to California, @ to the FERC, which undertook an
extensive environmental impact assessment. Although the staff of the
FERC preferred Oxnard, the Commission decided in favor of Point Con-
ception to avoid further confrontation with the California legislature. @
Round D. On the basis of the need to consider additional seismic risk
data, and continuing questions about California's need for LNG, opponents
of LNG appealed against the FERC decision at the federal level. The
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Washington DC Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the FERC,
requesting a decision after reconsidering the case in light of additional
seismic risk data. @ The FERC and CPUC held concurrent hearings on
seismic risk at Point Conception, and the CPUC ruled that the risks of the
site were sufficiently low to permit construction. @ However, it ap-
peared likely that the CPUC would require additional hearings on the
question of whether California still needed an LNG terminal. But these
hearings will not now be necessary since the utilities have announced
their decision not to build the terminal in the near future, but to keep
open the option of constructing a terminal at Point Conception if the
need should arise - perhaps in the 1990s. @
PARTY CONCERNS
To structure the siting process we need to have a good understanding of
the different concerns of the interested parties. For the LNG problem,
three categories of concern are relevant: risk aspects, economic aspects,
and environmental aspects. Table 6.2 depicts a party/concern matrix
showing the main concerns of the parties involved over this eight-year
period.
The concerns listed have been selected to reflect the nature of the
debate, that is, to reflect those concerns expressed by the parties in-
volved, rather than to characterize the concerns in an analytical manner.
For example, population risk involves the risk to life and limb borne by
neighbors of the LNG terminal due to accidents, including those induced
by earthquakes. Earthquake risk, which involves both population risk and
supply interruption risk due to earthquakes, is included as a separate
attribute since it was handled as such in the process. Supply interruption
risk due to need refers to shortfalls in the supply of natural gas due simply
to demand exceeding supply.
The crosses in Table 6.2 indicate the primary concerns of the interested
parties. Naturally, many of the parties cared about aspects of the siting
decision that are not marked as primary concerns. While "hidden con-
cerns" may have motivated parties, they did not surface as explicit argu-
ments and so these are not identified as primary concerns in this table.
For example, the FERC, the state legislature, and the CPUC were
interested in consumer concerns, environmental quality, and risks. The
ERA, on the other hand, was restricted by its mandate to a concern for
price and particular types of supply interruption risk. A technical regu-
lator, such as the Office of Pipeline Safety Regulation (OPSR), was
limited to considering particular design features, while the CCC was
specifically charged with preserving coastal resources, although it also
displayed a concern for population risk. Local authorities and Western
were naturally primarily concerned with those factors that directly affected
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them or their constituencies, although Western was also concerned with
supply interruption risk. While the Sierra Club was interested in environ-
mental quality and population risk, neighbors to the site concentrated
more on local environmental quality and the risk to themselves both as
residents and workers.
THEMAMPFRAMEWORK
The siting decision process in California, which was characterized by four
rounds, will be discussed in more detail in accordance with the MAMP
framework. The main elements of these rounds are listed in Table 6.3.
The application raised two central questions, and these framed the
problem addressed in round A: Does California need LNG? and, if so,
which (if any) of the proposed sites is appropriate?
The agenda for discussion was narrowly defined at this stage. The
wheels of the process were set in motion, not by a broad-based energy-
policy question initiated in Washington, but by a proposal from industry
for three preselected sites. The importance of this process where the
initiative was taken first by industry in preselecting the agenda for debate
cannot be overemphasized. The initiating proposal formulated the
problem as "Should the proposed LNG sites be approved?", and not
"Should California have an LNG terminal in view of the alternatives,
costs, risks, etc.?" Setting the agenda in this manner did not preclude the
"need" question from entering the debate, but it did ensure that the
question was only considered in the context of a siting application.
Table 6.3 (a) also indentifies the relevant interested parties involved in
the interaction phase of round A; those parties with formal decision
responsibility are marked with a cross (+). The primary concerns that
entered the ensuing debate included the need for LNG, the risk of supply
interruption, land use, and the health and safety risks to the local popu-
lation. The need for LNG or the risk of an interruption in the supply of
natural gas (C 31 -C3d supported the location of a terminal at at least
one of the three proposed sites. Environmental and land-use considerations
(L II) suggested a nonremote site (Los Angeles or Oxnard), while the risks
to the population (L 4 ) argued for siting the terminal in a remote area
(Point Conception). Finally, concerns about earthquake risk (L 43 ) resulted
in opposition to the Los Angeles site, which had been found to be crossed
by a significant fault.
The interaction phase of round A detailed in Table 6.3 indicates the
concerns used as arguments by each of the major parties. It is important
to distinguish these concerns from those listed in Table 6.2, which specifies
those attributes that were of primary concern to each party. For example,
although Western was concerned with both profit considerations and
supply interruption risk, its arguments in support of each site stressed
only supply interruption risk.
Questions:
Process
constraints:
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Table 6.3. The MAMP framework applied to the decision process on LNG in the US.
(a) ROUND A: September 1974-July 1977.
I PROBLEM FORMULATION
Assumptions: It is technically feasible to import LNG from Indonesia and Alaska into
California.
(1) Does California need LNG?
(2) If so, which of the proposed sites is appropriate?
There is a standard siting procedure developed from experience with
smaller-scale and/or less novel facilities.
Outcome
constraints: A contract has been signed for natural gas, so timely siting is desirable.
II INITIATION
Western files with the FPC for approval of three sites: Point Conception (PC); Oxnard (OX),
and Los Angeles (LA). <D a
III INTERACTION
Party
Western
FPC (FERC)+
CEC
CCC+
LA City Council+
OX City Council
Santa Barbara
County
PC neigh bors
OX citizens
LA neighbors
Sierra Club
Position
For PC, OX, and LA
For PC and OX, against
LA
Against PC, OX, and LA
For pursuing both remote
and nonremote sites
For LA
For OX (?)
Against PC (?)
Against PC
Against OX
Against LA
Against PC and LA,
for OXb
Arguments
Minimize supply interruption risk (C31 );
low population risk* (L 4 ).
Minimize supply interruption risk (C31 );
high population risk due to earthquake
fault at LA * (L 43 ).
Low supply interruption risk (C31 ).
High population risk (L 4 ); environmental
quality, land use (L 11 ).
Taxes (L 21 ); low population risk (L 4 ).
Taxes (L 21 ); low population risk (L 4 ) (?).
Environmental quality (L 11 ).
Environmental quality (L II ).
High population risk* (L 4 ).
High population risk* (L 4 ).
Environmental quality (L 11 ); air
quality, (R I ); low population risk at
OX (L 4 ); high population risk at LA (L 4 ).
IV CONCLUSIONS
Key decisions
(1) CCC advises Western to pursue PC. @
Procedure: internal among staff, 12 lay commissioners.
Key tradeoff: population risk outweighs environmental quality (land use).
(2) FPC staff oppose LA on seismic risk ground. ®
Procedure: position developed by staff, never brought to hearing.
Key trade-off: seismic risk to population outweighs supply interruption risk.
Applicant perceives a stalemate, i.e., that no site is approvable without long delays. ®
+ denotes decision power.
* denotes supported with technical risk analysis.
(?) denotes uncertain position.
Italics indicate arguments involving population risk.
a Numbers in circles refer to nodes in the PERT diagram in Figure 6.3; this is applicable to
all rounds in this table.
bIn 1977 the Sierra Club shifted its position and opposed Oxnard.
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Table 6.3. (continued) The MAMP framework applied to the decision process on LNG
in the US.
(b) ROUND B: July 1977-SeptemberjOctober 1977.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Assumption:
Questions:
It is difficult, if not impossible, for Western to gain approval for a site under
existing procedures.
(1) How should need for LNG be determined?
(2) If need is established, what changes are required in the process in order
to site an LNG facility?
II INITIATION
Pressure is brought to bear on state legislature by Western, utilities, business, and labor
unions to pass legislation implementing a siting procedure that is more amenable to siting an
LNG terminal. G)
III INTERACTION
Party
Senator Alquist
CPUC, Western,
business, labor
Assemblyman
Goggins
CCC
Position
ForOX
For OX
Against OX, for an
offshore site
Against OX, for an
offshore site
Arguments
Minimize supply interruption risk (C 31 ).
Minimize supply interruption risk due to
need (C31 ).
High population risk * (£4)'
High population risk (£4); environmental
quality, land use (£11)'
IV CONCLUSIONS
Key decisions
(3) State legislature passes LNG Terminal Siting Act (SBI081). ®
Procedure: Closed meetings to set principles, draft (Sierra Club excluded). Floor vote.
The Act states that California needs an LNG terminal, and calls for an accelerated siting
procedure in which the cee will rank sites and the CPUC will select from this ranking (one-
stop licensing). In addition, the site must not be offshore but must be remote.
Act features
Accelerate siting
One-stop licensing
One-stop is CPUC
No offshore site
Site must be remote
Corresponding trade-offs
Economic health over environmental quality, local sovereignty.
Coherent policy, supply interruption risk over local sovereignty.
Supply interruption risk over environmental quality.
Supply interruption risk over environmental quality.
Population risk over environmental quality.
Question:
Process
constraints:
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Table 6.3. (continued) The MAMP framework applied to the decision process on LNG
in the US.
(e) ROUND C: September/October 1977-April1981.
I PROBLEM FORMULATION
Assumptions: (1) California needs an LNG terminal.
(2) A site must be selected according to procedures specified by 8B1081.
Which site is appropriate?
As specified by 8B1081, the CPUC must select a site from those ranked by
the CCC, subject to some conditions, by 31 July 1978.
Outcome
constraints: The site must be remote and land-based.
II INITIATION
Applicant files for approval of Point Conception site (applications for both PC and OX
remain technically "alive" at federal level). ®
III INTERACTION
Party
Western
ERA
FERC+
CCC
CPUC+
PC neighbors
8ierra Club
Position
For PC
Approves import to PC
For OX
For PC
Ranks PC third of four
For PC
Against PC
Against PC
Arguments
Minimize supply interruption risk (C31 );
no seismic risk (C 34 ).
Minimize supply interruption risk (C 31 );
improves air quality (R I ); no seismic risk
(L 43 ).
Does not degrade environmental quality
(L II ); low population risk at OX (L 4 ).
Avoid state-federal confrontation.
Degradation of environmental quality at
PC (L II ).
Minimize supply interruption risk (C 31 ).
High seismic risk (L43 ); degradation of
environmental quality (L II ).
High seismic risk (L 43 ); degradation of
environmental quality (L II ).
IV CONCLU8ION
The FERC and the CPUC will consider more seismic risk data. @
Key decisions
(4) CCC ranks PC third of four. @
Procedure: non-judicial/open hearings; vote by 12 lay commissioners.
Key trade-off: environmental quality and seismic risk outweigh supply interruption risk.
(5) CPUC selects PC, conditional on more seismic data, etc. @
Procedure: quasi-judicial hearing.
Key trade-off: supply interruption risk outweighs environmental quality and seismic risk.
(6) ERA approves import. @
Procedure: open and closed hearing, deliberation.
Key trade-off: acceptable supply interruption risk due to earthquakes.
(7) FERC approves PC'. 4)
Procedure: quasi-judicial hearing.
Key trade-off: accepts loss in environmental quality (land use).
(8) Washington DC Court of Appeals remands case to FERC to consider seismic data. @
Procedure: judicial hearing upon petition.
Key trade-offs: more seismic data over supply interruption risk due to need caused by
delay.
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Table 6.3. (continued) The MAMP framework applied to the decision process on LNG
in the US.
(d) ROUND D: April1981~nd of 1982.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Assumptions: (1) State and federal processes have selected Point Conception subject to
acceptable seismic risk conditions.
(2) FERC ruling on Point Conception will withstand NEPA best alternative
challenge.
Questions: Is Point Conception seismically safe? If so, should the site be given final
approval in view of the decreased demand for natural gas?
ProcESS If Point Conception is not approved, the federal government can reopen the
constraints: process only at appreciable costs.
II INITIATION
The CPUC and the federal court call for continuing deliberations considering new seismic
risk information. @
III CONCLUSIONS
At the time of writing, the LNG Seismic Review Panel has judged the site to be seismically
safe @ and the CPUC and the FERC have conducted hearings concerning seismic risk at
Point Conception. However, the utilities have announced their decision to defer construction
of the terminal until an unspecified date since California no longer needs to import natural
gas. @
Two key decisions were made during round A, and these are described
in Table 6.3 (a). First, the CCC implied that it could favor Point Con-
ception over the nonremote sites due to concerns over population
risk. This decision was made after long and difficult deliberations within
the CCC, since its mandate was to protect the coastline and not to reduce
the risks to residents of urban areas. This decision shows the difficulty of
justifying trade-offs that are made, which explicitly expose people to
safety risks. Against its own interests, the CCC thus advised Western to
pursue at least one site in a remote area since it could deny approval to
any nonremote site.
Secondly, the FERC indicated that it would not approve the Port of
Los Angeles site because a recently discovered earthquake fault presented
an unacceptable seismic risk, although no clear definition was given of
what constituted an unacceptable risk. Contrary to many other siting
issues, Los Angeles City Council, after considering this seismic risk,
remained in favor of the terminal in the port. This turnabout, where the
local interests favored a site and the national interests were opposed,
shows the importance of political and economic factors. The Los Angeles
city councilors found the potential economic benefits to the harbor,
which was badly in need of new industrial development, more salient,
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especially in light of their short-term political perspective where they
perceived their re-election to depend primarily on economic consider-
ations. The federal authorities, on the other hand, would have found it
difficult to justify siting the terminal in Los Angeles, since other, less risky
alternatives existed.
A very different situation arose in Oxnard. The federal authorities
could justify their approval of the Oxnard site based upon their int~rnal
risk assessment (FERC), which showed the probabilities of an accident to
be justifiably low. But the economic situation in Oxnard contrasted
sharply with that in Los Angeles in that the city was less in need of the
project, and a middle-class housing development was located in the
vicinity of the proposed site. The risk assessment commissioned by
Oxnard City Council (SES) was, in this climate, decisive. The worst-case
scenarios, showing that 70000 Oxnard citizens could be victims of an
LNG vapor cloud, provided the necessary arguments for those opposed to
the terminal. However, the project never actually came to a vote in the
council, since pressure emanated from other directions to change the
siting procedures.
It was clear to all the parties involved that it was difficult, if not impos-
sible, for the applicant to gain approval for a site under the existing siting
procedure in California. In particular, there were possibilities of vetoing
proposals at either the federal, state, or local levels, as evidenced by the
respective reactions to the three proposed sites. In such a situation, as
pointed out by Majone (1979), rather than trying to operate within
existing constraints of the process, interested parties frequently try to
change the rules of the game. Thus, the perceived stalemate that character-
ized the interactions in round A set the stage for what can be seen as a
second round of interactions.
This behavior relates to the process described by Braybrooke (1978)
who points out that issues are frequently transformed over time; round B
is a good illustration of this process. The problem was redefined into two
new questions: How should need for LNG be determined? If need can be
established, what process would facilitate the identification of an appro-
priate site? Round B was thus initiated when pressure to change the
existing siting procedures was brought to the California state legislature by
the utility companies, the business community, and labor unions. Table
6.3 (b) details the relevant alternatives that formed the basis for the debate
on the elements of the proposed legislation, SB1081.
Round B contrasts with the others insofar as there was a single arena,
the state legislature, compared with the array of hearings, statements, and
so on, that characterized the interactions of the other three rounds. The
debate can be pictured here as one between the pro-development interests
personified by Senator Alquist, and the pro-environment and safety
interests represented by Assemblyman Goggins, although, of course, the
issue was not so clearly defined. A great deal of lobbying, where there
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were inevitably "hidden agendas", preceded the debate in the senate. A
notable feature of this round was that the Sierra Club, which opposed
land-based remote siting, was not part of the final compromise process.
The passage of the LNG Terminal Siting Act opened up a new proce-
dure for finding an acceptable site, and thus set the constraints for yet
another round of discussions (see Table 6.3c) with the following problem
formulation: Which site is appropriate? Round C was initiated when
Western filed for the Point Conception site.
Round C is a remarkable example of a democratic process for siting a
technological facility. The CCC held numerous informal meetings with
residents along the coastline and solicited suggestions from the citizens of
California. Although the stipulation that the site submitted by the utility
be included in this ranking, which was then passed on to the CPUC, can be
questioned, this process stands as a good example of a participatory model
for site selection.
As shown in Table 6.3(d), the initiating proposal in round D was
determined by the activities in round C, which framed the alternatives
as simply whether or not to declare the Point Conception site seismically
safe. In addition, the reopening of the hearing procedures permitted the
state and federal authorities to re-address the need question. Only two
parties -- FERC and CPUC - are currently active in the process. The
LNG Seismic Review Panel has found that a terminal can be operated
safely at the site, but the utilities have deferred pursing their application
in the near future.
The MAMP framework illustrates the sequential aspect of the LNG
siting process in California. The key decisions that were made, and the
trade-offs that were explicitly or implicitly set by those decisions, are
listed at the conclusion of each round in Table 6.3, showing how particu-
lar decisions constrained possible future options. During the course of the
decision process, the need for imported natural gas in California dimin-
ished greatly. Instead of examining this need, the interested parties,
"locked in" by previous decisions, examined the seismic data at a rather
slow pace. This is an example of a process of non-decision making where
the interested parties may be using existing political institutions and
procedures to limit the scope of actions.
A second example of undesirable effects from sequential constraints
concerns the planned and actual implications of the project on the supply
of natural gas. Initially, the applications were for three separate sites, each
with large storage capacities. During the course of the decision process,
the number of sites was reduced from three to one, and the number of
storage tanks at that site was reduced from four to two. Because of this
concentration in one small area with less storage capacity than planned,
the possibility of nondelivery resulting from bad weather or accidents
would reduce the reliability of supply below the level Western intended
in the original application. This transformation was not the result of a
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systematic analysis by Western, but was brought about by the sequential
nature of the decision process.
THE USE OF RISK ANALYSES
One of the most striking features of the US decision process was the
dominant role played by concern over public safety risk. As seen in Table
6.2, for all but two of the main parties population risk was a primary
concern. In addition, this concern (including seismic risk) was used as a
primary argument in 15 of the 22 times parties were listed in the inter-
action sections of Table 6.3 (rounds A-C). Finally, round D was focused
almost entirely on seismic risk.
During the course of the LNG debate in California, six studies assessing
the safety risks of the proposed terminals were conducted by the utility
and local, state and federal government agencies. Several studies are of
particular interest. Western, the applicant, commissioned a consulting
firm, Science Applications, Inc. (SAl), to assess the risks of each site, and
the FPC (FERC) produced its own risk analysis. These reports showed
very low numbers on various probabilistic measures of risk (expected
fatalities per year and individual probability of fatality per year), and
these were interpreted to mean that the risk was acceptable. A risk
analysis for the Oxnard site produced by the consulting firm Socio-
Economic Systems, Inc. (SES) for the Oxnard municipal authorities
suggested similarly low probabilistic measures of risk (though expected
fatalities were 380 times higher than the SAl assessment). The SES study
interpreted the uncertainty concerning safety to mean that it was high
enough to preclude any confident statement that the facility posed a low
probability of accident, and pointed out that the possible consequences of
an accident could be catastrophic.
The formats for presenting the results differed markedly among the
reports. The SAl study described maximum credible accidents in tables
with accompanying probabilities. The SES study described worst-case
scenarios in the form of graphic maps, with shaded areas showing where
fatalities were likely to occur, but did not provide probabilities. Opposi-
tion groups interpreted the latter results as evidence that the terminal was
not acceptably safe. The Oxnard City Council, originally in favor of the
site, began to waver in its support, probably influenced by the apparent
uncertainty of the risk and the strength of the opposition groups (Ahern
1980). In sum, the risk assessments did not provide a single, coherent
assessment of acceptability of the risk of an LNG terminal; their results
were subject to interpretation depending on party positions (Lathrop
1980). In fact, risk assessments were used both to promote and to oppose
the terminal applications.
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In reviewing the technical differences between the assessments, Lathrop
and Linnerooth (1982) have shown that there are many degrees of free-
dom left to engineering and analytical judgment, including how to charac-
terize risk, what formats to use for presentation, what gaps to fill with
assumptions, which of several conflicting models to use, how to portray
the degree of confidence in the results, and what contingencies simply to
leave out of the analysis. This analytical freedom helps to explain the
differences between the risk assessments of LNG discussed above, since it
can push the risk measurement in any direction. For example, very con-
servative assumptions can drive it up; omissions of inconvenient aspects
such as terrorism can drive it down. Clear presentations of expert disagree-
ments can decrease the confidence in the results. The conclusions may
therefore have as much to do with the predilections of the analyst as with
the physical characteristics of the site or the technology.
This finding takes on special significance when viewed in the context
of the policy process. Not unexpectedly, the risk assessments in this case
study, though intended to advise clients on the safety of a proposed
terminal, were, almost without exception, used at some time to support a
party argument. For this reason, in many cases, clear incentives existed for
the analysts to present their results as persuasively as possible. This
explains the tendency on their part to omit discussions on the uncertainty
of their results and to choose suitable presentation formats for making
certain points regarding the LNG hazard.
In addition, the sequential nature of existing decision procedures limits
the possibilities for comprehensive analyses, so that risk studies have no
broader systematic evaluation into which to feed. They either address a
narrow problem floating in an ill-defined broader problem, or they address
a narrow problem after other variables have been constrained by previous
decisions. In particular, the risk studies were carried out, not as an input
to a broad energy siting analysis in California, but to support the problem
of whether site X or site Y should be approved. Since round A in California
was not formulated in these narrow terms (the question of whether the
terminal was needed had yet to be resolved), the analyses were ill-suited to
address fully the issues on the table. Analyses designed to address the
question of safety were prematurely introduced into a process that had
not resolved higher-order questions of energy policy. Although risk
analyses could not offer (nor were they intended to offer) a panacea for
the resolution of the siting question, they did serve to focus the debate on
the safety question. 5 In contrast, the seismic risk studies of round D
addressed the central question of that round, but only after most other
variables had been constrained in previous rounds, again without a com-
prehensive evaluation.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the discussion of siting issues, it is important to distinguish between the
questions whether to site the facility, and that of where to site it. Whether
to have a facility at all ultimately depends upon national (regional)
interests or objectives. In the energy debate, the lines are often drawn
between two different objectives: one of large-scale technology, high
economic growth rates, and a centralized level of decision making; or one
of small-scale technology using, wherever possible, renewable resources or
recycling, with a no-growth economy, and decentralized decision making.
The resolution of the conflict between these objectives will depend on the
political system, where national goals are arrived at through the inter-
actions of various interested parties. In the case of the California LNG
controversy, these parties included the industry or utilities, federal,
state, and local governments, organized action groups, the unorganized
consumers, those who benefit from an unspoiled coastline, and those
who benefit, as well as those who do not, from generalized economic
growth. The question of how parties view the political decision process is
a basic issue that is germane to most of what follows.
An important consideration involves the direction of the decision
process. In the US energy sector most projects are initiated by the
industry, in contrast with the transportation sector, for example, where
projects (roads, etc.) are planned by the government and are carried out
by private industry after competitive bidding. A desirable mix of public
and private enterprise involves trade-offs between the advantages of
private initiative and those of national planning. In the case of energy
supply, it is important to question whether broader national objectives
can be achieved in the absence of a coherent national energy plan.
Where a project is conceived by industry before it has been con-
sidered by federal planners, there exists the danger of limiting further
decisions to small variations of the proposed project. In the California
case, one might ask whether this process, either before or after the
1977 siting legislation, encouraged an imaginative consideration of all
the possible alternatives. For instance, was it necessary to have one
large facility, or could there have been a series of smaller LNG storage
facilities that would present correspondingly smaller risks on the same
order as those of peakshaving plants located in industrial areas? Also,
were the possibilities for offshore siting given sufficient consideration?
More specific to the issue of the direction of the precision procedures
is one-stop licensing. Before 1977, it was necessary for the industry to
obtain permits from many local authorities. However, this picture was
changed by the 1977 LNG Terminal Siting Act, which gave one agency
- the CPUC - the responsibility for granting a siting permit (it was also
necessary to have federal approval, but the FERC appeared willing to
accept the state's decision). An LNG facility brings prospects of regional
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economic development and may increase the tax revenues of the
municipality, but it also imposes risks on local residents. For this
reason, a procedure requiring local approval may prove difficult. Yet, if
citizen participation in decision procedures is important, any process
that is less sensitive to local preferences may be undesirable. Here one
might investigate other mechanisms through which the preferences of
the local population could be more fairly taken into account, such as
"bidding schemes" that would allow for compensation to those who
perceive themselves to be at risk, or that would enable municipalities to
bargain over a siting decision. Such proposals are discussed in detail in
Chapter 9.
In California the move to one-stop licensing represented a trade-off
between public participation and licensing expediency. The purpose of
the 1977 LNG Terminal Siting Act was to ensure a decision on an LNG
terminal without extensive delay - at some sacrifice to local partici-
pation. This Act, in the interest of maximizing public safety and mini-
mizing further delay, might have precluded finding an "efficient"
solution to the siting decision by imposing the population density and
the land-based siting constraints. By "efficient" we are asking whether,
in the absence of these constraints, a site could have been identified
that would have been viewed as more desirable by all the parties. One
of the anomalies of the California siting process was that at one time
nearly all the parties (including the utilities, the Sierra Club,6 the CPUC,
and the FERC) favored the Oxnard site, and yet it was ruled out by
the state legislature primarily on the basis of a risk assessment showing
that an accident at the site could result in catastrophic consequences.
The catastrophic dimension of the risks of LNG might therefore be
viewed as having been the decisive element in the California LNG siting
debate. The above hypothesis suggests that the facility would have been
located at Oxnard, as recommended by the FPC (FERC), had it not been
for the SES worst-case scenario showing that Oxnard could be engulfed
by an LNG vapor cloud. After publication of this report almost all the
relevant government agencies, as well as the public, became increasingly
risk averse. A staff member of the California state legislature was quoted
as saying that a terminal that could kill so many people could not be sited.
The SES report also seems to have had a considerably greater effect on
sensitizing the public to the risks of LNG than an earlier event - the
explosion of an oil tanker in Los Angeles harbor. The latter showed that
an accident could happen, whereas the former showed that a holocaust
was possible!
Attributing the California LNG Terminal Siting Act, which required a
remote site for the terminal, to the SES report showing worst-case
scenarios should, however, be done with caution. This Act was the out-
come of several complex factors, including industry's long-term aspirations
to have a more expedient siting process that was not so heavily dependent
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on local politics, and the desires of at least one state legislator - Assembly-
man Goggins - to build his reputation on opposing large-scale hazardous
facilities. Both interests were satisfied by the Act with little or no cost to
industry. The extra costs of a remote site are thus borne by the unorganized
and, for the most part, unaware California consumers, and not by industry.
Indeed, regulatory practice allows industry a profit based on a fixed
percentage of its capital costs - and these costs are increased by the added
expense of a remote site.
A comparison of the costs of the decision process for land-based sites
versus the costs of more expensive, but in some ways, less risky, offshore
alternatives was not considered during the California siting process. Since
the costs of "delay" due to the time required to construct an offshore
facility were considered important, it might have behooved the applicant
and government decision makers alike to have asked: How would the final
figures including the costs of delays due to procedural mandates and those
due to design problems, compare for land-based sites and offshore sites?
In the course of the decision process, the need for natural gas in California
diminished greatly, leading to the eventual withdrawal of the utilities from
pursuing a terminal site at the present time. Yet, detailed and expensive
investigations of the faults at Point Conception preceded re-examination
of this need. The sequential nature of the decision process, in this case,
did not adequately provide for the dynamic decision environment, where
concerns such as the need for natural gas re-emerged and were not
explicitly considered.
NOTES
1. An exception to this pattern is the California Coastal Commission,
where the 12 lay commissioners preside directly at non-judicial hear-
ings.
2. The circled numbers refer to the corresponding nodes in the PERT
diagram in Figure 6.2.
3. The relationship between the federal and the state authorities for LNG
facility approval and siting is deliberately vague. The federal govern-
ment, by choosing not to clarify its mandate, has in effect chosen not
to challenge state authority.
4. These sites, in order of their ranking, were: the US Marine Corps base
at Camp Pendleton, Rattlesnake Canyon, Point Conception, and Deer
Canyon.
5. It is therefore not surprising that round A ended in a stalemate.
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Round B, where the state legislature took center stage, narrowed the
problem (by resolving the question whether California needed a site)
to one more receptive to technical risk studies.
6. The Sierra Club changed its stand in early 1977 to oppose the Oxnard
site.
Chapter 7
LEG Risk Assessments:
Experts Disagree*
One of the most challenging problems in decisions concerning the deploy-
ment of novel, large-scale technologies is the assessment of the risk to the
surrounding populations. In particular cases, such as nuclear reactors or
liquefied energy gas (LEG) facilities, the political process involved may
tend to focus on one particular form of that risk: the risk to life from
catastrophic accidents. This chapter examines several assessments of this
type with two main goals in mind:
(1) to present and compare the various risk assessment procedures as they
have been applied to LEG terminal siting, and in so doing to clarify
the limits of knowledge and understanding of LEG risks;
(2) to quantify and compare the risks estimated in analyses prepared for
four LEG sites, namely:
• Wilhelmshaven (Bratz 1978; DGWE 1979; Krappinger 1978a,b,c;
WSB 1978).
• Eemshaven (TNO 1978).
• Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay (Aberdour and Dalgety Bay Joint
Action Group 1979, henceforth referred to as Aberdour; Cremer
and Warner 1977; HSE 1978a).
• Point Conception (ADL 1978; FERC 1978; SAl 1976).
The advantage of LEG technology, as explained in Chapter 1, is to
reduce the temperature of a gas until it becomes a liquid, so that it can be
transported and stored efficiently in tanks, with a high energy per unit
volume. While LNG (mainly methane) is stored at -161.5 °c at very low
pressure, LPG (mainly propane and butane) is stored at near atmospheric
temperatures and pressures, leading to significantly different behaviors
during spills. However, these three substances involve essentially the same
*This chapter was written by Christoph Mandl and John Lathrop.
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accident scenarios, though with different parameters and probabilities of
ignition.
Although there are many aspects involved in assessing the advantages
and disadvantages of an LEG terminal at a specific site, the risk to the
local population is one of the most crucial concerns. But because of
a lack of historical data on accidents at LEG terminals, the frequency of
such accidents as well as their consequences cannot be readily estimated.
Over the past few years attempts have therefore been made to quantify
the risk to local populations for different planned LEG terminals, using
various techniques and models, with different results.
This chapter reviews the risk assessments undertaken for LEG terminals
in four countries, discusses their plausibilities, explains their differences,
compares their risk estimates, and draws conclusions as to their usefulness
and limitations. Where necessary and appropriate, we also describe some
of the reports in detail. While this is not the first comparison of LEG risk
assessments (see, e.g., SES 1977) it is, to our knowledge, the first compari-
son of assessments from four countries.
Because LEG terminal risk assessment is a new technique, there is still
disagreement between experts concerning how to quantify the risks,
which models to use, what to include, and what to exclude. Clearly, no
pretense is made that this chapter provides complete or final answers con-
cerning comparative risks or risk assessments; rather, it describes some
initial attempts to address important problems in the field of risk assess-
ment.
RISK AND RISK ASSESSMENT
Before we can quantify risk, we must define it. It will become apparent in
this section that different people mean different things when they talk
about risk. Therefore our definition (actually a set of definitions) cannot
be descriptive, but rather will be prescriptive.
Ideally, if one adopts the axioms of rational choice under uncertainty,
the evaluation of any decision alternative should consider the probability
distribution of the consequences of that alternative (see, e.g., Luce and
Raiffa 1957). Yet the concept of risk singles out a subset of those conse-
quences for special analysis. The term is typically applied to particular
uncertain consequences, diverting attention from other costs and benefits
that could be just as important in the evaluation. In the case of LEG, for
example, several dimensions are of concern in site selection and facility
design, such as cost, land use, environmental quality, air quality benefits
of LEG, and dependence on foreign supplies. Some of these involve
uncertain costs, such as financial losses to the developer if anything
goes wrong (e.g., delay in application approval, loss of supply contract,
vessel accident); environmental effects due to accidents or even routine
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disruption; fatalities or injuries due to supply interruption (e.g., unem-
ployment, or health effects in a severe winter). These uncertain costs can
be and are referred to as risks, and they can be analyzed by techniques of
risk assessment, yet the term risk assessment in the context of LEG typi-
cally refers only to assessments of fatalities due to accidents. That is the
scope for all the reports reviewed in this chapter.
Definitions of risk
Let us start by quoting some definitions of risk from the literature:
"Risk is the expected number of fatalities per year resulting from the consequences
of an accidental event." (SAl)
"Risk is the probability of an injurious or destructive event generated by a hazard,
over a specified period of time." (Cremer and Warner)
"Group risk is defined as the frequency at which certain numbers of acute fatalities
are expected from a single accident. The risk to society as a whole is defined as 'the
expected total numbers of acute fatalities per year resulting from accidental events
in the system'." (Battelle)
Surveying the set of risk assessments reviewed in this chapter, one can
identify two polar definitions of risk. One extreme definition (Cremer and
Warner) considers only the probabilities of destructive events and does not
look at the consequences of these events. Such an approach only makes
sense for comparison or evaluation in the very limited case when all
destructive events have equally valued consequences, and risk is defined
as the probability that anyone of the events would occur in a given time
interval. It would be meaningless to label two facilities equally risky if
they had equal probabilities of an accident, but if an accident at one
facility would have much more serious consequences than an accident at
the other.
At the other extreme, risk can and sometimes is viewed as the event
with the most serious consequences. Again we would argue that focusing
on this kind of risk is not meaningful because it omits the probability of
an event. We find the definitions of risk given by Keeney et al. (1979) the
best because they address the following different aspects of risk:
(i) Risk of multiple fatalities: the probability of exceeding specific
numbers of fatalities per year. I
(ii) Societal risk: total expected fatalities per year. This is appropriate
for particular types of analysis, such as cost-benefit or risk-benefit
analyses, where social preference is assumed to be linear in terms of
number of lives lost.
(iii) Group risk: the probability of an individual in a specific exposed
group becoming a fatality per year. This could be used to determine in
some sense how much of the risk is being borne by neighbors, campers,
boaters, etc. This definition also allows separate determinations of
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occupational and nonoccupational risks, which are often treated quite
differently in political and social processes.
(iv) Individual risk: the probability of an exposed individual becoming
a fatality per year. This is simply an average over the group risks measured
by the third definition. This measure is somewhat troublesome because it
depends on how an exposed population is defined. If "exposed" means an
individual probability of fatality of greater than 10- 12 per year, the
individual risk will be averaged over a small region around the facility.
If, on the other hand, "exposed" is defined with a cut-off probability of
10-30 per year, the individual risk will be averaged over a much larger
region, and so will be much lower. In spite of this shortcoming, individual
risk is a measure that allows a convenient comparison between the mea-
sured risk and more routine risks the individual may face; e.g., risk due to
smoking, driving, etc. While such comparisons do not fit into a decision or
choice framework, they do provide readily understandable benchmarks
for scaling the risk of a facility.
Risk assessment as a decision aid
Given the orientation of this chapter, it is easy to forget that a risk assess-
ment is not an end unto itself, but is in fact only one element in the com-
plex process of LEG facility siting and design. More importantly, a risk
assessment should be an aid for one or more of the decisions that must be
made. A knowledge of where risk assessments fit within an LEG siting and
design process is essential to the understanding of their adequacy and use-
fulness as decision aids.
Given the many decisions that must be made involving risk, there are
several roles for risk assessment in LEG facility siting. Yet the processes
studied in our research have narrowed that role down to a single appli-
cation: on one dimension, risk to life and limb; and at one level, siting or
design (depending on the country). There are several effects of this
narrowing. First, it diverts analytical effort and political attention away
from those questions not addressed by a risk assessment; for example,
supply interruption risk could be a significant factor. On the other hand,
it allows the analysis to be done. A fully comprehensive risk analysis
might take decades, and would probably not be complete anyway.
A second effect of the narrow role given to risk assessment is that the
level at which it is applied affects how it is conducted. When a risk assess-
ment is part of the site selection process, a particular facility design is
assumed, and analytical effort concentrates on such things as shipping
traffic and local population density as site-specific inputs in a calculation
of population risk. When a risk assessment is part of the facility design
process the site is assumed fixed, and the analysis considers the sizes,
arrangements, and specifications of components of the facility. In that
case technical design variations are considered in terms of incremental
risk reductions.
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There is a third effect of the narrow role given to risk assessment. Once
a site is selected, given the political realities of the situation, the question
of the overall acceptability of the risk is more or less settled. If a risk
assessment is applied at the design level, it may consider various modifi-
cations to reduce the risk in the most cost-effective way. However, given
its scope and charter, the assessment is unlikely to find that the site
cannot be made acceptably safe with current technology and to recom-
mend that it should be abandoned. On the other hand, if a risk assessment
is applied at the site selection level, it would at least be feasible to rule
that none of the sites in the current choice set is acceptable.
Risk assessment does not exist in a vacuum. It is a decision aid within a
much larger process. Any understanding of current methods of assess-
ment, and any suggestions for improvement, also requires an understand-
ing of that larger process. As this section has pointed out, that larger
process controls the role and nature of risk assessments in very basic and
important ways, even though they may be carried out as strictly indepen-
dent studies.
REVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENTS
In Table 7.1 we give a comprehensive overview of the most important risk
assessment reports prepared for Wilhelmshaven, Eemshaven, Mossmorran-
Braefoot Bay, and Point Conception. Some comments on the row head-
ings of this table might be helpful.
(a) Parts of the system considered. Not all reports consider all the compo-
nents of an LEG terminal system, namely: vessel, transfer, and storage
tanks. In particular, for Wilhelmshaven there were two types of
reports: one deals only with vessel operation and LEG transfer, the
other deals only with the storage tanks.
(b) Concept of risk. As discussed above, there is no unique definition of
risk. We have indicated the type of risk analyzed in each report.
(c) Estimation of probabilities of events. One crucial part of a risk assess-
ment is the esitmate of probabilities, unless only the consequences are
considered. It is therefore necessary to see how this problem has been
solved in different reports. Two techniques can assist in performing
this task for specific plants. The event tree is a technique for identify-
ing a logical sequence of events (failures) that could result in unwanted
consequences (accidents). Having identified the possible events, fault
tree analysis attempts to determine the probability of a "top-level
event" (typically a specific accident) that is the result of a sequence of
events (failures) of the system. However, these techniques are not
appropriate for estimating accident probabilities such as ship collisions.
Two methods for estimating these probabilities are discussed later.
(d) Estimation of consequences of events. The consequences should be
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stated in terms a decision maker can understand. For this reason, and
because of the definitions of risk typically adopted, most reports esti-
mate the consequences in terms of the number of fatalities a certain
event could cause.
(e) Estimation of risk. Different estimates are given depending on the
definition of risk employed; in some cases no estimate is given at all.
(f) Final findings. As we see it, the ideal result of a risk assessment report
is the quantification of the risk (in this case, from LEG) in comparison
with risks from other sources. The ideal, and thus most useful, com-
parison is between risks from alternatives actually faced in the
decision-making process; e.g., site A versus site B, site A versus no site,
risk mitigation I versus risk mitigation II, etc. In any case, it should be
kept in mind that decisions concerning the acceptability of the risk
from LEG involve social value trade-offs and perhaps political con-
siderations that go beyond the scope of the risk assessment and the
legitimate authority of technical risk analysts. It follows that the final
findings of a risk assessment should impart information to enable the
decision maker to use them as a basis for a decision, without that
decision actually being made.
(g) Uncertainties in final findings. Due to the limited data from LEG acci-
dents there remains a substantial amount of uncertainty about the
accuracy of the estimates of probabilities and consequences of such
events. The reports handle this problem differently: some ignore
uncertainties completely; some give conservative estimates; some
perform sensitivity analysis; and some give error bounds on the
quantified risk.
(h) Single event with the highest risk. If mitigating measures to reduce risk
are to be undertaken it is helpful to know which event presents the
highest risk. It is often the case that the highest-risk event offers the
most cost-effective opportunities for mitigation.
When evaluating the risk assessment reports one should keep in mind
that their differences, as shown in Table 7.1, can at least partially be
explained by the fact that they were prepared and used for different
decision processes. Each one was developed in a way suited to the par-
ticular process it was to serve.
ASSESSMENT AND COMPARISON OF LEG TERMINAL RISK
In this section we discuss the probabilities and consequences of different
events (failures). First we consider the estimation of probabilities of
failures, then the estimation of the size of the resulting vapor cloud and its
ignition probability, and finally we consider the consequences to the local
population. Our purpose is to compare the results of the risk assessment
reports and to discuss important differences in estimates of probabilities
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Table 7.1. Comparison of risk assessment reports prepared for the four sites.
Cremer and
Issues TNO Aberdour Warner ADL
(u) Parts of the Vessel, Vessel Vessel, Vessel,
system transfer, transfer, transfer,
considered storage tank storage tank storage tank
(b) Concept of Risk of multiple Group and Probability of Multiple
risk fatalities and individual an injurious fatalities
and group risk risk or destructive risk
event
(c) Estimation of:
• probabilities Yes, Yes, Only in terms Yes,
of events quantitative quantitative of low, very quantitative
low, etc.
• event tree
analysis used Yes No No Yes
• fault tree
analysis used No No No Yes
(d) Estimation of Yes, Yes, Yes, but only Yes, quanti-
consequences quantitative quantitative physical cons. tative in
of events in terms of in terms of (eg, spill size); terms of
fatalities fatalities no estimation fatalities
of fatalities
(e) Estimation Societal and Individual risk No estimation Yes,
of risk individual risk high cf. other of expressed quantiative
low cf. other man-made risks fatalities; only
man-made risks of probabilities
of events
(f) Final findings Societal and Individual risk "No reason to Point
individual risk high cf. other doubt that Conception
low cf. other man-made risks installations suitable
man-made risks cannot be with respect
built and oper- to vessel
ated in such a traffic
manner as to safety. Risk
be acceptable is very low.
in terms of
community
safety"
(g) Uncertainties Not Not Not Sensitivity
in final mentioned mentioned mentioned analysis
findings
(h) Single event Grounding of Not Not Not
with highest LNG tankers identified identified identified
risk
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Table 7.1. (continued)
FERC SAl Bratz Krappinger WSB
Vessel Vessel, transfer, Transfer, Vessel Vessel
storage tank storage tank
Societal, group, Risk of multiple Not defined Not defined Not defined
and individual fatalities, group
risk & individual risk
Yes, Yes, Only in terms Yes, Only in terms of
quantitative quantitative of very low very low
Yes Yes No No No
No Yes No No No
Yes, Yes, Yes, but only No estimation Some quantita-
quantitative quantitative physical cons. given tive statements
in terms of in terms of (eg. spill size); in terms of few
fatalities fatalities no estimation and many
of fatalities fatalities
Yes, Yes No estimation No estimation Yes,
quantitative quantitative given given quantitative
Risk compar-
able to risks
from natural
events & thus
on an accept-
able level
"The risk is
extremely low"
With regard to
consequences
& their proba-
bility there is
no danger, cf.
relevant laws
No final
findings
Risk is not
insignificant
Disagreement Sensitivity
between experts analysis
is mentioned
Not
mentioned
Not
mentioned
Mentioned
Not identified Not identified Not identitied Not identified Not identified
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and consequences in terms of the underlying assumptions of the models
used and their plausibility. However, not all the reports are easily compar-
able. Some do not consider all the events we will be discussing, while
others do not quantify either the probabilities or the consequences of
events. Therefore, this section cannot be a complete comparison for all
events.
In Table 7.2 we give brief descriptions of the planned terminals at Eem-
shaven, Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay, Point Conception, and Wilhelmshaven.
Mossmorran is different from the others in that not only is this an export
terminal, but the exported gases are LPG (mainly propane and butane),
while LNG consists mostly (approximately 90%) of methane. As far as
one can tell from the available risk studies, the layouts of the four termi-
nals, the LEG tankers (except in size), storage tanks, and transfer systems
are basically similar.
Probabilities of LEG spills
One of the most difficult questions in risk assessment is the identification
of possible events or failures and the estimation of their frequencies or
probabilities. By definition it is nearly impossible to get enough historical
data to estimate the probability of a low-frequency event. Rather, one has
to build models and rely on data from other, presumably similar, systems.
Another important part of the risk assessment problem is the identifi-
cation of events that have never occurred that could have serious conse-
quences. This problem was acknowledged in the Lewis Report on nuclear
safety (1978):
It is conceptually impossible to be complete in a mathematical sense in the con-
struction of event-trees and fault-trees; what matters is the approach to complete-
ness and the ability to demonstrate with reasonable assurance that only small
contributions are omitted. This inherent limitation means that any calculation using
this methodology is always subject to revision and to doubt as to its completeness.
We therefore do not and cannot claim that the events considered here are
a complete set of all possible events. However, the set includes all events
that were accounted for in the risk assessment literature (e.g., TNO, SAl,
ADL, Battelle).
The two major potential failures are vessel accidents and storage tank
ruptures. Philipson (1978) describes two methods typically used to
establish estimates of the probabilities of vessel accidents.
(1) Statistical inference. Estimates are computed using historical data,
first for a larger class of ships, such as oil tankers, and then the esti-
mates are modified to account for the anticipated differences in LEG
ships and their operations at a specific harbor. This is done, for
example, by employing judgment and by assessing the proportion of
past accidents that would not have occurred if various mitigating
measures had been taken.
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(2) Kinematic modeling. In SAl ship collisions are analyzed by assuming
ship motions to be random in a zone of interest within the short time
interval preceding an accident. A kinematic model provides the expec-
ted number of collisions per year for a harbor with specific configura-
tions and traffic characteristics. A calibration to the actual conditions
of a number of harbors is then made by scaling the model to fit actual
past collision frequencies in these harbors.
Estimates of the probabilities of different types of events are given in
Table 7.3. It should be mentioned that these estimates are not always
taken directly from the reports; in some cases we have adjusted the esti-
mates to take additional data into account. For example, SAl used more
ships with larger tanks than those currently planned, so we reduced
the probabilities and spill sizes accordingly. In FERC only spill sizes of
25 000 m 3 were considered, although data were also provided for smaller
spill sizes, and these were considered in generating Table 7.3. The three
Krappinger Gutachten (1978a, b, c) reported a variety of results using
different accident reduction factors, ranging from 1.0 to 0.05. Because the
latter factor was not based on any stated reasoning, we used the factor
1.0, which was used in Krappinger (1978a).
The most interesting findings from this comparison of assessments are:
(a) Compared with the probability of collision, grounding, and ramming,
other events are considered to be rather unlikely (except for internal
failure in Aberdour).
(b) The differences in spill probabilities between the three reports for
Point Conception are substantial (between 10-3 and 10-6 for 10 000-
25 000 m3 spills).
(c) Although the traffic patterns at Eemshaven, Braefoot Bay, and Wil-
helmshaven are quite different, they all come up with a total spill
probability on the order of 10-3 • The spill sizes at Eemshaven and
Braefoot Bay differ, and are not defined for Wilhelmshaven.
The event that could create the largest spill is the rupture of a storage
tank, caused by severe winds, airplane or missile crash, meteorites, earth-
quakes, internal system failure, or accidents at chemical plants nearby.
The estimate of TNO is taken from historical data from a peakshaving
LNG plant. Cremer and Warner only qualify the probability as "remote",
without reference as to how this qualification was produced. ADL and
SAl derive their estimates from historical data on weather conditions,
earthquake frequencies, and frequencies of airplane crashes. The prob-
abilities for internal system (metallurgical) failure were derived from a
technical analysis of the metal used and the temperature variations that
could cause metal fatigue or stress. Using historical data from the FRG,
Bratz estimates the probability of an airplane hitting one of the six tanks.
All LEG storage tanks are placed within containment basins capable of
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holding all the contents (in liquefied form) of the tanks. All credible failure
scenarios assume that these basins will not break and therefore that all
spills will be held. For common-cause failures (such as earthquakes, air-
plane crashes) this assumption is questionable. Only SAl considers the
probability of more than one tank rupturing at a time due to a common
cause. The maximum credible spill is then considered as a simultaneous
rupture of all three storage tanks, each containing 77500 m 3 . SAl adjust
their probabilities because the tanks are empty approximately 40% of the
time.
Major findings on storage tank rupture probabilities are as follows:
(1) The probability of a storage tank rupture for all sites is estimated to
be on the order of 10-5 per year.
(2) A conservative estimate of spill size is generally assumed to be at least
the complete contents of one tank. However, Cremer and Warner
assume that only 15% of the contents of one tank will be spilled.
(3) There are no major differences in the estimates, except between ADL
and SAL For example, the SAl probability of a spill due to objects
crashing into the tank is 4 x 10-7 , while the ADL estimate is 10-5 .
Elisabeth Drake (of ADL) has pointed out that this difference is due
to changes in missile launch plans at the nearby Vandenburg Air Force
base between the times the two reports were written (personal com-
munication 1981).
(4) Common-cause failures that could cause more than one tank to rup-
ture are only considered by SAL
Consequences of LEG spills
We have discussed the probabilities of different spill sizes resulting from
failures of parts of the system. Before we can quantify the number of
fatalities that could result from these spills, we have to discuss what
happens to the spilled LEG and how it can cause fatalities.
There seems to be agreement that only ignition and subsequent rapid
burning or detonation of the spilled LEG can result in fatalities due to
thermal radiation and blast effects. LEG will immediately start to vaporize
after a spill, resulting in a vapor cloud, which, if not ignited, will then
travel downwind and disperse. If there is no ignition, all parts of the cloud
will eventually reach the lower flammability limit of concentration, below
which ignition cannot occur. To estimate the effects it is therefore neces-
sary to estimate the size of the vapor cloud, the downwind travel distance
of the part of the cloud that retains a concentration above its lower flam-
mability limit, and the probability of ignition.
Vaporization and dispersion. Among all topics of LEG risk assessment
the question of how LEG behaves after a spill has attracted the most
scientific interest. So far, empirical studies include only data for LNG
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spills of up to 50 m 3 on land, and up to 200 m 3 on water. The prediction
of the behavior of large spills has been based on theoretical models, which
are not easy to validate. Predictions differ for large spills but have pro-
duced good estimates of observed spills.
The predicted maxmum downwind travel distances of flammable LNG
vapor clouds after spills on water taken from the different reports are
listed in Table 7.4. LEG vapor cloud dispersion on land is likely to be
faster over rough terrain than over water, except in the case of LPG
vapor clouds that could accumulate in low-lying areas due to their high
density. The differences between the reports are substantial. While SAl
and Bratz predict that such a cloud would travel relatively short distances,
ADL and FERC predict large distances. It is also worth noting that the
distance increases with decreasing wind speeds in FERC, while for SAl the
distance decreases with lower wind speeds.
Although they are likely to be larger in size, spills on land are generally
considered to be less dangerous than spills on water. Spills on land are
usually confined because the storage tanks are surrounded by dikes, which
are generally not expected to rupture. Also, the vaporization rate of LEG
on land is slower than that on water.
Ignition of vapor clouds. A vapor cloud can be ignited by the event that
caused the spill, or at a later time by some other means. As can be seen
from Table 7.5, the probability of immediate ignition, depending on the
event, is generally high since an event that can cause a tank to rupture
can be assumed to create enough frictional heat to ignite the resulting
vapor cloud. The probability that the vapor cloud will be ignited by some
other means, given that it is not ignited immediately, depends on the
presence of ignition sources within the flammable bounds of the cloud.
Delayed ignition will in general have greater consequences because the
cloud increases in size as it travels downwind. Therefore, for most spills
immediate ignition will reduce the overall risk. In this respect, the esti-
mates of TNO and Aberdour are more conservative than those of the
other reports. Certainly, the immediate ignition probability can be site-
dependent. For example, Keeney et al. (1979) point out that the immedi-
ate ignition probability at the particular site studied is high because
collisions would involve large vessels carrying flammable cargoes. Because
historical data on LNG spills are limited, estimated ignition probabilities
cannot be validated.
The same model for delayed ignition probability is used by FERC, SAl,
Battelle, and Keeney et al. (1979), who assume that each source of ignition
has the same probability p of igniting a vapor cloud. Thus the probability
Pn that the cloud will have been ignited by one of n sources becomes Pn =
1 - (1 - p r. Additionally, all the reports using this model assume that
each person is a source of ignition, because he or she is likely to be using
facilities (e.g., car, oven, light) that could ignite the vapor. The main
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Table 7.4. Maximum downwind travel distance of LNG flammable vapor clouds follow-
ing instantaneous spills on water.
LEG spill Atmospheric Wind speed Downwind
Report size (m3 ) stabilitya (km/h) distance (km)
Bratz 20000 A-F All wind speeds 2.3
During night only All wind speeds 3.5
TNO 25000 D 3.3
E,F 10.0
ADL 25000 A 25.0 1.0
D 21.0 7.0
E 19.8 10.0
F 10.8 20.0
FERC 30000 A 25.0 0.5
16.0 0.5
9.0 0.6
D 25.0 4.2
16.0 4.9
9.0 5.9
E 25.0 7.8
16.0 9.2
9.0 11.3
F 25.0 18.1
16.0 21.6
9.0 27.1
SAl 37500 A,D,F 54.0 6.0
A,D,F 25.0 3.5
A,D,F 11.0 2.0
A,D,F 0.0 1.0
ADL 50000 A 25.0 1.0
D 21.0 9.0
E 19.8 15.0
F 10.8 25.0
SAl 88000 A,D,F 11.0 2.5
a Atmospheric stability: ranging from A, very unstable (rough) to F, very stable (calm).
differences between the reports lie in the judgmental estimates of the
probability p, as shown in Table 7.6.
The assumed values of p can be viewed as either conservative or non-
conservative depending on the number of people (and thus ignition
sources) within the bounds of the vapor cloud. The estimate of FERC, for
example, is less conservative for Point Conception than that of SAl
because there would be less than 130 people living within a 10 km radius
of the LNG facility. Thus the FERC estimate implies that there is a sub-
stantial probability that the vapor cloud will not be ignited at all, while
that of SAl implies that the cloud will be ignited with very high probability.
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Table 7.5. Probabilities of immediate ignition following vessel tank rupture caused by
different events.
Event causing the Keeney
ignition TNO Aberdour FERC SAl Battelle et al. (1979)
Collision 0.65 0.66 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9-0.99
Grounding 0.1 0.0 0.3
Ramming 0.9
Missile Iairplane 0.9 0.9
Meteorite 0.0
Internal failure 0.9 0.0
Table 7.6. Ignition probabilities per person in case of delayed ignition.
Probability p that each
person within the vapor
cloud ignites the cloud
FERC
0.01
SAl
0.1
Battelle
0.01
Keeney
et al. (1979)
0.01--0.1
On the other hand, using the model for Wilhelmshaven, with 43000
people living with 10 km of the LNG site, the FERC estimate implies that
the vapor cloud will be ignited, but only after covering a more densely
populated area than that predicted using the SAl estimate.
Fatalities caused by ignited vapor clouds. Effects of ignited vapor clouds
include thermal effects (e.g., fire, burning) and blast effects (e.g., mechan-
ical destruction, shock waves). There is no doubt that thermal effects
exist, but it is an open question whether blast effects due to a deflagration
or detonation can occur at all with methane and, if so, whether the peak
overpressure thus created is sufficient to cause damage. TNO considers
that blast effects are the only serious danger and that thermal effects are
comparatively small. Cremer and Warner consider both thermal and blast
effects, since the Mossmorran terminal would handle butane, propane, and
ethylene, which are known to explode in certain mixtures with air. ADL
only considers thermal effects, because methane explosions (either
deflagration or detonation) are believed to be very unlikely. FERC and
SAl again only consider thermal effects, while Bratz considers both
thermal and blast effects. In NMAB (1980) it is concluded that LNG vapor
cloud explosions cannot be ruled out completely, even though there is no
empirical evidence for such a possibility.
A first step in estimating the fatalities within certain distances from a
vapor cloud is to determine the levels of thermal radiation and peak over-
pressure above which fatalities can be expected. Here one has to distin-
guish between primary and secondary effects. Primary effects are fatalities
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directly caused by thermal radiation and peak overpressure; while sec-
ondary effects are fatalities from fires caused by thermal radiation, and
from collapsing buildings resulting from peak overpressure.
All reports consider only primary thermal effects and secondary blast
effects. Bratz maintains that primary blast effects can be ruled out
because the required peak overpressure has never been observed. Second-
ary thermal effects, however, may affect people sheltered from direct
radiation, but are very difficult to estimate. One way to include them is to
assume a low radiation threshold level for fatalities. Blast effects are not
significant in the risk calculations of most of the reports studied. The only
report dealing with these at some depth is TNO; Bratz does not consider
them at all. The treatment of thermal effects also varies markedly. The
distance from the center of a fire to the lower fatality level is about twice
as large in ADL than in FERC and SAL Neither Cremer and Warner nor
Bratz give a lower fatality level.
Summarizing the major findings of our comparison of fatality calcu-
lations we find:
(a) The reports disagree on the major causes of fatalities. While TNO
assumes that all fatalities would be caused by secondary blast effects,
ADL, FERC, and SAl assume that they would all be caused by
thermal radiation. Neither Cremer and Warner nor Bratz consider
fatalities from vapor cloud explosions or fires.
(b) There are disagreements as to the radiation level above which there
will be fatalities. ADL adopts the most conservative estimate on this
topic.
(c) The effects of LNG and LPG spills can be quite different. For ex-
ample, it is known that LPG vapor can explode, while the possibility
of an unconfined LNG vapor cloud explosion has not yet been deter-
mined.
(d) The ignition of an LEG vapor cloud is likely to affect nearby chemical
plants, as well as the people living or working in the vicinity. With the
exception of Point Conception, there are chemical plants near all the
planned terminals. Both Cremer and Warner and Bratz consider this,
but conclude that these effects would not increase the overall risk
significantly. TNO points out that in the case of detonation a nearby
ammonia storage tank in Rotterdam harbor could collapse with
disastrous consequences (a lethal cloud of ammonia would extend
tens of kilometers).
Assessment of population risk
The estimates of the societal risk, the individual risk, and the risk of
multiple fatalities are given in Table 7.7; no estimates were given by
Cremer and Warner or by Bratz. It should be noted that the estimates of
SAl were for an LNG terminal with more storage tanks and larger ships
than the one currently proposed. Not surprisingly, Point Conception has
166 Risk Analysis and Decision Processes
Table 7.7. Estimates of risks for the different sites.a
TNO Aberdour ADL FERC SAl
Societal risk Not
(fatalities per year) 4 x 10-2 estimated 7 x 10-6 10-5 10-6
Individual risk
(probability of
fatality per year) ,,;; 7 x 10-6 7 X 10-4 ";;9 X 10-8 8 X 10-7 10-8
Number of people Not
at risk >5000 defined >80 15 90
Risk of multiple
fatalities: prob-
ability that number
of fatalities per
year is equal to or
greater than:
1 3 x 10-3 Not 10-6 Not 6 x 10-7
10 10-3 estimated 10-8-6 x 10- 7 estimated 3 x 10- 11
100 5 X 10-6 r) r)
1000 5 X 10-6 r) r)
5000 3 X 10- 7 r) r)
a Note that the SAl estimates have not been adjusted to make them compatible with
ADL and FERC, as has been done elsewhere in the text. Therefore, the risk of the
smaller LNG terminal currently planned, as estimated by SAl, would be lower than
those presented here, so that the differences between risk assessments here and in the
text are in some sense understated.
the lowest population risk of the three sites. However, differences in the
estimates should be interpreted with caution, since they consider quite
different events. The probabilities for the same event, even for the same
site, also vary between different reports. A more subtle difference
between the reports is that the total number of people exposed N is
defined in different ways, as can be seen by comparing the three Point
Conception reports in Table 7.7. This difference can be important because
N determines, and in some sense even defines, the individual risk measure
in a way that may not be clear to the reader of the report.
While the relative ranking of Point Conception is not particularly
surprising, what is striking about the estimates in Table 7.7 is the magni-
tude of the differences. Societal risk, individual risk, and the risk of one
or more fatalities vary over four orders of magnitude across sites, and the
risk of ten or more fatalities varies over eight orders of magnitude across
sites. It is hard to imagine another area of political concern where perfor-
mance measures receiving as much attention as these did could vary over
such a wide range. Yet even more striking are the differences between
the three reports prepared for Point Conception. There is about a factor
of ten difference in both societal and individual risk (but note that the
LEG Risk Assessments: Experts Disagree 167
differences in individual risk can be partially explained by the different
numbers of people exposed). There is a difference of four orders of magni-
tude in the risk of ten or more fatalities. A policy maker faced with such
variations could conclude that all three reports are based on very limited
knowledge of the risks of LEG.
EVALUATION OF LEG RISK ASSESSMENTS
It has become clear that there are substantial disagreements on both the
probabilities and the consequences of events, even for the same site. There
also exist discrepancies in reports for different sites that cannot be
explained solely by the LEG terminal and the respective locations. How-
ever, because risk assessments are produced for specific decision-oriented
purposes we also have to ask whether or not they serve those purposes
well. Thus we now evaluate the reports from two aspects: their scientific
quality, and their usefulness in the decision-making process. Although
these are certainly interrelated there are specific questions related to each
one.
(1) Given the reports discussed above, can the scientific quality of risk
assessments be improved, and in what way?
(2) Given a risk assessment, even a scientifically perfect one, can it be
extended or improved to become a more effective aid in a decision-
making process?
Scientific quality
The one clear objective of a risk assessment is to estimate the level of risk
from a planned LEG terminal facility. There are three criteria related to
the scientific quality of a risk assessment: the terms of the risk definition
used, the accuracy of the estimate in some probabilistic sense; and the
verification of its accuracy. The question of accuracy is crucial to the
entire area of risk analysis. It was broadly discussed when the Rasmussen
Report was first published (NRC 1975), and has remained an important
issue ever since. As we have shown, there are substantial differences
between the risk assessments examined here on three dimensions: the
events considered, their probabilities, and their consequences. All reports
claim that their estimates are conservatively high, and only a few mention
uncertainties. We now discuss the different problems of accuracy in more
detail.
(i) Events considered. The reports disagree substantially on the
events considered, even for the same LEG facility. One possible event,
sabotage, is not considered in any of the reports. It would be scientifically
more accurate to say that the results of the risk assessments are conditional
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estimates of the risk, assuming that particular events, such as sabotage, do
not happen. It is important to realize that this is a simplification of reality
that any scientific model builder has to cope with. However, it is impor-
tant to mention in a risk assessment the assumptions under which the
estimate is valid. Clearly, certain events are not considered for good
reasons, in particular because specific events are a priori felt to be unim-
portant or because they are nearly impossible to quantify, like sabotage.
This results, however, in the notion of risk assessment as being an estimate
of risk conditional on certain assumptions.
(ii) Estima tion ofprobabilities. Probabilities are derived from frequency
distributions, personal (expert) judgments, and combinations of the two.
The use of historical data to estimate probabilities of future events is very
appropriate, unless major changes in the likelihood of events occur. If
future events are expected to differ from those in the past, or if historical
data do not exist, one has to rely on the judgment of experts to estimate
probabilities. This method - the Bayesian approach to probability - is
conceptually well founded in the axioms of rational behavior (see Lindley
1973, Luce and Raiffa 1957) and is extensively used in decision analysis
under a single important assumption: that a single decision maker is
involved. In that case it is conceptually feasible to use the decision
maker's personal judgment, or a single source of expertise commissioned
to generate the probabilities. In our case, however, this assumption is
not appropriate. If the estimation of risk depends heavily on expert judg-
ment of probabilities, the results can be biased by the specific experts
used. One set of results cannot be readily held to be more reliable than
another set generated by an expert who believes in different probabilities.
Yet in analyses of processes as poorly understood as LEG accident
scenarios, expert judgment of probabilities cannot be avoided. While it is
clearly desirable to minimize the role of such estimates (in favor of more
objective probabilities), this requires data collection that is expensive in
terms of both time and money and may be sometimes even impossible. In
any reasonable LEG siting process, trade-offs will be made between cost
and decision quality in such a way that expert judgement probabilities
play an important role. It follows that in any LEG risk assessment, the
sensitivity of the risk estimates to a range of different expert judgments
should be clearly specified.
(iii) Estimation of consequences. Before the consequences of an event
can be analyzed it must be clear what aspects of risk are to be considered
- e.g., fatalities, injuries, or financial losses. To estimate one of these
risks, the consequences must be stated in the same terms, i.e., the number
of fatalities, the number of injuries, or the amount of financial losses.
Reports that consider consequences only in terms of the amount of LEG
spilled, density of thermal radiation, or the like, cannot estimate risk in
terms the decision maker or the public can easily understand. Many, but
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not all, reports consider consequences in terms of the number of fatalities;
none considers injuries or financial losses explicitly, and some consider the
consequences only in terms of spill size or thermal radiation. Even those
reports dealing with the number of fatalities differ to some extent with
respect to consequences, mainly due to the lack of experience with large
LEG spills and doubts as to how to model LEG vapor cloud behavior.
Thus it is not known with certainty how many people are potentially
at risk, although it is possible that these uncertainties could soon be
reduced in the light of current experiments on large LEG spills.
Having presented the crucial issues in LEG risk assessment we turn
now to the problem of evaluating the accuracy of such assessments.
Although we have identified some important factors, it is nonetheless very
difficult to identify the most accurate risk assessment because we are
dealing with extremely rare (or low-probability) events. This calls for
some explanation.
Crucial to the growth of scientific knowledge is the ability to marshall
evidence that a certain scientific statement or theory is false. In fact, as
some philosophers (such as Karl Popper) argue, it is not possible to prove
the correctness of a scientific statement, but only to prove its falsity. An
example from the history of physics supports this view: a very strongly
held theory, Newton's laws of motion, was only shown to be false, or, to
be more precise, was shown by Einstein to be a special case of relativity
theory after more than 200 years. Not all scientific statements can be
shown to be false, for two reasons. One is that a scientific statement may
be so accurate that any attempt to prove its falsity fails; the other reason
is that a scientific statement may be so imprecise, or concerns such in-
accessible events (e.g., in the distant future), that it is not currently
possible to prove its falsity. But the latter type of scientific statement is
much weaker than the first. While the laws of physics are examples of
the first type, Marx's forecast of the economic development of industrial-
ized countries is a scientific theory of the second type.
Let us now look at LEG risk assessment. It is not difficult to design
experiments that could prove that certain predicted consequences are
false. This could be achieved, for example, by experimenting with large
LEG spills. But it is difficult to prove that the risk estimate is incorrect
because important events are not considered or because the probabilities
are wrong. The reason for this difficulty is that, by definition, low-
probability events occur very rarely. Even the data on LEG terminal
system behavior for 20 or 30 years would provide insufficient inform-
ation, because very few accidents, if any, would have occurred. Such
experience can only put an upper bound on a probability of occurrence
at a particular confidence level, a bound that may be far greater than
the very low probabilities involved in LEG risk assessment.
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There is no easy way to resolve the problem of validating estimates of
low-probability events. For this reason, Weinberg (1982) considers risk
assessment to be an "art" because "there are, and will always be, strong
trans-scientific elements in risk assessment." However, the fact remains
that risk assessment is an "art" that is a more desirable means of estimat-
ing risk than any other alternative.
Limitations of risk assessments
We will now discuss the shortcomings of LEG risk assessments as decision
aids, and how they can be improved. It is first necessary to identify the
types of decisions for which risk assessments are used. Basically two dis-
tinct decision problems are involved: the choice of a specific site for an
LEG facility, and whether or not certain risk-mitigating measures should
be introduced. Although it is not clearly mentioned in the reports, it
seems that those prepared for Point Conception and Eemshaven were used
as inputs to both types of decisions, while the reports prepared for Moss-
morran--Braefoot Bay and Wilhelmshaven were primarily used for decisions
on mitigating measures.
Of course, decision problems are not only concerned with risk; conse-
quences such as costs, benefits, environmental impact, supply interruption,
and risk to life are also important dimensions. From a decision analysis
point of view one should first clarify the alternatives and then quantify
the consequences for each alternative, as shown in the decision trees of
Figure 7.1. The siting decision is of course not independent of the choice
of which technical standards to employ for the terminal, a fact that
further complicates the process. However, at some point a trade-off has to
be made between the various consequences of the decision, e.g., costs,
benefits, risk, etc. This is exactly the point where questions such as "How
safe is safe enough?" or "What level of risk is acceptable?" are raised. In a
decision analysis framework one should instead ask questions like: "Is it
preferable to reduce the expected number of fatalities and improve the
layout of the plant (with additional costs), or should the expected number
of fatalities remain at 10-6 per year and the technical standard of the LEG
facility also remain the same as planned?" There is no scientific approach
to answering such questions. In fact, there is not even a unique way of
answering them for society as a whole, because we do not know of a
unique way to aggregate preferences of individuals into a societal prefer-
ence list. No matter what the results of the risk assessment may be, differ-
ent people may prefer different alternatives for the problems posed
in Figure 7.1 because individual trade-offs between risk and other conse-
quences are likely to differ.
In the past, decisions concerning technological risk have largely been
made by the engineers and companies who plan the facilities: civil engi-
neers decide on the safety level of dams, and airplane industries and
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Site 1 Consequences if site 1 is selected
Site 2 Consequences if site 2 is selected
LEG terminal
siting decision
Site 3 . .
1----------'--'----1 Consequences If site 3 is selected
Site N
Consequences if site N is selected
No site
at all
Possible alternative
decisions if no LEG
terminal is built, and
the consequences of
these alternatives
1---------------/ Consequences 2Techn ical standard 2
Technical standard~
I Consequences 1
Decision on r--.,
mitigating
measures at
given site
Technical standard 3 I~------ Consequences 3
"
'" .~~h"'''' "'''d''d M I
-----I. Consequences M
Figure 7.1. Decision trees for the main decisions on LEG terminals.
regulatory commissions decide on the safety level of airplanes. Although
this is a generally accepted practice one must be aware that underlying
these decisions are subjective trade-offs between safety (or risk) levels and
other factors. Even if people or interest groups do not accept the sub-
jective trade-offs of experts or engineers, there is no scientific way to
prove that these experts are correct. As shown in Table 7.1, the Cremer
and Warner and Bratz reports state that the risk levels were acceptable,
a statement that cannot be defended on scientific grounds, although this
does not mean, of course, that the risk level was unacceptable to all the
parties involved,
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It is also important to realize that the consequences of decisions will
affect groups or individuals in different ways. Not many people in a
society are exposed to the risk of LEG terminals, while many receive the
benefits. On the other hand, if no individual is exposed to the risk because
an LEG terminal is not built, the consumers might have to pay a higher
price for natural gas. Thus there is a conflict of interests between different
groups that cannot be solved by scientific means. Although our reasoning
here is not new, there still seems to be a tendency within the political
process to believe that risk assessments can make decisions more objective
or that the people who do the risk assessments can also answer the ques-
tion of whether or not the risk resulting from a specific decision is accept-
able. Although risk assessments cannot solve the problem of people having
different trade-offs with regard to the consequences of decisions related to
LEG terminal facilities, risk assessment may still be useful. Its uses are dis-
cussed further in Chapter 8.
Differences between risk assessments
As discussed above there are important differences in risk assessment
reports, especially between those for Wilhelmshaven and Mossmorran-
Braefoot Bay on the one hand, and Point Conception and Eemshaven on
the other. These discrepancies could be attributed to a number of factors,
including differences in cultural styles, in the risk analysts responsible
for the reports, in the purposes of the reports, in analytical and financial
resources, or some other unknown factors. Although it cannot be sub-
stantiated, the expectations of the clients, as well as the scientific back-
ground of the analysts, are also likely to be significant reasons for the
differences.
While the reasons for the differences cannot be ascertained, their
extent indicates the great amount of leeway left to analytical judgment.
As this chapter has made clear, several decisions must be made in the
course of performing a risk assessment, such as how to characterize risk,
what presentation formats to use, what gaps to fill with assumptions,
what assumptions to adopt, which of several conflicting models to use,
how to indicate the degree of confidence of the results, and which events
simply to omit from the analysis. These decisions can push the results in
any direction. Very conservative assumptions increase risk estimates;
clear presentations of expert disagreements can reduce confidence in the
results; and particular formats highlight particular aspects of the risk. Such
factors can push the results of an analysis over such a large range that
the final result may be affected more by the predilections of the analyst
than the physical features of the site or technology. This same result was
found in the comparison of three risk assessments performed for the
proposed terminal at Oxnard (FPC, SAl, and SES; see Lathrop and
Linnerooth 1982).
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Table 7.8. Ranking of reports for Point Conception in terms of conservatism of esti-
mates on specific issues.
Conservative Less conservative
1 2 3
Completeness of events considered SAl ADL FERC
Spill probability due to ship collision FERC ADL SAl
Spill sizes considered ADL SAl FERC
Spill probability due to storage tank
failure SAl ADL
Spill sizes considered SAl ADL
Maximum travel distance of flammable
vapor cloud after spill on water ADL FERC SAl
Maximum travel distance of flammable
vapor cloud after spill on land ADL SAl
Lower fatality level of thermal radiation ADL FERC SAl
Delayed ignition probability SAl FERC
Overall risk FERC ADL SAl
When looking at the three reports for Point Conception, however, there
is no indication that one report is more conservative (or less conservative)
in its overall risk estimate than the others, as shown in Table 7.8.
Dealing with uncertainties
There are difficulties in determining and protraying the accuracy of risk
estimates. Some reports deal with only a few of the uncertainties, as
shown in Table 7.9, but the greatest uncertainties are acknowledged in the
Battelle report:
For both the number of expected fatalities per event and the corresponding annual
frequencies, the lower limit of the confidence intervals should be considered to
be significantly less than 0.1 times the given values, the upper limit over 10 times
the given values. In some cases the upper limit is given by the total number of
persons at risk.
The reports not listed in Table 7.9 do not explicitly consider uncertainties
in the risk estimates at all; even those that do differ as to what these are,
and the relevant range that these values can take. We consider as particu-
larly uncertain the estimates of probabilities of events stemming from
expert judgment. Therefore sensitivity analyses should involve at least the
following parameters:
• probability of an LEG vessel accident resulting in a spill;
• probabilities of immediate and delayed ignition of an LEG vapor
cloud;
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Table 7.9. Uncertainties in risk estimates.
Report
ADL
SAl
Battelle
Keeney et at.
(1979)
SES (1977)
Range of expected
number of fatalities
per year
4 X 10-6 to
7 X 10-6
1.2 X 10-6 to
1.201 X 10-6
At least 10-6 to 10-'0
1.7 X 10-5 to
2 X 10-5
1.5 X 10-2 to
5.7 x 10°
Reasons for range
Population density - present or
future; active time of ignition source
Percentage of fatalities among people
enveloped by a burning plume, and
other conservative assumptions
Probability of vessel accident,
probability of immediate and
delayed ignition of LEG vapor cloud
Probability of ignition per source,
maximum travel distance of
flammable vapor cloud
Maximum travel distance of flam-
mable vapor cloud, probability of
LEG vessel accident
• probability of transfer system and storage tank failure resulting in a
spill.
Another topic, the maximum downwind travel distance of an LEG
vapor cloud, seems to us to be less critical because this will be primarily
determined by the delayed ignition probability. This view is also sup-
ported by Battelle:
The uncertainties resulting from the application of simple, experimentally unveri-
fied models describing the dynamics of the LEG vapor are not considered to be
critical for the assessment of the risk.
To show how large the differences between accident probabilities can
be, it is useful to examine the probability of a spill per year at Point
Conception (Table 7.3). This probability was estimated at 9.9 x 10-7
by SAl, as 7.7 x 10-5 by ADL and as 8.1 x 10-3 by FERC. If the range
on the order of 104 is taken as the possible probability, the range of the
societal risk given in Table 7.7 should also be of the order of 104 , because
the probability of a spill on water is essentially related to the expected
number of fatalities per year. The FERC and SAl risk estimates in Table
7.7 do not differ a great deal because the former makes less conservative
assumptions on other issues, as shown in Table 7.8.
From this small example of sensitivity analyses we would argue that
the range of uncertainty stated in Battelle and SES of the order of at
least 10 2 is defendable as a minimum range for most risk estimates. Of
course, this is a very rough estimate. It is certainly necessary to perform
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thorough sensitivity analyses to make more precise statements on the
ranges of uncertainties.
But a more general point should be made here. Each report poses as a
representation of the current state of knowledge regarding LEG risks, but
because that knowledge is incomplete, some of the reports represent it
using probabilistic terms or error bounds. Yet each report is based on a
different state of knowledge: different assumptions are made, models
used, probabilities estimated, etc. No one report in fact represents a
comprehensive representation of the current state of knowledge. When
SAl gives a probability of 9.9 x 10-7 , and FERC gives a probability of
8.1 x 10-3 , for the same event, the policy maker is likely to be somewhat
at a loss as to the appropriate figure upon which to base his or her decisions.
There is some "societal subjective probability" that most likely lies
between those two probabilities, since each represents only a subset of
the total state of knowledge. Yet neither report acknowledges that the
other estimate exists! What is needed is a "meta-analysis" combining the
different estimates and models, so that it represents a larger fraction of
the available knowlege than anyone of the existing risk assessments.
A meta-analysis would be more objective than any of the existing
reports because if two consulting firms were each asked to do such a meta-
analysis, the two reports would probably be more in agreement than, say,
SAl and FERC. Such an analysis would also have much larger error
bounds, or broader probability distributions than the existing analyses.
While policy makers would prefer more precise estimates of risk, our
present state of knowedge simply does not warrant such statements. The
imprecision in our knowledge about LEG risks should be clearly commu-
nicated to readers of risk assessment reports.
GUIDELINES FOR STANDARDIZED RISK ASSESSMENTS
In this section we organize many of our findings in the form of guidelines
for a standardized LEG terminal risk assessment. These are meant to
suggest ways of improving assessments, and also to enable someone not
familiar with the field to evaluate such reports. The guidelines are in-
tended to improve both scientific and decision-aid aspects of LEG risk
assessment. Much of what we present here has already been stated at some
point in this chapter, yet we feel it is useful to present these issues in a
summary form.
(1) Definition of risk. Because there are several different definitions and
concepts of risk, the particular one used in an assessment should be
made clear. In addition, the reason for the choice of that particular
risk definition should be explained.
(2) Completeness of considered events. It is conceptually impossible to be
sure that all possible hazardous events have been included in the
assessment. However, the events listed in Table 7.3 can be considered
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a minimal set to be included. Other events that could add substantially
to the risk (such as sabotage), but were not considered for some
reason, should also be mentioned. Thus the reader of a report should
realize that the validity of the risk estimate is conditional on the con-
sideration of only certain events.
(3) Estimation of probabilities. Whenever possible, probabilities should be
estimated using data rather than judgment. Whenever judgmental
probabilities are used they should be identified. Furthermore, a
number of experts should provide estimates so that a range of possible
judgmental probabilities is generated.
(4) Estimation of consequences. The consequences should be expressed in
terms that concern the decision makers (e.g., fatalities, injuries, finan-
ciallosses) rather than in physical terms (e.g., spill size, thermal radi-
ation). The possible consequences of domino effects (between an LEG
terminal and nearby chemical plants, for example) should also be con-
sidered. Whenever possible, consequences should be estimated using
data from experiments rather than theoretical, unverified physical
models.
(5) Identification of system parts that present the maximum risk. For
considering mitigating measures and engineering design features, it is
helpful to identify the parts of the system that present the greatest
risk.
(6) Sensitivity analysis. Any risk assessment report should perform sensi-
tivity analysis, particularly on the judgmental probabilities, to show
the possible range of uncertainty of the risk estimate.
(7) Assumptions. The assumptions on which the analysis is based should
be clearly stated. In addition, wherever possible the implications of
each assumption should be presented to aid comparison with other
assessments.
(8) Risk-benefit analysis. Although the estimation of the risk itself
increases the understanding of the implications of certain decisions,
we feel that the estimation of the risk and the benefits of alternatives
in the context of LEG terminal siting and design problems would be
more appropriate and useful to the decision makers.
(9) Acceptable risk level. There is no scientific way to decide whether a
certain risk level is acceptable to society or not. Therefore risk assess-
ment reports should avoid making statements on this question.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The major findings in this chapter can be summarized as follows:
(a) There is no unique concept of risk that is used throughout all the risk
assessment reports. Many of the important differences between the
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reports stem from alternative risk concepts used. Some reports do not
even define their underlying risk concepts.
(b) The possible failures of a system, the probability of those failures, and
the estimation of their consequences differ between the reports. Not
all the differences can be explained in terms of the terminals and sites;
some must be viewed as resulting from the limited knowledge and
understanding of LEG risks. In this respect, most reports make scant
reference to the remaining uncertainties in the estimation of risk.
(c) Although there are differences, there is no tendency for any single
report to over- or underestimate the risk. Rather, each report is more
conservative on certain topics and less so on others, compared to the
other studies.
(d) On a relative risk scale it can be said that among the four sites Point
Conception presents the lowest societal risk (because of the very low
population density), Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay and Wilhelmshaven
present the highest relative risk (because of the high population
density and increased vessel traffic), and Eemshaven is in between.
(e) Although risk is an important aspect of the decision to import LEG
and to choose a terminal site, other aspects such as reliability are also
important. Any decision regarding LEG imports and terminal siting
should involve comparisons with alternative options. As part of that
process the risk of LEG should be compared with the risk of other
options.
(f) Whatever the flaws of these LEG risk assessments, they are clearly
superior to less systematic ways of identifying possible system weak-
nesses in order to inform decision makers on the topic of risk.
NOTE
1. The risk of multiple fatalities is typically displayed as a complemen-
tary cumulative probability distribution - the probability per year
that the num ber of fatalities will exceed x shown against x. Such a
curve, sometimes called a Rasmussen curve (see NRC 1975), contains
information not available in the individual probabilities: the effect of
correlations between those probabilities. A Rasmussen curve addresses
the sensitivity to catastrophe found in the political perspective of risk.
For instance, consider two facilities that can cause equal numbers of
expected fatalities per year. In one facility these are bunched into very
rare catastrophes, and in the other they are spread over common small
accidents. The former facility may encounter greater political oppo-
sition due to sensitivity to catastrophe.
Chapter 8
Risk Analysis in the
Policy Process*
Technological risks are big business. Tuller (1978) estimates that in the US
the total damage in 1974 caused by technological hazards was in the range
of $98 to 180 billion. According to a study by Clark University Hazard
Assessment Group and Decision Research (1982), 17-31% of mortality in
the US can be attributed to technology. Not surprisingly, risk analyses of
technological hazards are growing in popularity. For instance, the US
National Research Council (1981), which produces around 250 reports
a year, estimates that half of these reports deal with risk and that one in
five is a fully fledged risk analysis.
In our four case studies, we find no fewer than 15 studies of the risks
from the proposed LEG terminals. The most important of these analyses
were reviewed in Chapter 7. One conclusion was that risk analysts tend to
present an overconfident picture of the accuracy of their estimates by the
way in which they choose the data, couch the assumptions, and present
the results. A second conclusion was that risk analyses are very narrowly
focused on one aspect of the siting decision. What was called for was a
comprehensive decision analysis of the alternatives (including the alterna-
tive of not building a terminal) in the context of multiple parties with
their varied concerns.
Whereas Chapter 7 presented the analyst's perspective on improving
analyses, this chapter looks at analyses in their social and political context.
Although policy makers can be identified, no single decision maker can
claim a comprehensive understanding of the social and political processes
of which risk is a part. After drawing some general comparisons among the
siting procedures in the four countries, we examine the sequential and
interactive nature of the siting process, asking why more comprehensive
analyses such as those suggested in Chapter 7, were not pursued. We then
*This chapter was written by Joanne Linnerooth.
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turn to the uses and the usefulness of quantitative risk analyses in the
political decision process. Finally, we ask whether analysts can usefully
contribute to resolving complex public policy issues such as the siting of
LEG terminals.
THINGS IN COMMON AND THINGS THAT GET DONE DIFFERENTLY
Drawing comparisons between the siting procedures in four countries,
each with its own cultural style, governmental structures, and economic
conditions is doomed to be both oversimplified and incomplete. To appre-
ciate the difficulties involved, one might begin by comparing the observa-
tions of two participants in the IIASA Task Force Meeting of Septem ber
1980. William Ahern, a member of the California Coastal Commission,
had this to say:
I sense a sort of late 20th century technology.... The issues, the people involved,
the kinds of things we are talking about, even the analyses seem to have much in
common. Our differences are much greater on what we eat for breakfast or how we
educate our children than on how we deal with liquefied gas.... (KLS 1982, p550)
Whereas Michael Thompson (1980a), a cultural anthropologist and mem-
ber of the IIASA risk group, observes that
Even a cursory comparison of the way the same technological risks are handled
reveals that things do get done differently in different cultures (p.iii)
Depending upon how one goes about parceling or slicing up the case
studies, staking them against each other reveals that there are surprising
commonalities, but also that things get done differently. Our intent in this
section is to distill out the issue of risks to the population, as distinct (or
not so distinct) from issues such as national energy policy or public parti-
cipation in technological questions, and to trace this issue through the
four separate political processes. Setting the stage in this manner, we can
turn to the similarities and differences in the national styles of handling
risks, in the various roles played by the actors, as well as in the outcomes
with regard to the safety of the selected sites.
An overview of the risk issue
The following brief review reveals that concerns about the risk of a pro-
posed LEG terminal to the safety of the population was an important,
sometimes even an overriding, consideration in the political debates in
each country.
The FRG. The safety risk issue at Wilhelmshaven was an important con-
cern during the early stages of the siting process, yet it appears to have
been a somewhat less controversial issue than in the other three countries.
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The 1976 settlement contract, where the state (Land) and local authorities
agreed in principle to DFTG's plans to site an LNG import terminal at
Wilhelmshaven, was signed in the absence of any comprehensive analysis
of the potential risks of the facility. A review of the arguments in these
first two rounds of interaction, neither of which included objector groups,
reveals an atmosphere of concern, but of technological optimism. The
safety of the terminal was considered by the parties involved to depend
primarily on engineering factors. The terminal could be designed to
satisfy existing regulations and would thus ensure the safety of the popu-
lation. This picture, however, changed during the third round of discus-
sions when public interest groups became involved and when the federal
shipping authority (WSB) became concerned that a "residual" risk,
especially to the residents of Hooksiel, would remain even if all the
appropriate measures to ensure public safety were taken. The debate at
the federal level, involving a number of ministries, resolved that this
residual risk to the local residents and users of the recreational area near
Hooksiel was acceptable.
The Netherlands. Doubts about the safety of an LNG terminal in Rot-
terdam harbor on the part of local authorities effectively diverted the
decision momentum away from Maasvlakte and towards Eemshaven. The
acceptability of the risk from the terminal at Maasvlakte was an important
argument made by nearly all the participants throughout the three rounds
of interaction. It was an issue that was addressed at an early stage of the
decision process when the Ministry of Social Affairs commissioned a
government supported research institute, TNO, to carry out a quantita-
tive risk assessment for Maasvlakte and later for Eemshaven (TNO 1976,
1978). Yet the outcome, as distinct from the procedures leading to this
outcome, seems to have been more a result of political and economic
considerations, namely, the industrial development of Eemshaven, than of
concerns about the risks to the public.
The UK. The safety risk issue of the LEG export facilities at Mossmorran-
Braefoot Bay played a large role in the public siting debate, mostly as a
result of the efforts of a strong and vociferous interest group that vehe-
mently opposed the project. To appreciate the importance of the risk
issue in the siting process it is important to recognize that the debate
reported in the case study was geared to granting outline planning per-
mission, or permission in principle for gas processing, storage, and
transhipment facilities on the proposed site. Only if this outline planning
permission is granted are full design details presented and the statutory
authorities make a full scrutiny of the installations. Thus, the safety issue
is not fully settled at that point in time where outline planning approval is
granted. The main forum for resolving this question of planning permission
was, in this case, the public inquiry, though a new safety issue emerged
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after the inquiry with the introduction of information concerning radio
sparks.
The US. The safety risks of the proposed terminals were a dominant
concern throughout the California decision-making process. A site in the
Port of Los Angeles harbor, though supported by the local authorities,
was turned down by the federal government on the grounds of an un-
acceptable safety risk posed by an earthquake fault. In Oxnard, a very
different situation arose. The federal government was prepared to approve
the site on the ground that the terminal presented an acceptable safety
risk to the public, whereas the local authorities were more hesitant as a
result of strong pressure from a local action group whose arguments had in
many ways been reinforced by an environmental impact statement (SES
1976) prepared for Oxnard City Council. This report presented several
worst-case scenarios showing the possibility, without accompanying
probabilities, of 70 000 fatalities. 1 This scenario became the basis of a
major push on the part of environmentalist interests for legislation requir-
ing remote siting of LNG terminals. Pressure from environmentalists,
along with pressure from industry and unions to expedite licensing pro-
cedures, resulted in the passing in 1977 of the California LNG Terminal
Siting Act. Yet, even at the remote site of Point Conception, there were
concerns about the risks posed by an underlying earthquake fault. This
issue further delayed the process, to the point when the utilities have
decided to defer their present application, on the basis that California no
longer needs LNG.
Differences and similarities
While the safety risks of the proposed terminals were a prominent concern
in each country, the styles by which the four political systems dealt with
this concern differed. Keeping in mind that the four countries belong to
the capitalistic, Western world, we find nonetheless differences in the
degree of govenment centralization - from the highly centralized system
in the UK, the consensual system of the Netherlands, to the more decen-
tralized, federal systems in the FRG and the US. In the US, there is a
more adversarial style of resolving conflicts, in contrast with the UK and
the Netherlands where more emphasis is placed on discussions between
the conflicting parties. Another point of interest is the expanding role of
the courts in settling technological conflicts, especially in the US and the
FRG.
Notwithstanding the contrasting national styles, we find that the
stands taken by the various parties and the roles they played in the policy
procedures showed remarkable similarities.
(1) The utilities, though highly regulated in the US, less so in the FRG
and the UK, and partly nationalized in the Netherlands, served as the
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initiators in screening and choosing the site(s) first submitted to the
approval process. Except for general planners, there existed no regional
or national planning authorities for designating appropriate sites speci-
cally for an LNG terminal.
(2) With the possible exception of the Oxnard City Council (where the
issue never came to a vote), the local city councils were in favor of
having a terminal in their community. In contrast with many siting con-
troversies over nuclear power stations, we find in each case study that
local authority representatives argued that an LEG facility would
increase business and bring jobs to the local community.
(3) The opposition to the LEG facilities was dominated by the "not in
my backyard" (nimby) groups. The Oxnard Citizens' Group and the
Bixby and Hollister Ranch Associations in the US; the Hooksiel
Citizens' Group in the FRG; and the Aberdour and Dalgety Bay Joint
Action Group in the UK, were the most important. With the excep-
tion of the Sierra Club in California and the Conservation Society in
the UK, there were no national or regional environmentalist groups
actively involved in the siting debates. Though disinterest on the part
of broadly based groups can be partly attributed to their often limited
resources, that in many cases had already been allocated to opposing
nuclear power plants, another contributing factor may be that lique-
fied energy gas (LEG) does not raise, at least as intensely, the same
moral issues as nuclear power. The scale of a possible catastrophe is
perceived by the public as more serious in the case of a nuclear
accident, which involves longer-term, even intergenerational conse-
quences. In contrast with the nuclear power controversy, the problem
raised by the case studies lies in explaining the limited opposition,
rather than any widespread opposition.
(4) National and regional authorities played an important role in deciding
whether the proposed facilities posed an acceptable level of risk to the
workers and the public. In the US, the federal authorities decided
the fate of Los Angeles harbor, the state legislature decided Oxnard's
fate, and the state and federal authorities ruled on the seismic risk
at Point Conception. In the UK, the acceptability of the risks posed
by the planned facilities at Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay was decided
ultimately by the Secretary of State for Scotland; in the FRG this
issue was decided by the Federal Minister of Transportation; and in
the Netherlands the location of the terminal with its inherent risks was
ultimately resolved by the cabinet.
While the actors and the roles they played appear similar, things still got
done differently in different countries. Consider, for instance, California,
with a decade of political controversy and no approved site for its LNG
terminal. While this case appears exceptional, it should be kept in mind
that the California case presents not one, but two separate siting proce-
dures. The first was an unsuccessful attempt by the utility to locate at
Risk Analysis in the Policy Process 183
Los Angeles, Oxnard, or Point Conception; the second attempt to locate
at Point Conception represented a distinctly different process set by the
conditions of the California LNG Terminal Siting Act in which the local
authorities relinquished power to the state in the form of the California
Public Utilities Commission. Today the procedure in California is possibly
the most expedient of the four since the utility need only make "one
stop" at the state level and "one stop" at the federal level, thus bypassing
local public bodies. Hence, a process that was considered cumbersome by
industry and valuable by certain local interests has been radically changed
by this Act in the interests of minimizing delays in siting LNG facilities.
What is safe enough?
As a final comparison, we can examine the outcomes of the siting debates.
Why were terminals considered safe at Wilhelmshaven, Mossmorran-
Braefoot Bay, and Eemshaven, yet not at Oxnard or Rotterdam? The
explanation may lie in the existence (or nonexistence) of less risky or
otherwise more desirable sites. For example, the Netherlands and the FRG
are limited in the number of remote sites, though in the Postscript Michael
Thompson points out that the population density of some parts of the
Scottish coast is similar to that of the California coast.
Another explanation can be found in the economics of the proposed
sites involved. The communities of Wilhelmshaven, Cowdenbeath (near
Mossmorran), and Eemshaven were in serious need of economic invest-
ment, whereas the Rotterdam and Oxnard communities were more
affluent and more ready to question technological developments. As
pointed out above, the decision on the acceptability of the risks was to a
large extent the responsibility of the regional or national authorities; yet
these authorities needed the support of the local communities and thus
needed an appropriate justification for their decision. For this purpose, we
find that the prospect of jobs provided a persuasive political argument in
those processes where the sites were found to be "acceptably safe".2
Viewed in this economic context, the outcomes of the debates might
be interpreted as following a simple and predictable pattern. If the harbor
and the surrounding region are badly in need of economic development,
the jobs that will be created by the terminal become a more persuasive
argument and the risks will be viewed as acceptable. If the surrounding
area is affluent or less in need of economic development, and if there exist
reasonable alternatives, the risks of the proposed terminal become more
salient and are likely to be found unacceptable. There is thus no absolute
level of acceptable risk; rather, there is a close relationship between the
question of the acceptability of risks and the economic setting in which
these risks occur.
This is not a surprising nor undesirable finding since all questions of
safety and acceptable risk should, at least from the economist's view, be
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considered in relation to the benefits gained by those who must accept the
risks. Yet, on closer look, these outcomes do not reflect a clear and simple
economic trade-off, but point instead to an opaque and complex process
of political bargaining. First, as was pointed out by Robert Vincent from
Gaz de France, an LNG import terminal does not create a significant
number of long-term jobs.
[The] terminal located near 81. Nazaire has been, from the beginning, wished by all
the people in this area, including the public as well as the Administration. It was
believed that such a facility could be of some help for the unemployment situation
in this area. Actually, I don't think an energy terminal provides a lot of jobs, except
during the building period. (KL8 1982, unpublished draft).
Secondly, the economic trade-offs involved in accepting a risky technol-
ogy were not made explicit; rather, there was often a pretense of an
absolute level of safety against which the acceptability of the site could be
measured. This notion of "acceptable risk", however, can only be an out-
come of a decision process since there is no "objective" means of deter-
mining what is or is not acceptable. As Volker Ronge (1980, p231) puts
it:
The "question" of safety is no question at all- and the same could be said for the
"question" of acceptable or unacceptable risk - and cannot be "answered" in an
ordinary sense.... Instead, safety - as well as admitted, tolerated accepted risk
- is an outcome of [a] highly complex systems process.
In sum, we find on one level starkly contrasting elements of style -
the more adversary environment in the US, the highly centralized system
of policy making in the UK, the emphasis on the consensus in the pluralis-
tic Dutch system, and the legalistic federal system in the FRG. On another
level, we find many similarities in the proceedings, especially in the
positions taken by the parties involved. The project is initiated by a utility,
supported by the local municipality for reasons of increased economic
activity and jobs, opposed by a local environmentalist or public interest
group, and eventually approved or not approved by the regional or
national authorities. Underlying this process there appears to be a com-
mon and fundamental theme, which states that the acceptability of the
risks will depend to a large extent on the economic conditions of the local
community.
However, the economic interpretation for the selection of the sites, that
the risks to the local community are balanced in some manner with the
benefits to the local community, must be made cautiously and with some
important qualifications. Though the prospect of jobs and local economic
development was a persuasive argument for locating the terminal at a
chosen site, the argument was often deceptive, and the implied risk-
benefit trade-off was never presented as such. To some extent this econo-
mic interpretation presupposes that the siting question is a "decision" to
be resolved by a single person with a clear knowledge of the trade-offs
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involved. The question is not, however, resolved by a "decision maker" at
a single point in time; rather, it is addressed in small, sequential steps by a
number of competing interests, whose interactions are colored by the
political and cultural setting in which they occur.
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
Sequential decision making
The siting of technological facilities is a policy issue that is not resolved as a
systematic problem involving a range of costs and benefits, but rather as a
sequential set of questions, each addressing small segments of the problem.
How these questions are formulated by the "governing body" of that
organization with responsibility for setting the formal agenda determines
the considerations and concerns brought into the debate and therefore the
types of scientific analyses generated. For instance, if the problem at hand
is formulated as a choice between site X and site Y, the content of the
debate, including the analyses, will be more narrowly focused than if the
problem is framed in more general terms of identifying an appropriate
energy source or an appropriate site along the coastline. As Braybrooke
(1974) points out, the latterformulation is more appropriate for economic
thinking, and for broader "systems" analyses that look at the costs and
benefits of various alternatives; yet, it demands more complicated solu-
tions and is hence less expedient. The choice between two sites, on the
other hand, can be approached with simpler, incremental heuristics and,
therefore, can be supported with more narrowly focused analyses.
Looking over the "problem formulation" (at least the visible agenda, as
opposed to the "hidden agendas" of the separate parties) of each political
discussion round for each country, it is possible to distinguish the five
categories listed in Table 8.1. The content of the debate in the respective
rounds was generally addressed to one or some combination of these
Table 8.1.
Problem
formulation
Policy
Screening
Selection
Approval
Licensing
Question(s)
Would a site be desirable from the national perspective?
Which site(s) or category of site(s) is (are) appropriate?
Is site X preferred to site Y'?
Should site X (or site Y) be approved?
What changes are needed in the site or technology before con-
struction or operations can proceed?
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problem formulations, but varied considerably across the four countries.
Discussions in the US and the Netherlands covered an agenda from energy
policy in the early rounds through site approval in the later rounds,
whereas rounds in the FRG and the UK covered a somewhat narrower
agenda, including only site approval and licensing. The siting question in
the US and the Netherlands was therefore debated, at least in the early
rounds, in the context of energy policy. On the other hand, in the FRG
and the UK, the siting question was debated primarily in the context of
regional development policy. This does not mean that energy policy and
site screening questions were not addressed in the FRG and the UK, but
that they were not addressed in a political forum or in the context of
LEG. 3
In this larger context, the siting question takes on an added status. It
becomes a matter of public policy, which, according to Majone (1984)
can be differentiated from individual decision making in many ways,
the most important being that competing institutions take stands on
policy issues consistent with objectives related to the long-term survival
of their institutions. While the problem may be formulated as approving a
certain site, other institutional concerns related, for instance, to energy
policy or regional development may determine a party's position on the
narrower agenda item.
Not only are the larger problems - whether and where to site an LEG
facility - broken down into smaller subproblems, but these subproblems
are usually dealt with sequentially by agencies with different and some-
times conflicting responsibilities. Constraints due to legislative and legal
considerations may dictate the order in which certain actions must be
taken. These decisions or actions are usually hierarchical, much like the
sequence shown in Table 8.1. Resolution of the question of whether an
LEG terminal is needed usually precedes the site selection phase which, in
turn, usually precedes the licensing phase. Because of time and cost
considerations, a decision on one level is often binding in that it cannot
easily be reopened for political discussion. Thus, the process becomes tied
or locked in to certain courses of action. 4 The responsible agencies have
little alternative but to consider increasingly narrow aspects of the prob-
lem.
This locking-in phenomenon was illustrated in the US case study, where
the California LNG Terminal Siting Act legally committed the state to the
need for an LNG facility and to finding a remote site. However, the
deregulation of natural gas prices in 1978 led to an increase in the supply
of domestic gas. Rather than re-examining this need, the authorities
pursued the question of whether there was a serious earthquake fault
underlying the site, and the utilities have now withdrawn their current
application on the basis of more optimistic forecasts of domestic natural
gas supply.
The framing of the subproblems, as well as the order in which they are
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considered, may affect the final outcome. The sequence of events in the
Netherlands illustrates this point. In an early stage of the process, the
City of Rotterdam authorities commissioned a study revealing that the
import of LNG would be cost-competitive with other import possibilities
(e.g., gas pipeline) if it were on a scale of 25 billion m 3 per year (Rotter-
dam 1977). The order of the decision process was such that, first, a com-
mitment was made to build the facility and, second, its scale was decided.
As it turned out, the scale of the facility was reduced to below the cost
competitive level. Had the order of the decision been reversed, it is possi-
ble that the project would not have been commissioned.
As these examples illustrate, a sequential decision process precludes the
use of a comprehensive analysis of the LEG question in which the costs
and benefits of various options could be assessed. Such an analysis would
address questions ranging from energy policy through licensing simulta-
neously. From a political standpoint it is difficult to identify a site with-
out some commitment on the need for the terminal and, likewise, to gain
sufficient information on the technical licensing requirements without at
least a partial commitment on the site. s The sequential process contrib-
uted to the fact that the sites were not chosen on the basis of some
explicit balancing of the full range of costs and benefits. 6
Party interactions
Understanding how a site is settled upon rests not only in recognizing the
sequential nature of the process, but also in understanding the ways in
which the interested parties take stands on the issues as they arise. A
critically important element in this process is the extent to which each
party with standing or decision responsibility can make a credible and
justifiable argument to support whatever stance it has chosen to take.
Justification for an LEG project that is viewed by the government
officials to be in the national interest appeared to rest throughout the
case studies on two separate arguments. First, the project would bene-
fit the national economy and create jobs for the local community; and,
second, the project would not impose an unacceptable risk on the local
population. These arguments were independent of each other in the
sense that the risks were not argued to be acceptably low because the
terminal would create jobs, but rather they were acceptable due to some
other criterion. Risk-benefit comparisons did not appear as a legitimate
justification for a party's stand on the safety of the terminal. The question
of "acceptable" risk thus became an issue unto itself.
As our case studies have shown, the question of whether a proposed
LEG facility is acceptably safe is by no means clear cut with well defined
criteria for its resolution; rather, it is intertwined with other concerns and
is decided by a complex, interactive process. During the course of this
process, those parties included take stands or argue for or against the
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safety of the proposed operations. The sophistication of these arguments
depends on the manner in which these questions are usually resolved in
the country concerned; in our case studies, the arguments ranged from
showing that the facility was safe in the best judgment of the engineers,
to comparing quantitative estimates of the risk with estimates of other
risks or with some acceptable risk criterion. We review these arguments
below.
Best engineering judgment (the terminal is safe). Many of the party posi-
tions on the safety of the proposed terminals were not based on quantita-
tive risk analyses. Statements to the effect that LEG could be transported
and stored safely at the sites under consideration were typically made
during the early rounds of discussions by an applicant/developer in seeking
approval for its preferred site. Often these statements were based only on
the judgment of the engineers employed by the utility or agency who
were knowledgeable about the operation of the planned project. For
instance, in the FRG, when requesting and receiving planning permission
(the settlement contract), the DFTG argued that there was no danger to
the public; in the UK Shell/Esso argued successfully at the public inquiry
that the safety of the plant would be ensured. These statements were
based upon "best engineering judgment", supported by the reputation and
safety record of the applicant. 7
The Cremer and Warner report, commissioned by the Scottish local
authorities to assess the safety of the proposed Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay
terminal, was carried out much in this spirit. Although safety risk was
recognized as a probabilistic phenomenon, no attempt was made to calcu-
late these figures in a quantitative manner. The chance of an event that
might lead to serious consequences was expressed in terms of low, very
low, or extremely low, and the consequences were not enumerated in
terms of, for example, lives lost. Nevertheless, the report did layout the
possible events that could lead to a spill of LEG at Mossmorran-Braefoot
Bay, and therefore provided some detailed information rather than
unqualified statements of safety. 8
As technical problem solving moves further into the political arena, the
difficulties presented by relying on principles of "best engineering judg-
ment" or "reasonable man standards" become apparent. Lave (1981)
refers to this practice as "intellectually bankrupt", and Rowe (1980) calls
it an "old boys" form of decision making. Critics of this approach point
to formal analyses, such as those discussed in Chapter 7, as an alternative.
In fact, a risk analysis is not so much an alternative to using the judgment
of experts, as a method for making this judgment open and transparent.
The experienced engineer, when asked to consider the safety of an
operation, will rely on his or her judgment of the likelihood of an accident
and the seriousness of the consequences based on his or her experience
with similar technologies or components of the technology. Unlike formal
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risk analyses, however, the cognitive processes of the expert making these
judgments are not accessible to those relying on them.
Risk judgments (the risks are low). Turning to those arguments that are
based on a risk estimate, meaning a quantitative or qualitative estimate
of the probability of an accident and its consequences, we find various
ways of introducing value judgments into the presentation of these argu-
ments. The most subtle involves the simple choice of words: statements
such as "the risks are negligible" or "the risks are high" introduce values
by the way in which these words are interpreted. For example, the WSB in
the FRG found the risks to be "non-negligible", which meant a need for
concern, whereas the SAl consultants in the US found the risks at Oxnard
to be "extremely low", meaning no need for concern.
Wherever low-probability, high-consequence events are concerned,
values are inevitably introduced into the presentation of risk figures by the
emphasis placed on either the probability of the occurrence of an event or
on its consequences. The Hooksiel Citizens' Group in the FRG argued that
the risks of the planned Wilhelmshaven terminal would be unacceptably
high due to a significant probability of shipping accidents, whereas the
regional government, as well as the Bratz Gutachten, argued that there
was no danger since the worst conceivable accident would have no serious
consequences. The Cremer and Warner risk assessment commissioned by
the local authorities in the UK considered the probability of destructive
events only and did not assess the consequences of the events. In Califor-
nia, representatives in the state legislature, in support of remote siting,
placed the emphasis on the consequences, arguing that a terminal could
not be located in an urban area where the possibility existed, no matter
how small, for a catastrophic accident. In general, we find that in the case
of low-probability, high-consequence events, those opposed to a project
tend to emphasize the potential catastrophic consequences, while those
promoting the project tend to emphasize the very low probabilities. 9
Risk comparisons (the risks are lower than . .. ). Frequently in debates on
novel technologies the estimated risks are compared with those from
natural or other technological hazards. In the US risk analyses, for
example, the reader finds the individual probability of death from the
LNG terminal being compared with the probability of being struck by
lightning or of being the victim of a tornado. Although comparisons of
this sort only provide a perspective without explicitly judging the accept-
ability of the risk, the message is that if the public is living comfortably
with the dangers from lightning, an LNG terminal might also be considered
acceptable.
A form of this revealed-preference approach to the problem can be
found in each of the LEG siting debates, but was most prominent in the
Netherlands. In the TNO study the quantitative risks estimates for
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Maasvlakte (and later for Eemshaven) were compared with other industrial
risks in the area, and the report concluded that the LNG facility would
not add significantly to the existing cumulative risk burden of the popu-
lation. This conclusion was cited by both STUNET (North Sea Island and
Terminal Steering Committee) and the City of Rotterdam authorities in
their support of the terminal. 10
It has become increasingly clear that this revealed-preference approach
to the problem may be helpful, but is not by any means sufficient, for
determining the acceptability of a large-scale technology. Many of the
concerns germane to the debate cannot be addressed by comparing the
quantified risks, in terms of the probability of an event and the associ-
ated deaths, alone. A risk cannot be fully described by the probability
of death; rather, risk is a multidimensional concept involving social,
psychological, and cultural aspects that may somehow relate to the future
of a high-technology society. These issues will be discussed further in the
next section.
Acceptable risk criteria (one in million is safe). A seemingly more straight-
forward way of justifying the acceptability or nonacceptability of a risk is
to compare it with an acceptable risk criterion, recognizing that such a
criterion is essentially arbitrary. A number frequently found in the litera-
ture (see, for instance, Keeney 1980) is an annual probability of death of
one in a million, meaning that an annual probability of death to a person
that is equivalent to or below 10-6 is acceptable, otherwise unacceptable.
This convenient figure can be traced back to an early paper by Starr
(1969) who showed that the risk to an individual from natural hazards
ranges between 10-6 and 10-7 throughout the world; hence this measure
could be taken as a de minimus level set by nature. The US Federal Drug
Administration, for example, in adopting this figure as an acceptable
lifetime probability of death to a person from a carcinogen, stated that it
was conservative in the interests of protecting human health (see Vaupel
1981b). More recently, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has also
proposed an acceptable risk level for nuclear power plants, which states
that nuclear reactors are safe enough if they add no more than two
chances in a thousand to the risk of dying from other causes (New Scien-
tist 1982).
Such a criterion was suggested only once in the case studies. The
Aberdour and Dalgety Bay Joint Action Group, which carried out a risk
analysis showing the annual probability of death to those people living in
close vicinity of the Braefoot Bay terminal to be 10-4 , suggested that an
acceptable risk criterion be set by the public authorities. The group stated
that it would consider 10-6 to be a useful and fair yardstick for this
purpose.
In sum, the interested parties supported their stands on the safety of
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the proposed LEG terminals based upon the judgment of engineers or
upon quantitative or qualitative estimates of the risks involved. In the
latter case, the risks were presented as high or low, significant or negligible,
or they were compared with those from other natural causes, with those
of other technological hazards, or with some arbitrary acceptable risk
criterion. One of the most remarkable findings of the case studies is that
in no case were the risks of the proposed terminal explicitly compared
with the benefits. Since the economist would argue that a risk-benefit
comparison is the only relevant one from a social welfare perspective, it
is thus notable that such a comparison did not constitute a legitimate
policy argument.
This appears especially puzzling to those who have witnessed policy
making in other areas involving risks, such as, for example, many decisions
in the US on highway safety, where risk-benefit calculations have played
an influential role. Yet, even in the US and the UK, where cost-benefit
calculations are a more acceptable input into policy decisions than in the
FRG or the Netherlands, we find that weighing the risks against the bene-
fits is becoming an increasingly questionable analytical practice. Such a
practice inevitably involves placing an implicit or explicit value on human
life, a procedure fraught with difficulties (Linnerooth 1975, 1979, 1982).
Rarely have reliable quantitative assessments of costs, risks, and benefits
been available, and all too frequently these factors are separated in time,
accrue to different population groups, and generally appear to be incom-
mensurable.
We concluded in the last section that the sequential nature of the
decisions to site an LEG terminal precluded the usefulness of comprehen-
sive analyses of the costs and benefits of the various alternatives. A
narrower or more targeted risk-benefit analysis, barring the analytical
difficulties of valuing lives, etc., might have presented a useful political
argument except for the uncomfortable fact that the risks would be borne
by a small group of people living near the facility and the benefits reaped
by a larger population. In contrast, for example, with highway safety
measures, the siting problem is fundamentally a problem of equity for
which risk-benefit tools are not helpful, at least in the absence of any
mechanisms for redistributing the costs and benefits.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the interested parties did not cite
the overall distribution of the risks and benefits as a political argument,
but cited only those benefits that were of direct interest to them or to
their constituencyY To the local politician the benefits of providing a
secure gas supply to the region or nation generally took second place to
the benefits of providing jobs and economic development to the local
community. The analytical challenge of finding a meaningful way to
address problems where the costs and benefits accrue to different groups
of people is taken up in Chapter 9.
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THE USES OF QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSES
The process of risk assessment is generally thought of as comprising two
separate activities: risk estimation and risk evaluation (Otway et al. 1975,
Lowrance 1976, Rowe 1977, Jennergren and Keeney 1979). Risk esti-
mation is concerned with identifying the various possible negative conse-
quences of a project or activity and assigning probabilities to those conse-
quences. This activity is usually viewed as the scientific, fact-finding part
of risk assessment. Quantitative risk analyses (QRAs), such as those dis-
cussed in Chapter 7, are meant to contribute to this activity, without
bringing in value judgments on the part of the analyst concerning the
acceptability of the estimated risks. Risk evaluation, which examines
whether the risks are in some sense "acceptable", is usually viewed as the
subjective, value-laden part of risk assessment. In the previous section we
examined how the various parties evaluated the risks in justifying their
respective stands on the proposed sites. In this section we will take a step
back and examine the uses made of quantitative risk analyses in estimating
these risks.
Table 8.2. Overview of the major risk analyses.
us (Oxnard) Netherlands
SAl SES FPC TNO
Prepared Applicant City Coundl Federal Ministry of Social
for Commission Affairs
Prepared by Private consultant Private consultant In-house Government-sponsored
research institute
Timing Round A Round A Round A Round A
(policy and (policy and (policy and (policy and screening)
approval) approval) approval)
Use Support applicant Inform City Council Support staff Infonn cabinet mem-
stand at hearing stand at hearing bers and other parties
Scope Vessel, transfer, Vessel, transfer, Only ship acci- Vessel, transfer, and
and storage and storage dents considered storage
relevant
Methodology Event and fault Composite of several Fault tree; Event tree; quantitative
and format tree; quantitative studies; worst-case quantitative probabilities
probabilities scenarios probabilities
Conclusion ... risks ... are It is not now possible ... risks ... are Societal and individual
extremely low to state that [it] poses negligible ... an risk is low compared to
a low probability of a acceptable risk to other man-made risks
high-consequence event. the public
Influence FPC persuaded Increased opposition FPC persuaded to Cabinet persuaded that
to approve approve both sites present
acceptable risks
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The widespread use of QRAs began in the US and their popularity is
spreading to many European countries. Mazur (1980) traces the roots
back to the development of systems analytical techniques, especially
operations research and cost-benefit analysis during and directly after
World War II. In the US, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
required all federally funded projects to be justified by environmental
impact statements in which the various benefits and costs should be set
out, preferably in quantitative form. With the emergence of the nuclear
power controversy, the nuclear industry produced the Rasmussen Report
(NRC 1975), which emphasized, in the spirit of an earlier article by Starr
(1969), that nuclear power presented very small - and acceptable -
safety risks to the public. Given the lack of historical data on reactor
accidents,12 this study was based on hypothetical estimates in the form
of fault tree or event tree analysis. This technique has served as the model
for many subsequent risk analyses of the reliability of technologies for
which no historical data exist.
Who commissions and who produces risk analyses? As can be seen in
Table 8.2, which shows the major risk analyses that entered the siting
debates in the four countries, the answer to this question is seen to
Table 8.2. (continued)
UK
Cremer and Warner
Local authorities
Private consultants
Round A (approval)
Evidence at public inquiry
Vessel, transfer, and
storage
Qualitative probabilities;
no estimation of fatalities
No reason to doubt that
the installation can be
built and operated in such
a manner as to be accept-
able in terms of commu-
nity safety
Secretary of State for
Scotland convinced of
safety
Action Group
Members of Action
Group
Private consultant
Round C (approval)
Prepared too late
for official use
Primarily jet ty
operations
Historical data and
quantitative
probabilities
Individual risk is high
compared to other
man-made risks
Reinforced Action
Group's view that
risks were unaccep-
table
FRG
Bratz
Federal Shipping Board
(WSB)
Certified expert
Round C (approval)
Advise WSB
Vessel, transfer, and
storage
Qualitative probabilities;
no estimation of
fatalities
With regard to the conse-
quences aad their prob-
abilities, there is no
danger, bearing in mind
the relevant laws
Did not fUlly persuade the
WSB of facility safety
Krappinger
Federal shipping
Board (WSB)
Certified expert
Round C (approval)
Advise WSB
Vessel, transfer, and
storage
Historical data and
computer model;
quantitative prob-
abilities
Probabilities of
shipping accidents
estimated
Informed WSB of
probability of
shipping accidents -
considered high
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differ in each case study. In the UK and the US, local authorities and
interest groups reach into their pockets to pay private consultants for
expert advice. In stark contrast to the number of reports produced in the
US and the UK, the Netherlands appears to show a greater trust in expert
authority; only one major risk analysis was carried out for Maasvlakte and
Eemshaven by a government-supported research institute. This report was
read, and frequently referred to, by nearly all the parties in the Dutch
sitmg process. Still another style of recruiting expert advice can be found
in the FRG, where traditional trust in scientific expertise is illustrated by
the practice of commissioning certified experts to estimate the risks.
At what stage in the siting procedures were these risk analyses commis-
sioned? The timing of the analyses varied significantly in the four coun-
tries. Only in the Netherlands was a quantitative risk assessment carried
out during the screening procedures before a definite site had been identi-
fied and submitted to the relevant authorities for approval. In contrast, in
Scotland only a generic, qualitative report (Cremer and Warner 1977) was
submitted as evidence at the public inquiry. As another example, the
report prepared by the UK Action Group was not given publicly acknowl-
edged scrutiny by the statutory authorities since it was prepared after the
pUblic inquiry and was thus rendered inappropriate by statutory proce-
dures.
Why were the risk analyses produced in the US and the Netherlands more
quantitative than those produced in the UK and the FRO? The qualitative
approach taken by Cremer and Warner in the UK was explained above as
resulting from the nonavailability of detailed plans of the facility. A
second contributing factor is, no doubt, the changing philosophy in the
UK. In the past, decisions on plant safety have been left to the engineers
or technicians responsible. Only recently have the statutory authorities
required detailed, quantitative evidence of the reliability of technological
systems.
In the FRG, the job of the regulatory agencies is to ensure that facilities
meet the legally required standards for fire resistance, construction reli-
ability, and so on. Certified experts are often asked to prepare reports that
address these legal questions. It was somewhat unusual for the federal
WSB to become concerned that the facility not only complied with
existing safety regulations, but also that it did not pose the potential for a
large-scale accident, especially through the synergistic possibilities presen-
ted by neighboring industrial facilities, and that it did not present a
serious threat to the lives of local residents. The WSB, however, was not
interested in the probability of a local citizen dying per se, and thus
requested that Bratz carry out a qualitative assessment of the likelihood
of events (in terms of low, very low, etc.) that might lead to a catastrophic
accident.
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Several other factors contributed to the lack of a comprehensive, quan-
titative analysis of the risks of the LNG terminal at Wilhelmshaven. First,
responsibility for public safety is spread over a number of federal, state,
and local agencies. The WSB was concerned with the risks from LNG ship-
ping operations in Jade Bay, and this part of the problem was extensively
analyzed. In contrast, somewhat less attention was paid to the possibility
of a storage tank rupture, as a result of which a vapor cloud could threaten
the population living near the site. One reason for this was that the WSB
had access to the TNO report prepared for the Maasvlakte terminal, which
showed that the risks from the shipping operations in Rotterdam harbor
would be significantly more serious than risks posed by the land-based
storage tanks. This result appeared to be true, as well, for the FRG.
Secondly, in the atmosphere of strong enthusiasm on the part of
Wilhelmshaven authorities for the economic development of the area,
there was little motivation for the city or the state authorities to take an
independent and critical look at the plans and prepare a comprehensive
risk analysis. This can be compared to the more skeptical atmosphere
surrounding the deliberation of a site at Maasvlakte, which was economi-
cally more secure, and more concerned about the potentially adverse
environmental consequences. Finally, in contrast with Mossmorran-
Braefoot Bay and Point Conception, there was no strong interest group in
Wilhelmshaven with sufficient funds to carry out its own risk analysis.
For what purposes were the risk analyses used? In answering this
question, unlike those asked above, we find a great deal of similarity in
the four countries studied. Risk analyses were frequently commissioned to
support a party's position on the safety of the terminal. In the US, for
example, the utility commissioned the SAl report in support of its position
to the FPC that the terminal could be safely operated at Oxnard. As a
second example, in the UK, the Cremer and Warner report was submitted
by the local authorities to the public inquiry as evidence that the facility
would be acceptably safe.
Majone (1984) draws the distinction between prospective (or pre-
decision) analysis and retrospective (or post-decision) analysis, emphasiz-
ing that policy makers need the latter just as much as the former. In our
case studies we find that often analyses played a dual role: for example,
the report prepared by SES for the Oxnard City Council was used first to
advise the council members and eventually to justify their positions to
their constituency. The same dual role was played by the TNO analysis in
the Netherlands, and by the Bratz and Krappinger reports in the FRG.
Analyses are thus conducted for multiple purposes and for multiple
audiences, but are almost always intended ultimately to persuade these
who are responsible for setting the relevant policy. Majone (1978, p213)
thus sees a role for the analyst as "a producer of policy arguments ...
more similar to a lawyer ... than to a problem solver." Others, however,
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view the use of the analyst's expertise as a political weapon in the
adversarial process as a misuse of this expertise (see, for example, Behn
1979).13
When risk analyses are commissioned for the purpose of strengthening
and justifying the client's case (and this appears to be more the rule than
the exception) it is hardly surprising that they are written in such a way as
to be as persuasive as possible. From Chapter 7, we find that assumptions
are hidden, the uncertainties are not calculated, the data are carefully
chosen, and presentation formats are constructed to direct the reader's
attention to one aspect or another of the safety of the operation. In this
way, the values of the client or analyst may enter into the estimates of the
risks, clouding the distinction between risk estimation and risk evaluation.
Who reviews the analyses? A disturbing finding of the case studies is
that there did not exist a fully adequate review procedure in any country.
This does not mean, however, that the analyses were not reviewed. In the
US there was an important redundancy of effort that exposed many, but
by no means all, of the shortcomings of the analyses. In the Netherlands,
a form of review was ensured by the fact that the one major analysis was
read by nearly all the interested parties, yet not all of these were qualified
to review the report critically. In the UK, the opposition groups had
access to the risk analysis commissioned by the local authorities before
the public inquiry, yet it is difficult for such a group to hire expensive
consultants to review such reports. However, objector groups did play an
important, and sometimes critical, role in exposing possible weakness in
the terminal and operations. In the FRG, the analyses were reviewed by
the staff of the government agency that commissioned the reports, but
since the reports were generally not distributed, the adequacy of this
procedure depended heavily on the existence of a qualified staff. More-
over, the staff may have little motivation to assess critically the merits
of outside expertise that has been commissioned for the purpose of sup-
porting an agency policy. Procedural reforms aimed at ensuring that
scientific analyses receive an adequate review are suggested in Chapter 9.
USEFULNESS OF QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSES
Now that we have examined the uses made of quantitative risk analyses,
we can turn to examining their usefulness. Do risk analyses make things
safer, make people feel that things are safer, make people feel confident
that their institutions are providing for the public safety, or improve
the quality of political debate? Alternatively, do risk analyses contribute
little to improving engineering design, fog discussions on safety in mathe-
matical complexity, provide only a pretense of factual knowledge, or
simply address the wrong questions? As risk analyses increase in number,
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these questions are becoming more and more subject to debate (see, for
instance, Conrad 1982). In what follows we review first the supporting
case and then the case opposing the use of quantitative risk analyses,
drawing upon experiences found in the case studies. We then draw some
tentative conclusions in the final section regarding the usefulness of
quantitative risk analyses for addressing the issues of the safety of large-
scale technologies.
The supporting case
Many analysts have argued that risk analyses, if applied with common
sense, a sound knowledge of the technology, and a recognition of the
inherent uncertainties involved, can be valuable and useful tools (Farmer
1976, Ramsay 1981, Drake and Kalelkar 1981, Stoto 1982). An intelli-
gent analysis may reveal inadequacies in the design of a technology, may
make the decisions affecting public safety more open and the public
officials more accessible, and may provide the basis for more informed
debate.
The use of fault or event tree analyses requires a detailed listing of the
possible accident chains. Even if probabilities are not assigned, this
exercise may expose a non-intuitive chain of events that could lead to an
accident. Whether or not this information changes the analyst's view or
judgment of the overall safety of the technology, it may help to identify
the kinds of failures most likely to occur and to indicate options for
reducing the risks. Some design problems may then be eliminated early in
the planning process.
This preventive value of a QRA was illustrated by the FRG shipping
authority's (WSB) use of the TNO risk study (prepared in the Netherlands
for the Maasvlakte terminal) in identifying shipping accidents as a particu-
larly weak point in the reliability of the operation, and their eventual
decision to change the configuration of the deep-water shipping channel.
Getting the design right on the first try is clearly commendable, though
Flint (1981) observes that relatively few reported failures are the result
of oversights in design; rather, most are the result of human error.
A risk analysis may serve a different, more modest role in helping
planners gain a general picture of the risks involved, as expressed by
Robert Vincent, from Gaz de France:
For our risk analysis, our engineers simply adapted figures from other analyses done
for the oil industry, although these figures could not apply to the kind of equip-
ment we use for LNG. But we did use the results of our risk analysis. A figure such
as 10- 15 means perhaps 10-10 or 10-18 , and it means that the risk is actually very
remote and not to be compared to value of 10-5 • This seems to be a good way to
detect the weakest points of the system under study. We use risk analysis rather for
this purpose than as a means to demonstrate that there is no risk or that there is
only remote risk. (KLS 1982, unpublished draft)
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One of the important functions of a QRA is to provide written docu-
mentation of the range of considerations underlying safety judgments,
including the assumptions, the available data, and the "best guesses" of
the experts. A risk analysis thus provides information to those who have
access to the report and may result in more accountable public decisions.
Such information is called for, since judgments by experts are becoming
increasingly regarded as an unsatisfactory way of deciding upon the
acceptability of large-scale technologies. According to O'Riordan (1981):
Risk assessment becomes not just a device for seeking to alter the balance of
political power, but also a means for reforming the nature of governmental secrecy,
and agency accountability. Neither of these two vital functions will be altered
rapidly or easily in any political democracy for many traditions and cherished
positions are at stake. But the battle is on and the way in which risk assessments are
used especially by the ecocentrists, is already proving an important strategic
weapon in this quest for change.
In the Scottish case a comprehensive risk analysis prepared by the local
authorities early in the proceedings may have made the procedure appear
more accountable to the Action Group. However, Macgill and Snowball
(1982) speculate that such increased accountability may not have an
effect on decision outcomes or on the safety of a given plant; rather, the
public relations value of a risk analysis, if adequately undertaken, may be
more relevant. The Health and Safety Executive is responding to obser-
vations of this sort by making available more information to the public,
though commercial confidentiality may inhibit the release, in full, of some
of the material (Barrell, in KLS 1982, p320).
Where there are varying opinons within the expert community concern-
ing the reliability of safety systems, a QRA might shed some light on the
source of the conflict. For example, a source of conflict revealed by the
QRAs carried out in the countries under study concerned the maximum
downwind distance a flammable vapor cloud could travel following an
instantaneous spill of LNG. These estimates, which mayor may not have
been crucial in assessing the danger to neighboring population centers,
ranged from 2.3 km (Bratz, FRG) to 27 km (FERC, US) under differing
atmospheric conditions. Since the physical properties of vapor cloud dis-
persion are not well understood, these differences cannot be resolved with
the present state of scientific knowledge.
Information of this sort can be used in a number of ways. Industry and
regulatory agencies might initiate further experiments to clarify the
unknowns, as did the US Department of Energy in funding experiments
on large spills of LNG. In those controversies where there are active
opposition groups, this type of information might promote a more con-
structive dialogue between the public and experts focusing on the assump-
tions and data. In some cases, opposition groups might contribute to
understanding the safety of the technology by carrying out their own
independent studies, such as was done by concerned residents in the
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vicinity of Point Conception (the Hollister and Bixby Ranch Associations),
and at Aberdour and Dalgety Bay.
The opposing case
The case that risk analyses, or analyses in general, contribute to reducing
political conflicts is by no means proven. Mulkay (1979) reports on
several studies (e.g. Nelkin's study of the Cayuga Lake controversy, 1971,
1975) investigating the uses made of scientific knowledge in the course of
political debate. The main conclusion of these studies is that scientific
knowledge contributes little to reducing the conflicts, but rather it
becomes a resource that can be used to promote political aims. As we have
seen in the case studies, opposing parties in disputes involving technical
issues can generally obtain analyses from reputable scientists to support
their positions. By now it is clear why this is possible - an analysis can be
swayed in many directions by the simple choice of assumptions and the
wording of the results.
In comparing the risk analyses of the four countries (see Chapter 7),
one is struck by the large discrepancies in the results. This is especially
apparent in the case of Oxnard, where several QRAs were carried out for
the same site (see Table 8.2). The SES report concluded that "it is not
now possible to state that [the facility] poses a low probability of a high
consequence event." This is a markedly different conclusion from those of
both the SAl and FPC reports, which found the risks to be "extremely
low" and "negligible" respectively. The SAl study estimated the risks in
terms of the probability of an individual death to be in the range of 10-7
to 10-10 , compared with the SES report where the results ranged from
10-4 to 10-7 •
Critics of formal risk analyses are quick to point out that the results are
not objective, that different analysts will inevitably produce different
results. It is apparent from the nature of the problem that there are many
competent and respectable ways of estimating risks. No one set of assump-
tions is best, no analysis can be complete, and no assessments are "free"
of judgment. Analysis is a social process influenced by human feelings,
values, and beliefs (Meltsner 1980, Mazur 1980).
Although several authors have discussed the possible "pitfalls" of
analysis (see, for example, Quade 1975, Majone 1980), whereby values on
the part of the analyst color his or her methodologies and results and
whereby heuristics introduce biases into his or her work, Brian Wynne
(1982, p127) suggests that these biases be recognized as part and parcel of
science, and not lapses from rational scientific analysis.
There is a pervasive myth about the nature of science which supports this false
approach to the question of "analytic bias". The tendency in the literature is to
regard bias or mistakes as individual and isolated in origin, which suggests that ideal
objective scientific knowledge can be attained in professional practice and as an
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input to policy issues .... This gives a fundamentally misleading and politically
damaging picture of the role of expertise ....
The myth of scientific objectivity, especially where the policy sciences
are concerned, has led to a dual perspective on risk analyses. On the one
hand, because they are quantitative they appear to be factual or objec-
tive. On the other hand, the large uncertainties involved necessarily push
the evidence out of the realm of facts and into the realm of what Weinberg
(1972) has called "trans-science". This dual nature of a formal risk study
has fogged discussions of its role in the policy process. The numbers
produced by a risk analysis are not exact or "hard". They incorporate a
number of judgments, but as has been pointed out by Ravetz, hardly
anyone in our culture is capable of handling inexact quantities or "soft"
numbers (see KLS 1982, p402).
Recognizing that the estimates produced by risk analyses cannot be
fully objective, critics of risk analyses object further that the probabilistic
results themselves are open to a number of sometimes contradictory
interpretations (see Vaupel 1982a). It was noted above that in the case of
low-probability, high-consequence events, objectors to a project frequently
highlight the consequences and promoters highlight the probabilities. In
no controversy was this more clearly seen than in Oxnard. The SAl report
(commissioned by the utility) reported the results in terms of the prob-
abilities of individual fatality or catastrophic consequences and com-
pared these probabilities with those from other man-made or natural
disasters. Since these probabilities were generally higher than those calcu-
lated for nuclear power plants (NRC 1975) the authors of the report were
careful not to include this comparison. 14 Alternatively, the SES report
(commissioned by Oxnard City Council) presented vapor cloud/population
risk scenarios, which graphically illustrated a deadly methane cloud cover-
ing parts of Oxnard, with no accompanying probabilities. Whereas the SAl
report persuaded the federal authorities to approve the Oxnard site, the
SES report had the opposite effect, and was influential in persuading the
state legislators to rule out Oxnard as a possible site through the remote-
siting provision of the LNG Terminal Siting Act.
In the Netherlands, we find an example of a single report taking on
different meanings according to the purpose for which it was used. The
TNO risk analysis supported the arguments of those promoting the
Maasvlakte site, namely, that the terminal would not add significantly to
the cumulative risk burden of the local residents. The analysis was also
used to support the case made by the Rijnmond Public Authority, that
the proposed terminal would increase the safety risks to the local popu-
lation. Most of the discussions by the local authorities focused not on the
likelihood of an accident, but on its possible consequences, the worst of
which could be over 17 000 deaths in the Rotterdam area. Because the
TNO report contained evidence to support the case of the proposers as
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well as those questioning the project, there was little need for any party to
prepare a counter-expertise.
This ambiguity in the results of risk analyses is also observed by
O'Riordan (1981, p160) who notes "the curious spectacle of not only the
'doomsday' extremists but also the 'hard-economic facts' school of devel-
opers both using the same objective risk analysis data to prove their
cases ... " To some extent, all scientific knowledge takes on a meaning
relevant to its social context (Conrad 1982), but Johnston (1980) argues
further that risk research is an immature science, or one in which there is
little consensus over fruitful lines of inquiry or even competent research.
When an immature science is relied upon to solve a practical problem,
there is a tendency for the outcome to establish the conclusion that its
sponsors wanted. Yet, according to Jerry Ravetz, the science of risk analy-
sis is maturing:
Of course, in the earlier period when the theme was being developed in a totally
undisciplined way without a lot of collegial criticism, people simply got some
accident statistics together and put exponents on numbers. Then it was a game that
anyone could play, and any number could have been used .... I think today ...
we don't play that game any more .... It is now used as part of a negotiation
rather than as part of propaganda campaigns. You can still disagree. You can still
use it to mystify if you can get away with it. But it is no longer simply a case of
valium from him and amphetamine from him. The thing is maturer; it has changed
character. (KLS 1982, p404)
Ravetz is referring here to what Reijnders (1982) has termed "valium"
and "amphetamine" analyses to reflect the resourcefulness of the analyst
in painting radically opposing pictures with the available data. This is
nicely illustrated with an example by Vaupel et al. (1982, p5), which
shows that it is possible not only to lie with statistics but also to insinuate
with statistics:
The highest estimate of the probability of a major accident at the proposed LNG
site at Point Conception, California, was that there was one chance in 10-4 that 10
or more people would die. Someone who wanted to make this risk look small might
claim that the risk is the same as the risk of one death every thousand years. On the
other hand, someone who wanted to heighten the risk might proceed as follows.
The analyst who made the estimate of 1 chance in 10000 per year of 10 deaths or
more was unsure about this estimate - he thought that there was about 1 chance in
100 that the true value could be as great as 1 chance in 100. In ten years a risk of
1 percent per year accumulates to about 10 percent, and 10 percent might be called
a "significant chance". The loss of 10 deaths or more was defined in the risk analysis
report as a "disaster", so the headline could read: "Analyst says that it is possible
that there is a significant chance of a disaster at Point Conception in the next
decade".
Indeed, insinuation is nearly impossible to avoid because nearly all policy-
relevant statistics take on somewhat different value colorings and import
various policy thrusts depending on how they are expressed and how they
are placed in context (Vaupel 1982a).
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Despite the open-ended possibilities for interpretation, risk analysis
often has the appeal of presenting a rational approach to public decision
making (Moss and Lubin 1980). The precise numerical results may provide
comfort by concealing the inherent and fundamental uncertainties, such
as those reflected in the millionfold difference between risk estimates for
saccharin and the Inhaber-Holdren debate (lnhaber 1979, Holdren et al.
1979) concerning the risks of nuclear power plants. This concern was
expressed recently in a report surveying the way in which risk analyses are
prepared by the US National Research Council:
Science is strongly biased towards numbers, for when numbers can be justly
employed they denote authority and a precise understanding of relationships.
Because this is so, there is an equally important responsibility not to use numbers,
which convey the impression of precision, when the understanding of relationships
is indeed less secure. Thus while quantitative risk assessment facilitates comparison,
such comparison may be illusory or misleading if the use of precise numbers is
unjustified. (NRC Governing Board Committee on the Assessment of Risk 1981,
p15)
As was pointed out in Chapter 7, LEG risk analyses are not immune to
this criticism. For example, the probability of a spill resulting from a
vessel accident at Point Conception was estimated by SAl as 9.9 x 10- 7
and by ADL as 8.1 x 10-3 , without any accompanying discussion on the
part of either report on the confidence intervals or uncertainties involved.
Another telling example is found in the SAl report prepared for the utility,
which reported the probability of a catastrophic accident at Oxnard to be
10-57 , or one chance in 710 septendecillion of a maximum catastrophe of
113000 fatalities! It is difficult to imagine such a low probability, espe-
cially as it was expressed as a point estimate with no mention of its confi-
dence interval. Yet this figure was quoted by the Federal Power Commis-
sion (FPC 1976) in justfying its support of the Oxnard site. 15
A danger of client-oriented research is that those commissioning the
analyses may be reluctant to fund research that is likely to uncover new
uncertainties that they feel will only further complicate the decisions at
hand. The clients may search for and reward experts who are willing to
present precise and unqualified estimates of the risks, where the case is
fairly secure. Or they may encourage the analysts to adopt the most
conservative or worst-case assumptions, a practice that has been criticized
by Raiffa (1980). As Stoto (1982) points out, analysts have an easier time
justifying results that their clients want. Presenting the results in an over-
confident way is particularly worrying since the uncertainties involved
may be of more concern than the exact estimates of the risks. In Holling's
view (1981b, pI), "The real questions are how to regulate and predict and
how to live within the limits that our ignorance places on each."
Possibly the most damaging critique leveled at those carrying out
risk analyses is that the problem of reaching a consensus between conflict-
ing interests in society, e.g., over the location of a large-scale and novel
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technology, cannot be solved, or even helped, by expert calculations of
the safety risks. The analyses are simply addressing the wrong problem.
By defining risk as some combination of probability and physical conse-
quences (usually lives lost), other social concerns about the technology,
for which risk may only be a surrogate, are ignored. In other words, risk
may only be a symbol for the fears and anxieties that the public may
have concerning the technology. These fears are not adequately captured
by the "body count" figures found in risk analyses.
The psychologist views these fears in terms of the perceptions of the
public regarding the seriousness of a risk. Much research suggests that
people are sensitive to many dimensions or characteristics of a risky activ-
ity as well as the probability of death (see especially Lichtenstein et at.
1978, Slovic et at. 1979, 1983, Fischoff et at. 1981a, Otway and von
Winterfeldt 1981, Stallen 1981, Clark University Hazard Assessment
Group and Decision Research 1982, Humphreys 1982). For example,
whether the risk is voluntary or involuntary, whether there are potentially
catastrophic consequences, whether the person has control over the out-
come, whether the risk is observable, novel, equitably distributed, and so
forth, are all relevant to how serious an individual perceives the risk to be.
Stallen and Tomas (1981, p39) conclude that "there is no (psycho-)logic
according to which people's assessment of technological safety is propor-
tionally related to (or can be predicted from) observed relative frequencies
or statistically calculated probabilities of negative consequences of the
technology concerned."
Alternatively, the sociologist does not see the problem of personal risk
assessment as depending so crucially on the perceptions of the seriousness
of risk, but rather on social and political values, including plans for the
future of society, the evaluation of political decision-making processes,
the credibility of institutions, and communication of information
(Nowotny 1982). According to Otway and von Winterfeldt (1981) risk
has become so topical in today's debates about the acceptability of
technologies that the complex problem of social acceptability is too
often reduced to a mathematical problem of defining and measuring risk.
If opposition to LEG terminals is grounded in these vague misgivings
about the future of technological society, the decision procedures in the
four case studies discourage debate on this basis. The reason lies in the
necessity, which is true to varying extents in the countries studied, to
justify arguments on scientific (often interpreted as quantitative) grounds.
A review of the arguments brought to the debate show that the majority,
including the need for natural gas, the jobs created, and the economic
benefits, are in some sense quantifiable.
Still another school of thought, developed by the anthropologists,
explains problems of technology and technological risk as embedded in
the different cultural biases (or political cultures) that make up society.
Douglas (1972, 1978a), for instance, sees pollution or risks as threaten-
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ing to some because the pollution or risk intrudes upon their standard
of "purity". Rules against pollution or risk can only be understood as
a defense of a specific "moral" order, or some state of society that
is deemed worth preserving. Thompson (1980a, b, 1981) has developed
these ideas into a cultural theory of risk, which he explains in the Post-
script to this book. According to Thompson, the individual is not an
isolated entity, but a social being, and how she or he interprets and
behaves toward technological risks is shaped by this social context. He
develops five cultural categories depending on the extent to which a
person is bounded by social groups and the extent to which he or she is
subject to socially imposed prescriptions. Although Stephen Cotgrove
(1981) speaks of only two alternative paradigms to which an individual
adheres, his interpretation of technological conflicts fits nicely with that
of Thompson. Interpreting the nuclear debate, Cotgrove remarks:
What is rational and reasonable from one perspective is irrational from another. If
the goal is maximizing output, then nuclear risks are not only justified but it would
be unreasonable not to take them. From another perspective, from the viewpoint of
a quite different set of beliefs about how the world works, and quite different aims
for some kind of more convivial society, to take even the possibly small, but in
practice incalculable, risks for future generations stimulates a moral indignation
which justifies unorthodox political action that crosses the threshold of legality.
(p128)
It is this second paradigm that Ronge (1982) sees as threatening the
very core of society in the FRG, as well as other countries that are
experiencing a social movement referred to as "alternative culture". In
this environment, Ronge doubts whether risk analyses commissioned by
traditional political institutions can be helpful. "Risk researchers are
players - and victims -- of a game which is fundamentally opposed by the
new social movements".
A remarkable aspect of the LEG debates recorded in the case studies is
the conspicuous absence of this "alternative culture", especially the
cultural category that Thompson refers to as the sectist, who is strongly
bounded to social groups but relatively free from socially imposed pre-
scriptions. The absence of sectist groups, such as the Friends of the
Earth 16 can in part be explained by the type of risk presented by LEG.
There is evidence in the case studies that LEG risks are not perceived to be
as serious as those from nuclear power. Indeed, in the Netherlands, one
argument that proved persuasive in dampening environmentalist objections
to a Maasvlakte site was that if an LNG terminal was approved, this would
preclude any possible future siting of a nuclear power plant in the area.
Individual risks from an LNG terminal as estimated by the TNO report
were, however, higher than the individual risks from nuclear power esti-
mated by the Rasmussen Report (NRC 1975). If LEG does not arouse the
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same moral indignation as nuclear power, this explains to some extent
why the LEG controversies remained relatively low-key.
In sum, the psychologist, among others, sees individuals reacting to
risks along a multidimensional scale of the characteristics of that risk,
whereas the sociologist and anthropologist, again among others, see risk in
its broader political and cultural context. Jungermann et al. (1982)
describe the development of two "camps" of disciplines engaged in risk
research. One camp views the technical issues of risk analysis as side issues
that cover up value and cultural differences underlying technological
debates. The other camp agrees that this is true for some technological
issues, especially nuclear power, but that there exist smaller-scale problems
for which the technical questions are more relevant. The first camp is
skeptical of analytical methods that may circumvent the political process,
whereas the second camp believes that analysis is merely an aid to these
political processes and that analysis can enhance communication between
conflicting groups and increase the transparency and accountability of
political decision processes. 17
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Notwithstanding the merits of detailed, quantitative risk analyses for
improving the design of a hazardous technology, the usefulness of these
analyses for resolving the questions of whether or where to put the tech-
nology is somewhat less clear. The evidence found in the case studies
suggests that technical risk analyses contribute little to building a con-
sensus concerning the safety of a proposed LEG terminal. The results of
these studies, though generally presented in an overconfident manner,
were nonetheless susceptible to conflicting interpretations. There was thus
a tendency for an analysis (or analyses) to polarize further the political
controversy.
In response to the apparent deficiencies in the "science" of risk analysis,
a bill (HP8303, the Risk Analysis Research and Demonstration Bill) has
been introduced into the US Congress to establish a program for improv-
ing and facilitating the use of risk analysis. Where science cannot provide
answers, the only recourse, as evidenced by this proposed legislation,
appears to be to improve the science. But a risk analysis, no matter how
sophisticated the methodology becomes, cannot provide unambiguous
estimates of the risks involved; the numbers will remain speculative. Nor
will such analyses be able to shed light on the value-laden question of
whether the risks involved are acceptable. According to Moss and Lubin
(1980, p29):
We can't turn back the clock of political mood. We can't tell legislative bodies that
they will have to wait for better science, or better risk assessment methodology, or
better risk-balancing institutions (mechanisms) to develop from the better science.
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On the other hand, we can't pretend that we are dealing with a fully developed
technology, ready to be plugged into whatever problem society comes up with.
If the answer does not lie in improving the science, it may lie in improv-
ing the procedures by which these decisions are made. We must carefully
examine the use of scientific expertise, with its inherent uncertainties, in
policy processes that are ill equipped to cope with these uncertainties.
Without discrediting the analyst's role as a policy advocate, we must ask
what changes are needed in our institutions to encourage a more honest
reporting of the limits of analytical expertise.
We must also recognize that conflicts over the future of technological
society cannot be resolved by the scientists alone. Yet, there is hope that
analysts can contribute usefully to resolving complex public policy issues
such as LEG siting decisions. In addition to providing the necessary tech-
nical expertise, a new and promising role for the analyst lies in the area
of conflict mediation. This, and other prescriptive measures for improving
the siting process will be taken up in Chapter 9.
NOTES
1. An accompanying chapter of the SES report did present the risks of
the terminal in terms of individual probability of death.
2. The Los Angeles harbor was also economically depressed but was
found to be too risky by the national government. Los Angeles City
Council, however, voted in favor of the terminal.
3. The rounds recorded in the case studies generally commence at that
point in time when the question of siting an LEG terminal gains
status as an issue on the political agenda. The term agenda here can
be thought of as a set of questions or controversies that are viewed as
falling within the range of concerns meriting the attention of the
political authorities (see Cobb and Elder 1972). In both the FRG and
the UK, the site screening and site selection stages were primarily of
internal concern to the utility (Ruhrgas-Gelsenberg and Shell/Esso).
Shell/Esso consulted informally with local, regional, and even nation-
al authorities before lodging a planning application, but, in the
UK "the onus of site selection rests firmly with the applicant." (see
Chapter 5). The energy policy questions in the FRG and the UK
were, for the most part, considered resolved by all parties to the
debate; the need to import LNG to the FRG and the desirability of
exploiting North Sea oil in the UK were settled in rounds of dis-
cussions preceding the LEG siting issue.
4. For example, in the US, the applicant originally stressed the risk of
an interruption in the supply of natural gas as a major reason for
importing LNG to three separate sites. During the course of the
decision process, the three sites were reduced to one, and the number
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of storage tanks at that site were reduced from four to two. Because
of this concentration in one small area, and the possibility of routine
closures or nondelivery due to bad weather conditions, the net result
of the sequential decision process was that a project originally meant
to decrease that risk was shaped over time into a project that may
increase supply interruption risk.
5. In the US the policy question to import LNG was resolved by the
state legislature independently of whether an acceptable site could be
identified. This was also the case in the Netherlands, where an official
government policy paper on the need to import LNG preceded the
site negotiations.
6. Of course, with more national or regional planning some of the
sequential decisions listed could be exogenous to the question of
siting a particular plant. As Norbert Dall from the Sierra Club points
out, more state planning (as envisaged by the California Coastal Plans
and San Francisco Bay Area industrial siting plan) may be a practical
alternative to difficult case-by-case decision making (1982, personal
communication). However, an IIASA case study carried out for the
selection of a gas pipeline route in the USSR (Mechitov 1982) shows
that a similar sequential apparatus exists in this centrally planned
economy.
7. In neither the FRG nor the UK, however, was this approval final;
rather, it was conditional on the eventual scrutiny by national
authorities - the WSB in the FRG and the Health and Safety Execu-
tive in the UK.
8. As noted above, the lack of rigor on the part of the analysts can be
attributed to the fact that they did not have access to detailed plans
that would be made available at a later stage along with a complete
safety audit.
9. Mary Douglas (1982, personal communication) has suggested that a
third characteristic of debates of this sort is the tendency for the
opposition to focus on the adequacy of the decision procedures.
10. The cabinet decision in favor of Eemshaven, however, did not make
any statements on the comparability of the risk in support is its
argument that the risks at Eemshaven were acceptable. In fact, the
cabinet did not justify its argument of "acceptable risk" in an
explicit manner.
11. O'Riordan (1981) argues that much of environmental impact analysis
(EIA) in the context of energy developments has become institution-
alized, even ritualized, without fundamentally altering the decisions
of energy policy makers. He suggests, further, that one motivation
or the promotion of QRAs over EIAs was that the dangers to human
health were viewed as a more powerful argument than the dangers to
the natural environment.
12. Even when limited experience does exist, Fairley (1981) has pointed
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out that data of zero occurrences of a catastrophe is of cold comfort
in ruling out a catastrophic event.
13. Vaupel (1981), in discussing procedures for setting environmental
standards, draws a crucial distinction between the risk evaluation
processes that produce health, safety, and environmental standards,
and the risk evaluation justifications that are used to explain, defend,
and advocate the resulting standards (p95).
14. Although the SAl report adopted the other comparison reported in
the Rasmussen Report (NRC 1975).
15. An exception to this failure to address uncertainty is found in the
SES risk analysis, which, by referring to the range of estimates in
other reports, explicitly dealt with the inherent uncertainties.
16. The Friends of the Earth were not, however, absent from other con-
troversies involving LEG. The controversial Staten Island terminal
was the basis for some activity. See, for example, the highly critical
book on this subect by R.N. Davis (Frozen Fire, 1979) published by
the FoE.
17. Despite these differences, a broad-ranging research program including
researchers from these two perspectives has been undertaken at the
International Institute for Environment and Society, Science Center,
Berlin.
Chapter 9
Improving the Siting Process*
The descriptive material presented on the four case studies illustrates how
different interested parties form strategies and present arguments to
defend their positions regarding the siting of technological facilites. This
chapter has a prescriptive flavor by focusing on ways to improve both the
decision process and the resulting outcomes.
In Chapter 1 we noted that there are two broad objectives that guide
final choices: the welfare and distributional objectives. Each party will
have a different view of the relative importance of these two objectives
because each sees the problem from its own special vantage point. Poten-
tial conflicts emerge for this reason; the institutional procedures in each
country determine if and how these differences are settled for any given
problem.
To illustrate why these conflicts are likely to emerge, first consider the
welfare objective. The applicant may argue that a new LEG facility can be
justified from the point of view of societal well-being, in that it promises
to spur regional development in an area, and will increase the security of
future energy supplies in a cost-effective manner when compared to other
options. The applicant's criteria for justifying the final decision are likely
to be primarily economic, with the provision that the facility meets speci-
fied environmental and safety standards. On the other hand, public
interest groups like the Sierra Club may argue that net benefits to society
are primarily based on the impact that the facility is likely to have on the
quality of the environment for future generations, and so they may reach
the opposite conclusion regarding the desirability of the facility.
The distributional objective is likely to cause similar problems. Some
local residents may oppose a project because they fear the consequences
of an accident even if they agree that society will be better off having the
terminal. They might favor the project as long as it is "not in my back-
yard". On the other hand, local government may want the facility because
*This chapter was written by Howard Kunreuther.
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they believe that it will have a positive effect on economic activity in their
area. Whether in fact it will achieve this objective is an open question, as
was illustrated in Chapter 8.
Reconciling these differences may not be an easy matter. Louis Claren-
burg, from the Rijnmond Public Authority in the Netherlands, pointed
out the difficulties policy makers face in drawing up explicit rules for
dealing with welfare and distributional concerns:
How can you make up your equity equation? How can you compare apples and
guns in a final analysis, and come up with a computer solution? For political
decisions, I cannot use the computer at all because it is really weighing values,
benefits, costs, who is suffering, who is gaining. I feel no computer can give this
answer, and if it can it is gambling with our democracy. (KLS 1982, p370)
Although a computer cannot solve the equity problem, nonetheless
decision makers can be assisted in dealing with the conflicts inherent in
siting hazardous facilities by the use of policy analysis, which encompasses
both risk analysis and other approaches for improving the siting process
and the final outcomes. Its actual use will be determined in part by the
nature of the existing decision process. Because of differences in the
entitlements, standing, and responsibilities of interested parties within
each country I there is no one right way to do business in the world.
National styles are important when proposing policy remedies. 2
A COMPARISON OF INSTITUTIONS
The institutional arrangements governing siting decision processes affect
the types of analysis that will be used. Two types of process models can
be contrasted:
• A judicial model involves a single decision maker in the form of a judge,
commission, or government body who decides on the outcome after
hearing statements and evidence from the various parties that have been
given standing.
• A compromise model involves direct interaction between the different
stakeholders involved in bargaining, and negotiation. The implicit rule
for reaching a final decision is unanimity. In practice this is rarely
obtained, although tools such as compensation can transfer some of
the gains from potential "winners" to "losers". The four case studies
reflect different variations on these two broad approaches to resolving
siting conflicts. 3
The FRG. In the FRG a proposed LNG terminal is licensed like any
other major industrial project. The applicant must develop a plan for a
particular site, which is then presented to the relevant authority (usually
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the Land, one of the ten autonomous states of the FRG). In the case of
the Wilhelmshaven facility, Lower Saxony played a predominant role
since it was not only involved in the licensing procedures, but was also
directly concerned with the impact of the project on regional develop-
ment. In addition, all facilities must comply with town and country plan-
ning regulations of the municipalities responsible for approval of the plans
(in this case the city council of Wilhelmshaven).
Any individual or institution has standing by being able to appeal
against a particular decision directly to the courts, which can rule on its
legitimacy. In the case of Wilhelmshaven, the threat of a court case by the
citizens of Hooksielled to negotiations, resulting in a compensation agree-
ment in which Lower Saxony increased its subsidy for a planned recre-
ational center. There was thus an attempt to reach a compromise between
the relevant parties even though the decision structure is characterized by
a judicial model.
The Netherlands. The siting procedure in the Netherlands is centralized
only to the extent that the national government coordinates major deci-
sions. The existing institutional arrangement promotes a mixture of
adversarial debates and consensual decision making. A large number of
interested parties had standing and were involved in the LNG debate so
that points of conflict surfaced and were aired; in this sense the Dutch
siting process is in the spirit of a compromise model. At the same time the
desire for consensus was expressed formally by the central position
assigned to an interdepartmental coordinating committee (leONA),
which included representatives of all relevant ministries.
Since Gasunie is a semi-state-owned company it was operating in line
with official Dutch energy policy when it applied for a site for an LNG
terminal. Formal responsibility for site approval for industrial facilities
normally rests with the provincial and municipal authorities. Opposition
to the proposed sites at Maasvlakte came primarily from the Rijnmond
Public Authority, a collection of 16 municipalities in the Rotterdam
harbor area that was primarily concerned with the safety risks associated
with LNG. The local authorities in Groningen, on the other hand, wel-
comed the prospect of a terminal at Eemshaven because it promised to
stimulate industrial activity and provide jobs in this area. Environmental-
ists opposed the construction of LNG facilities in both areas, but these
groups were unsuccessful in acquiring an influential role in the process. No
citizens' action organizations were formed to protest the applications,
although some of the residents in the affected communities linked up with
the environmentalist groups. The Dutch cabinet, which had final authority
on this siting question, selected the Eemshaven site knowing there was
united official support for the subsequent approval of the terminal at
provincial and municipal levels. In this sense, this procedure was more in
keeping with a judicial model.
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The UK. The UK has a well defined hierarchical structure for reaching
decisions. A developer wishing to build a facility normally files a planning
application at district council level and this proposal is then transmitted to
the regional or national level whenever the project is expected to impact a
wide area. The proposed LEG facility at Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay was
considered to have national significance for energy policy and industrial
development so that the relevant decision maker was the Secretary of
State for Scotland. The decision process was thus in the spirit of a judicial
model rather than one involving compromise. The district council played a
coordinating role by publicizing the application so that interested parties
could state their positions in writing prior to any official decision. Due to
substantial opposition to the Shell and Esso applications, the Secretary of
State decided to hold a public inquiry that would focus on local issues.
The local authorities unanimously favored the application because of the
potential positive impact on employment in the area. Following the public
inquiry the Secretary of State approved the project despite strong objec-
tions by the Conservation Society and an action group composed of resi-
dents from villages bordering on the site.
The US. In recent years the decision process regarding the siting of
hazardous facilities has been transformed from a technological regulatory
process with cooperation between parties, into an adversarial system
(Allison et al. 1981). This change has occurred because the courts have
played a more active role so that all parties feel they have an opportunity
to present their positions to an administrative law judge presiding over a
set of hearings.
The California case study illustrates a change that was made to institu-
tional arrangements for LNG siting decisions. When the Western LNG
Terminal Company initially filed an application with the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) in September 1974, it was required to obtain approval
for any proposed site from a number of different sources: the FPC was
responsible for ruling on the environmental and safety risks, the California
Coastal Commission (CCC) was charged with preserving coastal resources,
and a number of local agencies had the authority to issue permits. Due
to an impending stalemate regarding approval at either Oxnard, Los
Angeles, or Point Conception, the applicant pushed for new legislation.
The result was California LNG Terminal Siting Act of 1977, which author-
ized one-stop licensing, so that Western was only required to obtain
approval from the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) rather
than from the CCC and local authorities. The Sierra Club, in conjunction
with citizens' groups at Oxnard, strongly favored a remote site, preferably
offshore, and their views were thus partially reflected in the legislation
through new restrictions on maximum population density within certain
prescribed limits from the terminal. These legislative changes reflected
compromises between some of the relevant parties but moved the siting
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process into the judicial camp since the CPUC was the sole decision-
maker.
THE ROLE OF POLICY ANALYSIS
We now turn to the question of how policy analysis can aid the siting
process. Three perspectives are considered. From one perspective, facts
can be provided on the potential effects associated with a proposed
facility. From a second perspective, policy analysis can help elicit prefer-
ences of the parties with standing in a siting debate, so that decision
makers may gain insights into what aspects are likely to produce conflicts.
From a third perspective, policy analysis can help design proposals for
clarifying the entitlements of the groups and the individuals affected by a
siting decision. These options may help resolve some of the conflicts
between the welfare and distributional objectives.
Perspective 1: Clarifying the effects
Analysis can help clarify the potential effects of a proposed facility in
several ways (Vaupel 1982). At one level experts can provide an analysis
of the costs and benefits of a particular technology such as the impact of
importing LNG on the future price of energy, while at another level
experts can provide data on the effects associated with locating a facility
at a specific site. Examples of the latter include the consequences to the
citizens of Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay in the event of a vapor cloud
explosion following a storage tank rupture, or the costs associated with
transporting LNG if Point Conception were chosen as a site in California.
We have explored in detail the discrepancies between experts regarding
risk analyses for LEG siting in Chapters 7 and 8. As was pointed out in
Chapter 8, there did not exist a fully adequate review procedure in any
country. In addition, objector groups played an important, and sometimes
crucial role in exposing possible weaknesses in the safety of the terminal
and operations. This role, however, was limited by the financial resources
of these groups, but could be encouraged by such means as providing
public funds for them to review existing analyses or to perform their own.
A difficulty with this procedure is in deciding upon the groups that should
receive the funds. An alternative might be to fund "Science Shops",4 or
groups at universities to provide technical aid and advice to citizens'
groups. Either of these methods would be a step towards encouraging
more critical review of risk analyses carried out by industry or government
agencies.
A difficulty with the above procedures are the inevitable differences in
opinions that will result from simultaneous studies. Ackerman et al.
(1974) point out that the traditional approaches such as legal responses,
agency hearings, and judicial reviews have inherent limitations with respect
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to evaluating these conflicting assessments. As a way of dealing with this
problem, they advocate the need to establish rules of evidence for scien-
tific studies used in legal proceedings. These rules would encourage more
uniform analyses, so that the debate could focus on the alternatives them-
selves rather than the particular assessment or presentation promoted by
an interested party. Lathrop and Linnerooth (1982) provide a suggested
set of guidelines with respect to establishing rules of evidence, and stress
the importance of defining the risk being assessed, clarifying the assump-
tions and error bounds, as well as indicating the conditional nature of
specific analyses that are undertaken.
Decisions also have to be made in each country as to when specific
analyses of potential negative effects should be undertaken. There were
clear institutional differences between the four countries on this point. In
the UK the Secretary of State, after granting planning permission in
principle, stipulated that a full safety audit should be undertaken prior to
the commissioning of the facility. The difficulties over timing in this case,
however, have led to changes in the procedure for handling future plan-
ning applications in that new applicants now have to submit more detailed
plant designs earlier in the process. In the US a number of different
analyses were undertaken soon after three sites were proposed for Califor-
nia. In both the FRG and the Netherlands analyses were undertaken prior
to the approval of the projects, but these studies did not playa central
role in determining the final outcomes.
There is no easy answer to the question as to when analyses should be
undertaken. At the LEG Task Force Meeting in September 1980, the
following contrasting views on this point were expressed by Ralph Keeney,
a decision analyst from Woodward Clyde Consultants in California, and
Robert Norton, a manager from Distrigas in Boston, Massachusetts:
Keeney: Responsibly, siting analysis should be done before the decisions on the site
are made, and this is personally where I would really like to see analyses done.
(KLS 1982, p369)
Norton: I think it may be useful for existing terminals, but I do not think it will
prove useful for siting purposes .... The real benefit in risk analysis is when it is
relatively constrained, where you can work within the system, namely an existing
plant. (KLS 1982, pp289-90)
Perspective 2: Eliciting preferences
Analysts have proposed several different techniques for eliciting prefer-
ences and values of individuals with standing before a decision is made. s
Wynne (1982) contends that it may be difficult for individuals to articu-
late their preferences because their value structures are open-ended, and
tentative. The approaches outlined below for eliciting values must be
interpreted with this potential caveat in mind.
The best known methodology is multi-attribu te utility analysis, a
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formal technique for eliciting different attributes and determining their
relative importance with respect to a particular problem. 6 It is normally
utilized in conjunction with just one interested party, although this stake-
holder may have obtained inputs from other groups concerned with the
final outcome. For example, three analysts (de Neufville, Keeney, and
Raiffa) assisted the Mexican Ministry of Public Works in selecting a
strategy to develop airport facilities for the Mexico City metropolitan
area. With the assistance of these analysts, the Ministry estimated the
utility functions for each of the relevant attributes, as well as the weights
that would be assigned to them. In undertaking these assessments an
attempt was made to incorporate the concerns of all interested parties
(e.g., residents near the airport, the ministry of Communication and
Transport) by utilizing information from previously commissioned reports
on the airport problem. 7
Recently there have been two other promising approaches that may
enable analysts to obtain quantitative data on the preferences of different
interested parties. One of these is value tree analysis, developed by Edwards
and von Winterfeldt (1981), in which individuals or groups are presented
with alternative scenarios regarding the choice between several different
technological options. On the basis of these scenarios the analyst attempts
to build a value tree to capture all expressed relevant corners. Proto-
typical value tree analysis consists of a set of risk-benefit dimensions
that are then operationalized through a set of measurable variables.
Through the use of traditional multi-attribute utility analysis techniques,
importance weights are assigned to the different attributes comprising the
value tree.
Another systematic procedure is the analytic hierarchy process pro-
posed by Saaty (1980), which represents the elements of a problem
through a hierarchical structure. Figure 9.1 illustrates the elements of this
approach in the context of LEG facility siting. The first level of the
hierarchy is the single overall objective: which LEG site (if any) to select.
In our case studies, with the exception of the US, this question was
decided by industry and did not reach the political arena. The second level
specifies the set of five interested parties and then lists the attributes that
are considered to be important to each of these groups (level 3). The
lowest level consists of the set of alternatives available at a given point in
time. Priorities are established within each level by assessing the relative
importance of one element over the other in a pairwise comparison with
respect to the criterion in the next higher level. For example, the impor-
tance of each interested party with respect to the others (level 2) will be
determined in reference to the question of siting a facility (level 1 ).
It is difficult to see how these techniques would have been useful in the
four LEG case studies within the existing institutional arrangements. All
interested parties would have had to feel that trade-offs between attributes
were possible and that it was desirable to make such comparisons. Even if
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Levell:
Focus Which LNG site (if any) to select
~Ls;J
Level 3:
Attributes
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Interested
parties L--,-_--J
Level 4:
Alternatives I Site A I I Site B I I Site C I I No site I
Figure 9.1. Hierarchical structure for siting an LEG facility.
the parties knew their value structure they might have been reluctant to
articulate it for fear of losing some bargaining and negotiating power. As
an analyst, Ward Edwards encountered this problem in evaluating alterna-
tive school desegregation plans submitted to the Los Angeles School
Board. He noted that the interested parties in a societal decision problem
may be unlikely to reveal their value structure because when this informa-
tion becomes public certain groups might feel they would be held ac-
countable for their judgments (Edwards 1981).
This concern was also voiced by William Ahern of the California Coastal
Commission, at the LEG Task Force Meeting, when he responded to his
own rhetorical question, "What was the role of analysis ...?" as follows:
This is a perfect project for multi-attribute decision analysis. Five perfect sites. You
can compare them on environmental risks, safety problems, the cost of the sites,
the technical problems. It was a classic. In fact, I haven't told this next bit of infor-
mation even to Ralph Keeney.
Ralph works up the street from us, and he came over to our office, as I under-
stand, and talked to some people on my staff and he asked, "Wouldn't you be
interested in a nice multi-attribute analysis of these alternative sites?" Well, my
staff came to me and said, "Bill, this guy is from Woodward-Clyde and, gee, he
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sounds good. Shouldn't we hire him to help us do this?" And I said, "Absolutely
not!" And it's not because he isn't an excellent analyst, but because he doesn't
work for me and therefore he would be out of my control in many ways, because
Ralph talks to people such as yourselves. He's got his own principles to uphold, and
he would not give us a report that we could put under the shelf because Norbert
Dall would know that we had contracted with Ralph Keeney to do the report, and
he would want to see it - no matter what it came up with, and that's not some-
thing we wanted.
Not only did we on the staff not want it, but our commissioners didn't want it.
Actually I'm trained in this stuff myself, and I tried to talk my staff into doing it as
they, at least, work for me. And if they put a number in I didn't like, I could jiggle
it around. They were so appalled at the idea of doing this. (KLS 1982, p284)
Ahern went on to point out that the commissioners were not interested in
such an analysis because they did not want to be explicit about their
reasons for making their decisions.
By eliciting preferences at an early stage in a siting process the analyst
may be able to point out the types of conflicts that are likely to be diffi-
cult to reconcile, and those where some negotiation and bargaining may
be possible. For example, if there are disagreements on social values so
that one group feels that "small is beautiful", while another feels that
"large is necessary", then this may suggest that some new, more politically
acceptable, alternatives are required (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1981).
On the other hand, if one group feels that it is bearing the risks of a
project without receiving sufficient benefits then this information may
facilitate trading arrangements between groups. Some of the policy
options that might be considered are discussed under Perspective 3.
Finally, one has to be aware that the preferences of different individuals
and groups may change over time. In the context of the multi-attribute,
multi-party (MAMP) framework there were clear changes from one round
to the next. For example, in the FRG the environmentalists and citizens'
groups only raised objections to the LNG terminal in Wilhelmshaven after
learning that Imperial Chemical Industries wanted to site a new petro-
chemical plant in the area. In the US the Sierra Club initially favored
Oxnard as a potential site but later reversed its position.
This does not mean that analysis cannot be useful in shedding light
on preferences, but it does suggest that what is viewed as desirable today
may not be deemed appropriate several years later. Michael Thompson
pointed this out with an interesting account of a housing project at a
British university:
When taking individual values or preferences into account, one of the troubles is
that people don't stay in the same place. Sussex University went to a terrible lot of
trouble to find out what students would like, in particular what kind of buildings
they would like. It took several years for the buildings to go up and as the students
only stayed there about three years, none of the students whose preferences had
been taken into account were there any more. There were a whole lot of new
students who detested the buildings. Furthermore, the same people change their
minds, change their preferences, so even if you haven't got a fresh load of people
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there, you often find that their values have changed - in some cases dramatically,
which we see in the US, with the changing attitudes to nuclear power, for instance.
(KLS 1982, p365)
Perspective 3: Designing proposals
Policy analysis may also be useful in developing proposals for selecting the
location(s) for new facilities, as well as formulating options for distributing
the potential gains and losses from final decisions.
Selecting a community. The four case studies suggest several different
procedures for selecting a site for a hazardous facility. In each country the
discussion of a possible LEG terminal was initiated by a utility company
who felt that a new plant would be economically viable and would be in
the interest of the nation's energy supply. In the FRG, Ruhrgas and
Gelsenberg proposed Wilhelmshaven because the Land authority (Lower
Saxony) had set out to encourage industrial development by deepening
the shipping channel and by reclaiming from the sea a large area of land
designated for industrial installations. As early as 1972 the two gas com-
panies even established a subsidiary firm based in Wilhelmshaven to indi-
cate how serious they were with respect to this site. In the UK a similar
selection process was followed. Shell and Esso pursued the possibility of
developing an LEG facility in the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay area know-
ing, amongst other things, that there was considerable concern with the
high level of unemployment in the area. These two examples illustrate one
type of siting procedure: the developer negotiates directly with represen-
tatives of a community and attempts to work out a settlement.
In the Netherlands Gasunie attempted to follow this same process with
respect to a Maasvlakte site, but ran into strong resistance on safety
grounds from the Rotterdam local authorities. The company thus ap-
proached the Groningen local authorities about the Eemshaven site
after they had marshaled strong political support for this location in order
to aid industrial development.
In California, Western LNG Terminal Company proposed three sites for
consideration and then attempted to gain approval for them. They were
encouraged in their efforts by local authorities in Oxnard and Los Angeles,
but met strong resistance from citizens' groups and environmentalists.
This procedure illustrates a case where various interested parties react to a
set of options initiated by a developer.
In judging the relative merits of these three procedures, one important
consideration is the cost in terms of time and money in developing plans
for a terminal and having to negotiate contractual arrangements with the
relevant community. If there is great uncertainty on the part of the devel-
oper as to how long this process will take then there may be a reluctance
to propose a site in the first place. This is the current problem facing the
nuclear power industry: utilities are disinclined to initate new proposals
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for plants given the uncertainties associated with reaching licensing agree-
ments. A second consideration is the importance of such projects in terms
of national energy needs. If an LEG terminal is considered essential to the
country then there is likely to be considerable pressure from government
authorities to find a site.
An alternative procedure is illustrated by the Massachusetts Siting
Hazardous Facility Waste Act of 1980 (O'Hare et al. 1983), under which
the community has entitlement to the land and the applicant is required
to negotiate a satisfactory settlement. Members of the community are
represented by a local assessment committee;8 surrounding communities
can act through a siting council to have specific costs imposed on the
applicant as compensation for potential losses. The siting council can also
force the negotiating process into binding arbitration if the interested
parties are not responsive to each other. To date, however, no community
has agreed to negotiate voluntarily on a potential site.
In the light of the Massachusetts experience, the following sequential
process for sell::cting a site for an LEG terminal might be considered. First,
a set of acceptable sites is selected and conditions are established as to
how gains and losses could be distributed among the interested parties.
Second, a lottery could then determine which site would be selected. Any
community not picked from the lottery could then make a more attrac-
tive offer to the developer in the hope of being chosen over the site selec-
ted at random. One type of process that may be relevant at this second
stage has been proposed by O'Hare (1977), who suggests that any com-
munity interested in having a terminal in its backyard can determine a
minimum level of compensation for which it would be willing to make a
legal commitment to accept the project. The compensation could be in
monetary form (e.g., taxes) or in kind (e.g., having the developer allocate
some of this land for a park). If no community wanted to enter such a
bidding process, then the site selected by the lottery would be declared
the "winner".
Sharing gains and losses. The choice between alternatives can be facili-
tated by developing programs for sharing gains and losses from a proposed
project. At a descriptive level, policy analysis can indicate what is likely to
happen if a certain course of action is followed, while from a prescriptive
point of view it can recommend what should be done to achieve specific
objectives.
To illustrate these two aspects consider the history of nuclear power in
the US. At a descriptive level, risk analyses by the industry revealed that
the probability of a major nuclear accident was extremely remote, but
that if it did occur the consequences would be very serious. Private com-
panies felt that even a remote chance of a catastrophe would be a major
setback to their participation in the development of nuclear technology.
The exposure of firms to large liabilities also increased the awareness of
the public to potential losses. If there were an interest in the development
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of nuclear energy then the government felt its involvement would be
necessary to encourage firms to participate. Furthermore if there was a
desire to compensate the public for damages caused by a catastrophic
accident then federal relief would be needed (Chevarley 1975). These
analyses led to the passage of the Price-Anderson Act of 1975, which
established a complex program of private financial protection through a
nuclear liability insurance pool and government guarantees covering total
claims up to a maximum of $560 million in the event of a nuclear acci-
dent.
Turning to LEG, there has been no effort by any of the four countries
under study to establish special insurance programs for encouraging
industry to develop these facilities. The energy supply companies have not
voiced undue concern about their potential liability should a large-scale
accident occur. In fact, it appears as if the applicants and the insurance
industry feel that the prospects of their having to deal with the conse-
quences of an accident are sufficiently remote that they prefer not to
address the issue. Only citizens have recently become alarmed when a
facility has been proposed in their own backyard.
The proposals in this section involve types of compensation for individ-
uals or groups. A distinction can be made between ex ante compensation,
which refers to payments in money or in kind at the time a terminal is
approved or constructed; and ex post compensation, which refers to
reim bursement to individuals or groups who suffer losses from an acci-
dent.
Ex ante compensation: If considered appropriate on social and politi-
cal grounds, ex ante compensation should only be given to those parties
who can make a convincing case that they stand to lose as a result of a
decision to site a new facility. Those individuals who have entitlement to
the land will demand a certain amount of money before they will relin-
quish their property rights. However, if government exercises special
powers to acquire this land then these individuals may not be satisfied
with the settlement. Life becomes even more difficult for residents near
the site who have no formal entitlements to the property on which the
facility will be located. One way to compensate them could be through
reduced tax rates.
One proposal with potential merit is an agreement by the applicant to
reduce electricity rates to residents within a certain distance of the
hazardous facility in order to compensate them for the increased risk or
unpleasantness created. Such a system has recently been introduced in
France with respect to nuclear power plants. People living within approxi-
mately 15 km of a facility who feel that they are adversely affected can
apply to the local authority for a reduction of up to 15-20% in electricity
rates. This compensation applies to both businesses and private house-
holds. 9
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The most difficult problem in designing ex ante compensation schemes
is to distinguish between those who will bear direct losses, and those who
are resisting the development for more general reasons concerning the
future of society as a whole. This distinction is a subtle one, particularly
when it involves questions of safety and environmental impacts that affect
individual members of the community, as well as future generations.
Linnerooth (1982) suggests that policy makers should consider the possi-
bility that the public may wish to distribute equitably the costs and risks
of industrial society. Yet, monetary payments to groups who resist a
project, but who will not be directly affected by it, may encourage others
to demand a share of the pie. In addition, society wants to preserve the
belief that life is special; money may cheapen it, while laying bare the
inequality of wealth. Calabresi and Bobbit (1978) make this point by
noting that "the willingness of a poor man, confronting a tragic situation,
to choose money rather than the tragically scarce resource [life] always
represents an unquiet indictment of society's distribution of wealth."
The authors contend that a democratic society should not tolerate such
exchanges, even if both rich and poor prefer them.
For these reasons monetary compensation to protesting groups has
rarely been implemented. One example we have found is from the FRG,
where the utility company STEAG (Steinkohle-Elektrizitatswerke AG)
announced plans in 1976 to construct a 1400 MW coal power plant in the
city of Bergkamen in the Ruhr area. A citizens' action group protested the
project and threatened to delay the licensing procedures. In March 1977 a
contract was signed between the utility company and three representatives
of the action group: the group would be reimbursed with a DM 1.5 million
payment if they agreed to cease protesting the project further. However, a
court case was provoked when the city of Bergkamen refused to distribute
the money. The federal court decided that the contract was valid because
the citizens' group should be compensated for legitimate rights, but the
decision was greeted with negative reactions by FRG public opinion.
Concerns were voiced in the media that health and safety were citizens'
inalienable rights that could not be paid off with money (Blount 1983).
Compensation in kind or for specific causes appears to be a more accept-
able way of sharing the pie than direct monetary transfers to individuals.
In this spirit, proposals have been made that communities should be
provided with specific facilities such as a hospital, which reduces the risks
in other spheres of daily activity. In the FRG, the increased subsidy
provided by the state of Lower Saxony for the recreational facility at
Hooksiel is a good example of how this type of compensation system was
implemented in the context of our case studies.
Another example of this type of compensation relates to the construc-
tion of a 1500 MW coal-fired power plant in Wyoming. A law suit had
enjoined construction of the plant hecause of its potential damage to the
surrounding environment. The suit was settled when the utility companies
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agreed to set up a $7.5 million trust fund for the express purpose of pre-
serving a 60-mile stretch of the Platt River, the habitat of migratory birds,
including the whooping crane. The coal plant was completed in 1981 and
is fully operational today. 10
Ex post compensation: These proposals require a set of liability rules
that transfer entitlements from one party to another in the event of an
accident. In the case of hazardous facilities such as LEG terminals, the
principal question regarding this type of compensation is who is liable for
losses should an accident occur. Pfenningsdorf (1979) points out that for
ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activities, public policy sup-
ports the doctrine of strict liability whereby the operator of the facility is
liable for damages, regardless of fault. Accidents associated with LEG
vessels and terminals fall under this category in all four countries we have
studied. 11
Both the applicant and the potential victims are naturally concerned as
to how they will fare after an LEG-related accident. From the point of
view of the applicant, a large-scale disaster may cause bankruptcy if the
firm were required to pay for the entire loss, and so it may decide not to
build a facility. Residents may not know how much they will receive in
compensation for property damage they may suffer. Some may feel that
no amount of money could compensate them or their surviving relatives
for loss of life or severe injuries; they may thus oppose the facility.
If the society feels that ex post compensation for damages from acci-
dents should be entirely the responsibility of the developers of new tech-
nological facilities, then private or public insurance appears to be a policy
tool worth considering. Insurance would have the advantage of creating
incentives for firms to make their facilities safer. If premiums are based
on the risk associated with a given design then the applicant may want to
spend extra funds to reduce the chance of an accident and correspondingly
lower the annual premium for a given amount of coverage. The applicant
also has an incentive to hire experts to estimate the risks associated with
the facility, which can then be used as inputs into the negotiations.
The most difficult problem associated with developing a meaningful
insurance program is the uncertainty associated with the risk of a catas-
trophic accident. Private insurance and reinsurance firms are concerned
with the magnitude of the losses from a low-probability event, so they are
reluctant to enter this market. We could not determine in any of the four
case studies what proportion of the damage from a disaster would be
covered by firms, how much the goverment would pay, or what propor-
tion would have to be absorbed by the victims themselves. These distribu-
tional questions should be more explicitly considered as part of the siting
decision process itself, rather than after an accident has occurred.
Another form of ex post compensation are payments in kind to groups
that have been adversely affected by a particular disaster. A landmark case
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in this spirit was the settlement by Allied Chemicals in Virginia after being
found guilty of polluting the James River with the pesticide Kepone.
Rather than paying a $23.2 million fine, the company proposed paying
$5.2 million and establishing an $8 million trust fund to be used for
environmental grants in Virginia. 12 In essence, the firm provided ex post
compensation for research to prevent future damage to the environment.
The other extreme position is when society feels that ex post compen-
sation for damages is primarily a public responsibility. In this case, the
government could provide disaster relief in the form of low-interest loans
or grants. Alternatively, some type of damage compensation fund could
be established to aid victims. For example, the government could impose a
tax on applicants to obtain funds for operating such a program to handle
losses. The pu blic sector would thus have a stake in the operation of the
facility and it could thus set a tax either to encourage or discourage
certain types of operations (Okrent 1982, personal communication).
Summary. These proposals for sharing gains and losses are designed to
facilitate the bargaining and negotiation process between the interested
parties who have standing in a siting debate. If certain individuals have
the entitlements to block the approval of a facility that promises to
increase general social welfare, then society may want to consider some
of these proposals as a way of sharing the benefits more equitably. Con-
siderably more empirical research is needed to determine how well each
of these proposals is likely to perform in different situations.
How difficult will it be to implement specific plans as the population
becomes more heterogeneous? What are the costs associated with imple-
menting and enforcing certain property and liability rules? How accept-
able are certain proposals likely to be within consensual and adversarial
siting processes? These questions are beyond the scope of this book but
suggest avenues for future study.
NORMATIVE CRITERIA FOR A DESIRABLE SITING PROCESS
This section recommends selected normative criteria that might be
explicitly addressed in determining a siting procedure for any given coun-
try. These criteria are couched in relative rather than absolute terms since
each society will determine its own appropriate targets. The status quo
frequently serves as a benchmark for specifying these criteria and it may
not be viewed as desirable to stray far from existing procedures. For
example, Niall Campbell from the Scottish Development Department takes
a conservative view that only incremental changes should be made in
the public inquiry system in the UK, based on the experiences in the
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay siting decision:
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The way to make the inquiry system better is to change small parts of it. I know
that is not a very exciting conclusion. You could examine the time limit, you could
look at the amount of advance preparation, how much in advance, and how exten-
sive it is. It is the degree that we are looking at rather than fundamental changes.
(KLS 1982, p236)
By specifying these criteria one can then design a set of rules to satisfy
them. For example, in designing rules of the road there are trade-offs
between permitting drivers to reach their destinations as rapidly as possible
and society's concern with highway safety. 13 The criteria described below
relate to the decision process itself, as well as to the outcomes resulting
from the party interactions. The criteria thus address questions of pro-
cedural as well as substantive rationality. The final choice will be deter-
mined by each society on the basis of current and desired institutional
arrangements.
Criterion 1: Degree of openness
How open should the siting process actually be? What should be the
degree of participation of the different viewpoints in the siting debate? At
one extreme is the philosophy that it is useful to hear the widest possible
range of viewpoints before making a final decision, while at the other end
of the spectrum is the position that the process should be highly central-
ized within the government bureaucracy.
The first position is exemplified by the Berger Inquiry, which explored
the technical, social, economic, and environmental issues of building an
oil and gas pipeline through the Mackenzie Valley in northern Canada.
Justice T.R. Berger, who headed the inquiry, traveled 17 000 miles in the
Northwest and Yukon Territories over several years to hear evidence in
towns and villages. The Inquiry offered funding to numerous native and
regional organizations to enable different groups to provide testimony.
Organizations were funded who had a clearly discernible interest that
Berger felt should be heard but who could not afford to present their
positions on their own. All groups had to have clearly delineated pro-
posals as to how they intended to make use of the funds. Government
and industry spent millions of dollars on the process (Gamble 1978).
In the end they decided not to build the pipeline.
The other extreme, centralization, is illustrated by the French system.
Louis Vincent of Gaz de France has pointed out that discussions regarding
siting take place predominantly inside the ministries in Paris. With respect.
to the construction of LEG terminals, there is only one government
agency in France with which Gaz de France has to deal, and no public
interest groups have voiced concern about proposed projects (see KLS
1982).
In the four countries we have studied, there are clear differences in the
degree of openness of the siting processes. The systems in the Netherlands
and the US allow considerable room for debate and discussion between
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interested parties, but the other two countries have more structured
arrangements: in the UK different points of view are aired through public
inquiries, while in the FRG, through discussions between the utility
companies and the licensing authorities.
Points can be made both for and against a more open process for parti-
cipation in siting decisions. The presentation of a wide range of viewpoints
enables all parties to feel they are part of the process. New information
can change the outlook of some groups and may suggest a wider set of
alternatives than had previously been considered. An open process may
thus create possibilities for negotiating settlements between parties by
suggesting ways of redistributing some of the gains from winners to losers
(Orr 1977). On the other hand, such a process takes time, is costly, and
may create additional conflicts between parties as certain issues in the
debate are explicitly raised.
Ultimately, cost will influence the degree of openness. Only affluent
countries can afford to have such time-consuming decision processes as
the Berger Inquiry, which at the time was considered a landmark study
with respect to the degree of public participation. It is doubtful, however,
whether governments and industry in any country will invest this magni-
tude of funding within the near future to facilitate open siting processes.
Criterion 2: Nature of deadlines
How rigid should time schedules be with respect to different phases of the
siting process? Should there be considerable flexibility, or should dead-
lines be specified in advance and revised only if an interested party can
present a convincing argument for delaying the process? The Berger
Inquiry in Canada is an example of a process that was somewhat open-
ended. Justice Berger felt that hearings should be continued until all
parties had had an opportunity to present information that they felt was
relevant to the pipeline decision. As a result the Inquiry lasted three years,
from March 1974 to March 1977 (Gamble 1978).
As a contrast, the Windscale Inquiry in the UK into the need for and
desirability of a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility ran only 100 days. In
fact, it represented for the first time in British political history that a
technological debate had been rigorously structured. Mr. Justice Parker
finally recommended that planning permission be granted to British
Nuclear Fuels without delay, despite serious objections by public interest
groups that it would be unwise to do so (Wynne 1978).
Deadlines formed an important part of the LEG siting process in all
four case studies. In both the FRG and the Netherlands the contracts with
the Algerian company Sonatrach stipulated that the exact locations of the
sites for an LNG terminal be specified by October 1978, and this spurred
the decision processes in both countries. In the UK the key deadline was
the conclusion of the public inquiry. after which additional evidence
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could only be considered if the Secretary of State felt it was relevant. In
the US the California LNG Terminal Siting Act of 1977 stipulated that a
final decision on a site had to be agreed upon by July 1978, at which time
Point Conception was conditionally approved.
One of the principal arguments for setting firm deadlines is that the
applicant can plan its investment strategies with greater certainty. Fixed
schedules also reduce the incentives for other interested parties to use
information as a delaying tactic (O'Hare 1981). In the case of LEG there
are important international implications of failing to meet agreed dead-
lines, as illustrated by the following comment by Philippe Cruchon of the
French Ministere de l'Industrie:
Generally, when a contract is signed with an importing country, this contract
specifies a time schedule for the fulfillment of the contract. And there is a link in
the contract between the construction of the receiving plant in the importing coun-
try and the construction of the liquefying plant in the exporting country. From an
importing country's point of view, the contract is not only a private business
matter, but it is also a matter of the international credibility of the consumer
country. (KLS 1982, p435)
There are also advantages of not setting specific deadlines, in that
parties do not become locked into a particular technology or specific site,
and hence are less constrained in dealing with new information. Norbert
Dall, project manager of the Sierra Club from 1976 to 1980, reflected this
point of view when commenting on the siting process in California:
The very assumptions of the project were critically reviewed by government agencies
and interested parties that, in part, did not share the applicant's point of view. That
process will, as far as the Sierra Club is concerned, continue as long as the gas
supply-demand balance changes in California. As such, the review process is a
dear expression of American pluralistic politics .... Thus we have perceived the
present expenditures to review the project as a prudent investment that may keep
California from making an economically and environmentally horrendous mistake.
(KLS 1982, unpublished draft)
It can be concluded that parties or organizations that support, and may
depend on, economic development will want well specified deadlines.
Those who prefer to reflect on their technological future will insist on a
more open-ended and flexible process.
Criterion 3: Specificity of contractual arrangements
How detailed and well specified should contractual siting arrangements
be? Is it desirable to indicate in writing exactly who is responsible for
damages from specific accidents, or should these arrangements be left
intentionally vague? These questions came to the fore after the Three
Mile Island accident, when there was a problem as to who would assume
actual financial responsibilities for damage: the utilities, insurance com-
panies, or the federal government. Similar questions are likely to arise
should there be a catastrophic LEG-related accident.
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In addition to questions of responsibility for an accident there are other
consequences of the siting decision that may affect local residents. What
happens if property values fall as a result of locating a hazardous facility
in the area? Will these individuals be compensated for their loss in net
worth? Suppose there are unexpected negative environmental impacts
from a facility. Do residents of the area have legal recourse? Opposition to
a proposed facility from citizens may arise because individuals do not have
information on what recourse they have to recoup these losses.
Contractual arrangements should be explicitly specified so that all parties
have a clear idea of their entitlements and those of others when agreeing
to a particular siting proposal. This would also provide a firm basis for
negotiations between groups in the siting debate since the potential gains
and losses would be more clearly delineated. In some cases, less explicit
agreements may facilitate the siting process by not raising a set of con-
cerns by some of the parties. For example, if an actual dollar figure were
attached to a severe injury or loss of life from an accident then people
may disagree on the amount, and considerable time might be spent debating
this point. On balance, however, it is important for all parties to know
who has property rights to the site in question and who is responsible for
damages should an accident occur after a facility has been built.
Criterion 4: Nature of compensation
What types of compensation systems, if any, should be introduced into
the political arena for distributing the costs and benefits among the
affected parties? Should there be an explicit recognition as to who are
likely winners and losers, or is this an issue that society prefers not to
address?
The philosophical underpinnings guiding societal decisions will influence
the role that compensation plays in the siting process. For example, a
libertarian system, which forms the basis for the operation of a free
market system, stresses the importance of individual freedom unless
others may be harmed by certain actions. The Pareto criterion is used as a
guide to judge future actions. If the status quo is the baseline from which
to judge future actions, then any project that is likely to harm a single
individual would not be approved unless that person is sufficiently com-
pensated that she will consider herself at least as well off after the decision
is made as before. A utilitarian system, on the other hand, is based on the
objective of maximizing the utility of society as a whole. Using this ethical
system projects would be approved even if some parties would be made
worse off than under the status quO. 14
The issue of compensating potential losers is closely related to the
question of the rights of individuals and groups with respect to their
safety and quality of living. If individuals have a right to reject a project
because it imposes environmental and safety risks on them, then the
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compensation issue is likely to play a central role in dealing with these
problems of risk. If certain risks are imposed on individuals without their
consent then issues of compensation assume a less important role.
The four case studies illustrate different philosophical positions regard-
ing the issues of rights and the role of compensation. In each of the three
European systems a site was approved because there was sufficient positive
feeling by local and regional groups that the project would provide added
employment and revenues to the area - compensation in kind rather than
in money. In the US, the city councils in Los Angeles and Oxnard also
favored the sites for the same reasons, yet the Oxnard Citizens' Group had
sufficient standing that their concern with safety risk issues was instru-
mental in restricting potential sites to more sparsely populated areas than
Oxnard. The Joint Action Group from Aberdour and Dalgety Bay in
Scotland was also interested in the safety risk issue, but felt that author-
ities in the UK did not listen to their concerns. The rights of citizens in
the FRG are protected through the courts, and the residents of Hooksiel
were able to obtain additional subsidies for a planned recreational center
because of their concerns that the LNG facility, together with the adjacent
petrochemical plant, would have a negative impact on tourism in their area.
Providing opportunities for trade and negotiation between parties may
help to reduce conflicts by pacifying individuals and groups who would
otherwise be opposed to a project. Negotiating compensation agreements
can be a time-consuming process and it may be difficult to design a
system in which some groups do not behave strategically in an attempt
to obtain more than they actually require or deserve. IS Furthermore,
there may be differences in preferences between individuals in the same
political jurisdiction (e.g., a local municipality). In such cases some in-
dividuals will be more than satisfied with a proposed compensation
scheme, while others may feel they have not been offered enough to
make the project attractive. There may also be a concern that letting
tastes enter into the choice of sites may be inappropriate.
Recognizing the procedural difficulties, compensation to those who
stand to lose from a new facility siting decision may be desirable if this
action also improves social well-being. In this case, compensation would
be consistent with the Pareto criterion: if you can make everyone better
off by transferring some gains from winners to losers, then this is a desir-
able course of action to follow. Compensation will be most appropriate in
countries where the decision process is based on a compromise model.
Under a judicial model, where a number of policy makers have final
responsibility for a decision, then it is not necessary to reward certain
groups in order to reach a final decision. In this case the parties respon-
sible must weigh the relative importance of welfare and distributional
objectives in making their final choice.
Louis Clarenburg pointed out the dilemma faced by the Dutch on this
question:
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A major problem that we now are facing is how to weigh the voice of a small
population against the total population when you are talking about projects of
national interest, the problem of equity. At what level should decisions in such
cases be taken - at the municipal level, which has to take into account all the
interests of their own population, or at the provincial level, or at the national
level? That is the question which remains in my mind and which I haven't solved.
(KLS 1982, p264)
We have not solved this problem either. A siting decision represents a
balance between political and economic considerations. To improve the
policy process, policy makers and analysts need to have fruitful dialogues.
CONCLUSIONS
Finding a site for an LEG terminal, or deciding not to site the terminal, is
as much a problem of determining how to distribute the gains and losses
of technological society as a problem of how to increase economic
welfare. The way in which these trade-offs were made depended on the
institutional arrangements of the four countries, which followed to
varying degrees the judicial or compromise models for making siting
decisions. An important conclusion of this chapter is that analysts can
help by assisting decision makers on problems involving bo th welfare (or
efficiency) questions as well as distributional questions.
The analyst, in his or her more traditional role, can clarify the potential
effects of a proposed facility. By eliciting preferences of the contending
parties, the analyst may be able to point out those conflicts where some
negotiation and bargaining would be possible. Finally, policy analysis
may be useful in developing proposals for selecting the sites, as well as
formulating options for sharing the potential gains and losses of those
affected.
The problem of siting an LEG terminal is not, however, only one of
resolving the welfare and distributional objectives, but also encompasses
an equally complex set of questions concerning the process by which the
decisions are made. Four possible criteria have been suggested here that
should be addressed in determining a siting procedure: the degree of
openness, the nature of deadlines, the specificity of contractural arrange-
ments, and the nature of compensation. An open process is in many ways
desirable, however costly. Deadlines expedite the decision process, but,
again, have a cost in terms of limiting the time for reflecting on the future
of the technological society. In contrast to the costs of providing for an
open process with flexible deadlines, there appear to be fewer economic
or social costs of assuring that the contractual arrangements are dearly
specified so that each party has a clear idea of their entitlements and those
of others when agreeing to a particular siting proposal. Likewise, compen-
sating those who must inevitably bear the risks of technological develop-
ments appears to be an attractive policy recommendation, but must be
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considered within the political and institutional context of the country
involved.
NOTES
1. See Chapter 2, p18-19 for a more detailed discussion of these
concepts.
2. This point is discussed at length by Michael Thompson in the Post-
script. In a similar vein, James Douglas (1983) has contrasted differ-
ent political systems that have emerged to deal with conflicting
preferences within the electorate. He shows how different institu-
tional arrangements evade the constraints implicit in Arrow's (1963)
four conditions of rationality, which imply the impossibility of
eliciting social preferences from individual preferences.
3. Mark Pauly suggested the distinction between these two types of
process models.
4. Science Shops are centers set up in Holland to distribute expertise,
free of charge, to those who do not normally have access to it. They
are staffed by university faculty members, on a volunteer basis, who
provide information and undertake research and analyses for unions,
environmentalist and neighborhood groups, etc., who are involved in
negotiations (see Kunreuther and Ley 1982).
5. McFadden (1975) has developed a revealed preference approach for
inferring the weights given to different attributes as well as individ-
uals and groups after actual decisions were made by government
bureaucracy. He and Phoebe Cottingham have applied this approach
to an analysis of the California Division of Highways' selection of
freeway projects.
6. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of this methodology
in eliciting preferences and value trade-offs, see Keeney and Raiffa
(1976 ).
7. There was no reconciliation between two groups - the Ministry of
Public Works and the Ministry of Communications and Transport.
This conflict adversely affected the implementation process;
although land was purchased for the new airport, construction of a
new site has still not started.
8. This committee consists of the chief executive officer, chairman of
the local conservation commission, local planning board, fire depart-
ment, four residents appointed by majority vote of town officials,
and not more than four members nominated by the chief executive's
office and approved by a majority vote of the city council.
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9. Gaz de France (personal communication, September 1982).
10. Personal conversation with Patrick Pateneau, Vice-President, Resource
Conservation, US National Wildlife Federation, September 1982.
11. In the US a case arising from the death of a workman at an LNG
site resulted in a court ruling that storage of natural gas in a popu-
lated area is abnormally dangerous because of its inherent risks
(McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 467 P.2d 655 Oregon 1970).
In 1976 New York enacted the Liquefied Natural and Petroleum Gas
Act, which specifies that the storage, transportation, and conversion
of LNG and LPG within the state are considered to be hazardous,
thus entailing strict liability on the part of any person who under-
takes such activities (US General Accounting Office 1978).
12. Virginia Environmental Endowment, 1977 Annual Report, Rich-
mond, Virginia, USA.
13. Wittman (1982) provides a very interesting analysis of how rules for
highway safety and sports reflect specific criteria.
14. See Schulze and Kneese (1981) for a more detailed discussion of the
implications of different ethical systems on project selection and
questions of public safety.
15. For a more detailed discussion of the strategic aspects associated
with compensation, see Raiffa (1982).
Postscript
A Cultural Basis for Comparison
Michael Thompson
One thing that California and the UK have in common is that they have
both approved sites for LEG terminals. After a long, drawn-out process in
which it proved impossible to approve any of the proposed sites California
finally, with the help of a new statute passed expressly for the purpose,
was able to give approval for the remotest of all the sites on the list of
possibles - Point Conception. I California's LNG Tenninal Siting Act
requires that, within one mile of the perimeter of the site, the population
should not exceed ten persons to the square mile and that, within four
miles of the site, the density should not exceed 60 persons to the square
mile. Moreover, these stipulations also apply to the tankers laden with
liquefied gas, which may be conceived of as mobile sites carrying their
zones with them as they make their approach to the terminal or shelter
offshore waiting for calmer weather before docking.
Scotland has a longer coastline than California and most of the country
is very sparsely populated (less than 25 persons to the square mile) and
yet the approved site, at Mossmorran--Braefoot Bay on the Firth of Forth,
lies within the most densely populated part of the entire country (with a
population density of 250-500 persons to the square mile). On top of
this, laden tankers will pass within a mile or so of Burntisland (an indus-
trial town), and sometimes within four miles of Edinburgh - the capital
city of Scotland. If the California siting criteria (explicit in the 1977 Act)
had been applied to the Scottish case it would have been quite impossible
to approve the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay site and, if the UK criteria
(implicit in the Mossmorran -Braefoot Bay approval) had been applied to
the California case, any of the suggested sites could have been approved,
which means that the terminal would have gone to the first site to be
suggested - Los Angeles harbor.
Surely, a glaring contrast like this can mean only one thing - that one
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(at least) of these two countries is way off-beam in its handling of the
risks associated with LEG. But this "single-answer" approach has to make
a rather dubious assumption - that Californians and Scots are the same
(or, at least, that such differences that may exist between them have no
bearing on the safe handling of these technological risks). If we reject this
assumption then we can entertain the possibility that risk handling (and,
indeed, technology generally) may vary with what in the eighteenth
century would have been called "the temper of the people".
If this is the case then we cannot simply jump to the "single-answer"
conclusion. We will have to entertain the possibility that, widely divergent
though they clearly are, the Point Conception and Mossmorran-Braefoot
Bay siting decisions may nevertheless each be appropriate to their different
contexts. This approach would require us to focus not on the risks alone,
but on the relationship between the risks and their social setting.
THE PROBLEM
When we look at our environment we do not see it with the naked eye.
We see it as it is filtered through a cultural screen - our idea of nature.
Yet the environmental theory of perception rightly points out that it is
not what is inside our heads that matters, but what our heads are inside
of. What happens when we put these two together and merge the con-
textual approach with the notion of a cultural screen? Instead of a direct
relationship between an organism and its environment we have an indirect
relationship in which the interposition of culture makes it impossible for
the environment to be directly comprehended. Inevitably we perceive
nature always through a cultural glass and always darkly. For animals,
who have little if any culture, this is of scant consequence, but for humans,
who have a lot of culture, it is nearly everything. Culture opens up an
enormous interpretive space between the human organism and its natural
environment, and it is this space that transforms our ecosystem into what
Kenneth Boulding calls our echo-system. 2
Our cultural screen furnishes us with a way of seeing and, more impor-
tantly, with a way of not seeing. We act in the world on the basis of what
we see and our cultural screen then filters out nearly all the feedback that
would help us to correct our view and, at the same time, lets through
nearly all that confirms it. In this way perceptual bias is inevitable and
learning inevitably confirms that bias. 3 This is not to say that there are no
limits to perceptual bias - that there are no constraints on the dimensions
and shape of the echo-chamber - but only that there will be some bias
and that it cannot be eliminated. To accept this is to raise formidable
obstacles to comparison. If two cases are similar, is this because they are
similar in nature or because of a fortuitous convergence through cultural
screens? And, conversely, if two cases are dissimilar, is this because they
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are dissimilar in nature or because of a fortuitous divergence through cul-
tural screens? Do the case studies reflect similarities and differences
between the cases studied or do they reflect similarities and differences
between those who studied the cases?
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
To accept that the perception of risks is biased is not to claim that risks
are simply imagined. Risks, one may concede, are inherent in the universe;
it is just that, inevitably, they are perceived through a screen and that,
depending, as it were, on the cultural tint of that screen, some risks
will gain perceptual salience and others will be filtered out. The cultural-
environmental theory of perception simply says that risks are selected and
that, therefore, bias in perception is inevitable. 4
But biases in risk perception, it appears, are not infinite, nor do they
run away in every conceivable direction; they seem to be rather strongly
patterned and quite small in number. If this is indeed the case then it
should be possible to abandon the universalistic position, which has to
insist that the echo-chamber does not exist, without going over to the
totally relativistic position that ends up according equal plausibility and
legitimacy to every imaginable bias. 5 There is a theory, cultural bias
theorY, 6 which argues in favor of this notion of constrained relativism and
proposes that only those perceptual biases that are socially viable stand
any chance of persisting through time but, rather than elaborate the whole
of this theory here, I will try to follow the more empirical trail that has
already been blazed by a political scientist: David W. Orr. 7
In trying to make some sense out of the energy debate in the US, Orr
has identified three distinct perspectives, H each of which is appropriate to
a particular set of primary actors and with each of which goes a preferred
style of governance and a distinct set of salient risks. Each perspective,
moreover, gains its particular orientation from the distinctive way in
which the problem is defined (it is here, in the credible ways of defining
the problem, that the different ideas of nature come into play, but more
of that in a moment).
In what Orr calls the supply perspective the problem is inadequate
energy supply, the primary actors are the energy corporations, the pre-
ferred style of governance is laissez-faire (a minimum of government inter-
vention), and the salient risks are those associated with economic dis-
ruption. In the conservation perspective the problem is energy waste, the
primary actor is government, the preferred style of governance is Leviathan
(a major role for government), and the salient risks are those associated
with balance of payments, overseas dependence, and energy wars. In the
energetics perspective the problem is social and cultural, the primary
actors are the public (l would prefer to say the public interest groups), the
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preferred style of governance is Jeffersonian (one in which a participating
citizenry blows the whistle on government), and the salient risks are tech-
nological accidents, resource exhaustion, and climatic change.
Even in this skeletal form, Orr's tripartite scheme provides a powerful
corrective to some of the bias that is built into our LEG study. For
instance, one of the "difficulties" encountered in the US case study was
that, when the senior executives of the energy corporations were asked
about risk, they kept on going off at a tangent and talking about things
like supply interruption and contract insecurity - the economic losses
that might result from bad weather or breakdown preventing tankers from
loading or unloading on schedule, and the even worse losses that would be
incurred if gas-producing countries like Indonesia or Algeria were to
renege on their contracts. When the executives were finally steered back
to the topic of risks to life and limb they soon lost interest. "Oh those
risks", they would say, "I think it would be best if you spoke to our
Safety OfficerjPR man about all that!"
What is so interesting about this little anecdote is that it shows the way
in which the terms of reference for the LEG study have been drawn up in
such a way that the perfectly legitimate (and, according to Orr's frame-
work, the perfectly appropriate) risk concerns of the energy corporations
are rendered anomalous. These terms of reference are, in fact, derived
from the risk concerns appropriate to the energetics perspective (or,
perhaps, from a governmental worry about how it should try to deal with
the ever-increasing demands that are being made on it from the energetics
perspective). If we were to leave this bias unidentified then this whole
study, whilst claiming to be interpretive and descriptive, would inevitably
become strongly normative and narrowly prescriptive. The real prescrip-
tions would go through covertly under the label "description" with the
overtly prescriptive concluding chapter providing a few finishing flour-
ishes. 9 How can we avoid doing this?
Single-problem and multiple-problem analyses
If the analyst himself "decides"lO what are the relevant risks (or if his
clients do this for him in their terms of reference) then he is committed to
the single-problem approach. Clearly, this is what was tending to happen
in the US case study and it is what actually happens in the risk question-
naires administered by psychometricians - the risks are given by the
format of the questionnaire and the interviewee is allowed to say how
serious or trivial they are to him. In the multiple-problem approach the
analyst would explore (by informal guided interview or by participant
observation) in order to find out what sorts of activities and agents the
subject regarded as risky (and, indeed, whether the analyst's concept of
risk had any comparable counterpart in the subject's conceptual scheme).
Only then, when he had elicited the "home-made" risk model, would he
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feel justified in asking questions about the comparability and relative
seriousness of the various risks that loom large in the subject's life. Nor
could he bring himself to use a methodology that required the subject
to attach a fixed total of weights to the lexicon of risks that he (the
analyst) had identified, without having first ensured that none of the
values threatened was conceived of as sacrosanct (and therefore infinitely
weighted).
From all this it might appear that the multiple-problem analyst is so
fastidious that there is just no chance of his ever getting to grips with the
task and that, regrettably perhaps, there is no option but to persevere
with risk analysis in its present single-problem mode. But is this really so?
An approach is single-problem if the analyst defines risk for all his subjects
and it becomes multiple-problem if he allows each subject to define the
risk. This latter is what Orr has done. Far from defining what the risks in
energy are, Orr has assumed that risks are selected and he has allowed each
of his primary actors to define the risks that gain salience in that perspec-
tive. If the various positions within the energy debate depend for their
very existence upon risk being plural in this way then, by Ashby's law of
requisite variety, any approach that assumes that risk is uniform will be in
trouble. Are we in trouble?
The case studies
All our case studies started off by identifying the "interested parties" and
by sketching out the various "party perspectives"; so they certainly set
out with the best of multiple-problem intentions. But there can be no
doubt that, whatever happened in the early stages of their genesis, by the
time they have all been put through the MAMP framework they have all
been stripped of much of their variety. One sympathetic reviewer of our
study has spoken of the MAMP framework as "forcing everything into one
mold" and another, expanding on the same theme, has put it like this:
... you seem to be imprisoned by the notion that all the various partisan partici-
pants in problem solving agree, during anyone round, on a definition of the problem.
Indeed, you mark the progression from one round to another by shifts (always
unanimous?) from one problem definition to another. But it is a common character-
istic of interactive problem solving that many, perhaps most, of the participants
each carry a distinct version of what "the problem" is in their minds .... They are
not working on anyone given problem, nor do they think they are.
So, in this multiple-problem hypothesis, we see the MAMP framework -
our reader's aid - as a repressive device that, trimming a bit off this dis-
tinctive problem definition here, and pulling a plank out of that partisan
platform there, forces everything into the uniform single-problem mold. II
Orr's pluralist framework, by contrast, would allow each perspective the
freedom to define its own problem.
Yet, there is, surely, a sense in which it is valid to speak, as we do in
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Chapter 8, of each "round" as being framed by a particular "problem
formulation"; that formulation being the agenda, as it were, that is set by
the "convening body" for the siting process. The "convening body", of
course, seldom has a completely free hand in setting the agenda for the
process, but, nevertheless, the fact that the other interested parties par-
ticipate in that process can be construed as indicating that they have, to
some extent, accepted that particular problem definition. But only, so the
multiple-problem protagonists would argue, to some extent. Though they
all sit down to the one visible agenda, they all bring with them their own
hidden agendas. 12
So the conflict between the single-problem and the multiple-problem
hypotheses has to do with inclusiveness. Both can handle the visible
agenda (the its-the-same-the-whole-world-over part of the story), but only
the multiple-problem hypothesis can go on to handle the hidden agendas
as well (the things-get-done-differently-in-different-countries part of the
story). The multiple-problem hypothesis concedes that some ordering
principle will be needed if the case studies are to be compared, and it con-
cedes that the MAMP framework is a pretty effective ordering device, but
it is just that order has had to be purchased at a price, and that price is the
acceptance of a repressive single-problem approach. But this does not
mean that all is lost. If the single-problem approach is inadequate then we
should expect serious anomalies and paradoxes to show up in the case
studies. If they do show up then we can restore the multiple-problem
approach, and put it to the test by listing these anomalies and paradoxes
and then calling on the cultural hypothesis to resolve them.
The cultural hypothesis
Figure 1 sets out the essential features of Orr's framework. Each of these
perspectives is a whole package with each component playing its part. I
have put the ultimate energy sources in a separate box in order to empha-
size that each package is put together in such a way as to lead inevitably
to the desired future. One consequence of this is that risk is never just risk
but always "risk-for" (in the same way that history is always "history-
for" 13). The "risks-for" are the sticks (the sanctions) that are being used
to drive the society towards the desired energy future, and towards the
desired pattern of social relations that is perceived as accompanying that
future. Risks, in other words, are selected in order to provide rational-
izations for preferred patterns of social relations. That, given the inevit-
ability of "risk-for", is the cultural definition of risk.
If risks are the sticks, what are the carrots - the positive inducements
for society to move in the desired direction? Answer: resources. From the
supply perspective we live in a world of resource abundance; from the
conservation perspective we live in a world of resource scarcity; from the
energetics perspective we live in a world of resource depletion. 14 But how
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~Variables Supply Conservation Energetics
The problem Inadequate supply Energy waste Cultural and social
Primay actors Energy corporations Government agencies The public (public
interest groups)
Energy goals Inexhaustible Near term: efficiency Decentral ized
cheap energy Long term: inexhaustible solar-based society
(but not cheap) energy
Preferred style of Laissez-faire Leviathan Jefferson ian
governance
Value system No change Small (or gradual) change Large
changes requied (and sudden)
change
Sal ient risks Economic disruption Balance of payments Technological accidents
Overseas dependence Resource exhaustion
I Energy wars Climatic change
Ultimate energy Breeder/fusion Conservation Decentralized solar,
sources leading to wind, and biomass
breeder/fusion
Figure 1. Orr's framework.
do these contradictory convictions about the nature of resources arise,
and how is it that, in one world, these contradictory convictions can go on
and on existing? To answer these questions we have to resort to cultural
bias theory and we have to underpin Orr's scheme, which is essentially an
explanation in terms of goal-seeking (the goals being set by the evident
self-interest of the primary actors), at the much deeper level of goal-setting
(where one asks how it is that the actors can come to know where the self-
interest in which they act lies).
First, let me generalize Orr's primary actors into three distinct social
types: entrepreneurs, hierarchists, and sectarians. Each of these obtains his
distinct social identity from the social context that he finds himself in and
that he strives to maintain. Each context is defined by a distinct kind of
organization: the ego-focused network for the entrepreneur, the hierarchi-
cally nested group for the hierarchist, and the bounded egalitarian group
for the sectarian. I argue that this typology of organizations is exhaustive
- that these are the only kinds of organizations that are socially viable. 15
But there are two provisos. First the construction of ego-focused net-
works is a competitive business and, if there exist opportunities for
economies of scale, some networks (those of the forceful, skillful, and
lucky individuals) will expand at the expense of others (those of the
timid, de-skilled, and unlucky individuals). The result is a bifurcation into
two social types: the entrepreneur, freely transacting from the center of
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his extensive network, and the ineffectual, very much restricted by the
pre-empting of his transactional options that results from the prolifer-
ating networks of the entrepreneur. Secondly, the deliberate avoidance of
all three of these organizational forms can also be a socially viable strategy
in certain circumstances (one of which is the absence of opportunities for
economies of scale). Individuals who successfully follow this strategy
constitute a fifth social type: the hermit.
So, although there are only three organizational types, their dynamic
nature results in a total of five social types. These five can be conveniently
mapped onto two axes of social context: group, which has to do with the
extent to which an individual is incorporated into or is free from bounded
social groups, and grid, which has to do with the extent to which an
individual finds himself subject to or free from socially imposed prescrip-
tions (in which case, like our entrepreneur, this may be because he is
inadvertently busy imposing prescriptions on individuals in other social
contexts). With each of these social types there goes a distinctive socially
induced strategy that is all the time justified and sustained by a distinctive
cultural bias. The social types, in other words, are not just there; they are
continually in contention, and the whole thrust of this cultural theory is
that policy debates (such as those that surround LEG) are best under-
stood as particularly visible and focused instances of this continual con-
tention (see Figure 2).
GRID
The
ineffectual
I The
entrepreneur
+
The
hermit
The
hie rarch ist
f------+ GROUP
+
The
sectarian
Figure 2. Social types and their social contexts.
The sectarian, the hierarchical, and the entrepreneurial biases are all
clearly identifiable within our four case studies (though with some marked
variations in their relative strengths, influences, and standings as we go
from one country to another), but two social types - the ineffectual and
the hermit - never show up at all. The reason is simply that the ineffectual
could not gain access to the debate, even if he wanted to, whilst the
hermit's whole strategy is based on steering well clear of all that sort of
coercive involvement. Hermits drop out; ineffectuals are squeezed out.
But, just because they are absent from the debate, it does not follow that
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they are irrelevant to it. Many public interest groups, for instance, credibly
claim to speak on behalf of the poor, the helpless, and the disregarded.
In so doing, they do not bring the ineffectuals into the debate; rather,
they appropriate them as a moral bludgeon with which to belabor the
Establishment - the entrepreneurs and the hierarchists - who together
form the other diagonal of the social context map.16 But more of these
complex dynamics - these perpetual contentions - presently. First let
me present the essential features of the three social types that do partici-
pate in the debate; then let me run through a number of anomalies and
paradoxes within the case studies to see if I can resolve them with the
help of this plural frame (see Figure 3).
~:Variables Entrepreneur Hierarchist Sectarian
Organization Ego-focused Hierarch ically Bounded egalitarian
(conceptual scheme) network nested group group
Cultural bias Pragmatic Ritualism and Millenarianism/
materialism sacrifice fundamentalism
Socially induced Individualist Collectivist Group survival/
personal strategy manipulative manipulative coercive utopian
Idea of nature Skill-eontrolled Isomorphic Strictly
cornucopia (cornucopian with accou ntable
accountable limits)
"Carrot" justified Resource abundance Resource scarcity Resource depletion
by idea of natu re (culturally bestowed) (culturally bestowed (naturally imposed)
within natural frame)
"Stick" justified by Salient risks as in Salient risks as in Sal ient risks as in
idea of natu re Orr (Figure 1) Orr (Figure 1) Orr (Figure 1)
Scenario that sticks "Business as usual" "Middle of the road" "Radical change now"
and carrots are
steeri ng towards
Figure 3. The cultural underpinnings for Orr's framework.
ANOMALIES AND PARADOXES
Rounds and bouts
Planning procedures (in market economies) create an asymmetrical arena
within which the planning authorities act only when a proposer does
something. Planning is defensive; proposing is offensive, and in the UK the
initiative lies entirely with the proposer. The ShelljEsso consortium's aim
is to obtain planning approval for a site of their choosing. No doubt they
pay careful attention to economic factors such as pipeline costs and to
environmental factors such as coastal configurations, prevailing weather
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conditions, and the Strategic Plan on which are marked the areas where
development is variously encouraged or discouraged. If they are wise they
will also pay some attention to social factors such as the likely strength of
the opposition at the various points where they might try to put their
facility ashore. And, if at first they do not succeed, then they can try, try,
try, and try again.
In other words, the fight starts when the initiator decides he wants to
put a facility ashore and it ends when he gets permission to do so (or
when he gives up trying). From this perspective, the Mossmorran-Braefoot
Bay proposal was just one round within a bout that began with Shell/
Esso's earlier abortive attempt to put their facility ashore at Peterhead.
But the defense does not see it like that. It acts only when a proposal is
initiated and it defines each bout as beginning with a proposal and ending
with the approval or rejection of that proposal. Since there is no way in
which these two perceptions can be reconciled within a single formulation,
we really need two MAMP frameworks -- one for the proposer and one for
the planning authority - but we only have one! Let us briefly examine
this anomaly by considering what would happen if we went multiple-
problem and allowed plural MAMPs.
In the British case the mismatch between the two MAMP frameworks
would be considerable; in the US case it would be less so. The reason is
that, in the US, the need is debated first and then, if the decision is "yes",
a list of possible sites is drawn up and the proposer has to work his way
through this "public" list. 17 In Britain, the question of need does not get
this sort of public hearing, nor is there a public list of sites (though,
doubtless, the proposers have their own private list that they are prepared
to work their way through). The comparison of mismatches between these
sets of plural MAMPs is most instructive.
(1) Separate MAMPs for attackers and defenders permit us to recognize
the fundamental asymmetry within the planning arena: the attacker's
MAMP will reflect the entrepreneur's cultural bias, whilst the defender's
MAMP will reflect the hierarchist's cultural bias. Accordingly, the
pragmatic materialism of the attacker's bias leads him to treat the
defender's non-negotiable preconditions (as set out in the Strategic
Plan) as simply a part of nature, whilst the defender's bias in favor
of clarity and order leads him to chop discrete sections out of the
decision-making continuum at those points where he starts and finishes
acting in response to the attacker's appearances and disappearances.
(2) The patterning of the mismatches between these MAMPs as we go
from the US to Britain clearly reveals that things are much more
"chopped-up" in Britain and that public participation is much greater
in the US. This suggests a strong bias towards hierarchy in Britain and
a strong bias away from hierarchy, and towards the sort of Jeffersonian
demands associated with the sectist bias, in the US.
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(3) These sorts of contrasts between Britain and the US are often general-
ized in terms of a distinction between consensus and adversary cul-
tures, and the comparisons between plural MAMPs allow us to suggest
a plausible cultural basis for the very different political regimes that
underlie this distinction.
A representative but non-participatory style of democracy requires a
deferential populace that is prepared to tolerate quite a high level of
secrecy, that respects expertise, and that places trust in a system that
divides issues up into morsels suitable for ingestion at various levels within
its hierarchical structure. A more participatory style of democracy requires
a truculent populace that is prepared to blow the whistle at the first sign
of secretiveness, that suspects expertise, and that distrusts hierarchy-
building tendencies whenever it sees them. 18
So a comparison of plural MAMPs opens up a possible way of recogniz-
ing different political regimes and, through them, a way of getting at the
different institutionalized styles of risk handling that go with them. In a
deferential regime the balance that government has to strike is that
between the demands that are being made from the entrepreneurial and
the hierarchical cultural biases. In a truculent regime things are more compli-
cated and the balance that government has to strike is a three-cornered
affair that has to take account of the demands from the sectarian bias as
well.
A reasonable prediction from this hypothesis is that a regime that
demands public participation and opposes secrecy will generate much
more literature (reports, transcripts of hearings, etc.) than one that
restricts public participation and promotes secrecy. This is one comparison
between case studies that can be made. By the simple criterion of weighing
the "universes" of printed material accumulated during the course of the
case studies, it would seem that all three European countries share consen-
sus cultures whilst only the US has an adversary culture. 19 In exploring
the remaining anomalies I will look, first, to see whether this tentative
separation is supported and, second, to understand some of the unique
properties of the European cases that impart rather different flavors to the
one style of culture that they share.
Siting criteria compared
Only in the California case, with its LNG Terminal Siting Act, are the siting
criteria made explicit. In the other three cases the criteria have to be de-
duced from specific instances of approval and rejection. Of course, any such
deduced siting criteria would not carry anything like the same force of law
as the California criteria in arriving at future siting decisions; the best claim
that could be made with them would be that they had set a precedent.
Hierarchical regimes like precedent, which gives them a non-negotiable
frame with, at the same time, considerable space for manoeuver. 20 More
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egalitarian regimes are suspicious of the inequitable trade-offs between
the hierarchical and entrepreneurial biases that might go on within this
"manoeuver space" and prefer instead to have everything cut-and-dried
and written down in black and white.
The same gross anomalies that emerge when the California siting criteria
are applied to the British case also emerge when they are applied to the
Dutch and the German cases -- both seriously contravene the California
population density requirements. On the other hand, although there are
differences, the same gross anomalies do not emerge when the British, the
Dutch and the German siting decisions are superimposed on one another.
All three sites are fairly close to populated areas and the approaches to all
three involve quite complex navigation through restricted and much-used
channels. The geographical argument that sees these similarities and differ-
ences as being dictated by the difference between a small and constricted
Europe and a spacious and open California certainly does not hold up in
the case of Scotland; nor does it square at all well with the Dutch rejec-
tion of the artificial island option that would actually have satisfied the
California criteria.
No, we must seriously consider that, like the Duponts placing their
family mansion right in the center of their black powder works, these
European countries actually prefer that the risks they take for the benefit
of the whole be absorbed by that whole. Rather than pursue a goal of zero
risk, justified by the sectarian arguments in favor of equity, they strive to
institute a judicious measure of noblesse oblige - a hierarchic code in
which the proper relationships of the parts are given expression through
the sacrifices each must be prepared to make to the whole - which they
justify by the convergence of two arguments: the entrepreneurial argu-
ment in favor of economic efficiency; and the hierarchical argument in
favor of logical, orderly, and visible (but not necessarily participatory)
procedures.
A growing concern that does not grow
One prescription that is advanced in the FRG case study is that there
should be more public participation and less secrecy in the decision
process in order that "the growing concern about risk and the negative
effects of technological development" may be more adequately taken into
account. The argument is that the present representative system, by
excluding public debate on safety questions makes itself insensitive to
these concerns. Yet one of the most interesting features of this case study
is that these "growing concerns" are very little in evidence. "The oppo-
sition", we are told, "was not very strong in Wilhelmshaven"; there was
"no participation by national or regional environmentalist groups or
movements", and such opposition as there was remained focused on local
issues.
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The growing concern about risk and the negative effects of technologi-
cal development, it turns out, has its origin in nuclear power, and the fact
that it does not spill over into LEG should cause us to question this
common generalized assumption. Perhaps the generalization is the wrong
way round? Perhaps LEG, with its scant public participation, is the
German norm and nuclear power the German exception? Perhaps it is not
a growing concern about risk that creates a need for public participation
but, rather, more public participation that creates the growing concern?
In the case of nuclear power, it is the transition from federal policy to
Lander implementation that has provided the opportunity for increased
public participation. At the Lander level local citizens' groups (the
Burgerinitiatiuen) are guaranteed access to the otherwise rather inaccess-
ible process (by a constitutional feature that is somewhat at odds with
the German way of doing things, which was inserted by the Allies in the
hope that it would provide some sort of check on the development of
extreme state authoritarianism). These opportunities for public partici-
pation do not arise in the case of other technologies, such as LEG, because
the nature of the federal/Lander transfer is not the same. 21 But why
should public participation result in an increased concern over risk and the
negative aspects of technology in general? Cultural theory provides a
plausible answer.
If the local citizens' groups are sectarian (and, since they are (a) groups
and (b) external to the hierarchical system, this would appear very likely)
then they will follow an appropriately truculent strategy that rejects com-
promise, pulls back from negotiation, suspects expertise, sets an absolute
priority on equity, and sees arguments in favor of efficiency as nothing
short of conspiratorial. From this perspective, risk (involuntary, cata-
strophic, and irreversible) is for distancing oneself from the two pillars of
the Establishment - the entrepreneurs and the hierarchists. Small wonder,
then, that increased sectist participation in the decision-making process
results in a growing concern about risk and the negative effects of techno-
logical development!
The cultural approach suggests that increased public participation may
well be an appropriate prescription within an adversary culture, but that
it is probably inappropriate within a consensus culture (unless, of course,
your goal is to hasten the demise of the deferential regime that accom-
panies such a culture). But this is not to say that there should be no
response to those concerns about risks (and technology generally) that
gain salience in the sectist bias, only that they should be responded to in
the appropriate manner - sympathetically but at arm's length. This, of
course, is a brash and overconfident statement of how the cultural theory
can generate prescriptions that are sensitive to the notion of appropriate-
ness. It is intended more as a corrective to the sorts of prescriptions that
single-problem approaches generate than as an exemplar of prescription
making in the plural mode.
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The Dutch anomalies
(1) Central government assigned itself a central position yet was con-
fronted by new developments and dynamics apparently outside its direct
control - Gasunie's initiative in approaching the Groningen local author-
ities, for instance.
(2) Ultimate responsibility for a successful outcome rested with the
cabinet. "Success", in such a setting, is achieved by mustering convincing
justifications for the decision, yet the cabinet chose not to make any use
of the one absolutely marvelous justification that was lying there just
begging to be used - that in terms of the accident risks at the two sites.
The Dutch cabinet did not endorse the Groningen local authorities' view
that the Eemshaven risks were acceptable, nor did it involve itself with the
opponents of the Maasvlakte site who claimed that the risks there were
unacceptably high. But, though it rejected this justificatory basis, the
cabinet, in choosing Eemshaven, parted company with many of its official
advisory bodies (which were concerned with national rather than local
decision making and which favored Maasvlakte on energy policy and
economic grounds). Then, having spurned one excellent justification and
diverged from its advisors on two other justificatory arguments because
they pointed in the other direction, it pinned everything on the wishy-
washy socioeconomic argument. Small wonder, given the fragile and fluid
coalitions engendered by the Dutch system of proportional representation,
that the decision on LNG become one with the very survival of the
government. 22
The first anomaly (an agency claiming overall control and then being
continually surprised by its lack of control) is a familiar enough phenome-
non that may readily be understood in terms of the asymmetry of an
arena in which the initiative lies with the proposer. Surprise, after all, is
one of the Principles of War and it is not easy for a sedentary defender
to do anything very surprising.
Yet, when we look more closely, we find that Gasunie is not exactly
one of the savage beasts of capitalism; it is a semi-state-owned company
that has been given a mandate by the government to import LNG within
the context of a clearly stated and agreed energy policy. The trade-offs
and mutual accommodations between the entrepreneurial and hierarchical
biases are here so developed that the whole process is more like a cozy
little war game than the real thing. The asymmetry of the arena is so
eroded, and the two actors within it have become so complacently recon-
ciled, that it is difficult to see how either could do anything much to
surprise the other. Perhaps the real source of the surprise lies outside the
arena? Perhaps it was a sectarian assault on these complacent accommo-
dations that triggered the surprising events?
Look again, and we see that what prodded Gasunie into independent
action was the local concern about the safety of an LNG terminal at
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Maasvlakte that might have made official approval increasingly difficult to
obtain within the time available. This would suggest that the real source of
surprise had to do with an unanticipated shift in cultural bias (towards
sectism) as we go from the national to the local government level.
Occam's razor (the Principle of Parsimony) comes to the support of the
cultural theory at this point because this explanation, it turns out, also
resolves the much more serious problem that is presented by the second
anomaly - that the Netherlands case study lies beyond the scope of the
framework that is designed to explain it .
. . . the outcome ... cannot be interpreted solely in terms of the different official
party perspectives and dimensional party interactions, as represented in the MAMP
model. In particular the clear divergence between the cabinet's final view and many
of its advisory bodies ... limits the extent to which the cabinet's final decision can
be understood in terms of official advice submitted to it. 23
If the official framework cannot explain what happened, perhaps the
unofficial one can. But, to get at the unofficial framework, we have to go
right down into the social dynamics that generate and sustain the various
objector groups - particularly those at the local level in Rotterdam,
Rijnmond, and Groningen - but the Dutch case study, alas, does not
provide sufficient information on these groups. But we do have informa-
tion on these sorts of groups in the British context, and so I will make an
oblique approach by first providing a cultural sketch of the British case
study and then using it to present a plausible resolution of this serious
Dutch anomaly.
A cultural approach to central and local government
Local government, as its name implies, is nested inside something else:
national or central government. Of its nature it is hierarchical and, in its
tug-o-war with the other pillar of the Establishment - the entrepreneurs -
its hierarchical physique is its strength. But what if the sectists enter into
the contest as well? The whole thing is thrown off balance. The sectists,
above all, are pro-local and they demand that local government becomes
more local. "Decentralize in the name of Small is Beautiful", and "Redis-
tribute in the name of Equity", they demand. But decentralization requires
less hierarchically organized intervention, whilst redistribution requires
more. There's the sectist rub!
Local government, by virtue of the fact that it is local, is much more
prone to sectist demands than is central government. But, before there can
be sectist demands, there have to be some sectists there to make them and
this means that the potential cultural mismatch between central and local
government is only activated when the sectarian demands are effectively
present at the local level. In Scotland, for instance, the local objector
group, the Aberdour and Dalgety Bay Joint Action Group (ADBJAG),
operated along Establishment lines. They were at home in the setting of a
public inquiry, they understood and played by the rules, they respected
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science and expertise, they sorted out their differences with other object-
ing groups (the Conservation Society, for instance) beforehand so as to
present a consistent and unified front in the debate, and they even sat
down to dinner with the enemy. They were respectable rebels. 24 Like
nimby (not in my backyard) groups elsewhere in Britain their membership
is fairly conservative, fairly elderly, and strongly middle class, and this
leads one to suspect that perhaps not all nimbies are equal; that a nimby
mobilized from a social fabric richly embroidered with articulate profes-
sionals (Aberdour and Dalgety Bay, for example) is likely to be much
more formidable than one that emerges from a blue-collar fabric (Canvey
Island, for example) and that there may be some threadbare social fabrics
so lacking in manipulative and information-handling ability as to be
unable to mobilize any sort of nimby at all (Cowdenbeath, for example25 ).
The result is that planning proposals end up tripping daintily through the
nimbies - giving the formidable ones a wide berth, avoiding the weaker
ones where possible and, other things being equal, stepping where there
aren't any nimbies at all. As any civil engineer experienced in motorway
construction will tell you, the best soil conditions are always to be found
in working-class areas.
In the Braefoot Bay case, other things were not equal. There was
nowhere else to step (apart from Peterhead, which had already been tried,
and some much more expensive alternatives to the north and west),
Mortimer's Deep was just about the only economical place capable of
accommodating ShelljEsso's colossal foot, and so they really had no
option but to meet the nimbies head-on.
But in the Netherlands, the two things were different. First, the avail-
able options were such that it was possible for the applications to trip
daintily through the nimbies all the way to an unopposed site. Second, the
nature of the opposition along the way (I will suggest) was much more
sectarian than was the case in Scotland; and it was this sectarian cultural
bias that, in giving rise to the mismatch between central and local govern-
ment levels, produced the Dutch anomalies.
Moral justifications at cross-purposes
One way of understanding local government is to change it. Fortunately,
there is plenty of such change about. In Sweden, for instance, the massive
reorganization of local government that occurred during the 1970s was
justified by a number of claims:
(1) the economies of scale that would be achieved by amalgamation;
(2) the economies of rationalization that would be achieved by amalga-
mating in such a way that all the new local authorities were of com-
parable size;
(3) a fairer distribution of services. For instance, smaller authorities
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cannot afford even the smallest swimming pool but if they are amal-
gamated, then everyone will have access to a swimming pool.
This last is a justification in terms of increased equity, and the Swedish
assumption has been that increases in equity can be subsumed within the
efficiency argument that runs through the first two justifications. Effi-
ciency and equity, so the assumption goes (and it is not just a Swedish
assumption), may not be exactly parallel but they run in the same sort of
direction. This I will call the complacent assumption, and I will question it
by proposing a discomforting hypothesis that, far from running in roughly
the same direction, equity and efficiency are seriously divergent and
perhaps even directly opposed.
Already, some students of local government (those who have tried to
evaluate the reorganizations) have suggested that efficiency arguments
have a built-in technocratic bias and are anti-democratic, whilst equity
arguments have a built-in grassroots bias and are democratic. Translated
into cultural theory, what they are saying is that the pursuit of efficiency
leads to hierarchy-heightening, whilst the pursuit of equity leads to base-
widening. 26 What, then, happens if you insist on both? You increase the
height of the governmental pyramid and you increase its base; therefore
you increase its volume. If, on the other hand, you cannot increase its
volume (because of a world recession, for instance) then you must choose
either one or the other. Central government will usually choose efficiency,
but local government, in a strongly sectist locale, will be forced to flip
the other way. Let me explain this switching mechanism in more detail,
for it is the key to the whole argument.
The trade-off between entrepreneurs and hierarchists is shaped by con-
siderations of efficiency and is tempered with two partially contradictory
concerns:
(1) the entrepreneurial concern for competition, which is normally justi-
fied by the notion of equality of opportunity and which is seen as
being achieved through the free operation of the market;27
(2) the hierarchical concern for order, which is normally justified by the
notion of equality before the law and which is seen as being achieved
by nicely judged interventions aimed at mitigating the worst excesses
of the market.
If we call the mediating institutions that are responsible for achieving
these trade-offs government, then this balancing act between the two
powerful cultural biases provides quite a good description of what govern-
ment, in the context of a consensus culture, has to do in order to moder-
ate each specific debate in such a way as not to erode its general consent.
But what happens in an adversary culture where the sects (or, rather, the
sect-leaders) are also in on the act?
To the sectarians the trade-off along the positive diagonal, 28 between
the hierarchists and the entrepreneurs, is an unacceptable and disgracefully
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inequitable piece of mutual nest-feathering. Their characteristically
strident and uncompromising demands are that the trade-off should be
radically shifted at right angles to the positive diagonal and strongly in the
direction of increased equity. Single issues, irreversible risks, inviolable
rights, purity of commitment, refusal to compromise, redistribution acting
as a trump card over "expedient" arguments for efficiency, and equality,
not of opportunity, but of result are the hallmarks of the sectarians' posi-
tion. Their strategy is shaped by a rationality of truculence and their
uncompromising moral stance is achieved by a commitment to the nega-
tive diagonal 29 that connects their social context to those isolated and
impotent individuals - the ineffectuals - on whose behalf they credibly
claim to speak. 3o
Then, if the sectists are to be persuaded not to withdraw their consent,
government will have to strike a much more complex balance. Of course,
in a deferential regime, such sectist demands may safely be ignored;31 the
sectist bias is so weak in comparison with the positive diagonal that govern-
ment would actually stand to lose more consent by moving in the equity
direction than it would gain. In Scotland, for instance, only one voice,
that of Mr. Jamieson,32 is raised in the name of sectism. With fine and
xenophobic frenzy he castigates both the entrepreneurs and the hier-
archists for their willingness to throwaway the land that fed a thousand
Scots. But the final decision, though it attaches numerous conditions in
response to the positive diagonal arguments of the Conservation Society
and ADBJAG, pays absolutely no heed to poor Mr. Jamieson. The final
decision is a straight balance between the two pillars of the Establishment:
the trade-offs run smoothly up and down the positive diagonal.
But, in a truculent regime, the sectist bias is sufficiently strong for a
government's departure in the direction of equity to bring with it an
increase in consent. Only if it moves too far in this direction will the loss
in consent from the positive diagonal start to outweigh the increase it is
receiving from the negative diagonal. In this way government, if it is to
maximize its consent, has to strike a complex three-cornered balance in
which the rewards of efficiency that are generated along the positive
diagonal have to be diverted at right-angles along the negative diagonal
in order to keep all them grassroots a-growin'.
If central government finds itself striking the two-cornered balance, and
local government the three-cornered balance, then they will be working
against one another. The moral justifications in terms of efficiency that
sustain the positive diagonal simply cannot be reconciled with the moral
justifications in terms of equity that sustain the negative diagonal. Central
government will be acting so as to stabilize a deferential regime whilst
local government will be doing all it can to usher in a truculent regime.
When all this is referred to the social context diagram (Figure 4) the result
is two fundamentally crossed purposes. The efficiency arguments, in
providing a negotiating language for the hierarchical and entrepreneurial
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Figure 4. Social contexts, cultural biases, moral justifications, rationalities, and the
attraction of opposites.
biases, define an axis of complacency; the equity arguments, in providing
the sectists with a passive clientele of ineffectuals, define an axis of criti-
cism. In this way efficiency and equity are literally at right angles to one
another.
The Dutch anomalies revisited
How does this hypothesis - that efficiency and equity are seriously diver-
gent and that central government may go one way and local government
the other - explain the Dutch anomalies, and what evidence is there to
support it?
First, variations in social fabric as we go from the prosperous and
metropolitan Rotterdam area to the less prosperous and more provincial
Groningen area would account for a falling off in the strength of nimby
opposition and, by the tripping-through-the-nimbies principle, this falling-
off would explain why the terminal finally ended up at Eemshaven.
Second, if the dominant cultural bias within these opposition groups was a
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sedist bias, then that would provide the switching mechanism that would
put a complacent central government completely out of step with a criti-
cal local government (in Rotterdam and Rijnmond). This would explain
central government's surprise when it was hit by a sedist assault from out-
side the complacent arena that it shared with Gasunie, and it would
explain the curious pattern of justification subsequently adopted by the
cabinet.
In tripping through the nimbies, the final decision passed out of the
effective control of a deferential regime and, thereafter, followed the line
of least resistance that led it away from the consensus-lacking truculent
regimes around Rotterdam and towards the nimby-free (and consensual)
Groningen area. 33 So the decision was really determined by the equity-
focused criteria of truculent local government regimes, but it had to be
justified in terms of the efficiency-focused criteria of a deferential central
government regime. In bowing to the strength of the sectist arguments
around Rotterdam, central government had to part company with its
positive diagonal advisors yet, in justifying that decision, it could not be
seen to espouse the sectist risk arguments that, in fact, decided it all. What
evidence is there to support this argument?
Clearly, Gasunie found itself dealing increasingly with the local govern-
ment world. Directly, and indirectly, it received indications that there was
a lack of consensus on the acceptability of LNG in the Rotterdam area.
But central government kept itself remote from these dealings and the
first thing it "knew" about the reintroduction of the Eemshaven site was
when it received a request from the Groningen local authorities who had
by that time reached a satisfactory accommodation with Gasunie. That
this arrangement was satisfactory suggests that, unlike in the Rotterdam
area, there was a consensus on LNG in Groningen. So what was responsi-
ble for the lack of consensus in the Rotterdam area?
(1) The case study tells us that reports in the media indicated that the
main issue was the impact on the local environment and, in particular,
the increased danger that LNG would pose to the local population.
Lack of consensus on criteria for deciding factual risk led to concerns
being aired about the perceived risk level to the local population.
Orr's table tells us that environmental change and technological accidents
are the risks that gain salience in the sectist cultural bias, and the fact that
these concerns were pressed with sufficient force to dislodge the compla-
cent axis's determination of factual risk, and to substitute a higher per-
ceived risk, indicates that the sectist bias was present in some force and
that it was effective.
(2) A serious threat of delay was presented by "the interest which was
shown by some (in particular within the Rijnmond Public Authority)
to design a unique 'public participation' program as part of the
approval procedure at the local level. "34
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Though the case study does not tell us who those "some" were, we can
guess. As local government gets more local, so increased public partici-
pation (if it is sectist) erodes the consensus that has been reached at the
higher levels (central government and Rotterdam).
(3) The case study has to appeal to the presence of "political pressures"
to account for the switch from Maasvlakte to Eemshaven. Groningen,
we are told, had got its act together and was able to lobby effectively,
whilst in the Rotterdam region the local authorities were divided. In
addition, the condition demanded by Rotterdam - that they would
not get a nuclear power station as well as an LNG terminal - helped
sway the decision in favor of Eemshaven.
But why did Rotterdam impose this condition and why did Groningen not
impose it? And why was Rotterdam divided and Groningen together? The
cultural hypothesis has the perfect explanation.
The presence of a strong sectarian bias in Rotterdam (and particularly
in Rijnmond) would explain the lack of consensus there, and the absence
of such a bias in the Groningen area would explain the presence of consen-
sus there. On top of this, the great "risks-for" in the sectarian bias are the
involuntary, irreversible, and catastrophic consequences that are perceived
to accompany nuclear power. So the presence of a sectarian bias in the
Rotterdam area would account for the nuclear plant condition there, and
the absence of such a bias in the Groningen area would account for the
absence of the condition there.
(4) The cabinet's overriding emphasis on the socioeconomic argument
(regional development policy, unemployment, etc.) in justifying its
final decision in favor of Eemshaven is readily understood when we
see that its official advisors (on the grounds of economic costs and
energy policy) favored Maasvlakte. But it does not help us to under-
stand why it chose Eemshaven in the face of these two efficiency
arguments; nor does it explain why, having made the decision, it did
not draw on the readily available safety argument as a powerful justifi-
cation for that decision.
The cultural hypothesis (and in particular the switch from deference to
truculence as we go from the central to the local government level)
explains why central government, faced with a sectist fait accompli at the
local level, had no option but to decide in favor of Eemshaven. At the
same time, it explains why the cabinet, as an institution committed to the
stabilization of a deferential regime, could not possibly be seen to use the
sectarian safety arguments. They are the arguments appropriate to the
stabilization of a truculent regime and, as such, would justify the capitu-
lation of a deferential regime.
An alternative interpretation that is still consistent with the cultural
hypothesis (but which places less emphasis on the switch from hierarchical
to sectarian influence as we go from central to local government) sees a
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culturally rather inconsistent cabinet stumbling, as best it can, from one
crisis to the next. In the sorts of coalition systems that follow from
proportional representation, sectism is able to penetrate government much
more strongly than in the "two-party, first past the post" system. All sorts
of people (our case study writer, for instance) can gain access to the upper
reaches of the Dutch government and civil service with an ease and legiti-
macy that would never be tolerated in Britain or the FRG. The result is a
lack of cultural consistency and a rather high degree of arbitrariness, with
power receding to more private (and more culturally consistent) cliques,
and with the cabinet's capacity shrinking to piecemeal bilateral agree-
ments and deals (like Gasunie's). Within this interpretation, the cabinet's
shunning of the justification in terms of accident risk is seen as not so much
an assertion of a strongly hierarchical cultural bias, but rather as a stop-
gap measure aimed at avoiding setting a precedent that might reduce its
scope and manoeuverability, even further.
Perhaps, pushing the hypothesis to its speculative limit, these two inter-
pretations are best seen not as alternatives but, rather, as fairly distinct
phases within a single continuous process of transformation. First, the
sectarian influence increases at the local level and central government (still
hierarchical) fights back; then sectarianism, diffusing upwards, pluralizes
even the cabinet, breaking down its cultural consistency and rendering its
decision making increasingly arbitrary and hand-to-mouth; finally, power
migrates to more private and culturally more consistent cliques that can
then use the public organs of government as little more than legitimizing
rubber stamps for their multifarious deals.
TECHNOLOGIES AS CULTURAL PRODUCTS
Coming to LEG risk from nuclear power and from smoking and health,
the most interesting thing about this debate is that it is so boring. Shell
and Esso, admittedly, are no more boring than British Nuclear Fuels or
Philip Morris;35 the tedium has to do with the almost complete absence of
variety among the groups and individuals, who, though not the instigators
of the proposals, nevertheless feel sufficiently moved by them to speak
out - either for or against. In the ShelljEsso corner we find no counter-
part of SE 2 (Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy) and its awesome
spokesperson, Ed Teller - "the Father of the H-bomb"; in the other
corner, instead of a cacophonous assortment of anti-groups with won-
drously assorted acronyms like GASP (Group Against Smokers' Pollution)
or SCRAM (Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic Menace), there is just
one quite well behaved nimby - the Aberdour and Dalgety Bay Joint
Action Group - with an instantly forgettable set of initials that cannot
even be pronounced.
What makes this absence of excitement so exciting is that it runs counter
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to the current conventional wisdom that sees everywhere a growing con-
cern about the negative aspects of technology and that then seeks to
explain this general phenomenon in terms of a widespread transition from
industrial to post-industrial society. According to this prevalent hypothe-
sis, once a certain level of affluence has been reached, there comes an
inevitable shift from material to spiritual values. This shift, by diminishing
the positive (but material) advantages of modern technology and by in-
flating its negative (and spiritually damaging) disadvantages, radically
alters our whole attitude to the innovative flow that has been so central a
feature of Western society since the start of the Industrial Revolution. 36
But this explanation is of the "single problem-single answer" type and,
as such, deserves to be viewed with suspicion.
Why, if there is everywhere a growing disenchantment with technology,
was there no participation of national or regional environmentalist groups
or movements at Wilhelmshaven? In Scotland, why were the Friends of
the Earth not there? Where was the Oxford Political Ecology Group?
These are not idle questions. The German Greens have been vigorously
active in the nuclear debate and at Frankfurt Airport; the British Friends
of the Earth and the Oxford Political Ecology Group were there in force
at the Windscale Inquiry (as were SCRAM and other anti-nuclear power
groups), and both (unlike SCRAM) had legitimate reasons for wanting to
be at the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay inquiry as well. The British FoE, it
turns out, would have liked to have been there but they had devoted all
their resources (a total of £40 000) to the Windscale Inquiry which,
fortunately for Shell/Esso, was taking place at virtually the same time. But
why did the FoE choose to allocate their resources so disproportionately
between these two technologies? If LEG is likely to kill as many people as
uranium oxide reprocessing (and, unlike reprocessing, it has already killed
a considerable number), why does it have such a low priority and why,
conversely, does nuclear power have such a high priority? What rationale
lies behind such seemingly irrational behavior?
Since it lacks the requisite variety, the post-industrial society theory is
powerless when faced with such marked variations in response as we go
from one technology to another. But cultural theory can advance the
following hypothesis in terms of the hidden agendas (the "risks-for") that
are built into each of the cultural biases. In each cultural bias the risks are
selected according to how effective a lever they provide for the advance-
ment of the hidden agenda - the desired pattern of social relations -
appropriate to the stabilization of that cultural bias. These "risks-for" are
to be understood in terms of the internally generated requirements for
stabilizing the various organizational types that underlie and, at the same
time, are sustained by the various cultural biases. 37 What, then are the
organizational requirements of the bounded egalitarian group - the sect -
and what kinds of risks are best suited, culturally, to its organizational
purposes?
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The sect member's overriding commitment to equality prevents the
development of any of those internal differentiations that characterize the
hierarchically nested group. The sect's structure, therefore, has to be con-
centrated at the edge of the group, at the point where it cuts itself off
from the nasty, inequitable outside world. To justify, and to keep on
justifying, the constant vigilance needed to maintain and defend this
crucial boundary you need a suitably powerful, greedy, and villainous
besieging force. By their risks ye shall know them: 38 massive concen-
trations of energy high-handedly set down on the doorsteps of those least
able to resist; the impoverishment (perhaps, even, the extinction) of
future generations for the short-term benefit of a power-crazed elite; and
the insidious destruction of those who dare to speak up against it all.
For a bounded egalitarian group, according to the cultural hypothesis,
an issue is likely to have a high priority:
(1) If it entails the physical concentration of energy and the social con-
centration of its control. Concentrated energy is the life-blood of the
corporate state, and the specialized institutions that channel it are the
elite and vital organs of its circulatory system. Energy, as Aaron
Wildavsky has remarked, is to sectarians as red meat is to vegetarians.
(2) If it involves risks that extend to the long term; better still, if some of
the risks are restricted to the long term; best of all if they are also
irreversible, involuntary, and catastrophic. The entrepreneur, notori-
ously, will sell his grandmother; the hierarchist will sacrifice the part
to the whole; both, in their different ways, discount the future. Only
the sectist cares ceaselessly about the meek, the helpless, and the
innocent. And what could be more perfectly inequitable than the
imposition, as a result of decisions taken today, of appalling and
incalculable risks on future generations? Identify and broadcast the
long-term, involuntary, irreversible, and potentially catastrophic
consequences of some new technology and you can make credible in
the here-and-now the most dreadful, the most despicable, and the
most indefensible of all the moral outrages that are perpetrated by
the positive diagonal: the massacre of the unborn innocents.
(3) If it brings with it risks that threaten the sinister and unseen pene-
tration of the body. One apparent paradox of the sect-like organiz-
ation is that its puritan bias tends to restrict the supply of media for
(among other things) the expression of the social concerns that will
sustain its existence; often the supply is restricted to just the physical
body as a metaphor for the social body.39 But, since the human body,
with its fragile skin and its tempting orifices, provides an apt and
powerful natural sym bol for the soft, vulnerable sect forever threatened
by a nasty, devious, and predatory "them", this is no great disadvan-
tage. The fear is not so much of straightforward rape as of the fatal
corruption produced by invisible penetration or by agents that, though
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visible, are not what they appear to be (witchcraft and conspiracy
fears). Concede the validity, the power, and the organizational good
sense of this natural symbol and many a seemingly emotional and
irrational sectarian response clicks into place: corporate capitalism
causes cancer. 40
Nuclear power scores very highly on all three of these counts. Indeed, if
you set out deliberately to design a technology that would provoke the
maximum sectist opposition you could scarcely do better. LEG, on the
other hand, scores badly. True, it involves a massive concentration of
energy, but it is a clean concentration. If it is going to kill you it will
freeze or fry you instantly, producing some water vapor and a little
carbon dioxide that soon disperse leaving no poisonous or persistent
residue. The risks in LEG (apart, perhaps, from those involving ignition
caused by radio waves) are honest, instantaneous, and visible, and they
do not get inside the body. By these cultural criteria, LEG provides
little by way of leverage for the advancement of the sectist's hidden
agenda. 41
Now, equipped with this cultural hypothesis, one can say that the
FoE's allocation of resources between nuclear power and LEG is perfectly
rational. And one can go on to say that the overspill from nuclear to other
issues (such as LEG), whilst possible, is not simply mechanical. It is not
that there is everywhere a growing disenchantment with technology, nor is
it that some "pathfinder" technology has cleared the way for other more
fortunate technologies to follow largely unopposed. 42 Rather, contain-
ment and overspill have to be socially achieved, and the "risks-for" criteria
will provide us with a useful basis for assessing which way any particular
technology is likely to go.
Of course, the fact that the different cultural biases are in contention
means that containment and overspill do not depend on just this sectarian
assessment. The technology has always to be assessed in relation to the
regime (the particular mix of biases) that is handling it. Although the
nuclear case is rather special, and (other things being equal) likely to be
contained, it may nevertheless spill over into other technologies because
of the strength of the negative diagonal's criticism. Mature and confident
establishments know how to bend so as to incorporate serious opposition
but the pro-nuclear establishment (in Britain and the FRG, at least) has
not bent and, losing its hierarchical confidence, has itself taken on some-
what sectarian characteristics - for instance, by emphasizing the general
apocalyptic consequences that will ensue if it does not get its way ("Stone
Age? No thanks" stickers in response to the anti's "Nuclear Power? No
thanks"). The result of this fluid contention between increasingly effec-
tive sects and badly rattled hierarchies has been a waning of compromise
and a broadening of what was initially a quite narrow issue, and this
generalization has led to the incorporation of other concrete issues
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(Frankfurt Airport, for instance) and to an erosion of the legitimacy of
many overcomplacent institutions. 43
CONCLUSION
One major source of this complacency has been technology assessment
and its offspring, risk assessment, which have fastened, with technocratic
tenacity, on just the technology itself and not on the relationship between
the technology and the temper of the people that the technology is
intended to serve. But man cannot live by multi-attribute utility functions
alone; and the narrow rationality that speaks of the prevalent mispercep-
tions of lay people, that insists on the explicit trade-off of risks and
benefits, and that pretends that the open-systems art of engineering is just
a low-status branch of bench science, has been knocked sideways by the
unwillingness of those misperceivers to realign their vision with that of the
experts, by the refusal of those who hold certain things sacrosanct to
exchange them for things they do not hold sacrosanct, and by the distrust
that has greeted those who claim to have anticipated and quantified
everything that can go wrong.
In this Postscript I have advanced cultural theory as a way of trans-
ferring the focus of attention away from the technology itself and onto
the relationship between the technology and the regime that is handling it.
Unlike the "single problem-single answer" approach that pervades both
technology assessment and its radical mate, post-industrial society theory,
cultural theory assumes a plurality of biases that are locked in continuous,
dynamic, and fluid contention. Material and spiritual values are always
with us; it is not their presence or absence that matter, but the manner,
the influence, and the stability of their mixes. At the same time, by
tracing these biases back to the stabilizing needs of different types of
social organization, cultural theory avoids that counterpart to the univer-
salist fallacy - the individualist fallacy - that insists that every individual
must be treated as a special case.
That said, I should stress that both the cultural theory and the interpre-
tations of the case studies that have been offered here are not intended to
be definitive and final. Rather, they should be seen as exploratory and
suggestive; as ways of opening up fresh prospects and of pointing towards
the sorts of directions in which it may be worth looking in the future. The
essential difference is that the "single problem-single answer" theories
assume generality and are then powerless to explain variation, whilst the
cultural hypothesis assumes that there will be variation and then looks to
particular historical, social, and symbolic conjunctions to explain particu-
lar instances of generality when they occur.
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NOTES
1. Subject to clearance on seismic risk - a Californian preoccupation
that did not enter into the British debate. (Clearance was finally
obtained in 1982).
2. Kenneth Boulding National Defense Through Stable Peace. Lectures
delivered at IIASA, June/July 1981
3. For an elaboration of this argument see my Rubbish Theory (Thomp-
son 1979).
4. See Douglas and Wildavsky (1982).
5. The universalistic position leads to the impossible claim of the
"cosmic exile"; the totally relativistic position leads to the serious
consideration of all "so-called possible entities". For a philosophical
approach, see Quine (1953).
6. Douglas (1978b).
7. Orr (1977).
8. These perspectives clearly have much in common with those dis-
cerned, independently, by Harold Linstone and others (Linstone et
al. 1981, see also Thompson 1982).
9. This normative/interpretive trap has long been a topic of concern in
anthropology and it has resulted in an important distinction between
two sorts of approaches - the etic approach, in which the analyst
defines the relevant categories and then fits his exotic society into
that framework in much the same way that poor Procrustes was
fitted to his couch; and the emic approach, in which the analyst tries
to discover the categories of the people he is studying and then inter-
prets that society in terms of those categories. The etic approach is
likely to be strongly normative and highly ethnocentric and it results
in what is called the anthropologist's model; the emic approach,
bending over backwards to avoid these twin evils, results in what is
called the home-made model. Of course, once a number of these
home-made models have been constructed, it is perfectly legitimate
(from the emic point of view) then to put them beside one another
and to try to construct a meta-model, as it were, to explain their
variance. From the emic point of view the anthropologist's model is
valid only at this meta-level (where, of course, it will have to com-
pete with the rival models of other anthropologists). That said, it
only remains for me to add that I am an anthropologist and that
nowadays no self-respecting anthropologist could possibly bring
himself to take an etic approach. (Leastways, not knowingly! Just
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because you are striving to compensate for bias it does not follow
that you are entirely free of it.) The problem for me, as a member of
an interdisciplinary team, is to find an emic way of handling these
case studies; the problem for the team, as a whole, is to find some
non-arbitrary basis on which to compare them. I will argue that the
solution to the first problem solves the second problem as well.
10. Often the decision is already taken for him by the unquestioned
assumptions that are built into the social context of the analysis.
Technical fixers, for instance, have an idea of nature as essentially
fixable and, for them, all risks lie within that nature.
11. Also, as Brian Wynne has pointed out to me, MAMP should be criti-
cized for lobotomizing the interest groups - for defining them
according to its framework, rather than getting a feel of their con-
cerns and interests "in the round" and then fitting the LEG siting
issue into that social and plural frame.
12. A parallel with organization theory may help to illuminate this
crucial distinction. A hierarchical organization will, by virtue of its
structure, define for itself a manifest goal, but only in the smallest
of such organizations will this be the only goal that is being pursued.
As different information cultures crystalize out in different sectors
and levels within the organization, so they create for themselves
latent goals that are likely to be in conflict both with one another
and with the manifest goal. This means that an analysis in terms of
just the manifest goal will be hopelessly inadequate since the behavior
of the organization will make sense only in terms of the complex
patterns of contentions - both those between the protagonists of the
manifest and latent goals and those between the protagonists of the
various latent goals.
13. Levi-Strauss (1966).
14. But the tactical uses of references to resources may differ from these
underlying strategic categories. Entrepreneurs for example, will say
there is resource depletion in one sector (hydrocarbons or, even,
uranium) to justify business-as-usual and resource abundance in
another (fast breeder reactors). For a discussion of the relationship
between strategic and tactical uses see my Among the Energy Tribes
(Thompson 1982).
15. I should stress that here I am following the definition of an organiz-
ation as a conceptual scheme. I do not wish to suggest that the
concrete reality -- the process of social life - crystalizes out so neatly.
In general, this process is sufficiently complex and messy for anyone
involved in it to be able to conceive it, and render a plausible account
of it, in one of these three ways. The patternings and transformations
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of this "concrete reality" are to be understood as the resultant of
these contradictory conceptual schemes as they are acted upon by
those who variously hold to them.
16. Ineffectuals form, as it were, a reservoir of social capital that each of
the other social contexts (except the hermit) tries to appropriate,
and then transmute, with the help of its cultural bias. Whilst the sec-
tarians need them for a moral bludgeon, the entrepreneurs need them
as both a pool of labor and a placid source of consumption, and the
hierarchists need them beneath them, as wayward children or as
cannon-fodder, according to circumstances.
17. Indeed, in the LEG case, need went on and on being debated even
after it was supposed to have been established that there was a need
for the terminal - a nice example of visible and hidden agendas in
contention.
18. Within a deferential populace sects can gain little standing, because
the hierarchies have managed to achieve and sustain an impressive
maturity. But, within a truculent populace, sects do have standing
and the result of their continual whistle-blowing is the imposition of
a permanent immaturity on such hierarchies (government bureaucra-
cies, for instance) as do form.
19. Indeed, two countries that are reputed to be the most hierarchical of
all '- France and Japan-- were actually dropped from our study in
its early stages because their "universes" were so light.
20. But this is not to say that they like all precedents. We will presently
look at the remarkable contortions that the Dutch cabinet had to
perform in order to avoid setting a precedent that would have re-
duced its manoeuver space.
21. And, probably, for some other reasons as well. These have to do with
the social achievement of overspill and containment and are dis-
cussed later.
22. The decision on LNG could have endangered the government by
precipitating a no-confidence vote in parliament. Parliamentary
sources, however, play down the likelihood of this possibility.
23. The exact wording is taken from the full IIASA case study (Schwarz
1982).
24. King and Nugent (1979).
25. Cowdenbeath is a depressed one-time mining community with a very
high level of unemployment. It is near to both Mossmorran and
Braefoot Bay and its inhabitants (when asked by television inter-
viewers) are almost unanimous in their support for the project which
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they believe (wrongly in the opinion of many experts) will bring them
the employment they crave. They are dismissive of the risks entailed
in LEG technology, not so much because they have clear perceptions
of these risks as being lower than their questioners suggest, but
because they need work and are prepared to accept a high level of
risk to obtain it. In the happy days when they had work it was in the
now defunct coal mines and they claim, with some pride, to be used
to living with a high level of risk. So their perceptions of risk are
consistent with the predictions for the ineffectuals' social context,
as is their evident lack of control over their destiny. They, clearly,
have every bit as much incentive to form themselves into a pro group
as the articulate professionals of Braefoot Bay have to form them-
selves into an anti group, yet the pro group does not form whilst the
anti group does. At the Edinburgh Airports Inquiry in the early
1970s, Newhouse - a socially similar community to Cowdenbeath -
displayed exactly the same lack of involvement.
26. Whilst the pursuit of efficiency leads to hierarchy-heightening, this
latter does not always lead to increased efficiency. The relationship is
curvilinear - hierarchy judiciously introduced in small doses often
does increase efficiency but, beyond a certain level, hierarchy-
heightening (empire-building) results in inefficiency. The same is
pro bably also true of the pursuit of equity.
27. What they actually do may not always accord with this moral justifi-
cation. They may be happy to have no competitors (monopoly) or
high entry barriers (oligopoly) so long as they are winning!
28. So called because it links the two power-wielding contexts.
29. So called because it is sustained by its opposition to the positive
diagonal.
30. This is not to say that those in other social contexts are not con-
cerned for the ineffectual; only that the sectarian strategy "singles
them out", whereas the others try to "fit them in" (the hierarchist
strategy), or "melt them down" (the entrepreneurial strategy -
"what's good for General Motors is good for the United States,
including the weakest, you understand!)
31. Indeed, it is the ignoring of sectist demands (other than in an in-
direct, arms-length, way) that stabilizes a deferential regime. I do
not wish to imply that regimes and patterns of bias are clearly
separable. Rather, both are to be seen as the mutually reinforcing
conditions for certain recurrent regularities to be possible within a
continuous flux.
32. Mr. Jamieson does not receive a mention in the British case study,
but, as well as being a member of the ADBJAG, he appeared at the
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public inquiry as an individual objector. He also figured prominently
in the two television documentaries.
33. There were some nimbies there but they reluctantly conceded that,
in a straight contest with Rotterdam, the Eemshaven site was con-
siderably safer (mainly because of its lower population density) so
they didn't really have to refer to TNO's risk analysis which also
confirmed this difference.
34. The exact wording is taken from the full lIAS A case study (Schwarz
1982).
35. See my "Fission and fusion in nuclear society" (Thompson 1980c).
36. Inglehart (1977); OECDjInterfutures (1979).
37. It should be stressed that neither the cultural bias nor organizational
type is to be seen as logically or causally prior to the other; rather,
their mutuality is the necessary condition for their continued exis-
tence.
38. With apologies to St Matthew VlI:20.
39. See Owen (1982)
40. Another Wildavsky aphorism.
41. The very title ofthe FoE book - Frozen Fire (Davis 1979) accurately
reflects the immediacy and cleanliness of the risks that accompany
this technology. The fact that both the energy spokesman of the
British FoE and the author herself declined invitations (rather luke-
warm, admittedly) to the IIASA LEG Task Force Meeting lends
support to the interpretation that they have tried to do their best
with this technology but have found it to be sadly lacking in delayed
and insidious effects.
42. See Hafele (1974).
43. Ronge (1982).
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